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Belgium and NATO

Belgium has been one of the strongest supporters of NATO since the inception of the alliance in 1949. Having suffered through two invasions in two world wars, Belgium was aware of its security needs and the limitations of its means for self-defense. As a result, the leaders of that nation began calling for the formation of a defensive alliance shortly after the liberation of Belgium at the end of World War II. In March 1948 Belgium joined with France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Britain in an agreement to establish a joint defense system. This agreement, known as the Treaty of Brussels, was a recognition that individual national responses to the threat of aggression were inadequate and that a united defense effort was necessary for mutual security.

In 1948, after expressions of concern by several European states that the Treaty of Brussels was too limited in scope and effectiveness, the prime minister of Canada called for a mutual defense system comprised of Western Europe and North America. On April 4, 1949, the foreign minister of Belgium joined with representatives from Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and the United States in signing the treaty forming NATO Greece and Turkey became members in 1952, West Germany joined the alliance in 1955, and Spain became a member in 1982. The treaty established NATO as a multilateral political alliance that binds its members to obligations of mutual defense and economic cooperation.

During the Cold War Belgium's major NATO roles included: (1) participating in the defense of the central European region by air-land defense of an army corps area in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG); (2) military defense of its national territory and its immediate sea approaches, and the organization, defense and support of allied Lines of Communication (LOC); and (3) maintaining a mobile Belgian task force with a land component issued from a para-commando regiment and an air transport command.

Belgium has influenced the alliance policy in many ways. One of the country's most prominent international statesmen, Paul Henri Spaak, served as secretary general of NATO from 1957 to 1961. When France withdrew from the military operations of NATO in 1966, the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe was transferred to Mons, in a rural area southwest of Brussels. Six months later, the organization's political headquarters was also relocated to Brussels.

In 1967 the North Atlantic Council formally adopted a proposal, formulated by Belgian foreign minister Pierre Harmel, that altered the nature of NATO policy. The Harmel plan called for NATO to be partially transformed from an entirely defensive system to one designed to encourage East-West détente and increased political consultation among the members of the alliance. By the late 1970s, however, the optimistic policy of East- West rapprochement had deteriorated. Arms control negotiations were not achieving results, and the NATO countries became increasingly concerned about the Soviet military buildup.

In December 1979 the members of NATO decided to modernize the Europe-based United States nuclear arsenal by deploying 572 new ground-launched missile systems in Western Europe that were capable of reaching the Soviet Union. The deployment would consist of 108 Pershing II ballistic missiles and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM), all armed with single nuclear warheads. The missiles were to be deployed in five countries: the Pershing IIs and some cruise missiles in West Germany and cruise missiles only in Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, and Belgium. The NATO allies also agreed to attempt negotiations with the Soviet Union in order to limit further nuclear deployment in Europe. The NATO decision was an integrated, or dual-track, approach involving both modernization and arms control negotiation.

During the consultations that preceded the NATO decision, the Belgian coalition government was described as supportive of the proposed missile deployment. The NATO ministers expected the government to endorse the proposal and accept the missile deployment on Belgian territory. Domestic opposition, especially from the Dutch-speaking Socialist Party (SF), however, caused the government to condition its support for the deployment policy. Belgium endorsed the decision to modernize the nuclear capability of NATO but wavered on its applicability to Belgian territory. The government was unable to concentrate fully on the issue of deployment in 1979 because of its preoccupation with linguistic and economic issues.

In September 1980, however, the government issued an ambiguous "non-decision" that allowed supporters and opponents of deployment to claim victory. Belgian acceptance was linked to progress in the Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF), negotiations being conducted by the United States and NATO with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. If the negotiations did not succeed in lessening tensions between the states, then Belgium would, "in concert with its Allies, take all the measures agreed upon by the NATO partners (in 1979)," i.e., would allow the missiles to be stationed on Belgian territory. There would also be semiannual review of this 1980 policy until a firm decision could be made.

The SP continued to be the political group most strongly opposed to deployment. It made opposition to deployment one of its reasons for participating in the government, and its leaders have made a considerable political investment in the issue. The leader of the SP, Karel Van Miert, saw the initial NATO decision as an example of overwhelming American pressure on the Europeans and stressed that deployment in Belgium be linked to a possible INF agreement with the Soviet Union. However, the underlying rationalefor opposition by the SF may have been lack of economic gain to the Dutch-speaking areas of Belgium. The opposition may also have been mounted as a reaction to the strong antinuclear sentiment in neighboring countries, namely, the Netherlands and West Germany. The French-speaking Socialist Party (PS) has not seriously opposed deployment. The lack of PS opposition may have been positively influenced by the economic benefits to Wallonia that would result from deployment in that region.

Because of the fragility of coalition politics, as well as the continued economic strain in late 1984, the Belgian government was still unable to make a firm decision on cruise missile deployment. It has nonetheless taken initial steps to implement the plan, including the selection and construction of a site for the missiles at Florennes. A large number of Belgian officials continued to support the NATO dual-track decision and stressed Belgian willingness to counteract any increased Soviet threat to Western Europe. Nevertheless, in late 1984 it seemed likely that the government would continue to postpone a final decision as long as possible.

The Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty with the former USSR went into effect, closing us down (as well as RAF Greenham Common, 501 TMW; RAF Molesworth, 303 TMW: Comiso AS, Sicily, 487 TMW; Wueschheim AS, Germany, 38 TMW; and Florennes AB, Belgium, 485 TMW). The approval of the 1983 Belgian decision to accept Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM) at Florennes, Belgium, and its subsequent implementation, was a highly political and controversial issue. During the negotiations, however, there was never a question of Belgium's support for the NATO alliance. Indeed, when the time came to act, the prime minister announced in March 1985 his government's final agreement to the installation of the missiles.

Despite some opposition Belgium generally supported the NATO modernization programs for air defense and intermediate-range nuclear weapons. Ground-launched cruise missiles were been assigned to a base in Florennes in the province of Namur and were expected to be operational by early 1985; however, the final decision on Belgian acceptance of the missiles was subject to domestic political considerations. In late 1984, improvements in the air defense system were subject to intense debate; decisions to upgrade the existing defense system were based on economic, not military, considerations.