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European Union

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The status of the EU as a civilian power, a club of rich liberal states seemed to be well suited to take up the role of the leader in the emerging “new world order” where the role of military might seemed to be diminishing and NATO seemed to be a relic of the past. Even the US supported a stronger EU role in its own security affairs.

However this euphoria soon melted away – the gap between EU ambitions to become an important actor of the international security system and its capabilities became appearent right after the Maastricht Treaty. Europe was not prepared to deal with crises in its own backyard – the Balkans. Only NATO managed to stop the bloodshed and achieve the Dayton peace treaty of 1995. The EU efforts to handle the Middle East peace process were a continuous failure. Even the process of EU enlargement seemed to be the result of rapid NATO enlargement.

The Schengen passport-free zone was originally created by France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg in 1985 near the Luxembourg town of Schengen. It was put into practice in 1990 and expanded to cover the larger EU in 1995, except for the islands of Britain and Ireland, which remained outside the pact. Non-EU members Norway and Iceland also joined the zone in 2001, and in 2007, nine new EU member states, mostly in Central and Eastern Europe, joined.

By the end of 2016 a growing number of European countries were opposed to confrontion with Russia and were eager to end the economic sanctions imposed by the West. Ppro-Russian governents had come to power in Moldova, Bulgaria, and Estonia, and more were possible in 2017 in Austria, France, Italy, and even in Germany. The Netherlands, Greece, Cyprus, and Spain had already expressed discontent with the sanctions and the stalemated proxy war in Ukraine. And one anti-Russian government, the United Kingdom, had left Europe via Brexit.

Post-Brexit, EU enlargements were no longer conceivable. The news for all Ukrainians, Moldovans and Georgians was that EU enlargement embracing post-Soviet states or Balkan States had been delayed to a faraway future. The prospect of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia joining the EU had been destroyed until further notice. Indirectly, it meant that these countries would be pushed back into Russia's historic sphere of influence, even though no one in the European Union would openly admit it.

On 11 March 2014 the European Commission adopted a new framework for addressing systemic threats to the rule of law in any of the EU's 28 Member States. The initiative comes after the College of Commissioners held two orientation debates on the rule of law on 28 August 2013 and on 25 February 2014, which concluded that there is a need to develop a tool to deal, at EU level, with systemic threats to the rule of law. The new rule of law framework will be complementary to infringement procedures - when EU law has been breached – and to the so-called 'Article 7 procedure' of the Lisbon Treaty which, at its most severe, allows for the suspension of voting rights in case of a "serious and persistent breach" of EU values by a Member State.

The new framework established an early warning tool allowing the Commission to enter into a dialogue with the Member State concerned to prevent the escalation of systemic threats to the rule of law. If no solution is found within the new EU rule of law framework, Article 7 would always remain the last resort to resolve a crisis and ensure compliance with European Union values. The new framework does not constitute or claim new competencies for the Commission but makes transparent how the Commission exercises its role under the Treaties.

By 2018 the split between east and west within the EU was getting much wider. The rift was evidenced by the fact that the so-called "New East Bloc" of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia had remained steadfast in their refusal to implement majority measures regarding the redistribution of refugees. That was clearly a breach of contract, as the European Court of Justice had found. With their persistent intransigence, these countries were attacking the very foundation of the EU, which is based on legal compliance. Poland, for its part, had decided to crown this sad state of affairs by insisting upon completely dismantling the rule of law at home.

A 60-page report, Sailing On High Seas: Reforming And Enlarging The EU For The 21st Century, released on 19 September 2024 is significant. That's primarily because the report was initiated by France and Germany, the two largest member states in the bloc without whom nothing in the EU really works. While this might be an exercise largely for policy wonks in member states, the six EU hopefuls in the Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia), as well as Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, will be watching closely.

In places, the report is uncompromising: "the EU is not ready yet to welcome new members, neither institutionally nor policy-wise." That point is hammered home: "Not all governments agree that expanding the EU to the Western Balkans, Ukraine, and Moldova is really a geopolitical necessity. Likewise, improving the EU's capacity to act or to protect the EUs fundamental principles do not necessarily garner support across the EU."

The report puts a heavy emphasis on the need to strengthen the rule of law inside the existing bloc first. It may not be talked about openly inside the EU, but one of the main gripes in many Western EU states about the previous enlargements of 2004 and 2007 is the democratic backsliding among some of those new eastern members since then. The EU is already trying to get its own house in order, with ongoing rule-of-law procedures against Hungary and Poland, an investigation into the alleged misuse of EU funds by the previous Czech government, and the continued refusal to let Bulgaria and Romania into the visa-free Schengen zone over corruption fears.

"Before the next enlargement, all remaining policy decisions should be transferred from unanimity to qualified-majority voting." Known as QMV, the voting procedure in the Council of the European Union means that a decision is passed if 55 percent of EU member states vote in favor, representing at least 65 percent of the EU population. This could essentially mean an end to veto rights in sensitive areas such as enlargement, foreign policy, and the economy.

The report states that "for security and stability reasons, countries with lasting military conflicts cannot join the EU. The same applies to countries with a territorial conflict with another candidate country or an EU member state." According to a further clause, the accession of countries with disputed territories with a country outside the EU will have to include a clause that those territories will only be able to join the EU if their inhabitants are willing to do so. For Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, this could be a problem. The phrasing appears to give a "Russian veto," or at least gives Moscow the chance to meddle in a future settlement.

https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/document/download/9db42c04-15c2-42e1-8364-60afb0073e68_en?filename=Joint-Communication%20_Defence-Readiness-Roadmap-2030.pdf Eastern Flank Watch European Drone Defence European Air Shield European Space Shield European Defence Agency (EDA) https://www.euractiv.com/sections/defence/ The European Commission is pitching four major defence projects for urgent development: an Eastern Flank Watch, a Drone Wall, an Air Defence Shield, and a Space Defence Shield, according to a draft of the Readiness Roadmap for 2030. The European Defence Agency (EDA) Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), which suggests options for collaboration on defence projects to EU countries, will be the basis for measuring progress in rearmament, The need to speed up and ramp up efforts reflects the increasing dangers of today, as well as the evolving threat landscape which Europe and its Member States must contend with, adapt to, and prepare for. This starts with Russia’s unprovoked, full-scale military aggression against Ukraine, which is reaching new heights of brutality and violence. Reckless provocations and acts of hybrid warfare against Member States, from cyberattacks to violation of air space are increasing. Russia has militarised its economy and society. In 2025, its declared defence budget will surpass 7% of GDP. Around 40% of its budget in 2025 is for security and defence. This militarised Russia poses a persistent threat to European security for the foreseeable future. The European Commission on 16 October 2025 unveiled a roadmap proposing four major defence projects, including a counter-drone system and measures to strengthen the EU’s eastern border, as part of plans to boost Europe’s military readiness by 2030 amid growing fears of Russian aggression. EU High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy / Vice-President of the European Commission (EU HRVP) Kaja Kallas unveiled the defence roadmap at a press conference in Brussels. The proposals, in a defence policy "roadmap", reflect fears fuelled by the war in Ukraine that Russia may attack an EU member in the coming years, and calls by US President Donald Trump for Europe to do more for its own security. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said: “The recent threats have shown that Europe is at risk. We have to protect every citizen and square centimetre of our territory. And Europe must respond with unity, solidarity and determination. Today's Defence Roadmap presents a clear plan with shared goals and concrete milestones on our path to 2030. Because only what gets measured gets done. Moving from plans to action, the Roadmap proposes four European Flagships: the European Drone Defence Initiative, the Eastern Flank Watch, the European Air Shield, and the European Space Shield. This will strengthen our defence industries, accelerate production and maintain our long-standing support to Ukraine.” "Danger will not disappear even when the war in Ukraine ends. It is clear we need to toughen our defences against Russia," European Union foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas told a news conference. The Commission said two "flagships" were particularly urgent – the European Drone Defence Initiative, previously known as a "drone wall", and Eastern Flank Watch, which aims to "fortify the EU’s Eastern borders "across land, air and sea". "Drones are already redefining warfare. Having drone defences is no longer optional for anyone," Kallas told journalists, adding that the bloc had no choice but to build up its anti-drone defences against Russia. "Today we propose a new anti-drone system to be fully operational by the end of 2027." "Today is delivery day. Our Roadmap will guide Europe to deliver on defence readiness by 2030. We are building on the unprecedented decisions we took during this year, which created a ‘big bang’ in defence spending and legal, industrial and political opportunities to boost defence production. Our roadmap today creates conditions for clear plans, timetables, deliverables and indicators and a clear reporting and monitoring system, to ramp up procurement and production, bring permanent defence innovation, build European defence flagship projects and produce with, in and for Ukraine. Our roadmap shows all the major milestones to achieve Defence Readiness by 2030, so we can deter Russian aggression, prevent war and preserve peace. Our policy is production, our purpose is peace." Andrius Kubilius, Commissioner for Defence and Space. The EU Commission and HRVP Kallaas propose a set of initial European Readiness Flagships that are pan-European by nature. They will benefit the security of Europe as a whole and will be mutually reinforcing: the European Drone Defence Initiative, the Eastern Flank Watch, the European Air Shield and the European Space Shield. The Commission, the European Union's executive body, said both projects should have initial capacity by the end of next year. The drone project should be fully functional a year later and "flank watch" should reach that status at the end of 2028. It also proposed a European Air Shield, to defend against missiles and other airborne threats, and a European Space Shield, to protect European space assets and services. Leaders of the EU's 27 member governments will decide whether to endorse the flagship proposals and to agree on who runs projects that get the green light. The roadmap follows the ReArm Europe Plan/Readiness 2030, a major boost in public and private investment, which gives Member States greater financial flexibility to strengthen production and readiness. The European Commission and the High Representative will present this roadmap to the European Council, including the proposals for pan-European flagship projects that will guide Europe to full defence readiness by 2030. The roadmap also sets out plans to establish an EU-wide military mobility area by 2027, with harmonised rules and a network of land, air, and sea routes to move troops and equipment swiftly across Europe. Developed in close coordination with NATO, this will strengthen Europe's ability to respond rapidly to crises.