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Weser Ship-building Company
Deutsche Schiff- und Maschinenbau-Aktiengesellschaft [DeSchiMAG]

The Weser Limited Liability Company was founded in 1872, having been originally C. Waltjen and Co., established in 1843. The business was, from the beginning, remunerative, and the firm got many orders for mercantile ships, and also ships of war, though these were of comparatively small size. The iron foundry and machine shop Waltjen & Leonhardt was renamed AG Weser in 1872. As ships grew larger with time the yards proved too small, and an extension on its original situation was impossible. In consequence, the whole establishment was transferred to Gropelingen, a suburb of Bremen, and the new works were gradually completed between 1901 and 1905.

Through the intervention of the Imperial Ministry of Marine the Weser yard was kept on its feet. This concern had, on the whole, paid very well up to the inauguration of the new naval policy of the German Empire. But in 1904 it undertook a considerable extension of its premises and plant, to enable it to take full advantage of the increased construction for the German Fleet, and from that date up to 1912 its shareholders have received nothing. Miscalculations and strikes caused delays in the carrying out of the new works and consequent losses, and by 1907 the company was shaken to its foundations. Its snares fell from 130 to 45, and its position was all the more critical because its buildings and other structures were erected on rented land. At this juncture the Ministry of Marine took over the half-finished ships which the yard was building to its order, and in the following year the shareholders were persuaded to contribute an additional three and three-quarter million marks to save their investments from annihilation.

The shipyard as it was in 1911 was entirely new and entirely up-to-date, having no old equipments. This was, naturally, a very favorable position to be in, but to accomplish this entailed a very heavy outlay. On the completion of these works tne company became one of the important shipbuilding companies of Germany. They employed about 5,000 officials and workmen. There were five slipways, one over 200 meters long, another over 150 meters, one over 100 meters, and another less than 100 meters long. There was a floating dock of 100 to 150 meters long. The construction of two further slips had been begun in 1911. The dockyard harbor was 1,200 meters long, and the largest ships can easily be launched. The works covered an area of 600,000 square meters, and there was a waterfront of 1,200 meters long.

Mercantile ships were chiefly built for the North German Lloyd. The latest were the Giivcn and the Liitzow, and the transatlantic steamer Berlin, of 28,000 tons, the largest vessel built, up to that time, on the banks of the Weser. The company also built the first longitudinal-ribbed vessel in Germany. It will also be of particular interest to learn that the Hamburg- America Line ordered in 1911 r a 6,500-ton cargo steamer, to be driven by oil-motors. The vessel was to be 350 feet long, 50 feet beam, with a depth of 22 feet 6 inches. There were two motors on the " Junkers " system, each capable of developing 800 effective horse-power. The speed is 10 knots. The auxiliary engines were driven at sea by compressed air and electricity, and in harbor by steam.

The yard supplied the Navy with a considerable number of vessels, such as gunboats and small cruisers ; but when the new yards were established at Gropelingen it was possible to take orders for battleships and armoured cruisers. In 1907 the order for the battleship Westphalen, of the Nassau class, of about 18,000 tons, was placed here, although no battleships had previously been built, but only cruisers and gunboats. The vessel was delivered in prompt time, and successfully underwent all the trials. This yard had, in a very short time, showed itself capable and efficient for building the largest class of vessel. They introduced also a turbine on a system of their own, and known as the "Weser-Bergmann."

From 1926 the yard was part of Deutsche Schiff- und Maschinenbau-Aktiengesellschaft [DeSchiMAG], and from 1941 part of Fried. Krupp AG following the acquisition of a majority shareholding.

Resources

• A.G-"Weser" in Bremen

Deutsche Schiff- und Maschinenbau-Aktiengesellschaft [DeSchiMAG]

The Deutsche Schiff- und Maschinenbau-Aktiengesellschaft [DeSchiMAG] [German shipbuilding and mechanical engineering company] (Deschimag = keel), was formed on 28. December 1926, by the addition of the Vulcan works in Hamburg, the shipyard Joh. C. Tecklenborg A.G. in Wesermünde, and the A.G. "Weser", with the administrative headquarters in Bremen. Masterminding this whole merger and Konzentrationsbestrebungen was the Bremen banker J. F. Schroeder. He had gained a considerable fortune and great influence in Bremen merchants in the 1920s. He had influence in shipping companies such as the DDG "Hansa", DDG "Neptune" and the NDL. In 1925 his majority shareholding bank had purchased A.G. Weser. On 24. May 1927 the first annual general meeting of the leading conglomerate of the German industry was held in Bremen in the building of J.F. Schroeder Bank K.a.A. . The report of the DeSchiMAG Board was given in the first financial year graduated with a profit of 412.722,74 RM. At that time the Chairman of the Supervisory Board was F. Stapelfeldt, and CEO F. Schröder. Locomotive Dr. WACH as more members of the Board, Dr. Bauer, H. Wallwitz and H. Claussen. Finally eight yards from the North Sea and Baltic Sea coasts were united by more affiliations between 1927-1928:

1. Actien-Gesellschaft "Weser", Bremen
2. Vulcan plants Hamburg, A.G.
3. Joh. C. Tecklenborg A.G., Wesermünde
4. Vulcan plants Szczecin s.a.
5. G. Seebeck A.G., Wesermünde
6. Actien-Gesellschaft "Neptune", Rostock
7. Nüschke & co. A.G., Szczecin
8. Frerichswerft A.G. Einswarden

The incorporation of the Hamburg Vulcans and the Tecklenborgwerft occurred late in 1926 or early in 1927 Prof. Dr. G. Farmer and F. Wallwitz (Vulcan), Dr.-ing. H. Awake and Georg Claussen (Tecklenborg) to the DeSchiMAG Board, also shipbuilding Director Dr.-ing. Hermann Hein factory of A.G. "Weser". The size, scope and especially due to the keel Konzentrationsbestrebungen on a national scale, encountered on the one hand resistance from hamburg shipbuilding circles as well as protests in public and labor. The company had simply closed "Tradionswerften" like Tecklenborgwerft with a great name and latest technology. First the DeSchiMAG spread the impression that it was important to be the Tecklenborgwerft because the NDL needed this shipyard for repairs. Soon became apparent, however, that the A.G. "Weser" Bremen and the Tecklenborgwerft interbank had conflicting interests, so was that both comparable ship sizes built and had a similar production program. businessmen, including Hermann Goring's brother, to purchase DESCHIMAG in 1936. Krupp obtained the majority shares in DESCHIMAG in 1941, at the high point in Germany's wartime fortunes. The Seydlitz was laid down at the Deschimag Yard in Bremen on 29 December 1936, five months after the contract for her manufacture was placed. Construction of the basic hull and superstructure took just over two years. Deschimag-Bremen was one of the German U-boat construction yards. The assembly of electro-submarines was carried out in the open at three yards: Blohm und Voss in Hamburg, Deschimag AG Weser in Bremen and Schichau in Danzig. It was known that very little shop work was done at the Deschimag final assembly yard, so the Deschimag yard was attacked nightly at relatively low altitudes in good visibility. The targets were the town center, the docks, the Focke-Wulf aircraft factory, and the Deschimag submarine building yards. The bomb loads were adjusted to the various targets, but again mainly incendiaries were used. They bombed Hamburg's Blohm & Voss works, the Krupp Germania Yards and the Deutsche Werke at Kiel, the Deschimag submarine yards at Bremen, many others. But they have generally bombed them at night. On 6-7 October 1944 Nos 1 and 5 Groups attack Bremen with 253 aircraft, causing damage to the Deschimag yard. The biggest German construction yard, Deschimag AG Weser, from Deutsche Schiff und Maschinenbau ... at the height of production in 1942, the Deschimag yard employed 17,000 people. By 1943 new Type XXI U-boats would be built inland in eight prefabricated sections near the steel foundries and then shipped to the Blohm and Voss shipyard at Hamburg, the Deschimag yard at Bremen, or the Schichau yard at Danzig, for the final assembly. In spite of all the difficulties, however, the first Type XXI was launched in April 1944 at the Deschimag yard. Over 700 were planned, but only 121 were actually commissioned. Many more were bombed on the slip prior to launching and a substantial number remained incomplete at the end of the war. At war's end, sixteen Type XXI U-boats and two destroyers under construction in the Deschimag shipyard. The Deschimag in 1946 became the AG Weser and since then has been under a new management. Refounded in Bremen in 1949, to include ownership of Seebeckwerft in Bremerhaven. Company declared bankrupcy in 1984 -- Seebeckwerft was spun off and AG-Weser operations were shut down. The stunning demise of Bremer Vulkan Verbund AG, the largest shipyard employer in Germany with over 22,000 workers on the rolls at the time of its collapse in 1996, was a traumatic event. The refusal of creditors and the government to bail out the firm caused mass demonstrations and violent protests. Die Geschichte der Actien-Gesellschaft "Weser" 1843-1983

Today on the location of AG Weser is Space Park Bremen located and the Veranstaltungshalle Pier 2. http://http//werften.fischtown.de/archiv/agweser1.html the iron foundry and machine shop Waltjen & Leonhardt, founded in 1843 and renamed AG Weser in 1872, from 1926 part of Deutsche Schiff- und Maschinenbau-Aktiengesellschaft, and from 1941 part of Fried. Krupp AG following the acquisition of a majority shareholdin At the national level, key European governments remain relatively hostile to acquisitions by U.S. firms. For example, the German government opposes takeovers of German military vehicles' producers by U.S. companies. The experience of the war testified to the considerable effectiveness of strikes against the system of construction and basing of submarines. Thus, for example, despite several measures carried out by the German command to defend the points of construction and basing of submarines (construction at the shipyards of special concrete-covered shelters, in which were carried out the construction andassembly of submarines, construction of shelters for the basing and repair of operating submarines, strengthening of the antiaircraft defense of the points of construction and basing, etc.), submarine losses sustained by the German fleet at bases were very substantial. Directly at bases, from the strikes of aviation, 63 submarines were lost, 150 submarines were lost in thc process of construction -- at assembly yards, at outfitting yards, and in transport -- and 22 submarines were lost during trials and combat training. A total of 235 submarines were destroyed at bases, and in the process of construction and trials; this amounts to 25.2 percent of the total German submarine losses. In addition, as a result of bomber strikes against German shipbuilding centers and other industrial enterprises cooperating with them, German submarine shipbuilding systematically failed to fulfil submarine construction plans. During the years of the war, this nonfulfilment reached 29.5 percent of the plan and amounted to 462 submarines. Thus, although the main German submarine losses were sustained during their conduct of combat operations at sea, the tendency of a relative decrease of submarine losses at sea and a relative increase ofsubmarine losses at construction bases became evident. http://www.allworldwars.com/The%20Defeat%20of%20the%20German%20Air%20Force.html">The Defeat of the German Air Force http://www.allworldwars.com/USSR-Navy-1943-Part-I.html https://panel.dreamhost.com/index.cgi?tree=files.files French Shipbuilding

State-supported military and commercial shipbuilding is and has been French national policy and practice. Direction des Constructions Navales (DCN) reported directly to the Ministere de la Defense (MoD) under a January 2001 reorganization. Delegation Generale pour l'Armement (DGA) the French defense procurement agency is responsible for military acquisition. The DCN d'Indret is the state owned naval shipyard. The Pays de la Loire region is the center of naval engineering andFrances' Silicon Valley equivalent. The Institute for Shipbuilding Research (ISR), Ecole Centrale de Nantes, shipyards, trades, electronics/computer companies, andtelecommunication manufacturers come together in Loire to create this strategiccenter of excellence. The long history and continuing state support for shipbuildingonly strengths the relative priority within the French national security strategy.

European commercial shipbuilders have received direct construction subsidies for years. European governments have also supported domestic industries through numerous indirect subsidies, such as by providing equity capital to shipbuilding firms. For example, the French government owns 21 percent of Alstom, the parent company of France's premier shipbuilder, Chantiers de l'Atlantique. The trend in Europe is now to divest government ownership of shipbuilding.

French commercial shipbuilding is erratic and small in scale compared with that of Germany but is far more substantial than the remaining UK commercial production. A dip in the late 1980s coincided with the worldwide decline at that time, but the industry did not recover fully until the past few years. French commercial production is concentrated in a single shipyard, Chantiers de l'Atlantique, and almost entirely on cruise ships.

The greatest strength of French shipbuilding, as measured by dollar value, is found in the military sector and a substantial percentage of that is for export. In fact, France is among the largest of the European military shipbuilders, ranking second only to Germany in export production and far exceeding it in domestic military production.

The dollar equivalence of tonnage can be illustrated easily for the French industry. Typical cruise ships cost about $4,000 per GRT, and in 2003, a good year, the French output of such ships amounted to about 350,000 GRT. Thus, the French commercial market represents a potential of about $1.4 billion per year of business. France's military production, however, is forecast to average about $2 billion per year over the next decade.

The extensive shipbuilding capability frommilitary nuclear propulsion to bulk carriers to fast ferries and pleasure boats supportsa depth of marine support companies. Marine electronics, marine construction, marine equipment, marine repair and a host of other marine services benefit frominformation processing, modeling and simulation, data retrieval and automatedprocesses. Overhead attributable to manual labor and man-hours, schedule delays andultimately unit costs are decreasing in part due to use of IT. Decreasing costs can directly affect retaining market share of targeted shipbuilding sectors in the ever-increasing competition for new builds. French shipbuilding maintains their competitive edge in cruise liners, due to excellence, design and manufacturing modernization, IT and in part due to government subsidies.

Germany's MEKO modular frigates have also done well in the market. These ships are easy and inexpensive to build and adaptable to the customer's system requirements. France is also cultivating the La Fayette frigate for export in competition with the German MEKO vessels and may be considering export of the Mistral LHD (helicopter/dock landing ship) as well. In fact, the export market is largely an SSK/frigate market. SSKs make up about half the market and frigates another third.

The French have used a more commercial approach to meet some of their needs. The French Navy, in developing the Floreal class of six ocean-capable patrol frigates for routine patrol missions, decided against sophisticated and expensive warships to perform these missions. The commercial shipyard, Chantiers de l'Atlantique (owned by the Alcatel-Alsthom GEC Group), that specializes in the design and construction of passenger liners, received the contract. In lieu of military specifications, the French Navy permitted Chantiers de l'Atlantique to use somewhat less rigorous "safety of life at sea" norms conceived for merchant-marine and passenger ships. The patrol frigates are equipped with the same weapons systems as are standard frigates, but lack a computerized battle-management system capable of integrating them into a naval task force. Because of these economies, the patrol frigates were developed and built at one-third the cost of frigates built to military specifications. The limited defensive capabilities of the patrol frigates could, however, prove problematic if they confront comprehensive threats.

In the United States, two naval shipbuilders operate six yards, while Europe has 21 firms with 23 yards. With the notable exception of shipbuilders, land vehicles producers, and aircraft engine makers, there is little left to consolidate within Europe. Directions des Constructions Navales (DCN), the French shipmaker, is likely to be controlled by the state for some time. However, Noelle Lenoir, France's European minister, suggests that the project of creating a pan-European shipbuilder along the lines of EADS is important to the French and German governments. Whereas US defense firms have made a fair number of acquisitions in Europe in these particular sectors, European governments likely have reached the limits in their willingness to allow this trend to continue. In October 2004, two of Germany's biggest shipbuilders, Howaldtswerke Deutsche Werft (HDW) and ThyssenKrupp, merged their assets.

The next logical step would be a merger with France's DCN, although some in the French government would like to include Thales in the mix ? an addition that the Germans feel would give the resultant company too much of a French orientation. Given the strong hand that the French government has to influence this sector, it would be virtually impossible for shipbuilders to consolidate on their own accord. The British Ministry of Defence in 2003 selected Thales, instead of BAE Systems, to design a new aircraft carrier. Perhaps as a consequence, France and Britain agreed in June 2004 to cooperate in building their next generation aircraft carriers.

BAE Systems, which may at first glance look like a "national champion," instead may be a test case of a new breed of firm: a genuine transatlantic defense company. One reason British Aerospace opted to merge with GEC rather than Dasa was to own Tracor, GEC's largest subsidiary in the United States. General Dynamics boldly tried to acquire the UK's armored-vehicle maker, Alvis PLC, in early 2004. The U.S. firm had received regulatory approval from the EU and Britain's Department of Trade and Industry. But in June, BAE Systems offered to pay almost $100 million more than General Dynamics's $556 million bid, and the Alvis board withdrew its recommendation to shareholders that they accept the General Dynamics bid. With the Alvis acquisition, General Dynamics would have been one of the top three armor vehicle makers in Europe, along with GIAT of France and Germany's Krauss-Maffei.