Colombia - Navy (Armada República de Colombia [ARC]) History
The Navy was born with Independence, by president of the Supreme Board of Cartagena, Jose Maria Garcia de Toledo, who by decree September 17, 1810, created the General command of the Navy, under the command of Captain Juan Nepomuceno Eslava, son of the Viceroy Sebastián Eslava. On June 28, 1822, the General Santander created the Nautical School, which later disappeared along with their warships and sailors.
The feat that originated the National Navy occurred during the independence, when Admiral José Padilla faced Spanish troops lead by Commander Ángel Laborde at Lake Maracaibo (today, Zulia state in Venezuela). This dispute is known as Lake Maracaibo’s Naval Battle and it put an end to Spain’s Reconquista intentions. It is very important in the history of both nations, for it impeded the arrival of Spanish to Colombia and it gave Venezuela its final independence. Hundreds of creoles died during this war, but their sacrifice served as an example of honor for the new generations of vessels. That is why the National Navy celebrates its founding on July 24th 1823, the day troops in the America’s were victorious. /p>
The navy of Colombia by 1827 was was one of her weakest points, notwithstanding the anxiety she evinced to create a maritime force, and the sums she lavished in the attempt. At its first formation by Admiral Brion, it consisted of a few brigs and schooners, manned principally by foreigners; but the circumstances of the Colombian government at that time not allowing it to be very punctual in the payment of its seamen — a class of persons who are rather nice upon that point — they became disgusted with the service; and being for the most part English and Anglo-Americans, they took every opportunity of the arrival of a man of war of their respective nations in the ports of Colombia, to claim the protection of their national flag, and quit the service of the republic. The ships which the Colombians had purchased were also old and rotten, and proved asource of continual expense.
At length, the loan raised in England by Don Francisco Antonio Zea, placing them in rather better circumstances, they added three or four stout corvettes to their navy, and were emboldened to offer battle to the Spanish squadron, and attempt to prevent it from throwing supplies into Maracaybo, at that time held by Morales. In the action which ensued, they were however overpowered by the superior force of the Spaniards; and notwithstanding the gallant conduct of their commander, Commodore Daniels, a native of the United States, they were completely defeated, and lost two of their corvettes. /p>
The second loan they procured in England, again afforded them the means of increasing their navy, and as they seem to have thought that nothing was wanting but money and ships to render them a naval power, they immediately laid out a part of it in the purchase, in Europe and North America, of vessels nearly equal in force to a British seventy-four. They have now in their ports two or three of this class of vessels—some corvettes, and several brigs and schooners: but, unfortunately, there are not in the whole republic, sailors enough to man one of their large ships; and English and Anglo-American sailors being tired of the service, it is very probable that their newly purchased navy will lie in port till it falls to pieces, or becomes a prey to the worms.
It would, perhaps, have been better for Colombia, had she followed the example of the United States in this part of their policy. This latter country, although formed by nature for a naval power of the first order, and having at its command every essential for the formation and equipment of a navy, was content, for many years after the declaration of her independence, with two or three frigates, and some smaller vessels, to protect her extensive commerce. Colombia, on the contrary, has determined to have a navy at any cost, although she was obliged to buy the ships and every article necessary for their equipment, even to the provisions for the crew, and she was even then dependent on the caprice of a foreign sailor, to enable her to send any one of her vessels to sea.
In short, Colombia had no means within herself of forming a navy capable of opposing any effectual resistance, even to the feeble power of Spain, whose squadrons can at pleasure blockade her ports and keep her coasts in alarm; it would, therefore, be more prudent in her to desist from the vain attempt; for so long as she was under the necessity of purchasing every article requisite, both for the formation and maintenance of a naval force, it will prove not only a hopeless but a ruinous undertaking. From the situation of her coasts within the limits of the trade-winds, during the greater part of the year, easterly and northeasterly gales prevail from Cape Codera to Porto Bello ; and the passage of vessels bound to windward is rendered so difficult and tedious, that a voyage from Carthagena to Europe is attended with less danger, and requires a shorter time than the passage to windward from that city to Porto Cabello or Laguira. The last of these difficulties may, perhaps, be removed by the introduction of steam-boats; but even if they are able to make head against the wind and current on this coast, the nature of the employment on board such vessels is not calculated to make very expert sailors.
But even if Colombia could man her ships, she had no natives capable either of commanding or of acting in the capacity of subaltern and petty officers, on board of them, for, Padilla, although inferior to no one in personal bravery, or in the fighting of a gunboat, having had no other nautical education than that acquired during a short service as boatswain, or boatswain's mate, on board an English man-of-war, cannot be supposed well qualified for the management of one of their large ships; and although their deficiency in commanders is supplied by some foreign officers of ability, who, in addition to those already mentioned, still remain in their service; even their skill is rendered of no avail by the want of subalterns; the greater part of those foreigners who have heretofore filled those situations having retired from the service in disgust.
To remedy these defects in the Colombian navy, a marine school was established at Carthagena for the purpose of providing a supply of officers; and by a law, provision has been made for the organisation of a marine militia, to be raised in the maritime departments by a ballot amongst all persons between the ages of sixteen and forty, who follow the occupation of fishing, or are employed either in the merchant service, or in the internal navigation of the country.
Two very important decrees were issued by the Executive at Bogota in 1880. One of them is intended to carry out the law restoring the Colombian navy. Four vessels are to be purchased or built without delay. They must have modern artillery, and in all other respects be equal to the requirements of the service assigned to them by the law organizing the navy. Contracts shall be entered into with competent foreigners who may be willing to put themselves at the service of the Republic in this particular line. Two navy-yards were to be established, one at Carthagena and another at Panama, under the management of practical men, who may be selected either in Colombia or abroad. Two of the vessels would be school ships, and practical lessons in ship building would be taught at the navy-yards. The sum of $600,000 is appropriated for the purpose of establishing this navy. The other decree provided for the organization of the 4th Division of the Colombian army in view of complications possibly arising which may threaten Colombia's dignity and her territory. By 1903 the Colombian navy consisted of the following vessels : — On the Atlantic, 3 cruisers; on the Pacific, 2 cruisers, 2 gunboats, 1 troopship, 2 tugs; on the river Magdalena, 1 gunboat.
There was hardly a real sailor in he whole Colombian navy, the officers of which are soldiers. The nearest approaches that they have to true naval officers are a few Peruvians and Chilians, who are quite good men, but whose standard of naval education was far below that of an English, German, French or American officer.
The Colombian navy was composed of the cruiser Bogota, on the Pacific Coast, and the gunboats Cartagena and General Pinzon on the Atlantic side. There are a few small armed launches in addition to these, which are not worth considering.
The Bogota was the most formidable. She was formerly the merchant steamer Jessie Banning, and prior still the yacht of the Rajah of Cutch. She is a steel steamer of about 12 knots speed, although her old machinery rarely developed more than nine knots out of her. She had no protection whatever against an enemy's shot, but her armament, for a vessel of her size (she is less than 200 feet long), was excellent, being composed of one 14-pounder and eight 6-pounder rapid fire guns, all weapons of the latest type, and two Vickers-Maxim machine guns. Four of the 6-pounders were Hotchkiss, two were Driggs-Shroeder, and two were Driggs-Seabury semi-automatic guns.
The Cartagena was formerly James Gordon Bennett's yacht Namouna. She was a trim-looking craft, probably 180 feet long, and was formerly speedy, but her machinery, like nearly all other machinery left to the anything but tender care of Colombians, is in a woeful state. Her battery had been changed from time to time, and in 1903 was composed of a 12 or 14-pounder bow gun and four 6-pounders.
The General Finzon was still smaller, and a less effective vessel. The cruiser Padilla, and the little gunboats Chucuito and Darien, formerly in the Colombian navy, now belonged to Panama, and are on the Pacific side of the isthmus. The Padilla is a larger vessel than the Bogota, and was armed last year with a 14-pounder, a 12-pounder, two 6-pounders, two 3-pounders, and one or two machine guns. She is a better vessel than the Bogota, but her battery is not so heavy.
The Chucuito was a tiny tug-boat, carrying two 6-pounder guns. The Darien was little more than a steam launch, and carries one small gun. There was also in Panama a goodsized steam lighter called the Clapet which the Colombians for a time used as a gun-boat, mounting two 6-pounders upon her, but she was a decrepit old craft, of little use save for carrying stores and coal where wanted.
The Colombians were not sailors by nature, inclination or practice. Their vessels sailed from point to point along the shore by following landmarks. Their crews were mainly composed of negroes and half-breeds who will fight bravely, but with as little intelligence as the Colombian soldiers. It is safe to say that a thousand well-disciplined American troops, inured to tropical climates, are more than a match for ten times the number of Colombians either in aggressive or defensive warfare. As marksmen the Colombians were ridiculous. As for the Colombian sailors, they are so incompetent as to be ludicrous. It would be inhuman to put them in action against vessels and men of the United States navy.
In 1902 the Panamanians had very little trouble in overawing the few Colombian officers within their territory. They knew that the Colombian Government had no navy, from the fact that a year before the Colombian navy had been sent to the City of Panama to coerce the authorities there who were disputing with the Colombian Government over some items of revenue which were an issue; and meeting force with force the authorities of the City of Panama had succeeded, with the assistance of a small tug-boat and one piece of cannon, in sweeping the seas of the entire Colombian naval power, and as evidence of their success the two masts of the Colombian navy were sticking up out of the mud-banks of Panama Bay.
Nor were the inhabitants of Panama or Colon much concerned as to a possible attack from a Colombian army. That would entail a long march of hundreds of miles through morass and jungle, and could not be successfully accomplished in less than a year's time. And so the Panamanians were free to act in their purposes of securing independence without danger of very much interference from the home government.
The Hay-Varilla treaty, was ratified in December 1903. The Treaty gave the United States absolute title and sovereignty to a strip of land ten miles wide, five miles on either side of the center of the canal prism, extending from Colon to Panama, and three miles out into the water on either side, but without including either of the cities of Colon or Panama within its area.
In 1907, General Rafael Reyes Prieto created the Naval school through decree 783 of July 6, which was closed by General Ramon González Valencia on 28 December 1909. The conflict with Peru in 1932 made the Navy reappear. The School of Cadets in 1935, which today continue their work to train men and women seafarers serving the country.
By the XX Century, Colombian naval activity resurged because of the conflict with Peru; the Cabin Boys School was founded in 1934 and the Cadet School in 1935. Both institutions continue to protect Colombians.
The history of the Colombian Marine Infantry dates back eignt decades to January 1937. It took nearly two decades and a struggle of the magnitude and complexity of La Violencia to prompt Colombia into creating a riverine force. Since 1956 and the creation of the Flotilla Avispa, it is evident that Colombia’s Riverine Force has been closely tied to the political and social history of the country.
One need only look at the timeline of significant events that have transpired in Colombia to recognize the corresponding and reactionary development and evolution of the riverine force. Over their history, the Colombian riverine force have evolved to face a series of diverse threats, ranging from armed peasant uprisings, to organized and well funded subversive guerrillas, to ruthless drug cartels, and narco-terrorist organizations.
|
NEWSLETTER
|
| Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list |
|
|
|
