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Chinese Mine Warfare - Mines

After surveying nearly one thousand “Chinese language articles related to mine warfare,” the U.S. Naval War College concluded that “China’s naval mine inventory likely contains some of the world’s most lethal systems and that Beijing may be on the cutting edge of mine warfare (MIW) technology and concept development.”

China reportedly possesses between 50,000 and 100,000 mines, consisting of over 30 varieties of contact, magnetic, acoustic, water pressure and mixed reaction sea mines, remote control sea mines, rocket-rising and mobile mines. People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) submarines are said to use the Chen-1, -2, -3, and -6 type influence mines, appropriate for use in the sea area immediately outside of harbor mouths;” the T-5 mobile mine, appropriate for port channels and sea areas immediately outside a port; and the Soviet-produced PMK-1 and the Chinese-developed Mao-5 rocket rising mines, appropriate for waters up to 15 kilometers outside a port. China’s remotely controlled mines, such as the EM53 bottom-influence mine, are thought to be deactivated by coded acoustic signals to allow the safe passage of friendly vessels, and again activated to prevent the transit of those of an enemy. Remotely controlled mines are well suited to defensive mining purposes, but could be useful in offensive operations as well. China has taken notice of the U.S. Navy’s vulnerability to sea mines. One such example is when, in February 1991, “the billion-dollar Aegis cruiser USS Princeton (CG 59) suffered a ‘mission kill’ from an Iraqi-laid Italian Manta multiple-influence bottom mine costing about $25,000…”

What is particularly menacing about the Chinese mine warfare capabilities is that the Chinese have a diverse selection of “dumb” impact mines as well as “smart” self-navigating and remote-controlled mines that could possibly be used in the South China Sea.

The “magnetic influence” triggering mechanism detects changes in the magnetic fields around the mine. When a ship with a steel hull moves though the earth's magnetic field, a slight distortion occurs in the surrounding area. Although slight, this distortion is significant enough to trigger a mine. A similar technology, electrical potential influence, detects the electric currents caused by dissimilar metals immersed in sea water. Since the hull of a ship and the propeller are made of different types of metal, an electrical current is created when the ship moves through sea water.

The magnetic influence trigger is susceptible to mine sweeping using equipment that simulates the magnetic distortion created by a ship. This equipment is pulled through the water creating a magnetic field that is similar to that of a larger craft causing the mine to detonate a safe distance away from the mine counter measure personnel. A few examples of mines using electromagnetic influence technology are the MINEA family of mines, the MANTA mine, and the Chinese EM-53 mine.

After the turn of the century, the power shift across the Taiwan Strait turned to be even more adverse for Taiwan. The PLA coupled its traditional numerical advantage with qualitative advancement to give Chinese leaders with more credible means to conduct coercive campaigns against Taiwan and to deter, delay, and complicate the US intervention. In particular, a missile campaign and naval blockade became very effective coercive tools due to increasing lethality, accuracy, and size of the PLA’s missiles and expansion and upgrading of submarine forces and mine warfare capabilities. The PLA’s antiaccess/area-denial capability of keeping potential US intervention forces at bay seriously concerned US military planners.

Chinese officials have begun to seriously consider the advantages of mine warfare and its application to its area-denial strategy. These ‘weapons that wait’ are the quintessential naval asymmetric threat, pitting adversaries’ strengths against what they perceive as naval and maritime weakness. Indeed, sea mines are key to regional navies’ antiaccess / area-denial (A2/AD) and sea-control strategies and operations. China’s sea mine warfare is an often overlooked asymmetric capability that poses a threat not just to U.S. shipping interests, but to those ships of any other country that seeks innocent passage through the South China Sea.

From the worst-case scenario, the mine-sweeping force that can be assembled by foreign interfering forces will be three to five times the number of ships of the multinational mine-sweeping force during the Gulf War. There are about 70 new ships with mine-hunting capabilities. These ships are characterized by large tonnage and most of them are ocean-going; they are newer, and many were launched after the Gulf War; they are advanced in technology, and in addition to traditional towed minesweepers, many of them are equipped with remote-controlled minesweepers. There are also about 80 old and auxiliary minesweeper ships and 80 minesweeper helicopters. Under ideal conditions with suitable sea conditions and no external threats, such a mine-sweeping force can open up several waterways blocked by old-fashioned mines in a short period of time.

During the Gulf War, a multinational minesweeping force composed of 30 ships took 6 months to clear more than 1,200 mines. Before the armistice, only the channel for battleship bombardment was cleared. Most of the mines were handed over in Iraq after the armistice. Swept away after the information was deployed. In future conflicts across the Taiwan Strait, the enemy’s mine-sweeping force will be stronger, and the mine-sweeping area will be smaller (as long as several main ports and several waterways are opened); at the same time, China's mine will have more mines and more advanced technology, and it will not allow it. The enemy has key information such as the area, number, and type of mines to be deployed. Most of the minefields are within the range of China's long-range firepower strikes. Therefore, the future blockade and anti-blockade struggle will become more intense.

From a tactical point of view, (1) The timing of the blockade operation does not need to follow the provocative actions of the "Taiwan independence" forces, but China should take the lead. Once the "Taiwan independence" forces start a war, China should choose the most favorable for the blockade operation. The timing, such as bad sea conditions and unsuitable seasons for mine clearance operations, can have the effect of multiplying power. (2) The scale of the pre-mining operations must be large, because the pre-mining operations are concealed suddenly, and the enemy has not completed the assembly of forces, which poses a small threat to the mining activities. The larger the mine-laying scale, the longer the enemy's mine clearance cycle, the greater the difficulty, and the higher the success rate of blockade operations. (3) Continue to supplement minefields that have been cleaned by the enemy. Even small-scale supplements can maintain the deterrence of the minefields and achieve the purpose of blockade. (4) Mixed mines, a combination of multiple types, old and new, large and small, and true and false mines. (5) Focus on attacking the opponent's minesweeper ships and support ships. Since minesweeper ships and aircraft have poor self-defense and survivability, focusing on these types of targets can effectively interfere with and destroy enemy minesweeping.

(6) Short assaults. Even if China do not have overall air superiority, China can concentrate missiles, aircraft, and speedboats to conduct short assaults on the enemy's mine-clearing area. On the one hand, it can eliminate the enemy's mine-sweeping forces, and on the other hand, it can cover and supplement mine-laying operations. In the famous battle of Shangganling, China's supply to the frontline tunnels was carried out under the cover of many night counterattacks. (7) Maintain the survivability of the frontline base. The frontline base is responsible for the tasks of coastal defense, air defense in coastal areas, reconnaissance, and support for aircraft and naval attacks. The survivability of the frontline base is related to the smooth completion of China's first few tasks.

From a technical point of view, the technologies China need to focus on are: (1) Smart mines can more accurately select and strike important targets, such as minesweeper ships, submarines, and large commercial ships. The anti-sweep performance is stronger than that of mines with the "delay/count" function. (2) Mine camouflage technology, mainly used to counter mine detection sonar, and new mine detection technologies such as laser and ultrasonic. (3) Anti-mine hunting technology, dedicated to destroying mine detection sonar, expensive remote-control mine-killing equipment, etc., to improve the survivability of deep-water minefields. (4) Long-distance precise mine-laying technology, especially aerial and underwater long-distance mine-laying, is used to supplement mine-laying and offensive mine-laying.

The Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy conducted its first competitive live-munition underwater anti-mine warfare exercise in June 2018, with experts saying the training focused on future military scenarios. Bombers, minesweepers and mine-hunting ships of multiple PLA theater commands participated in "back-to-back" tests in the East China Sea, which included covert installation of underwater mines by air units. PLA deterrence strategy of laying underwater mines could effectively keep foreign forces away from China's coastal waters. Nearly 20 underwater mines were installed, detected and swept during the assessment.