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Ernst Kaltenbrunner

The International Military Tribunal trials at Nuremberg [Nuernberg] in 1946 charged the defendants with four crimes. Count One charged all of the defendants with being "leaders, organizers, instigators, or accomplices in the formation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit, or which involved the commission of, Crimes against Peace, War Crimes, and Crimes against Humanity." Count Two charged the defendants with crimes against peace by their participation "in the planning, preparation, initiation, and waging of wars of aggression." Count Three charged the defendants with war crimes. Count Four charged the defendants with crimes against humanity. Kaltenbrunner was indicted under counts one, three, and four.

Ernst Kaltenbrunner joined the Austrian Nazi Party and the SS in 1932. In 1935 he became leader of the SS in Austria. After the Anschluss he was appointed Austrian State Secretary for Security and when this position was abolished in 1941 he was made higher SS and police leader. On 30 January 1943, he was appointed chief of the security police and SD and head of the Reich security head office (RSHA), a position which had been held by Heydrich until his assassination in June 1942. He held the rank of Oberguppenfuehrer in the SS. As leadsr of the SS in Austria, Kaltenbrunner mas active in the Nazi intrigue against the Schuschnigg Government. On the night of March 11, 1938, after Goering had ordered Austrian National Socialists to seize control of the Austrian Government, 500 Austrian SS men under Kalteilbrunner's command surrounded the Federal Chancellery and a special detachment under the command of his adjutant entered the Federal Chancellery while Seyss-Inquart was negotiating with President Miklas.

When he became chief of the security police and SD and head of the RSHA on January 30, 1913, Kaltenbrunner took charge of an organization which included the main offices of the Gestapo, the SD and the criminal police. As chief of the RSHA, Kaltenbrunner had authority to order protective custody to and release from concentration camps. Orders to this effect were normally sent over his signature. Kaltenbrunner was aware of conditions in concentration camps. He had undoubtedly visited Mauthausen and witnesses testified that he had seen prisoners killed by the various methods of execution, hanging, shooting in the back of the neck, and gassing, as part of a demonstration. Kaltenbrunner himself ordered the execution of prisoners in those camps and his office was used to transmit to the camps execution orders which originated in Himmler's office. At the end of the war Kaltenbrunner participated in the arrangements for the evacuation of inmates of concentration camps, and the liquidation of many of them, to prevent them from being liberated by the Allied armies.

During the period in which Kaltenbrunner was head of the RSHA, it was engaged in a widespread program of war crimes and crimes against humanity. These crimes included the mistreatment and murder of prisoners of war. Einsatzcommandos operating under the control of the Gestapo were engaged in the screening of Soviet prisoners of war. Jews, commissars, and others who were thought to be ideologically hostile to the Nazi system were reported to the RSHA, which had them transferred to a concentration camp and murdered. An RSHA order issued during Kaltenbrunner's regime established the "bullet decree," under which certain escaped prisoners of war who were recaptured were taken to Mauthausen and shot. The order for the execution of commando troops was extended by the Gestapo to include parachutists while Kaltenbrunner was chief of the RSHA. An order signed by Kaltenbrunner instructed the police not to interfere with attacks on bailed out Allied fliers. In December 1944, Kaltenbrunner participated in the murder of one of the French generals held as a prisoner of war.

During the period in which Kaltenbrunner was head of the RSHA, the Gestapo and SD in occupied territories continued the murder and ill-treatment of the population, using methods which included torture and confinement in concentration camps, usually under orders to which Kaltenbrunner's name was signed. The Gestapo was responsible for enforcing a rigid labor discipline on the slave laborers and Kaltenbrunner established a series of labor reformatory camps for this purpose. When the SS embarked on a slave labor program of its own, the Gestapo was used to obtain the needed workers by sending laborers to concentration camps.

The RSHA played a leading part in the "final solution" of the Jewish question by the extermination of the Jews. A special section under the AMT IV of the RSHA was established to supervise this program. Under its direction approximately 6 million Jews were murdered, of which 2 million were killed by Einsatzgruppen and other units of the security police. Kaltenbrunner had been informed of the activities of these Einsatzgruppen when he mas a higher SS and police leader, and they continued to function after he had become chief of the RSHA. The inurder of approximately 4 million Jews in concentration camps was also under the supervision of the RSHA when Kaltenbrunner was head of that organization, and special missions of the RSHA scoured the occupied territories and the various Axis satellities arranging for the deportation of Jews to these extermination institutions. Kaltenbrunner was informed of these activities.

Kaltenbrunner's main interest lay in foreign affairs: he aspired to get hold of the foreign ministry in place of Ribbentrop, whom he hated. Kaltenbrunner, not Himmler, was entrusted with the investigation of the July 1944 attempt on Hitler. He often by-passed Himmler to report directly to Hitler, with whom he had had personal ties since childhood, and toward the end spent several hours with him daily. On 18 April 1945 Himmler named Kaltenbrunner Commander in Chief of all forces in southern Europe. He had reorganized his intelligence services as a stay-behind underground net, dividing the command up between Otto Skorzeny, head of the sabotage units, and Wilhelm Waneck, whose radio station in the Kerry Villa, kept in contact not only with Kaltenbrunner and other centers in the Redoubt and in Germany, but also with stay-behind agents in the southern European capitals.

Kaltenbrunner had false papers, those of a doctor discharged from the Wehrmacht, and he carried a medical kit and all the usual accessories, but upon being detained he was quickly identified. Kaltenbrunner's name had rarely appeared in public print. The official Reich photographer, Heinrich Hoffman, had been unable to find in his extensive collection a likeness of the man. He was described as 43 years old, six feet four inches tall, weighing 220 pounds, having a powerful build and dark features, with deep scars on both sides of his face. The press kept running some other Nazi official's photo to represent him and getting mixed up about what his position and duties had been.

His subordinate Wilhelm Hoettl said of Kaltenbrunner that he "was fascinated by Hitler, believed in him without reservation . . . . He believed he had a mission to serve Hitler with his entire RSHA . . . . He came to believe that Hitler was the man sent by God. This developed into a mania."

In July 1945 Kaltenbrunner was sent to British Interrogation Center 020 outside of London. Here, at a time when the horrors of the concentration camps were being brought to light, he was seized on as the first prisoner that had played a significant and responsible part in the extermination program. He was given third-degree treatment. The result was that henceforth he not only did not cooperate but refused even to admit he had any responsibility at all in the Nazi system. He was flown to Nuremberg for the trial in handcuffs--the only one of the 21 major defendants treated in this manner.

A letter which he wrote on 30 June 1944, described the shipment to Vienna of 12,000 Jews for that purpose, and directed that all who could not work would have to be kept in readiness for "special action," which meant murder. At Nuremberg Kaltenbrunner denied his signature to this letter, as he did on a very large number of orders on which his name was stamped or typed, and, in a few instances, written. The International Military Tribunal concluded that it was "inconceivable that in matters of such importance his signature could have appeared so many times" without his authority.

There was no evidence connecting Kaltenbrunner with plans to wage aggressive war on any front other than Austria. The Anschluss, although it was an aggressive act, is not charged as an aggressive war, and the evidence against Kaltenbrunner under count one did not, in the opinion of the Tribunal, show his direct participation in any plan to wage such a war.

Kaltenbrunner claimed at Nuremberg that, when he took office as chief of the security police and SD and as head of the RSHA, he did so pursuant to an understanding with Himmler under which he mas to confine his activities to matters involving foreign intelligence, and not to assume over-all control over the activities of the RSHA. It is true that he showed a special interest in matters involving foreign intelligence. The secret intelligence requirements of the German [Armed Forces] High Command [O.K.W.] under the Third Reich were served by a separate branch of the OKW called the Amt Auslands und Abwehr (commonly referred to as the Abwehr) independent of the three service commands. As one phase of the rivalry between the Wehrmacht and the S.S., and also because of increasing annoyance with the failure of the Abwehr, there was a long campaign by the R.S.H.A., and particularly [Heinrich] Himmler and [Ernst] Kaltenbrunner, to gain control of the Abwehr. This was successful in the spring of 1944 when the Abwehr was finally taken over by the R.S.H.A.

One may speculate as to the reasons why the German intelligence services failed to produce results more in keeping with the effort expended. The first reason seems to be over-organization, with conflicts and duplication between the Abwehr and R.S.H.A. and within the two organizations themselves. The Abwehr was further handicapped by bureaucracy, lack of initiative, and corruption on the part of many of its officers, who were lukewarm Nazis at best and regarded a berth in the Abwehr as an opportunity to avoid service on the Russian front. By contrast the R. S. H. A. tended to be aggressive and imaginative, but it suffered from lack of experience and inability to evaluate information objectively. The personnel of both services was poorly chosen. The comment has often been made by Allied counterintelligence agencies that most German agents were of low grade and quality.

Kaltenbrunner claimed at Nuremberg claimed that the criminal program had been started before his assumption of office; that he seldom knew what was going on; and that when he was informed he did what he could to stop them. But he exercised control over the activities of the RSHA, was aware of the crimes it was committing, and was an active participant in many of them.

Kaltenbrunner was stricken with a cerebral hemorrhage, and could not return to the dock until January 1946. The Tribunal found that Kaltenbrunner was not guilty on count one. He was found guilty under counts three and four. He survived through the entire trial, to be hanged on October 15, 1946, with eleven of his co-defendants.