Korean People's Army Navy
The navy, a separate branch of the KPA, is headquartered at P'yongyang. In 1992 the 40,000 to 60,000-person brown-water navy was primarily a coastal defense force. The navy is capable of conducting inshore defensive operations, submarine operations against merchant shipping and unsophisticated naval combatants, offensive and defensive mining operations, and conventional raids. Because of the general imbalance of ship types, the navy has a limited capability to carry out missions such as sea control or denial and antisubmarine operations.
Most North Korean combat vessels, such as light destroyers, patrol ships, guided missile boats, torpedo boats, and fire support boats are small. Some 40 guided missile boats pose a substantial threat; they have the capability of launching missile attacks against large vessels and are equipped with two to four 46-km-range Styx anti-ship missiles. At present, over 60% of North Korean combat vessels are deployed in forward bases.
The primary offensive mission of the navy is supporting army actions against South Korea, particularly by inserting smallscale amphibious operations--SOF units--along the coast. The navy also has a limited capability to conduct rocket and shore bombardment raids against selected coastal targets. However, any North Korean force attempting to engage in these operations would be at risk from both air and surface combatants because of limited air defense and detection capabilities.
The Naval Command has two separate fleets: the East Sea Fleet and Yellow Sea Fleet, with sixteen combatant groups. The fleets do not exchange vessels, and their areas of operations and missions determine their organizational structure; mutual support is difficult at best.
- The Yellow Sea Fleet, made up of six squadrons [versus five in the early 1990s] and approximately 300 vessels, is headquartered at Namp'o, with major bases at Pip'a-got and Sagot and smaller bases at Ch'o-do and Tasa-ri.
- The East Sea Fleet, with ten squadrons [versus nine in the early 1990s] and approximately 470 vessels [versus 400 in the early 1990s], is headquartered at T'oejo-dong, with major bases at Najin and Wonsan and lesser bases at Ch'aho, Ch'angjn, Mayangdo, and Puam-ni near the DMZ.
There are many smaller bases along both coasts. The submarine force is decentralized. Submarines are stationed at Ch'aho, Mayang-do, Namp'o, and Pip'a-got naval bases.
Approximately 60 percent of the North Korean naval force is deployed close to the front line area. They include 430 combat vessels, such as patrol boats, missile boats, torpedo boats and fire support vessels, 35 submarines including 9 small ones, and 335 supporting vessels such as landing ships and air cushion vessels. Support vessels are composed of amphibious vessels including personnel landing craft, landing craft air cushion (LCAC), surface patrol boats and mine countermeasure vessels. These support vessels, however, have a limited role in long-distance operations.
Korean People's Army Navy - Early History
After the end of The World War II it was created in Seishin Southern maritime defense area. P. X .Kan, now president of the Korean International Association "Unity", notes that the Soviet sailors of the garrison " pinned serious problems in helping to establish and strengthen the navy of the DPRK ."
The North Korean Navy was created on June 5, 1946 as the Maritime Security Force , headquartered in the port of Wonsan and began operations in July. In December 1946, the naval forces were renamed the Marine Patrols , and for more efficient control of the naval forces, the headquarters was transferred to the capital, Pyongyang. In June 1947, the Marine Patrol Academy was established in Wonsan. ) to train officers for the fleet. Initially, the naval forces were subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior, and from 20 August 1949 they were subordinate to the Department of National Security. After the torpedo boat division was formed on August 29, the patrol force became known as the Naval Forces, a date celebrated as Navy Day until it was changed in 1993 to June 5.
The USSR provided assistance to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the creation of its national fleet: ships and boats were transferred, the institution of Soviet naval advisers was introduced. According to Admiral V.M. Grishanov, who in 1947-1950. was deputy chief, and then chief of the political department of the 5th Navy, in 1949-1954. The Soviet Union transferred part of its warships and vessels to North Korea (a total of 68 units), including 37 torpedo boats, 9 minesweepers, and 8 submarine hunters. Most of them , apparently, were transferred after the 1953 armistice. According to other more reliable data, until 1950 the DPRK fleet was transferred: 1 minesweeper (most likely BTShch pr.53 - T-3 "Provodnik" in March 1953) , 4 patrol ships (there is information that one of them was SKR pr.39 - "Zarnitsa" ), 6 transports, 10 torpedo boats (at least five of the G-5 type) , 3 small (project OD-200) and 1 great hunter. In the naval schools of the USSR and in educational institutions in North Korea, Soviet teachers trained personnel for the new fleet. On March 1, 1950, 612 naval officers and 640 sailors were trained for the Navy. In particular, in the Pacific Naval Institute named after S.O. Makarov, North Korean crews of G-5 torpedo boats were trained in Vladivostok . Among the Koreans was the future Hero of the DPRK Kim Gong Ok, who received the title of Hero for the attack on the invaders' cruisers on July 2, 1950.
All issues of building the Korean fleet were discussed with Kim Il Sung and his assistants. From the Soviet side, the commander of the Soviet task force, Admiral G.V. Zhukov and V.M. Grishanov, took part in their discussion. According to the latter's recollections, "decisions were made quickly and then actively implemented in practice." In 1948, the commander of the Pacific Fleet, Vice Admiral A.S. Frolov, came to Seisin to discuss the creation of the DPRK navy. He took part in resolving issues related to the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the transfer of a number of Soviet warships under the command of Korean naval officers. Soviet instructors remained in North Korea, assisting the North Koreans in mastering Soviet technology.
On December 25, 1948, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from North Korea was fully completed. But several dozen Soviet warships and ships of the Pacific Fleet remained in North Korean ports. On March 18, 1949, at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), the Soviet-Korean Protocol No. 1949 "On the temporary abandonment of Soviet naval units in the Korean port of Seishin" was adopted. Article 1 of the Protocol stated: “The government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agrees to satisfy the request of the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and temporarily, in view of the presence of CTTTA troops in South Korea, to leave units of its naval forces in the port of Seishin, and the government of the USSR assumes all the costs associated with the maintenance of these military - sea units ". For its part, the government of the DPRK undertook "to provide the government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the port of Seishin with the port equipment and premises necessary to meet the needs of the basing of these naval units ."
On the basis of this Protocol and the Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of February 24, 1949, No. 835-319ss, it was ordered “ to ensure sea communications on the territory of North Korea until further notice to leave ... 73 units of naval ships. A total of 3753 military personnel and 264 civilian employees should be left behind . These remaining 73 Soviet ships were based as follows: 65 in the port of Seishin, including torpedo boats, anti-submarine ships and other ships, 2 in the port of Genzan and 6 in the port of Racine.
Korean War. Episodes of the participation of the Soviet Navy
Korean People's Army Navy - Korean War
At the first stage, the DPRK leadership actively used its small The Korean People's Navy ( KPN) fleet, which. consisted of four divisions of ships:
- 1 battalion of patrol ships ( 1 st Patrol boats Squadron ) - three sea hunters of the OD-200 type;
- 2 Division torpedo boats ( 2- nd PT boats Squadron ) - five boats of the type T-5 (including ? 21, ? 22, ? 23, ? 24), based on Wonsan;
- 3 division of minesweepers ( 3 rd Minesweepers Squadron ) - two former American minesweepers of the YMS type and one former Japanese;
- a division of ships under construction - 7 ships with a displacement of 250 and 800 tons.
In addition, the fleet consisted of: one floating base, one military transport with a displacement of 2,000 tons (formerly American, transferred from South Korea in 1949), six different boats and schooners (with a displacement of 60-80 tons). However, there is no exact data on the composition of the DPRK Navy.
According to some reports, it included 20 ships ; foreign sources speak of 110 ships with 13,700 sailors. According to available data, by March 1950, the DPRK Navy had delivered from the USSR: 1 minesweeper (there is information that it was BTShch pr.53 - T-3 "Provodnik" in March 1950 ), 4 patrol ships (there is information that one of them was SKR pr.39 - "Zarnitsa" in 1950 ), 6 transports, 10 torpedo boats, 3 small and 1 large hunter. In addition to Soviet supplies, the Navy apparently included some of the Japanese ships captured during the liberation of Korea in 1945, and at least two ships in 1949 transferred to the DPRK from South Korea.
On May 11, one ship of the South Korean Navy crossed, and on August 8, 1949. the flagship ship of the South Korean flotilla of patrol boats - SKA "Nr Di ai" under the command of A n Sen Gaba, moved north to the port of Mongyum . In addition, with the outbreak of hostilities, up to 100 ships with a displacement of 60 to 100 tons were mobilized.
As part of the Navy, in addition to the ship's composition, there were two regiments of the Marine Corps 945 and 956 ( Independent Naval Infantry Regiments ) stationed in Wonsan and Nampo, a coastal defense artillery regiment, an anti-aircraft artillery regiment (24 - 37-mm guns MZA and 12 - 85 -mm guns SZA), three naval bases and one naval school. On March 1, 1950, 612 naval officers and 640 sailors were trained for the Navy at the naval school . The total strength of the navy was 10,297 people, including 3,680 naval personnel, 5,483 marines and 1,134 coastal defense personnel.
In the formation of the fleet, the Koreans were assisted by Soviet specialists headed by the senior naval adviser to the DPRK, Admiral Kapanadze Seid Avvakumovich. And many command posts in the DPRK Navy were held by the so-called Soviet Koreans, these are persons of Korean nationality who were sent from the USSR from August 1945 to January 1949 to build a new state. Here are just a few of the Soviet Koreans associated with the navy.
The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy was General Khan Il Mu (born in 1905), later the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force; Chief of Naval Staff of the KPA was Major-General Kim In he Mu (born 1910), Pak Ding (born 1920) was the chief of operations at the Naval Headquarters, Colonel Kim Woo Hyun (born 1917) was the chief of the naval base in Nampo, and the 25th Coast Guard Brigade commander was Major General Oh Ki Chen (born 1904), the head of the naval school were Kim Gwang Bin (born 1912) and Major General L and Se Ho (born 1920), a teacher of the naval School was the captain of the 1st rank Hwang Geum Cher (born in 1924). The recognized authority in the Navy was the Hero of the DPRK, Rear Admiral Kim Chir Sen. At the end of the Korean War, part of the Soviet Koreans who remained in the DPRK were ousted from leading positions, many of them were repressed. Only a few remained in power and were forced to faithfully serve the regime of Kim Il Sung. The overwhelming majority returned to the USSR.
The main tasks that were carried out by the DPRK fleet during the war in Korea were the landing of tactical assault forces on the coast occupied by the enemy, episodic battles with enemy ships in the open sea and the setting of minefields. By the beginning of September 1950, the DPRK fleet had lost almost all ships as a result of air strikes and battles at sea. In the third and fourth stages of the war, only improvised floating means were used for operations at sea - fishing kungas and schooners. To repel possible enemy attacks from the sea, the coastal defense was significantly strengthened. To this end, instead of the two separate marines regiments that were available at the beginning of the war, four separate marines brigades were formed, reformed at the fourth stage of the war into artillery and machine gun brigades.
The very first operation of the Korean Navy was the landing on June 25 of several tactical landings on enemy territory in order to assist the offensive of the troops of the KPA coastal flank. As you know, airborne operations do not take place spontaneously and require some preparation. But when analyzing the landing operations carried out on June 25 by the DPRK against South Korea, it is clear that their preparation was compressed and in fact the units were involved in the operation right on the move. Moreover , all this took place against the background of the enemy's incessant preparations for war. In the spring of 1950, North Korean intelligence learned that South Korean troops were ready to unleash an aggression, and in early June this information began to take on concrete shape.Soviet sources report that on June 19, 1950, the Chief of the General Staff of the South Korean Army gave the order to go over to the offensive. However, the offensive did not take place, since the control and use of artillery was not organized at the headquarters of the 1st corps. A commission from the headquarters of the South Korean army and a large group of American military advisers hastily left for the headquarters of the 1st corps. After investigating the reasons for the disruption of the offensive and putting in order, the offensive was scheduled for June 25, 1950.
Against this background, the preparation of the North Korean leadership for the landing of troops on enemy territory is not something unexpected or aggressive. Preparations for the landing operation began only at the beginning of June 1950. For the operation, a separate 766 infantry regiment was assigned , formed in July 1949 in Wonsan. From July 1949 to June 12, 1950, all three battalions of the regiment were in the camp at Hoeryong. On June 12, the 766th regiment was transferred by rail to Muncheon, 5 kilometers north of Wonsan, where, under the supervision of Soviet advisers, the personnel were engaged in boarding and disembarking until 22 June. The regiment was then transported by rail to the area north of Yangyang Port.
There the regiment joined the guerrilla unit four ( of Guerrilla Unit ) - 15, 27, the Nam Don Ue and Namdo regiment expanded to six "battalions" with 1,200-1,500 fighters. The partisan units were also concentrated just before the start of the operation. The Nam Don Ue unit arrived in the Yangyang area in early June, where it merged with the 15th unit. On June 21, these two combined units, which had 400-500 troops, left the Yanyang area , relocating to the Changjon port 70 km north of Yangyang ... The 27th guerrilla unit arrived in the Wonsan area on June 21. On June 22, they embarked on eight boats and sailed south. The Namdo guerrilla unit was formed in Yangyang in June. On June 23, a unit of approximately 200 fighters was relocated to the port of Koson, where another 400 fighters joined the squadron.
According to the plan of the command of the KPA in the Gangneung area, it was envisaged to land a landing in the composition of two battalions of marines and two battalions of cadets of a military school at the junction between the 10th and 21st regiments of the 8th South Korean infantry division. The landed troops were to seize a bridgehead in the Gangneung area, cut off the escape routes of the 10th regiment and, in cooperation with the 5th KPA infantry division, advancing from the front along the coast, encircle and destroy enemy units. At the same time to the south of Gangneung, in the Samchek region, it was planned to land a detachment of 650 partisans. This detachment had the task of contributing to the deployment of the partisan movementin the rear of the enemy. The success of the landings was calculated on surprise, since the DPRK fleet did not have the forces either to cover the landing on the transition by sea, or to suppress the antiamphibious defense in the landing area. The expectation of success was also justified by the fact that only South Korean ships were in the ports of South Korea, which could not provide significant resistance. The US fleet at that time was still in the areas of its permanent base.
The North Korean leadership counted on Soviet assistance in carrying out amphibious operations, but the Soviet leadership refrained from direct participation in the conflict. Five days before the start of the Korean War, on June 20, 1950, the USSR Ambassador to the DPRK, Colonel-General T.F. Shtykov, sent a telegram to Stalin as follows: “ Kim Il Sung asked to convey: the necessary ships for the offensive and landing. Two ships arrived, but the crews did not have time to prepare. Asks ten Soviet advisers to use on ships. I think the request must be satisfied . " The answer, which came, of course, from Stalin, but signed by A.A. Gromyko, did not keep itself waiting and came on June 22: “ Your proposal is rejected. This gives rise to an intervention . "
During June 23-24, the 1st and 2nd battalions of the regiment and the 27th guerrilla unit were loaded onto ships - 20 schooners manned by the Korean People's Fleet at the Sokcho forward base near Yanyang. After the landing of troops and the loading of military equipment on the ships, the landing detachment, lined up in three wake columns, guarded by two small hunters and a minesweeper, began the transition to the landing site. The landing party's course passed 10-12 miles from the coast, and therefore the ships could not be seen by enemy coastal observation posts. The landing in the Gangneung area took place in two places. Battalions 1 and 2 of the 766th regiment landed near Nakp ' ung - ni 10 km south of Gangneung, these forces contributed to the capture of the city of Gangneung, and the 27th partisan detachment landed in Mukko next to Gangneung. Over the next two weeks, he moved south to Uljin, where he arrived on 5 July. Only a small police detachment resisted the paratroopers from the 766 regiment. Only four hours after the landing, when the landing force was consolidated on the captured bridgehead, an enemy infantry battalion was transferred to the landing area by vehicles. However, his actions did not significantly affect the solution of the landing tasks on the shore. In the description of the episode of the North Korean landing on June 25 in the Gangneung area, it is said about the battle between North Korean and South Korean ships, but the battle on June 25 there raises strong doubts. Most likely, it happened on June 29th.
Around June 24, a 600-strong Namdo partisan detachment embarked in the port of Koson on two minesweepers, a patrol ship and a small submarine hunter. He left two hours later than the detachment that left Sokcho. The passage of the second detachment was covered from possible attacks from the Lisynman ships by two torpedo boats and a large submarine hunter. The second airborne detachment marched more seaward than the first detachment and, having great speed, overtook it. The passage was made secretly, without enemy opposition. On June 25, the detachment landed in the Samchek area. The landing of the partisan detachment also took place in an orderly manner and without losses. Local fishermen provided them with their schooners and kungases as landing craft.After this, the detachment moved south, reaching Yonhae on 1 July, 14 kilometers north of Yondok.
Nam Don Ue guerrilla units and Detachment 15 embarked at the port of Changjon (70 km north of Yangyang) on 23 June on small ships to land in South Korean territory. On June 25, they landed at Imwolli, 28 kilometers north of Uljin, again split into two divisions and moved southwest into the mountains to Andon.
Thus, correctly assessing the situation and using the surprise factor, the DPRK fleet, in essence, using improvised means, successfully landed three tactical assault forces, consisting of two infantry battalions and four partisan detachments. The landing forces contributed to the offensive of the KPA troops, the encirclement and capture of enemy units.
Unfortunately, not all landings were successful. The landing party, sent to capture the port of Busan, was intercepted at sea by the enemy and died with the ship on which it was. The 3rd Battalion of the 766th Regiment in Sokcho boarded a former Japanese steamer to land in the Busan area. There are no details about this operation. It is not known whether he was accompanied by warships of the DPRK Navy. Already on the way to the target, it was intercepted by the South Korean fleet, and this was one of the first operations of the South Korean fleet.
In spite of the fact that the American fleet by the end of 1950 blocked all the north-eastern coast of Korea, most of the military cargo is still delivered to the front line of the sea from the ports of Chongjin and Sonchzhin Wonsan and Hungnam. In this regard, from mid-February 1951, the Americans began a close blockade of Wonsan, in March - Songjin (March 8) and Chongjin, and on April 26 - Hinnam. For this purpose, they have introduced four tactical groups. In the vicinity of the blocked objects, they captured islands and established temporary bases there for their forces. So, during the naval blockade of Wonsan, on the seven captured islands, which occupy a dominant position over the fairway leading to the port, correction posts and small units of the marines were landed, on some of them parking was set upfor ships, and one even built a runway. It should be emphasized that the blockade forces, despite the lack of opposition at sea, suffered losses from the fire of coastal batteries.
When the war began in June 1950, the DPRK did not need to lay mines, since its troops were successfully advancing, and the South Korean fleet did not pose a threat. But in July 1950, the American fleet began a blockade and shelling of the Korean coast, and this was already serious, since the North Koreans could not oppose at least something with the power of the American ships. After that, the headquarters of the fleet developed a plan for setting up minefields. According to this plan, it was planned to set up obstacles on the approaches to naval bases, main ports and bays of North and the liberated part of South Korea. The laying of mines along the east coast was to be carried out by floating craft and teams of miners located at the main base of Wonsan, and along the west coast at the Nampo naval base. To fulfill the planned plan, 4 thousand minutes were needed. However, by the beginning of the war, the DPRK navy had a small number of them. In addition, there were no specialists who could carry out these plans. But mine work, like no other, requires the highest professionalism, special ships to perform this important and responsible task. The North Korean sailors did not have either one or the other at that time, and Soviet specialists came to their aid.
After the conclusion of the armistice on July 27, 1953, the trawling of waters off the east coast of Korea was stopped. Despite this, the threat posed by mines in Korean waters continued to exist for some time. Thus, in August 1953, Vice Admiral Briscoe, the commander of the US Navy in the Far East, in a bulletin containing hydrographic information about the Pacific Ocean, warned that the waters north of the demarcation line had not been cleared of mines since July 27 ... Vessels entering the area must act at their own risk.Briscoe also stated that anchor mines have a pronounced tendency to move towards the open sea and, in stormy weather, get loose from the anchors, becoming drifting. He further indicated that the possibility of repeated mining by the enemy in some areas already cleared of mines to the north of the demarcation line is not excluded.
North Korean Naval Shipbuilding, July 1980 - August 1982
By mid-1980, at least 46 naval vessels, mostly combatants, were under construction or modification at four shipyards. The North Koreans have been engaged since mid-1980 in a major program to improvethe offensive capability of their navy. Four major naval shipyards in North Korea have been involved inthis program. They are Najin Shipyard 28 and Sinpo Shipyard South on the east coast andYongampo-ri Ship Repair Yard and Nampo Shipyard on the west coast. Eleven classes of naval vessels were under construction or modification by the end of 1980. Activity included construction of two new cruise missile-capable classes, modification of two existing classes to a cruise missile capability, continued production of one missile attack boat class, construction of one probable new-class submarine chaser, series production of submarine chasers and landing craft, resumption of construction of patrol craft and torpedo boats, and the possible resumption of attack submarine construction. The completion of all the cruise missile-capable vessels in this program would nearly double the number of STYX missile launchers available to the North Korean Navy.
The bulk of this shipbuilding and modification program was underway at Najin Shipyard 28, where the majority of the cruise missile-related shipbuilding was conducted. This included construction of the indigenous Sohung and Soju PTG classes and the Naj-A (NPIC interim designator) cruise missile-equipped large catamaran, and a modification program to retrofit the one east coast Najin FFL with cruise missiles. Also, series production of the Hantae LCU, resumption of construction of the Sinhung PT, and a modification program to use four unfinished Chongju PCFS hulls for PCs/PCSs hadbeen observed at Najin Shipyard 28.
Sinpo Shipyard South, also on the east coast, had been involved in series production of the Sin-A (NPIC interim designator), a probable PCS. Additionally, Romeo SS construction may have resumed at Sinpo Shipyard South following a period of 3 years without a submarine launch. Construction of the Soju PTG and the Sinhung PT had been taking place at Yon-gampo-ri Ship Repair Yard on the west coast. Also, production of the Hantae LCU and the Taechong PCS had been moved from Nampo Shipyard, where naval shipbuilding is apparently being phased out, to Yongampo-ri. At Nampo Shipyard, two of the five Chongju PCFS hulls, unfinished for 6 years, were modified to a PC/PCS configuration and launched during 1981. The remaining three hulls were modified to a PTG configuration, similar to that of the Soju PTG, during 1982.
The Naj-A, a large, catamaran-hulled vessel equipped with four SS-N-2(STYX) cruise missile launchers, anti-submarine rocket launchers, and a probable helicopter landing pad, was first observed under construction at Najin on imagery of July 1980. The individual hulls eachd have a space between them and the stepped superstructure, which rises three enclosed levels above the main deck and is almost entirely forward of midships. A probable helicopter landing area, one level above the main deck, extends from the rear of the superstructure to the stern. The main deck is open below this platform, but no elevators are discernible, and the space between decks appears to be of insufficient height for a hangar deck. However, the aft portion of the superstructure on the platform level appears to have an opening and could possibly serve as hangar space. The ship has four STYX cruise missile launchers, two in tandem on either side of the superstructure. Four RBU-1200 anti-submarine rocket launchers are mounted near the bow, and at east one gun mount twin barrel, probable 25-30mm) is on the forward portion or the superstructure top the 0-2 level the second leve! above the main deck), possible position for an additional weapon is atop the 0-7 letel, forward. Two enclosed probable 57mm dual-purpose guns have been waist-mounted on the raised platform at the rear of the superstucture. Two additional probable 25mm arti-aircraft guns are waist mounted near the rear of the superstruce, above the O-2 level.
The Naj-A was "mediterranean-moored" (stern first) at a nawly constructed fitting out quay. A Mediterranean type moor to the pier was employed when the ship's port anchor was dropped well up stream and a few dozen fathoms of chain veered. The starboard anchor was then dropped and dozens of fathoms of chain veered. At the same time the amount of chain veered to the port anchor was increased. The stern was pushed around until perpendicular to the dock and then secured to the dock.
Both the Naj-A and the Vajin FFL were absent from the fitting-out quay at the skipyard. The Naj-A FFL was at the main quay at Yoho-ri Naval Base and was probably conducting sea trials and helicopter landing operations, possibly with the HOUND (Mi-4) helicopter that was at Main Naval Base and Academy in the vicinity of Yoho Naval Base, approximately 190 nm to the south of Najin Shipyard.
The intended mission o! the Naj-A had not been determined. The large size and limited maneuverability of the catamaran hull and the fact that it carried a mix of anti-submarine warfare weapons and cruise missiles suggested that the ship was not intended to be a directly offensive platiform and that a PTG role for the ship would probably be limited to anti-merchant shipping. A helicopter could be used for targeting the cruise missils at a longer range than shipbome sensor's would allow. The probable helicopter pad is not large and if ulilized for storage of aircraft as well as for flight operations could accommodate only a limited number of helicopters. This would seem to rule out an assault ship role for the Naj-A. The use of the probable helicopter landing pad for an anti-submarine warfare helicopter would be a significant departure from the norm for the North Koreans, as they had no demonstrated airborne ASW capability.
North Korean Naval Shipbuilding, July 1980- August 1982
Construction and Modification of North Korean Naval Combatants, January 1983 through July 1986
Three Soju PTGs were under construction at Najin since mid-1980. This was the first indigenous production of an Osa I PTG-type vessel by North Korea. The Soju PTG is 4 meters longer than the Soviet-built Osa I. The deck house, two antiaircraft gun positions, and four STYX cruise missile launchers on the Soju PTG appear to be identical to those on the Osa I PTG. A probable DRUM TILT fire control radar has been mounted on a pedestal aft, in the same position as that on the Osa I PTG. The North Koreans produce their own DRUM TILT fire control radar (probably at Nampo Communications Equipment Plant) and have aland-based version of it deployed with a ZPU-4-type antiaircraft system. The two antiaircraft weapons on the Soju PTG have twin barrels and appear to be similar to the 30mm weapons found on the Osa I PTG.Unit 1 of this class had been launched by August 1981 and was undergoing sea trials south of the shipyardin November 1981. This unit was observed at the shipyard through August 1982. Units 2 and 3 were in themidstages of construction in May 1981, but imagery of June 1982 indicated no further progress. However, subsequently the second Soju PTG had been moved inside the construction hall, probably indicating a resumption of construction on the class. Soju PTG construction was also underway at Yongampo-ri on the west coast. In addition to the Soju PTG the North Koreans had eight Osa 1 PTGs acquired from the Soviet Union, four based on each coast. Two additional Osa I PTGs were newly identified on the west coast, bringing the total on that coast to six. These new Osa I PTGs may have been acquired from the People's Republic of China.
Construction of the Sohung PTG on the east coast was first confirmed in July 1980 when four Sohung PTGs were observed under construction at Najin Shipyard 28. Two Sohung PTGs had previously been built on the west coast at Nampo Shipyard; the first became operational in 1975 and the second in 1980. The Sohung PTG is a steel-hulled, North Korean version of the Soviet Komar PTG and carries two STYX cruise missiles. The first Sohung PTG constructed at Najin, unit 3 of the class, was in the water by early July 1980 and had departed the shipyard by February 1982.The second Sohung PTG constructed at Najin was initially launched in September 1980, then was returned to the building way and re-launched in August 1981. It was at the shipyard as of August 1982. The third and fourth units at Najin remained unfinished on the building way as of mid-1982. The length of time these two ships had remained on the building way and the removal of four missile launcher covers from staging along-side the units to the launcher component fabrication/storage area suggested problems with the vessels.
The Sohung PTGs constructed at Najin differ from those built at Nampo in that they, like the Komar, mountthe 25mm antiaircraft gun rather than the 14.5mm heavy antiaircraft machine gun seen on the two west coast units. The North Koreans also haf 10 Komar PTGs, obtained from the Soviet Union, based on the east coast.
The one east coast Najin FFL had been under modification at NajinShipyard 28 since July 1980. The torpedo tubes had been replaced by two STYX missile launchers and a new deckhouse. Unlike those on the People's Republic of China Navy's Gordyy-class destroyers and Riga-class frigates, these cruise missile launchers did not appear to be trainable. The superstructure forward and aft of the missile launchers had been modified, and the anti-aircraft gun suite of the vessel had been upgraded. Imagery of June 1982 revealed that the two 100mm gun mounts (main battery, located fore and aft) had been replaced by larger mounts. The new guns appeared to be at least 100mm. Thesecondary battery, twin 57mm guns, remained in place.
The Najin FFL was at Yoho-ri Naval Base during preparations for the North Korean Navy Day (28 August) activities. The FFL probably accompanied the Naj-A to the Yoho-ri area. The one west coast unit of this class had not undergone any cruise missile modification.
The Hantae LCU was still in series production at Najin at the endof the reporting period. The Hantae most closely resembles an LSM, having an enclosed well deck and clamshall doors at the bow, and was originally designated as such. However, the class is not considered tohave a blue-water capability because of its size (only 46 meters long with a beam of 7 meters) and hasbeen redesignated an LCU, Unit 1 of the class was constructed at Najin in 1978, while unit 2 was launched from Nampo Shipyard in 1979. By October 1981, two additional Hantaes had been launched from Najin, and two remained under construction as of mid-1982. On subsequent imagery a new construction hall precluded observation of the two Hantaes under construction, but a Hantae in the late stages of construction was observed outside the new construction hall in May 1982. This ship did not have the bow section attached and was probably unit 6 of the class; the status of unit 5 was unknown, although its bow had been attached by mid-1981. Two additional Hantaes were under construction by mid-1982 at Yongampo-ri, on the west coast, bringing the total for the class to eight units.
A resumption of Sinhung PT construction was observed in Febru-ary 1981 at Najin Shipyard 28 after a hiatus of 10 years. The Sinhung is a metal-hulled boat of indigenous design and was the most numerous PT in the North Korean naval inventory. Sinhung PTs were widely dispersed in both fleets, serving primarily as coastal defense assets. At least 74 Sinhungs were constructed at Najin and Nampo Shipyards between 1966 and 1971. Since resumption of construction, at least eight Sinhungs had been built at Najin, and a similar building program was underway at Yongampo-ri Ship Repair Yard, on the west coast, as of August 1982.
Modification of the four Chongju PCFS hulls at Najin Shipyard to a PC/PCS configuration was observed in March 1981. A total of nine Chongju hulls was laid down in 1974 and 1975 - four at Najin and five at Nampo Shipyard. The class was originally designed as a PCFS armed with an 85mm gun turret forward and a multiple rocket launcher amid ships connected by rails to a reload magazine at the stern. Only one unit of the class, at Nampo, was ever launched in the PCFS configuration and that unit was returned to the building way and disassembled in 1976.
Construction of the class was intermittent between 1977 and 1979 and was highlighted by the temporary mounting of at least one STYX missile launcher cover, but no launch rails, on a unit at Nampo and the modification of three Chongju hulls at Najin with sponsons, apparently for a similar purpose.
The program had apparently been abandoned by 1980; however, renewed activity on the four Chongju hulls at Najin was observed in March 1981, and one Chongju had been launched by August 1981. The forward gun turret on that unit had been retained, but the multiple rocket launcher assembly had been replaced by a pair of waist-mounted 25mm antiaircraft guns, two probable 37mm gun mounts and stern-mounted depth charge rails/racks in a configuration similar to that of the SO-7 PCS. Additionally, a pair of possible anti-submarine rocket launchers was mounted on the bridge wings. A second Chongju PC/PCSwas launched and undergoing fitting-out at the end of Augsut 1982. At that time the status of the remaining two units at the shipyard was not discernible because of the erection of a new construction hall over the main buildingways. However, prior to the erection of the hall, depth charge rails/racks had been mounted on those units; all four of the east coast Chongju hulls would probably be outfitted as PCS/PCSs.
The third east coast Taechong PCS, unit 5 of the class, was launched latein 1980 or early in 1981 from Najin Shipyard and is different from the four earlier units, marking apparentdesign charges to the class. The changes include a larger main gun (a 100mm forward gun instead of an85mm gun) and the placement of the RBU-1200 antisubmarine rocket launchers closer to the bow (Figure6). This Taechong PCS underwent a prolonged fitting-out period and was observed at the yard almostcontinuously through mid-june 1982. However, onthe PCS was at Najin Naval Base andAcademy, along with the other two east coast units, and may have been operational. Unit 6 of the class,built at Nampo Shipyard on the west coast, has the same design changes.
Najin Shipyard 28
Erection of the new construction hall at Najin Shipyard 28 began in June 1981, and the hall was externally complete by February 1982. This hall completely covered the four main building ways at the shipyard and concealled construction activity on all but the large inclined building way where the Naj-A was constructed. This concealment, coupled with a gap in coverage between late October 1981 and early February 1982, made determination of the status of several ship construction programs difficult. During the construction of the hall, all the vessels on the building ways were moved to the edge of the quay and all activity on those units was interrupted. The vesseis affected were: Soju PTG units 2 and 3, Hantae LCU units 5 and 6, and three unfinished Chongiu PC/PCS hulls. The two unfinished Sohung PTGs were outside the area of construction. The hall appeared to be nearly complete although the ships remained outside. When Najin was next imaged, all the vessels except Soju PTG unit 3 had been returned to the building ways inside the hall. The erection of this hall set back progress on the units involved by at least 6 months.
A very ambitious shipbuilding program was underway from mid-1980 through mid-1981 at Najin Shipyard 28; however, progress since mid-1981 had been very limited, Construction of the Vaj-A had been steady and modification of the Vajin FFL continued, albeit al a slow pace. The interruption of construction on at least three classes of vessels may be attributable to the raising of the new construction hall, but other delays in ship construction and extended fitting-out periods indicated the possible reordering of priorities in the construction program.
Sinpo Shipyard South
Romeo Ss. Following the launch of the 11th Romeo SS from Sinpo Shipyard South in early 1979, major naval shipbuilding was apparently suspended. The only shipbuilding observed at the yard between May 1979 and May 1981 was the construction of a large cargo ship, fishing vessels, and smallcraft. Also, several Midget submarines which were probably assembled in buildings at the yard were launched during that period. Approximately 32 Romo SS components, mostly outer hull sections, were observed on an open building way in May 1980. The components were being stored in the open and were not taken into the construction hall where at the Romco SS had been built. Additionally, several fabrication jigs for Ronco components were being stored in the shipyard component storage area. The storage (as opposed to staging) of the components and the location of the jigs (in open storage rather than in the fabrication buildings), along with the lack of any new ss launches, indicated an indefinite interruption of the submaarine construction program.
Between May and August 1981 some of the components were moved from the building way to an open area nearby to make room for a ship under construction. No further activity was observed until February 1902, when approximately half the components and several of the jigs were noved to the large inclined building way immediately adjacent to the submarine construction hail. The positioning of the components and jigs suggested staging for a resumption of Romeo SS construction. The 12th Romeo SS construccd in North Korea was observed in the filing out basin at the shipyard.
Synoptic coverage of Sinpo Shipyard, the two east coast submarine bases - Mayang-do Naval Base and Chaho Nodongagu Naval Base PUG - and Mayangdo-ri Naval Repair Yard and Storage PUG - accounted for the entire east coast inventory of attack submarines and confirmed this submarine as newly launched unit. This submarine was probably an unfinished unit from the 1974-1979 construction program. The submarine was probably not constructed from the Romeo-class components that were observed at the shipyard in 1980. The outer hull components and fabrication jigs were still outside the construction hall as of August 1982; the status of the Romeo chass submarine construction prograin was not known. The North Koreans had fout additional Romeo S$s obtained from the People's Republic of China based on the west coast.
Sin-A Probable PCs
Unit 1 of the Sin-A class, a probable PCS, had been under construction at Sinpo since May 1981. The vessel was very similar its appearance and size to the Taechong PCs. The O-2 level of the superstructure extended further aft than that of the Taechong class; this may cause the mast to be placed either on the deck or above the 0-2 level. No weapoas or electronics had been mounted on the vessel as of August 1982. Construction of unit 2 of the class began in early 1982.
1West Coast Shipbuilding
Yongampo-ri Ship Repair Yard 17
Since 1980 the focus of naval shipbuding on the west coast shifted from Nanpo Shipyard to Yongampo-ri Ship Repair Yard, located on the Yalu River. The construction of three classes of naval vessels previously constructed at Nanpo and the first west coast construction of the Soju PTG had been observed at Yongampo-ri from 1980 to 1982.
A Soju PTG, the fourth unit of the class, was seen in the mid-stages of construction at Forgarpo-ri by August 1982. At least four STYX cruise missile launcher covers were near the PTG huil. This was the first construction of an Osa 1 PTC-type vessel from the keel up on the west coast.
A Taechong PCS had been under construction at Yongampo-ri since late 1979. This ship was the fourth west coast unit and unit 7 of the class. As of August 1982 the weapons and electronics had not been mounted on the ship. Whether this unit will have the modifications observed on units 5 and 6 of the class (the 100mm main gun and positioning of the anti-submarinerocket launchers closer to the bow) was not known.
Two Hantae LCUs, the second and third units on the west coast and units 7 and 8 or the class, respectively, had been under construction at Yongampo-ri since 1981. Unit 2 of this class was launched from Nampo Shipvard in 1979.
At least eight Sinhung PTs have been constructed at Yongampo-ri during the 1980-1982 period. This resumption of west coast Sirhung PT construction started at the same time as the Sinhung PT program at Najin Shipyard. Between 1966 and 1971 all west coast Sinnung PT units were constructed at Nampo Shipyard.
Nampo Shipyard 22
Nampo Shipyard had historically been the major naval shipbuilding facility on the west coast. However, the last naval shipbuilding start at Nampo Shipyard was a Taechong PCS, begun 17 late 1978. With the exception of three unfinished Chongju PCFS hulls, at Nampo since 1974, there were no naval vessels at the shipyard by August 1982. In fact, all shipbuilding activity at the yard except the modification of the Chongju hulls to PTGs had been suspended in favor of heavy fabrication activity. This activity, the costruction of large cylinders, had been underway since late 1987 and occupied most of the building ways at the shipyard. These cylinders were in supportof the Nampo lockgate, Taedong-gang construction project at the mouth of the Tae-dong-gang River), 10.8 mm west-southwest of the shipyard. Groups of 18 completed cylinders had been attached at the ends by a framework and arranged upright in three rows of six cylinders each. By 1982 six of these completed units had been towed to the construction project and sunk, and four units remained at the shipyard. The cylinder units were emplaced to act as caissons for the lockgate.
A Taechong PCS, the third unit on the west coast and unit 6 of the class,was launched from Nanpo in mid-1981 and has the same modification as winit 5, which was constructedduring the same time at Najin Shipyard 28. The main gun is 100m:n, and the RBU-1200 antisubmarinerocket launchers are forward, away from the superstructure. One of the earlier units was on the repair-way at Nampo Naval Headquarters and Naval Base and Ship Repair Yardadjacent to theshipyard, in May 1982. This unit was being overhauled, and part of the weapons suit had been removed.However, the forward turret remained in place, and no retrofitting to the more recent Taechong contigu-ration could be discerned.24. S/WN) Chongju PC/PCS. Two of the five Chongiu PCFS hulls at Nampo were modified toPCs/PCSs in the same manner by the addition of depth charge rails/racks and possible bridge-mountedantisubmarine rocket launchers) as unit 1 at Najin Shipyard 28 and aunched in mid-1987. The twoPCS/PCSs were first observed operationally deployed at Cho-do Naval Base Southjonimagery of25. (SAWN) Chongju PTG. The modification of the three remaining Chongju PCFS hulls at Nampo toa PTG configuration was observed during the spring of 1982 (Figure 14). Three STYX cruise missile launchrails and one STYX missile launcher cover were observed imounted on the deck of one Chongju PTG onimagery of and by all four launchers had been emplaced. The other two Chongju PTGswere in an earlier stage of the same modification. The forward portion of the deckhouse had beenerected on all three units, and the mounting rings for antiaircraft guns on the centerline, fore and aft,were in place. The configuration of the weapons systems and the size of the vesselsin lengthwith a beam ofia re similar to those of the indigenous Soju PTG. However, features that makethe Chongju PTG diferent from either the Soju or Soviet-built Osa i PTG are a different bridge area/tor-ward portion of the deckhouse and cruise missile launchers mounted closer to the stern, entirely aft ofmidships. Twelve STYX missile launcher covers, observed with the three Chongju huils, will be sufficientto outfit all three units. The completion of the modification of the Chongju hulls to PTGs, the construc-tion of at least one Soju PTG at Yorgampo-ri, and the acquisition of two new Osa | PTGs will increase thenumber of Osa I PTG-type vessels on the west coast from four prior to 1982) to ten (Table 2).26. (S/WN) The North Koreans have attempted to conceal this modification program from ground-level observation since late 1987, A wall was constructed around the three Chongju hults between'and the 12 STYX launcher covers were moved inside it. This wall isoiatedthe only remaining naval vessels from the remainder of the shipyard. A screen had been erected aroundthe edge of the deck of the one unit with STYX missile launchers byeffectively shielding thelaunchers from ground-level observation. These two concealment etforts make the shipyard appear, fromground level, to be engaged only in civilian construction.25X125X1....------------...-25X1--:-25X125X1.-----------25X125X1...-25X1--:-REFERENCES...-----------IMAGERY(SAWS) All applicable satellite imagery acquired from june 1974 through August 1982 was used in the preparationof this report.-----------REQUIREMENTCOMIREX 199Project 542081)...-------S Comments and queries regarding this report are welcome. They may be directed toLSN, Asian Forces Division, imagery Exploitation Group, NPIC.25X125X1------ .---...2-14607/82**.14 -SECRETRCA-09/0021/32Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/02/04 : CIA-RDP83T00574R000102740001-2
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Construction and Modificationof North Korean Naval Combatants,January 1983 through July 1986 (S)
In 1983, the amount of new construction at North Korean naval ship-yards began to decline from that seen in the early 1980s. Priority was givento the completion of combatants already under construction. From 1983 to1985, only three new types of combatants were designed and built: the 34-meter and 32-meter midget submarines and the Pipa-A inshore minesweep-er. The North Koreans concentrated on completing units started prior to1983, including Taechong-class submarine chasers; Sohung, Soju, andChongju missile attack boats; Chongju patrol craft and torpedo boats; Sin-hung torpedo and patrol boats; and Hantae utility landing craft. In addition,the series production of the Romeo attack submarines, 18- and 21-metermidget submarines, and Soju missile attack boats continued into 1986. Be-tween 1982 and 1986, the new construction of missile attack boats had in-creased the number of STYX missile launchers available to the North Kore-an navy by approximately one-third. In 1986, the North Koreans shifted theemphasis from naval combatants to civilian merchant/fishing ships at threeof the four shipyards (Najin, Nampo, and Yongampo Ri). (S/WN)Additionally, a combatant modification program was also started in1983 and was probably undertaken to upgrade vessel performance and ca-pabilities, to tailor certain vessels to specific missions, or to utilize indige-nously produced weapons. Changes in the following vessel classes have re-sulted from the 1983-86 design modification program: the Soho frigate,Sariwon and T-class patrol ships, Taechong I and II submarine chasers, theSinhung hydrofoil torpedo boat, the Chongjin hydrofoil patrol boat, andthe Nampo patrol boat. (S/WN)The renewed naval combatant construction program that began in theearly 1980s followed a pattern similar to, but shorter than, that of the 1970sprogram. A high level of importance was placed on naval combatant con-struction in the early 1970s, and then the amount of naval constructiongradually tapered off. Toward the end of the decade, the emphasis turnedto civilian ship construction. Finally, after approximately one year, navalcombatant construction began again. (S/WN)If this pattern is repeated, the emphasis is expected to shift once morefrom civilian projects to naval combatant construction in early 1987. How-ever, a renewal of combatant construction would depend upon pressingeconomic or social factors, such as those that created the need for a shiftfrom construction of naval combatants to large fishing vessels in 1979 and1986. It could also be influenced by the need that the North Koreans per-ceive for continued buildup and improvement of their naval forces. (S/WN)25X1Top SecretReverse side blank25X1Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/26 : CIA-RDP87T00758R000103060001-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/26 : CIA-RDP87T00758R000103060001-8Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/26 : CIA-RDP87T00758R000103060001-8
TIL LI .Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/26 : CIA-RDP87T00758R000103060001-8Top SecretRUFFConstruction and Modificationof North Korean Naval Combatants,January 1983 through July 1986 (S)IntroductionFigure 1. Locations of Naval Shipyards, North KoreaCHINANAJINSHIPYARDNUMBER 28SEA OF JAPANYONGYANGBecause the east and west coasts of North Koreaare isolated by the South Korean portion of the penin-sula and naval craft do not transit from one coast tothe other, North Korean ships remain on the coastwhere they are built. The four naval shipyards in NorthKorea are Najin Shipyard Number 2825X1and Sinpo Shipyard South |on the east25X1coast; and Yongampo Ri Shipyard25X1and Nampo Shipyardon the west25X1coast (Figure 1). (S/WN)NORTHKOREANajin is the major surface combatant shipyard forSINPOSHIPYARDthe east coast. Over the years, its has produced theSOUTHlargest number and variety of ship types of any NorthKorean shipyard. Other than the surface combatants,YONGAMPO RISHIPYARDthese vessel types include a large catamaran-hulledfrigate, SSMs of different types, a variety of landingcraft, and even an air-cushioned vehicle. Sinpo is theNAMPOonly North Korean shipyard where attack submarines SHIPYARDare built. Most midget submarines and a limited num-ber of surface combatants (Taechong-class submarinechasers) are also constructed at Sinpo. (S/WN)Olav KOREASECRET/WNINTELOnly surface combatants are built at the shipyardson the west coast. Nampo has historically been the Secret/WNINTELmajor shipyard on the west coast; however, in 1982when construction of the Nampo Lockgate Taedong-gangbegan, the amount of ship con-The body of this report describes the current sta- 25X1struction at Nampo decreased and large caissons for tus of North Korean naval combatant construction andthe lockgate were built. After construction of caissons modification. It also updates and supplements a previ-had been completed in late 1983, Nampo returned to ous NPIC report.1 The descriptions are arranged bylimited construction of combatants. Since the earlyship type and class in order of strategic importance.1980s, the focus of naval ship construction on the west (S/WN)coast shifted from Nampo to Yongampo Ri. As of mid-1986, Yongampo Ri still produced a larger number andgreater variety of surface combatants than Nampo.(S/WN)SOUTH..--Top Secret—25X1---Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/26 : CIA-RDP87T00758R000103060001-8
LALADeclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/26 : CIA-RDP87T00758R000103060001-8Top SecretRUFFAttack Submarine (SS)Romeo SSmarine components were observed in the open stor-age area where they remained until February 1982,Construction of the Romeo-class SS began in when they were moved to the large, inclined building1974, and as of July 1985, 15 had been constructed ways adjacent to the submarine construction hall.and launched. Components observed in the open stor- (S/WN)age area at Sinpo Shipyard South through 1986 indi-cate that this program is continuing. (S/WN)The three-year hiatus in submarine launches end-ed in April 1982 when Romeo SS unit 12 was observedThe Chinese probably provided technical assis in the fitting-out basin (Figure 2). This submarine wastance for the first 11 Romeo attack submarines con probably not constructed using the Romeo compo-structed at Sinpo from 1974 to 1979.2 The program nents moved from the shipyard to the building hall inwas suspended in 1979; the lack of submarineFebruary 1982 because it would take longer than twolaunches, the absence of components in open storage, months to assemble those components, finish, andand the lack of component movement indicated an in-terruption in the Romeo program. In May 1980, sub-Figure 2. Romeo SS Construction, 1982 through June 1986UNITJAN-APR-JUL- OCT-JAN-APR-JUL- OCT- JAN-APR-JUL-JOCT-JAN-APR-JUL- OCT-JAN-APR-MARJUNSEP DEC MARJUN SEP DEC MARJUN SEP DEC MAR JUNSEP DEC MARJUN82848583861214.........15......O ESTIMATED TWO-YEAR PERIOD FORCONSTRUCTIONO FITTING OUT/SEATRIALSOPERATIONALSecret/WNINTELTop Secret25X15Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/26 : CIA-RDP87T00758R000103060001-8
ii....--..-..--._...Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/26 : CIA-RDP87T00758R000103060001-8Top SecretRUFFlaunch a submarine. Thus, unit 12 was probably an un-finished unit from the 1974-1979 construction pro-gram and was probably completed by the North Kore-ans without Chinese assistance. (S/WN)Unit 12 was the first Romeo SS to be returned tothe building hall for a brief period during fitting out.The same fitting-out procedure was followed by eachsubsequent Romeo unit. The fitting-out/sea-trial peri-od for unit 12 lasted eight to nine months. (S/WN)25X1ByRomeo unit 13 had beenlaunched. The North Koreans probably experiencedproblems with this unit, because the fitting-out periodwas unusually long-22 months. Additionally, the sub-marine only had a primer coat of paint for up to eightmonths; usually, the final coat of paint for a Romeo SShas been applied within two months after launch.(S/WN)25X1Top SecretTop Secret28X125X1Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/26 : CIA-RDP87T00758R000103060001-8
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.... ... ....-Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/26 : CIA-RDP87T00758R000103060001-8Top SecretRUFFMidget Submarine (SSM)25X1The North Koreans have the largest fleet of midgetsubmarines in the world. Pyongyang's high interest inspecial operations forces and sea infiltration into SouthKorea accounts for the large buildup of midget subma-rines. 3 This fleet contains one 34-meter SSM, one 32-meter SSM, and thirty-seven 18- and 21-meter SSMs.(S/WN/NF)25X125X1Top Secret25X1Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/26 : CIA-RDP87T00758R000103060001-81*
??????????????Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/26 : CIA-RDP87T00758R000103060001-8Top SecretRUFF25X1structures on the bow and stern (Figure 5). Two nar-row, raised structures on the bow extend the full beamand may divert water from the torpedo/sail area. Araised, rectangular structure on the stern has two rect-angular openings in the front and could be used topropel or control the vessel. (S/WN)The 32-meter SSM also is similar in some aspectsto the Italian COS MO S SX-404 submersible; bothhave three large, circular limber holes on either side(those on the COS MO S SX-404 are forward of thesail; those on the 32-meter SSM are aft of the sail); aflat, pointed bow; and a squared stern (Figure 6). How-ever, the COS MO S SX-404 is only 17 meters long. 4(S/WN)32-Meter SSM18- and 21-Meter Midget Submarines25X125X1The 32-meter SSM was first observed onwhile it was under construction at Najin Ship-yard Number 28. In late April 1984, this SSM wasmoved back into the building hall and was not seenagain until it was launched late that year. Other thanone transit to Najin Naval Base, 8 kilometers (km)south of Najin Shipyard Number 28, the SSM has re-mained at the shipyard.The North Koreans have a large midget submarineforce including thirty-seven 18- and 21-meter SSMs.Only six of the 21-meter SSMs have been confirmed;the remainder of the inventory appear to be the 18-meter version. The 18- and 21-meter SSMs have beenunder construction since the 1970s. They are probablyan indigenous design that may have been derived fromthe six 16-meter SSMs imported from Yugoslavia dur-ing the 1973-74 period. 3* (S/WN/NF)25X125X1This unusual midget submarine was the first NorthKorean midget submarine to be fitted with externaltorpedo tubes, which were mounted onto the hull,one on either side of the small sail. This configurationresembles a World War II German UCINI U-boat de-sign. (S/WN)25X1These midget submarines are constructed at SinpoShipyard South and repaired at Mayangdo Ri NavalRepair Yard(By mid-1983, 19 SSMSwere in the inventory. This number indicates a produc-tion rate of four vessels per year. In 1984, this produc-tion rate tripled and resulted in a total of 33 midgetsubmarines.In addition to the torpedo tubes, the midget sub-marine has other unique features, such as the raised25X125X1*These six SSMs are included in the count of 18- and 21-meter SSMSbecause the size difference is very difficult to detect on imagery, es-pecially when the submarines are in the water. (S/WN)Top SecretTCS-21216/87Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/26 : CIA-RDP87T00758R000103060001-8
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.........--------.- -----------...--.+4+-+---:.Il ..I .-...Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/26 : CIA-RDP87T00758R000103060001-8Top SecretRUFFFrigate (FF)25X1Soho FFThe Soho FF is the only catamaran-hulled vessel inthe North Korean naval inventory and is equipped withcruise missiles and a helicopter pad. It was laid downin 1980 at Najin Shipyard 28 and operational by De-cember 1982. In March 1983, the Soho FF was first ob-served with an Mi-4 HOUND helicopter on deck. Dur-ing 1983, the Soho FF conducted a few brief patrolsfrom its home port of Toejo Dong Naval Base (BEThe Soho was returned to the shipyard inlate 1983 where it remained for two and a half years.Armament for the Soho FF includes four SS-N-2(STYX) launchers; four Soviet-type RBU-1200s, one100-mm forward gun, two twin 57-mm dual-purposeguns, two 30-mm antiaircraft (AA) guns, one DRUMTILT radar, one unidentified radar, and two twin 25-mm AA guns (Figure 8). (S/WN)25X125X1Top Secret25X125X1Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/26 : CIA-RDP87T00758R000103060001-8
????? ????????????????????? ????? ??????? ????? ??????? ???? ?????? ?????. - ????????? ?? ????Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/26 : CIA-RDP87T00758R000103060001-8Top SecretRUFF25x1Patrol Ship (PGF)Sariwon and T-Class PGFIn the early 1950s, the North Koreans acquiredtwo T-class fleet minesweepers from the Soviet Unionand converted them into patrol ships. In the late1960s, the construction of the four Sariwon PGFs inthe North Korean inventory began at Najin ShipyardNumber 28.6 (S/WN)type of guns that were available to the North Koreansat that time.5 Both classes have a superstructure for-ward of amidships and a stack with two quad 14.5-mmAA guns on either side located amidships. However,the classes differed in weapons suites. The Sariwonhad one 85-mm gun forward, four quad 14.5-mm AAguns around the stack, and one twin 57-mm dual-pur-pose gun aft. The T-class had one 85-mm gun forward,two quad 14.5-mm AA guns on either side of the stack,and three 37-mm AA guns aft. (S/WN)Because the Sariwon design was based on the T-class, both classes are similar in size and structure;however, the original armament configuration was dif-ferent. This difference may have been because of theDuring the 1970s, the forward gun of Sariwon unit513 was changed to a twin 57-mm dual-purpose gun,Top Secret25X1Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/26 : CIA-RDP87T00758R000103060001-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/26 : CIA-RDP87T00758R000103060001-8Top SecretRUFFand in 1983, the addition of two RBU-600s and depthcharges gave this vessel an antisubmarine warfare ca-pability (Figure 9 and Table 1),5 Between late 1979 andlate 1984, units 511 and 512 had been modified differ-ently at Munchon Up Naval Base and Shipyard (BETable 1.Changes to Weapons Configuration of Sariwon andT-Class PGFsClassSariwon25X1....wm.. .---...1Unit Remarks511 Forward gun changed to 85-mm turret gun--** Twin 57-mm dual-purpose gun aft replaced" with two probable 37-mm AA gunsSame configuration as 511513..---Two RBU-600s added behind the forward gun-Forward gun changed from 85-mm to a twin57-mm dual-purpose.gun.Retained the twin 57-mm dual-purpose gun" "aft --- .-----..----wwwN--.-...A.--.-------.........--wwwww.. ----.-.-- Wo www.......---www.-----..-...--.--....w.----www------25X1..---...-.....Modifications to the two T-class PGFs were firstobserved in 1984 at their home ports; it is unknownwhen or where the modifications took place. Unit 571appears to be similar to the modified Sariwon PGF; thisT-class has one 85-mm turret gun on the bow, two ad-ditional quad 14.5-mm AA guns (for a total of fouraround the stack), and two 37-mm AA guns aft (Figure10). The only modification to T-class unit 1003 was thereplacement of the 100-mm forward gun with a muchsmaller unidentified gun; the other armament on unit1003 remained the same (Figure 11). (S/WN).......---· wa...--------...---..w..www---.w..-----..... -------.....-.-..T-Class - - 571 - Forward gun changed to 85-mm turret gun---Deckhouse aft of the stack modified for two--more quad 14.5-mm AA gunsOne 37-mm-AA gun removed aft; two remain-...-making the appearance similar to the ..Sariwon1003 Small unidentified gun installed as main gün- Retained three aft 37-mm guns and two quad14:5-mm AA guns.............--..wwwwwwwwww-----www.These modifications to the weapons suite do notsubstantially alter or improve a vessel's firepower andmay have been made to tailor a vessel to a specificmission or to utilize indigenously produced weapons.(S/WN)This table is classified Secret/WNINTEL.25X1Top Secret25X113Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/26 : CIA-RDP87T00758R000103060001-8 - T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/26 : CIA-RDP87T00758R000103060001-8Page DeniedDeclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/26 : CIA-RDP87T00758R000103060001-8Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied25X1------...---.--.-.-.---...------------------------------.-.-.-.-.--...---..-.-.--.---...------------------------------------...-----------------.---... -- ---------...---.--.-.-.---...------------------------------.-.-.-.-.--...---..-.-.--.---...------------------------------------...------------------------...---------------
??????????????????????????? ?????????????? ?? ?? .?????? ?????????????? ????? ????? ?? ????? ??? ??? ??? ???? ??????? ????? ????... .Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/26 : CIA-RDP87T00758R000103060001-8Top SecretRUFFSubmarine Chaser (PCS)Taechong-Class PCSTaechong 125X1Construction of the Taechong-class PCS began inthe mid-1970s. All the Taechong PCSs—including theTaechong I and its follow-on, the Taechong 11—have alength ofBothclasses have a superstructure amidships and a deck-house aft; however, the armament and electronics varybetween the classes. Features of the weapons suitecommon to both include one POT HEAD surface-search radar on the main mast, one 85- or 100-mmforward gun; two RBU-1200s, and one twin 57-mmdual-purpose gun aft. (S/WN)Nine Taechong I units were constructed; the lastfive are slightly different in design and armament fromthe first four units of the class. Units 1 through 4, con-structed at Najin and Nampo shipyards, are configuredwith an 85-mm turret gun forward, two RBU-1200antisubmarine rocket launchers aft of the forward gun,two twin 14.5-mm AA guns on the forward edge of the0-1 level, one twin 25-mm AA gun on the small deck-house, one twin 57-mm gun aft, and one POT HEADsurface search radar (Figure 12). One east coast unitconstructed at Najin has been slightly modified; theRBUs are forward of the main gun. (S/WN)25X1Top Secret25x116Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/26 : CIA-RDP87T00758R000103060001-8 -
LLLILLLLLLLLLLLL LLLLLLLLL LLLDeclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/26 : CIA-RDP87T00758R000103060001-8Top SecretRUFFUnits 5 and 6 were constructed at Najin and Nam-po shipyards concurrently, and both were operationalby the fall of 1982. Unit 7 was begun in late 1979 atYongampo Ri Shipyard and was not operational until _same length. Therefore, these combatants can now beconfirmed as Taechong 1 PCSs. The only design changeis the extension of the 0-1 level of the superstructureaft. (S/WN)25X1In 1983, a cover was constructed over the buildingways at Sinpo, so the Taechong ! units with the aft su-perstructure extension were not observed again until25X1These three vessels differ from the original four; a 100-mm gun is forward, and the two RBU-1200s are infront of the forward gun. However, on units 1 to 4, the85-mm turret gun is forward and two RBU-1200s areaft of this gun (Figure 13). (S/WN)Two units were identified under construction inMay 1981 and early 1982 at Sinpo Shipyard South.They were originally given the NPIC interim designatorSin-A, but further analysis indicates that they have thesame weapons suite as units 5 through 7 and are the25X1---Top Secret25X117Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/26 : CIA-RDP87T00758R000103060001-8
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/26 : CIA-RDP87T00758R000103060001-8Top SecretRUFF
Taechong II PCS
Two Sohung PTGs were built at Nampo Shipyard in the mid-to-late 1970s and home-ported at ChodoNaval Base South. Construction of four more units began in 1980 at Najin. Although two of these were launched that year, one was returned to the building ways and re-launched in 1981. Construction of the two remaining units resumed in mid-1983; two were complete in May 1984. All four units were at their homeport of Puam Dong Naval Base by July 1984.
In 1983, a Taechong-class PCS at Najin Shipyardhad been identified as Taechong I unit 8; however, af-ter a review of imagery, this unit was confirmed as aTaechong II. The combatant was last observed in mid-August 1984, when it had one 30-mm AA gun positionon the 0-1 level and one 30-mm AA gun position aft ofthe 57-mm gun on the stern. It also had a DRUM TILTmount on the deckhouse and an extended 0-2 level onthe superstructure (Figure 15). (S/WN)Construction of the Soju-class PTG began in mid-1980,25X1It is an indige- 25X1nous copy of theSoviet Osa-I PTG, which 25X1has four STYX launchers, two 30-mm AA guns (oneforward and one aft), one DRUM TILT radar, and anelongated superstructure. The only difference is thatthe Soju is 4 meters longer with a more sharply point-ed bow. (S/WN)Construction of units 1 through 3 began in mid-1980 at Najin Shipyard 28. In 1982, unit 1 was de-ployed to its home port of Toejo Dong. Unit 2, whichwas completed in mid-1983, transitted to Munchon UpNaval Base and Shipyard in mid-1984.25X125X1Soju unit 3 was launched in August 1984 25X1After fitting 25X1Missile Attack Boat (PTG)out and seatrials, unit 3 should join the other two SojuPTGs at Toejo Dong. Both units 2 and 3 underwentlong fitting-out and sea-trial periods, which could indi-Sohung PTGcate that problems were encountered with these units.(S/WN)North Korea's version of the Soviet Komar PTG isthe steel-hulled Sohung missile attack boat, which car- The construction of units 4 and 5 began in mid-ries two STYX missile launchers. The east coast So 1982 at Yongampo Ri Shipyard, and they were movedhungs have a 25-mm AA gun like the east coast Komar. to Nampo Shipyard in mid-1983, when they were inHowever, the west coast Sohungs have a twin 14.5 the midstage of construction. After a long final con-mm AA gun. (S/WN)
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