North Korea - Military Industry - Introduction
The military-industrial complex (MIC) of the DPRK is the main branch of the country's economy: all the rest are subordinate to the interests of its development in order to maintain and build up the power of the armed forces. By one account, upwards of ninety percent of the factories built in North Korea are manufacturers in the munitions industries. Materials needed for construction such as metal, steel, and wood can only be produced and deployed in munitions factories.
North Korea's announced defense spending for 2003 was nearly US$1.8 billion or 15.7 percent of the state budget, an increase of US$320 million, from 2002. However, when coupled with profit estimates from the Second Economic Committee's foreign military sales, it is possible that actual 2003 military spending could had reached as much as US$5 billion, or 44.4 percent of the total budget. North Korea's extensive defense production capability reflects its commitment to self-reliance and its military-first, or songun, policy. As it relates to the defense industry, emphasis on the military-first policy has two foci: preferential development of defense articles and accomplishment of announced economic priorities executed in the revolutionary military spirit.
North Korea's military industry is divided into a sector that produces various weapons and combat technology equipment and a sector that produces military necessities. That is, it can be divided into a specialized logistics division that produces guns, artillery, ammunition, tanks, warships, and military airplanes, and a general logistics division that produces military necessities such as military uniforms, boots, and gear.
North Korea has an impressive, although technologically dated, military production capacity. From an aggregate of some 180 arms factories, North Korea operates approximately 40 gun factories of varying calibers, 10 armored vehicle factories, 10 naval shipyards, and 50 munitions factories. Many of these factories are constructed underground in strategic rear areas.
The wartime operation plant receives and carries out the wartime mobilization preparation plan from the National Planning Committee and provincial level. The materials stockpiled for the production of military supplies at the Wartime Dongwon Factory are resolved through the accumulation of '5 materials'. The '5 supplies' stocked by the wartime mobilization factories are also known as spare materials for the Supreme Commander. In the mid-1980s, Kim Jong-il's modern war is “a war of al, war of oil. It is derived from the fact that the war is not dragged for more than six months, so that the war supplies must be stockpiled for six months.
According to existing estimates, the DPRK's military-industrial complex covers up to 1,800 enterprises in total, of which 134 factories are the main manufacturers of weapons and military equipment, many of which are fully or partially located underground and in rocky strata. Taking into account some of the 115 "civilian" factories that have mobilization plans for the production of weapons in wartime, there are more than 180 such well-defended factories. North Korea is believed to have 40 firearms factories, 17 artillery factories, 5 missile factories, 35 ammunition factories, 50 explosives factories, 5 - 10 armored vehicles factories (of which the largest is the Ryu Gen Su tank factory in Sinhun, Hamgennam-do province), 8 instrument-making and assembly factories of the aviation industry, 5-10 shipbuilding yards, 5 communication facilities, 8 major chemical and biological weapons production facilities. A nuclear industry has been created in the country.
In the case of conventional weapons, the technology of North Korea's military industry is at the level of independent development beyond assembly production. The tank and armored vehicle parts are manufactured in-house, excluding some special armor materials and precision parts. Arms plants are known to have an annual production capacity of 218,000 guns, 680 artillery and self-propelled guns, 1,530 mortars, 882 firearms, 22 tanks, 300 armored vehicles, and 87,000 ammunition. Most of the ship parts have their own design development, construction, and maintenance capabilities except for some. The aircraft industry is equipped with technology introduction and production and partial improvement capabilities, but it has not yet secured its own development capabilities.
North Korea's missile development and production technology level is evaluated at the level of advanced missile countries. While developing the multi-stage missile, the Taepodong missile, it was trying to equip the intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities. Some raw materials and parts necessary for the production of ballistic missiles are imported, but the missile production proceeds almost by itself. North Korea has mastered the production of guided ballistic missiles for operational-tactical and tactical purposes, anti-ship missiles, anti-tank missile and portable anti-aircraft missile systems, mine-torpedo weapons, a full range of small arms, anti-tank infantry and artillery weapons (including towed and self-propelled guns, anti-aircraft towed and self-propelled installations, multiple launch rocket systems and mortars), main battle and light tanks, armored personnel carriers, engineering weapons, some types of radar stations and communications equipment, medium, small and ultra-small diesel submarines, warships with a displacement of about 1500 - 2000 tons and a variety of combat boats. The North Korean military-industrial complex produces 11 types of small arms, 3 types of tanks, and 3 types of light armored vehicles.
The annual capacity of the national military industry is estimated at 200 thousand units of automatic small arms, 3 thousand guns of caliber above 100 mm, 400 light armored vehicles. The production capacity of the North Korean missile industry makes it possible to produce, for example, up to eight long-range ballistic missiles (operational-tactical) "Hwaseong-5" and "Hwaseong-6" per month.
P'yongyang has a well-developed arms industry with the capacity, particularly in munitions and small arms, to meet its own needs and support foreign assistance. Along with the military buildup of the 1970s, there had been growth in defense industries, giving the North Koreans greafer independence from their military allies. In the early 1970s, China and the USSR promoted the North Korean military buildup by providing military equipment and technical assistance. Both sent considerable numbers of tanks, APCs, and aircraft to North Korea, and the Soviets supplied large numbers of SAM systems.
Notable among the several projects involving technical aid were the Sinhung tank plant built with Soviet assistance and the submarine production yard built with Chinese help.
By the early 1980s the North Koreans manufactured medium tanks, APCs, self-propelled and towed field and AA artillery, multiple rocket launchers, submarines and other naval craft, and most of their own ammunition. North Korea must still depend on other states for aircraft, missiles, optics, and sophisticated electronics. Since North Korea was exporting weapons to Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia, observers surmised that its own armed forces suffered no serious equipment shortages — at least in the export items.
North Korea in the 1980s became a significant factor in the international arms market. North Korea produces almost all of its ground forces and naval weapons, ammunition, and equipment [other than aircraft]. Sales consist primarily of small arms and ammunition, towed artillery, mortars, multiple rocket launch-rarely engaged in hostile encounters. The limited ers, and anti-aircraft weapons. P'yongyang exports only a few domestically produced T-62 tanks and none of its indigenously designed armored personnel carriers or self-propelled guns.
North Korean defense industries showed no evidence of slowing the production of ground force weapons for force modernization. Towed artillery, self-propelled guns and anti-aircraft artillery, and multiple rocket launchers continued to be turned out and added to the forces. The North Korean plant engaged in the series production of medium tanks switched from copies of T-55s to T-62 types in the late 1970s.
Throughout the duration of the Persian Gulf hostilities, North Korea was been the major supplier of weapons to Iran. Artillery, antiaircraft machineguns, mortars, and ammunition made up most of the transfer. Tanks, small arms, naval mines, and antitank and surface-to-air missile systems had been sold in more limited quantities. North Korea's rapid response to Iran's purchase orders for conventional ground force weapons and ammunition in 1980 suggested that P'yongyang has acquired significant military stockpiles to meet any surge in demand for select clients.
North Korea has its own well-established arms industry, producing much of its own equipment, apart from aircraft, and some types of missiles. Most of North Korea's locally manufactured weapons were built to Soviet design. This industry has its origins in the aftermath of the Korean War (what the DPRK officially calls the “Fatherland Liberation War”), when Pyongyang struggled to make itself self-sufficient in armaments production through the development of an indigenous defense industry. The outputs include artillery, munitions, missiles, etc. Moreover, production is not just to satisfy North Korea’s own defense needs but for export to earn hard currency.
The relative importance of the defense industry in North Korea’s economy is much higher than that in any other country. This is because North Korea’s defense industry, based the state policy of “military first and self-reliance,” has supported the state system. In serving such a role, North Korea’s defense industry has long enjoyed the privilege of priority distribution of manpower and resources over other sectors. Furthermore, the defense industry has been of core interest to North Korea’s top leaders. As a result, North Korea’s defense industry has achieved great progress and it is now capable of developing nuclear warheads and intercontinental ballistic missiles.
While North Korea maintains large amounts of military equipment, much of it is outdated making it quantitatively superior to most armies but qualitatively inferior. Due to the high cost of modern military equipment and the lack of funds for and access to the same from years of economic sanctions and poor economic policies, the country retains obsolete hardware, as evidenced by the presence of the T-34/85—a World War II-era tank—in some of its lower-priority armor units. The age and variety of equipment from the former Soviet Union, Russia, and China, and its own internally produced equipment generate major logistical issues for the KPA to effectively keep the assortment of weapons systems fully functional. The various types of ammunition required by weapon systems that date from the 1940s also puts additional strain on the military’s logistics.
Most of the equipment is of Soviet or Chinese design, but North Korea has modified the original designs to produce both derivatives and indigenously designed versions of armored personnel carriers, self-propelled artillery, tanks, and high-speed landing craft. Ground systems production includes a complete line of crew- and individualserved weapons, tanks, armored vehicles, howitzers, rocket launchers, and missiles. Naval construction includes surface combatants, submarines, landing craft air-cushion vehicles, and a wide range of specialized infiltration craft.
Shipyards that have mastered the construction of warships are located in Muncheon, Shinpo, Mayando (submarines), Yukdaesori (midget submarines), Najin and Nampo (surface warships and boats). At the shipyards of the fishing fleet in Haeju, small boats are also being built for sabotage and reconnaissance units.
The aviation industry is represented by enterprises that produce spare parts for aircraft, including MiG-21, MiG-23, MiG-29 fighters and Soviet-made Su-25 attack aircraft. The largest aircraft plant in the DPRK is located near the city of Tokhen, another, somewhat smaller, is located in Chongjin. At a plant near Tokhen, a partial assembly of light multipurpose Mi-2 helicopters from components supplied by Poland was mastered at one time, it is also possible to produce light piston trainer aircraft here and, according to some information, it was supposed to produce its own version of the MiG-21 fighter, which, however did not take place. Equally, the program of assembling from parts and assemblies of MiG-29 fighters supplied by Russia was not implemented. In total, the North Koreans managed to assemble two MiG-29s in 1993,
Aircraft production includes Mi-2 helicopters, Yak-18 trainers, spare parts, and perhaps coproduction of jet fighters. There are no known indigenous aircraft built in North Korea, factories supply components or parts for current aircraft flown such as for Tumansky RD-9 turbojet engine used by Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-19 and Shenyang J-6.
The aviation industry is represented by enterprises that produce spare parts for aircraft, including MiG-21, MiG-23, MiG-29 fighters and Soviet-made Su-25 attack aircraft. The largest aircraft plant in the DPRK is located near the city of Tokhen, another, somewhat smaller, is located in Chongjin. At a plant near Tokhen, a partial assembly of light multipurpose Mi-2 helicopters from components supplied by Poland was mastered at one time, it is also possible to produce light piston trainer aircraft here and, according to some information, it was supposed to produce its own version of the MiG-21 fighter, which, however did not take place. Equally, the program of assembling from parts and assemblies of MiG-29 fighters supplied by Russia was not implemented. In total, the North Koreans managed to assemble two MiG-29s in 1993.
Special attention in the development of the North Korean military-industrial complex is given to rocketry. The general management of the DPRK missile industry is carried out by the 4th General Bureau of the 2nd Economic Committee. It is responsible for the development and production of ballistic missiles (the 2nd Research Center is engaged in them), anti-ship, anti-tank and anti-aircraft guided missiles. Under a Russian license, the portable anti-tank missile systems Malyutka (national name Susong-po), Fagot and portable anti-aircraft missile systems Strela-2M (Va-sung) and Igla-1 are produced.
The rocket-building enterprises are represented by the Yakjen Machine Building Plant in the Pyongyang suburb of Mangyongdae (also known as the Mangyongdae Electric Machine Building Plant; the main workshops, which employ approximately 1,500 people, are underground), Defense Plant No. 7 (located about 8 km from the Mangyongdae plant; produces, in particular, medium-range ballistic missiles "Tephodong-1"), plant number 26 in Kang (the largest underground enterprise of the military-industrial complex, the total number of employees is estimated at 20 thousand people; in addition to guided and unguided missiles, torpedoes are also produced here, depth charges and engineering mines), plant no. 118 in Kagamri and Kechenkun, plant no. 125 in Pyongyang (known under the code name "Pyongyang pig-breeding complex"), and plant no. 301 in Daegwang-Yp.Yakdzhen Machine-Building Plant and Plant No. 7 are subordinated to the 2nd Research Center of the 4th General Bureau.
| division | system | Specialized factory | General (repair/parts) factory | |
| Ammunition factory | 55 | 19 | 36 | |
| Gun and gun factory | 43 | 8 | 35 | |
| Armored vehicle factory | 12 | 2 | 10 | |
| Guided weapon factory | 8 | 5 | 3 | |
| Biochemical plant | 16 | - | 16 | |
| Shipyard ship | 12 | 2 | 10 | |
| Aircraft factory | 9 | 2 | 7 | |
| Telecommunication factory | 14 | 6 | 8 | |
| Other military factories | 11 | - | 11 | |
| Total | 180 | 44 | 136 |
