CCP Central Committee
In theory, the National Party Congress is the highest organ of power of party, but real power lies in Political Bureau of CCP Central Committee and, still more, in select Standing Committee of Political Bureau. The organizational principle that drives the Chinese political system is democratic centralism. Within the system, the democratic feature demands participation and expression of opinion on key policy issues from members at all levels of party organization. At the same time, the centralist feature requires that subordinate organizational levels follow the dictates of superior levels. Once the debate has reached the highest level and decisions concerning policy have been made, all party members are obliged to support the Central Committee.
Political power is formally vested in the CCP Central Committee and the other central organs answerable directly to this committee. The Central Committee is elected by the National Party Congress and is identified by the number of the National Party Congress that elected it. Central Committee meetings are known as plenums (or plenary sessions), and each plenum of a new Central Committee is numbered sequentially. Plenums are to be held at least annually. In addition, there are partial, informal, and enlarged meetings of Central Committee members where often key policies are formulated and then confirmed by a plenum. For example, the "Communique of the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee" (December 1978), which established the party's commitment to economic modernization, resulted from a month-long working meeting that preceded the Third Plenum.
The Central Committee's large size and infrequent meetings make it necessary for the Central Committee to direct its work through its smaller elite bodies—the Political Bureau and the even more select Political Bureau's Standing Committee—both of which the Central Committee elects. The Twelfth Central Committee consisted of 210 full members and 138 alternate members. The Political Bureau had twenty-three members and three alternate members. The Standing Committee—the innermost circle of power—had six members who were placed in the most important party and government posts.
The need for consensus and the desire to protect vested interests are the main drivers of Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) decision-making and Chinese leadership dynamics in general. Observers have variously described relations at the top of China's Party-state structure as akin to those in the executive suite of a large corporation, as determined by the interplay of powerful interests, or as shaped by competition between "princelings" with family ties to party elders and "shopkeepers" who have risen through the ranks of the Party. Some princeling families denounce those without revolutionary pedigrees by saying, "While my father was bleeding and dying for China, your father was selling shoelaces."
Leadership alignments at the top of the CCP was shaped largely by one's "princeling" or "shopkeeper" lineage. China's "princelings," the sons and daughters of prominent Communist Party officials, including many who helped found the PRC, shared a perception that they, as the descendents of those who shed blood in the name of the Communist revolution, had a "right" to continue to lead China and protect the fruits of that revolution. Such a mindset could potentially place the "princelings" at odds with Party members who do not have similar pedigrees, our contacts maintained, such as President Hu Jintao, Premier Wen Jiabao and Party members with a CYL background, who were derisively referred to as "shopkeepers' sons."
Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) decision making was akin to a corporation in which the greater the stock ownership the greater the voice in decisions, but the PBSC did not formally vote. It is a consensus system in which members can exercise veto power. Major policies, such as the country's core policy on Taiwan or North Korea, had to be decided by the full 25-member Politburo. Other more specific matters, were decided by the nine-member PBSC alone. Some issues were put to a formal vote, while others were merely discussed until a consensus was reached. Either way, the Politburo was the "most democratic body in the world," the only place in China where true democracy existed. Although there was something to the notion of a rough factional balancing at the top, major issues had to be decided by consensus.
The Party could be viewed primarily as a collection of interest groups. There was no "reform wing". China's top leadership had carved up China's economic "pie," creating an ossified system in which "vested interests" drove decision-making and impeded reform as leaders maneuvered to ensure that those interests were not threatened.
Leaders had close ties to powerful economic actors, especially real estate developers and corporate leaders, who in some cases were officials themselves. The same was true at the local level. These interest networks had policy implications since most local leaders had "bought" their positions and wanted an immediate financial "return" on their investment. They always supported fast-growth policies and opposed reform efforts that might harm their interests, according to Dong. Vested interests were especially inclined to oppose media openness, lest someone question the shady deals behind land transactions.
The central feature of leadership politics was the need to protect oneself and one's family from attack after leaving office. Thus, current leaders carefully cultivated proteges who would defend their interests once they stepped down. It was natural that someone like Xi Jinping, who had maintained a non-threatening low profile and had never made enemies, would be elevated by Jiang Zemin and Zeng Qinghong. Xi would act to ensure that Jiang was not harassed or that Jiang's corrupt son would not be arrested.
The Third Plenum of the Eleventh National Party Congress Central Committee in December 1978 officially made the Four Modernizations basic national policy and reemphasized the importance of intellectuals in achieving them. The policy of "seeking truth from facts" was stressed, and scholars and researchers were given freer rein to pursue scientific research. After the Third Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee in 1978, Chinese Communists with Deng Xiaoping as their chief representative conducted a thorough review of positive and negative experiences since the founding of the PRC. On this basis, and by drawing lessons from the history of world socialism, they established Deng Xiaoping Theory. The historic decision was made to shift the focus of the Party and the nation to economic development and to launch the reform and opening up drive, and it was made clear that China would follow its own path and build socialism with Chinese features.
In June 1981 the Sixth Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee marked a major milestone in the passing of the Maoist era. The Central Committee accepted Hua's resignation from the chairmanship and granted him the face-saving position of vice chairman. In his place, CCP secretary general Hu Yaobang became chairman. Hua also gave up his position as chairman of the party's Central Military Commission in favor of Deng Xiaoping. The plenum adopted the 35,000-word "Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the People's Republic of China." The resolution reviewed the sixty years since the founding of the CCP, emphasizing party activities since 1949. A major part of the document condemned the ten-year Cultural Revolution and assessed Mao Zedong's role in it.
After the Fourth Plenary Session of the 13th CPC Central Committee in 1989, Chinese Communists with Jiang Zemin as their chief representative upheld the Party's basic theory and guideline, deepened their understanding of what socialism is and how to build it and what kind of Party to build and how to build it, and gathered valuable experience in governing the Party and the country. On this basis, they developed the Theory of the Three Represents.
After the 16th National Congress of the CPC in 2002, Chinese Communists with Hu Jintao as their chief representative continued to take Deng Xiaoping Theory and the Theory of Three Represents as their guide. Against new demands of development, they explored and answered major questions, including what kind of development to pursue and how to pursue it in a new situation, thus forming the Scientific Outlook on Development.
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