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Kyrgyzstan - People

In 2011 Kyrgyzstan’s population was estimated at 5,477,620. The annual growth rate was 1.32 percent. In 2011 the ethnic groups were Kyrgyz 71.7%; Russian 7.2%; Uzbek 14.3%; Dungan (ethnic Chinese Muslims) 1.1%; Uighurs 0.9%; Tajik 0.9%, Tatars 0.5%; Korean 0.3%, German 0.3%, and Kazakh. In the early 2000s, increased emigration of Russians and other minority nationalities with technical expertise has been an important economic issue. In 2005 the net migration rate was -2.5 persons per 1,000 population. The population is concentrated in small areas in the north and southwest in the Chu (north-central), Fergana (southwestern), and Talas (northwestern) valleys. About two-thirds of the population lives in rural areas, and that figure has risen as the predominantly urban Russian population decreases.

In the south, in some provinces and towns, Uzbeks constitute the majority of the population. However, state institutions are dominated by ethnic Kyrgyz. In particular, the number of ethnic and national minorities working in state agencies is not representative of their numbers in the population. Uzbek minorities have found an important economic niche in the retail and service industries. Meanwhile, many ethnic Kyrgyz in the south face dire poverty in the often remote rural areas where they live. The economic gap between poor rural areas and urban centers underpins resentment of the urban elite, easily deflected to target those of different ethnicity.

In 2006 some 31 percent of the population was 14 years of age or younger, and 6 percent was 65 years of age or older. The birthrate was 22.8 births per 1,000 population, and the death rate was 7.1 per 1,000 population. Infant mortality was 34.5 deaths per 1,000 live births. Life expectancy for the total population was 68.5 years: 72.7 years for females and 64.5 years for males. The fertility rate was 2.7 births per woman. In 2006 the population’s sex ratio was 0.96 males per female.

In 1993 the population of Kyrgyzstan was estimated at 4.46 million, of whom 56.5 percent were ethnic Kyrgyz, 18.8 percent were Russians, 12.9 percent were Uzbeks, 2.1 percent were Ukrainians, and 1.0 percent were Germans (see table 4, Appendix). The rest of the population was composed of about eighty other nationalities. Of some potential political significance are the Uygurs. That group numbers only about 36,000 in Kyrgyzstan, but about 185,000 live in neighboring Kazakstan. The Uygurs are also the majority population in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region of China, whose population is about 15 million, located to the northeast of Kyrgyzstan. In November 1992, the Uygurs in Kyrgyzstan attempted to form a party calling for establishment of an independent Uygurstan that also would include the Chinese-controlled Uygur territory. The Ministry of Justice denied the group legal registration.

Between 1989 and 1993, a significant number of non-Kyrgyz citizens left the republic, although no census was taken in the early 1990s to quantify the resulting balances among ethnic groups. A considerable portion of this exodus consisted of Germans repatriating to Germany, more than 8,000 of whom left in 1992 alone. According to reports, more than 30,000 Russians left the Bishkek area in the early 1990s, presumably for destinations outside Kyrgyzstan. In 1992 and 1993, refugees from the civil war in Tajikistan moved into southern Kyrgyzstan. In 1989 about 64,000 Kyrgyz were living in Tajikistan, and about 175,000 were living in Uzbekistan. Reliable estimates of how many of these people subsequently returned to Kyrgyzstan have not been available.

The Fergana Valley, which eastern Kyrgyzstan shares with Central Asian neighbors Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, is one of the most densely populated and agriculturally most heavily exploited regions in Central Asia. As such, it has been the point of bitter contention among the three adjoining states, both before and after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Members of the various ethnic groups who have inhabited the valley for centuries have managed to get along largely because they occupy slightly different economic niches. The sedentary Uzbeks and Tajiks traditionally have farmed lower-lying irrigated land while the nomadic Kyrgyz have herded in the mountains.

However, the potential for ethnic conflict is ever present. Because the borders of the three countries zigzag without evident regard for the nationality of the people living in the valley, many residents harbor strong irredentist feelings, believing that they should more properly be citizens of a different country. Few Europeans live in the Fergana Valley, but about 552,000 Uzbeks, almost the entire population of that people in Kyrgyzstan, reside there in crowded proximity with about 1.2 million Kyrgyz.

Population statistics depict only part of the demographic situation in Kyrgyzstan. Because of the country's mountainous terrain, population tends to be concentrated in relatively small areas in the north and south, each of which contains about two million people. About two-thirds of the total population live in the Fergana, Talas, and Chu valleys. As might be expected, imbalances in population distribution lead to extreme contrasts in how people live and work. In the north, the Chu Valley, site of Bishkek, the capital, is the major economic center, producing about 45 percent of the nation's gross national product . The Chu Valley also is where most of the country's Europeans live, mainly because of economic opportunities. The ancestors of today's Russian and German population began to move into the fertile valley to farm at the end of the nineteenth century. There was a subsequent influx of Russians during World War II, when industrial resources and personnel were moved en masse out of European Russia to prevent their capture by the invading Germans.

In the era of Soviet First Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev, a deliberate development policy brought another in-migration. Bishkek is slightly more than 50 percent Kyrgyz, and the rest of the valley retains approximately that ethnic ratio. In the mid-1990s, observers expected that balance to change quickly, however, as Europeans continued to move out while rural Kyrgyz moved in, settling in the numerous shantytowns springing up around Bishkek. The direct distance from Bishkek in the far north to Osh in the southwest is slightly more than 300 kilometers, but the mountain road connecting those cities requires a drive of more than ten hours in summer conditions; in winter the high mountain passes are often closed. In the Soviet period, most travel between north and south was by airplane, but fuel shortages that began after independence have greatly limited the number of flights, increasing a tendency toward separation of north and south.

The separation of the north and the south is clearly visible in the cultural mores of the two regions, although both are dominated by ethnic Kyrgyz. Society in the Fergana Valley is much more traditional than in the Chu Valley, and the practice of Islam is more pervasive. The people of the Chu Valley are closely integrated with Kazakstan (Bishkek is but four hours by car from Almaty, once the capital of Kazakstan). The people of the south are more oriented, by location and by culture, to Uzbekistan, Iran, Afghanistan, and the other Muslim countries to the south.

Geographical isolation also has meant that the northern and southern Kyrgyz have developed fairly distinct lifestyles. Those in the north tend to be nomadic herders; those in the south have acquired more of the sedentary agricultural ways of their Uygur, Uzbek, and Tajik neighbors. Both groups came to accept Islam late, but practice in the north tends to be much less influenced by Islamic doctrine and reflects considerable influence from pre-Islamic animist beliefs. The southerners have a more solid basis of religious knowledge and practice. It is they who pushed for a greater religious element in the 1993 constitution.

Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan may support actors perceived to be capable of preserving inter-ethnic stability as a way to avoid bloody conflicts like those that occurred in Osh in 1990. During the Tulip Revolution the Uzbeks did not see Bakiev as a capable candidate. During the Tulip Revolution, a majority of protestors active in the south were ethnic Kyrgyz. Uzbeks have generally stayed away from the Kyrgyz political revolution and other political activities. Ethnic Uzbek citizens who become disillusioned with the supposed democratic political process may be pushed to join the radical Islamic group Hizb-ut Tahrir as a means of finding some sort of representation.

Uzbeks are under-represented in employment in state political, social, and economic institutions. The interethnic situation between ethnic Kyrgyz and ethnic Uzbeks in the south remains tense, characterized by arbitrary arrests, detention, torture, and extortion of ethnic Uzbeks by members of security services. Since June 2010 little progress was made in terms of reconciliation. Ethnic Uzbek citizens in Osh and Jalalabad reported discrimination in finding jobs, particularly with the government. There were multiple reports of seizure of ethnic Uzbek businesses and property.

Ethnic, political, and socio-economic tensions continue to exist in southern Kyrgyzstan, including the cities of Osh and Jalalabad, the second and third largest cities in Kyrgyzstan, although there have been no widespread incidents of violence since 2010. As of December 2012, however, the immediate threat of violence appears to have subsided in the south, although ethnic, political, and socio-economic tensions continue to exist.




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