• Military Menu                       

• Introduction
• Systems
• Facilities
• Agencies
• Industry
• Operations
• Countries
• Hot Documents
• News
• Reports
• Policy
• Budget
• Congress
• Links

• WMD
• Intelligence
• Homeland Security
• Space

U.S.-Kazakhstan Relations

The United States was the first country to recognize Kazakhstan, on December 25, 1991, and opened its Embassy in Almaty in January 1992; the Embassy moved to Astana in 2006. In the years since Kazakhstan's independence, the two countries have developed a wide-ranging bilateral relationship.

Its status as an apparent nuclear power got Kazakstan off to a fast start in international diplomacy.U.S.-Kazakhstani cooperation in security and non-proliferation has been a cornerstone of the relationship. Kazakhstan showed leadership when it renounced nuclear weapons in 1993. President Nazarbayev became a signatory to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and its so-called Lisbon Protocol by which Belarus, Kazakstan, and Ukraine pledged to eliminate nuclear weapons in the 1990s. The United States assisted Kazakhstan in the removal of nuclear warheads, weapons-grade materials, and their supporting infrastructure.In 1994, Kazakhstan transferred more than a half-ton of weapons-grade uranium to the United States.

In addition, Nazarbayev was able to negotiate US$1.2 billion in prepayment by the United States against sale of the enriched uranium contained in Kazakstan's warheads, as well as another US$311 million for maintenance and conversion of existing missile silos. Equally important was that the nuclear warheads prompted the United States to become a party to negotiations concerning the warheads between Kazakstan and Russia. The United States eventually became a guarantor of the agreement reached by the two countries. In May 1995, the last nuclear warhead in Kazakstan was destroyed at Semey, completing the program of removal and destruction of the entire former Soviet arsenal and achieving the republic's goal of being "nuclear free."

Kazakhstan, with U.S. assistance, completed the sealing of 181 nuclear test tunnels in May 2000. Under the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, the United States has spent $240 million to assist Kazakhstan in eliminating weapons of mass destruction and weapons of mass destruction-related infrastructure.

U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) was 24.6% of total FDI in Kazakhstan in the first half of 2007. American companies have invested about $14.3 billion in Kazakhstan since 1993. These companies are concentrated in the oil and gas, business services, telecommunications, and electrical energy sectors. Kazakhstan has made progress in creating a favorable investment climate although serious problems, including arbitrary enforcement of laws, remain. A U.S.-Kazakhstan Bilateral Investment Treaty and a Treaty on the Avoidance of Dual Taxation have been in place since 1994 and 1996, respectively. In 2001, Kazakhstan and the United States established the U.S.-Kazakhstan Energy Partnership.

Sections 402 and 409 of the United States 1974 Trade Act require that the President submit semi-annually a report to Congress on continued compliance with the Act's freedom of emigration provisions by those countries, including Kazakhstan, that fall under the Trade Act's Jackson-Vanik Amendment. Bilateral trade in 2005 was valued at $1.64 billion, a 91% increase from 2004.

Between 1992 and 2005, the United States provided roughly $1.205 billion in technical assistance and investment support in Kazakhstan. The programs were designed to promote market reform, to establish a foundation for an open, prosperous, and democratic society, and to address security issues.

Since 1993, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has administered technical assistance programs to support Kazakhstan's transition to a market economy, fully integrated into the world trade system. These programs include cooperation in privatization, fiscal, and financial policy; commercial law; energy; health care; and environmental protection. In 2006, Kazakhstan became the first country to share directly in the cost of a U.S. Government's foreign assistance program. Through 2009, the Government of Kazakhstan will contribute over $15 million to a $40 million USAID economic development project aimed at strengthening Kazakhstan's capacity to achieve its development goals. The U.S. Commercial Service provides U.S. business internships for Kazakhstanis, supports Kazakhstani businesses through a matchmaker program and disseminates information on U.S. goods and services. The Peace Corps has about 140 volunteers working throughout Kazakhstan in business education, English teaching, and the development of environmental non-governmental organizations. Since 2001 and the advent of the war on terror, the U.S. has assisted Kazakhstan to combat illegal narcotics, improve border security, and, more recently combat money laundering and trafficking in persons.

The United States supports increased citizen participation in the public arena through support for non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Dozens of grants have been provided to support NGOs that promote an independent media, legal reform, women's rights, civic education, and legislative oversight. USAID also has provided training courses for leaders and professionals.

For a time, bilateral relations were constrained to a degree by the primacy of the US focus on democracy and human rights. The annual Freedom House report that rates Kazakhstan as "not free" and lumps it together with Uzbekistan and Belarus -- an absurdity that, to use Soviet-speak, "does not correspond to objective reality" -- seemed to some to play an inordinate role in determining to what degree we would engage with the Government of Kazakhstan.

Two constraints exist that should not be ignored. This is a post-Soviet state that has both progressive factions pushing for greater liberalization and old-guard factions seeking to retain tight control. The old guard are strong in the security bodies, especially in the Committee for National Security (KNB, the Soviet KGB successor) and, to a degree, in the Ministry of Defense. The KNB and [as of 2009] the Minister of Defense himself, but not all his deputies, were generally believed to be closely allied to the Russian siloviki faction. The KNB seemed addicted to playing games to uncover (or to manufacture) "Western threats." To a degree, they had Nazarbayev's ear, but he doesn't automatically succumb to their worst instincts.

The second constraint, also KNB-related, is Nazarbayev's implacably estranged son-in-law, Rakhat Aliyev who is exiled in Europe. To please Nazarbayev, who feels Aliyev compromised his honor, the KNB has demanded the US cooperate "to capture Aliyev and render him to Kazakhstan to face justice." The US cannot have a dog in that fight, which disappoints Nazarbayev, but it does not prevent him from productive cooperation when he judges that national interests coincide. With smart, reality-based diplomacy that puts US long-term national interests first, the US can build a mutually beneficial, strategic partnership with Kazakhstan.