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Kaiserliche Marine Expansion

Foreign policy in the Wilhelmine Era (1890-1914) turned away from Bismarck's cautious diplomacy of the 1871-90 period. It was also marked by a shrill aggressiveness. Brusque, clumsy diplomacy was backed by increased armaments production, most notably the creation of a large fleet of battleships capable of challenging the British navy. This new bellicosity alarmed the rest of Europe, and by about 1907 German policy makers had succeeded in creating Bismarck's nightmare: a Germany "encircled" by an alliance of hostile neighbors -- in this case Russia, France, and Britain -- in an alliance called the Triple Entente.

The first brick to fall out of Bismarck's carefully crafted edifice was Germany's Reinsurance Treaty with Russia. Harmed by Prussian trade policies, Russia did not renew the treaty and instead turned to France for economic assistance and military security. The two countries formally allied in early 1893. Britain joined them in 1907, even though France and Britain had nearly gone to war over a colonial dispute in 1898. Britain's main reason for abandoning its usual posture as an aloof observer of developments on the continent was Germany's plan to build a fleet of sixty battleships of the formidable Dreadnought class.

The German naval expansion program had many domestic supporters. The kaiser deeply admired the navy of his grandmother, Queen Victoria of Britain, and wanted one as large for himself. Powerful lobbying groups in Germany desired a large navy to give Germany a worldwide role and to protect a growing German colonial empire in Africa and the Pacific. Industry wanted large government contracts. Some political parties promoted naval expansion and an aggressive foreign policy to win votes from a nervous electorate they kept worked up with jingoistic rhetoric.

The German Empire was under an obligation to support and protect in their projects the shippers and merchants who undertook to dispose of the surplusage of German industrial energy in foreign lands and there establish new enterprises bringing profit to Germany. It seemed to Germans that the conduct of a Great Power which left its sea-interests without protection would have been as unworthy and contemptible as dishonorable cowardice in an individual ; but it would have been most highly impolitic also, because it would have made it dependent on States more powerful at sea.

The power to organize and control does not of necessity carry with it the power to create and maintain. The general authority with respect to naval matters, granted by the Constitution to the Kaiser, is not sufficient of itself to secure the creation and perpetuation of a complete naval system. The building and equipment of fighting ships required vast sums of money, and the maintenance of a sea-power necessitates a regular source of income devoted to that purpose. No authority is given to the Kaiser, under the Constitution, either to raise or to expend moneys. The Kaiser may command the navy when it is created, but he can neither create a navy nor support it after it is brought into being. The power to raise money and the power to appropriate it to public ends lie within the competence of the legislative bodies of the Empire. In the making of laws, however, both Kaiser and the legisla-tive branch of the government take part.

By making the organization of the navy a matter of law, an equilibrium was secured between the two factors essential to the development and maintenance of an efficient naval system; between the Kaiser, in whose hands the Constitution places the control and composition of the navy, and the Bundesrat and Reichstag, without whose consent a budget were impossible. The determination of the number and kind of ships, the fixing of the official roster, and the number of men in the naval service affect materially the determination of the budget. On the other hand, the determination of the budget affects materially the exercise of the authority in naval matters vested in the Kaiser by the Constitution.

The Imperial Navy dated from the year 1867, when a program for the creation of a Federal fleet was adopted by the North German Confederation, although the various States had prior to that date possessed some small ships of war. At the outbreak of the war of 1870 the North German Navy consisted of 3 ironclad frigates, 2 ironclad ships, 9 corvettes, 3 despatch boats, 22 gunboats, and one ship of the line, used as an artillery instructional ship, manned by 205 officers and 3,650 men. The program of 1867 had provided for the gradual construction of 16 ironclads, 20 corvettes. 8 despatch boats, 22 gunboats, &c., but after the war of 1870 it was considered that certain modifications would have to be made in this program in consequence of the changes in naval tactics, notably that the number of ironclads should be increased, and that a large number of torpedo-boats should be provided.

Accordingly in 1873 a new project was approved by the Reichsrath, in which the necessary strength of the Imperial Fleet was laid down as 23 ironclad ships (8 frigates, 6 corvettes, 7 monitors, 2 floating batteries), 20 unarmored corvettes, 6 despatch boats, 18 gunboats, 3 instructional ships, 2 artillery school ships, and 10 1st class and 18 2nd claws torpedo-boats. Many modifications had been made in this plan in the course of the years. The 8 frigates were all built, but one of them, the "Grosser Kurfiirst," was lost in the English Channel in 1878, and had not been replaced. Only 2 monitors, and no floating batteries had been built, but instead of the latter and the other 5 monitors, 13 armored gunboats had been acquired by 1885.

The chief figure in promoting the naval buildup was Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, who is considered the founder of the modern German navy. Tirpitz was an effective spokesman for the program and had the ear of the kaiser and his advisers.

It was not until the law of 10 April 1898 that adequate legislation was had on the organization of the navy. This law specified the number and class of ships, aside from torpedo boats, school ships, special ships, and gunboats, provided for the construction of vessels together with the required budget, regulated the matter of commissions and provided for officers and crews. In view of certain political and commercial conditions, this law was soon regarded as insufficient, and it was repealed by the law of 14 June, 1900, which provides for a larger sea force, and appropriates the funds necessary for its creation. Prior to this date the "plans for the creation of a fleet," on which the budget estimates were made, had not force of law, and the provisions for the naval organization were contained in the "Organisatorischen Bestimmungen fur die kaiserliche Marine," Berlin, 1888, granted by imperial decree of 14 June, 1888, and afterward much enlarged and amended.

In 1898, after the Reichstag passed the first Naval Bill, Anglo-German relations deteriorated. The Supplementary Naval Act of 1900 further strained relations with Britain, as did a proposed Berlin-Baghdad railroad through the Ottoman Empire, a project that threatened British as well as Russian interests in the Balkans. Two crises over Morocco, in 1905 and 1911, drove France and Britain closer together and made for a tense international atmosphere. The great powers remained neutral during the Balkan Wars (1912-13), a nationalist rebellion against Ottoman rule, but European tensions were increased still further, and the expectation that there would eventually be war on the continent became more certain.