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SSM Wuchang - small submarine

In 1982 the National Photographic Interpretation Center reported that two midget submarines (SSM) were observed in mid-to-late stage construction on the open building ways at RP 12. The SSM were approximately 26 meters in length with a 3.0-meter beam. These two SSM were assessed as probably units 3 and 4 of the class. One of the previously constructed units had been observed at Qingdao Motor Torpedo Boat Base. A second unit was observed on this imagery on the quay at Chikan (Diaoshuntsun) port facilities.

Wuhan shipyard [coordinates 30-32-04N 114-17-13E], approximately 500 nm upstream from Shanghai, constructs and repairs diesel attack submarines and constructs submersibles and fleet minesweepers. These notes were prepared for briefing purposes only and should not be used for detailed analytical work. Their use should be restricted to the particular briefing board(s) they were prepared forand must be considered valid only for the reporting period as indicated by the date of issue.

In 2015 H.I.Sutton reported that Google Earth imagery outside the Wuchang Shipbuilding Industry Co., Ltd yard disclosed a 35 meter long small submarine. According to Sutton, "Although there are several possible explanations, the most likely role in my view is as a dedicated Special Forces submarine loosely equivalent to the Cos.Mo.S MG110, Crocodile-250 and Darkon-220. It is also about the same length as the North Korean Sang-O class and comparisons are inevitable, but the likeness is likely to be weak. Today China is capable of producing a first-tier design in this class and shouldn't be underrated." Several classes of warships and modern diesel-electric submarines are produced at Wuchang, located on the Yangtze River.

The dimensions of this Wuchang mini-submarine are consistent with the SEAL delivery vehicle depicted in artwork of the 093T special warfare submarine. It is technically difficult for Chinese nuclear submarines to meet the needs of special operations. China has long been very interested in the US Navy's special combat submarine, and has even developed similar equipment. Due to the limitations of conventional submarines, nuclear submarines are naturally the best platform for vehicle selection. The United States engages in special nuclear submarine operations because of its high level of self-confidence in submarine technology. It is difficult to say whether a Chinese special nuclear submarine can penetrate the depth of the enemy s defense and safely reach the designated place for delivery. Therefore, if China engages in special nuclear submarine platforms, it needs to first solve a series of problems technically.

Under the conditions of modern warfare, although advanced reconnaissance methods such as reconnaissance satellites and reconnaissance aircraft have been continuously used, any technical equipment in the war is difficult to avoid being affected or even restricted by various factors. Therefore, various countermeasures such as camouflage and deception must be considered. Measures and means. Deepening the enemy's in-depth implementation of front-end enemy reconnaissance has always been the most effective way of obtaining information to make up for the shortcomings of technical reconnaissance. The importance of this reconnaissance method will not diminish with the continuous development of modern military technology. The combat mission of the special forces is mainly aimed at key targets and parts with limited defensive capabilities in the enemy's combat system, which is determined by its nature, scale, and combat method. The working distance of modern weapons makes the battlefield space unprecedentedly unprecedented, and the nodal structure of the modern war system also provides a very suitable environment and conditions for small-scale special forces to show their skills.

In all aspects of guidance and technology, special forces with long-range delivery capabilities and the ability to penetrate the enemy's depth activities are an indispensable and important part. In recent local wars, foreign special forces have repeatedly sent guidance teams to sneak into important attack targets in advance, use satellite positioning, laser irradiation, and other methods to indicate targets for long-range strike weapons, guide accurate attacks, and enter after their own long-range weapon attacks.

Like the armed forces of other countries in the world, the People's Liberation Army of the People's Republic of China has always attached great importance to the construction and development of special forces, but due to the nature, tasks and missions of special forces, it was kept in strict confidentiality. In recent years, with China's more self-confidence and openness in national defense construction, news reports and pictures about the development of Chinese special forces have begun to appear in some media, and people have been able to learn about the equipment and training of Chinese special forces.

According to domestic public reports, the soldiers of the Chinese special forces are all selected from the elite, and they are all outstanding in military technology, physical fitness, cultural level, and psychological quality.

Chinese special forces also pose a threat to underwater communications in Taiwan. In a public statement from the mainland, the PLA's strategy is not only to completely isolate the island of Taiwan, but also to cut off any connection between the island and its allies and the outside world. The use of submarines to deploy special forces to destroy submarine fiber optic cables in Taiwan will be a priority strategy of the PLA.

In its book "New Strategies for Deep Sea Submarine Combat" published by the Rand Corporation, it described in detail the severe situation facing the communications situation in Taiwan when it was attacked: The results of a recent survey of submarine cables connecting Taiwan are very disturbing. Whether Laoshan or Touteng, 4 of the 5 optical cables connecting Taiwan are very vulnerable to attack ... In the short term, if Taiwan s submarine optical cables are attacked, Taiwan s ability to send and receive data will be greatly affected ... and this situation becomes more serious with the mainland's continuous emphasis on information warfare.




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Page last modified: 25-12-2019 18:42:47 ZULU