Nicaragua - Corruption
The law provides criminal penalties for official corruption; however, the government did not enforce the law effectively, and officials frequently engaged in corrupt practices with impunity. A civic perception predominates in the country that the corruption of public officials is generalized, which has an influence on the system’s low legitimacy, as does the experiences suffered personally. The felt issue of crime and corruption are aggravated by the observation that citizens have little confidence in the justice system in Nicaragua, which is in charge of dealing with both these social problems.
The corruption of public officials reached the public arena through the media during the Alemán government, becoming a heartfelt demand of many civil organizations including business associations. International actors such as the World Bank, IMF and European Union had criticized the existing corruption and the need to take measures to avoid this problem that was affecting the climate of institutional security required by investors and by development cooperation.
As president, Arnoldo Alemán, like his Liberal predecessors the Somozas, acquired a reputation for corruption. He illicitly appropriated public funds to pay extra salaries “under the table” to top public officials. But they weren’t the only ones who received them; he also paid many people who weren’t public officials. During his government, a long line of people who didn’t work in the government would show up each month at the President’s office to collect their checks. A lot of loyalty grew out of this, not only among those who received the money but also their wives, children and other relatives. This process had a striking multiplier effect. Alemán would also go around illegally giving away state funds all over the country.
The Comptroller of the Republic, Agustín Jarquín, produced a report showing how Alemán’s net worth had increased nine-fold while he was mayor of Managua. He also investigated accusations that the presidential jet had been used to smuggle narcotics. Alemán struck back by jailing Jarquín on corruption charges that were later dropped. In September 2001, Alemán was accused of corruption from an unlikely quarter. The accuser was Ricardo Mas Canosa, brother of the late Jorge Mas Canosa, founder and president of the Cuban American National Foundation. Ricardo Mas Canosa said that Alemán had diverted $2.5 million in campaign contributions for his personal use.
An opinion poll conducted in 2001 by the Institute for Opinion Polling (IDESO, Instituto de Encuestas y Sondeos de Opinión) at Managua’s Jesuit-run University of Central America (UCA, Universidad Centroamericana) suggested that most Nicaraguans were not very disturbed by corruption. Less than 7 percent saw corruption as the country’s major problem, as against 47 percent who identified unemployment and 27 percent who identified poverty as the number one problem. Moreover, fully 57 percent approved of the president and legislators paying off those who helped them win their posts with political favors. An even larger number – 73 percent – said they favored an “authoritarian president,” though not a dictatorial one.
Enrique Bolaños took office at the beginning of 2002, launching a campaign against corruption that was widely accepted by the citizenry and the international organizations, but inevitably led to a confrontation with the PLC leader Alemán when a series of swindles were proven to have been carried out during his government (1997-2001) to his personal benefit, that of his family and of a group of collaborators. When that culminated with judicial sentencing and his imprisonment, the majority of the PLC leadership closed ranks in defense of its leader, such that the party split between those loyal to the caudillo and those seeking a new Liberal leadership.
In the Assembly, only a small group of legislators (6) broke away from the PLC to form a new “blue and white” bench loyal to the President. This meant that the executive branch lost its base in the second branch of the state, which was indispensable for the passage of laws such as the annual national budget, international laws and appointments to positions in other branches of the state, thus generating a conflictive situation between the branches and a governmental paralysis.
The citizenry came out publicly against corruption through various means, energized by recognized social networks such as the Civil Coordinator the Network for Democracy, the Women’s Network, the University Student Movement, unions, communal and religious organizations and other social actors. Nonetheless, civic enthusiasm for the government’s anticorruption policy has been gradually declining for various reasons, including the alleged use of fraudulent funds in Bolaños’ campaign, the high salaries and pensions of government officials, including the President, the under-the-table negotiations with implied corruption and the disenchantment due to the failure to comply with electoral promises regarding employment and basic needs.
Executive branch officials continued to disburse economic and developmental assistance funds lent by the Venezuelan-led Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA), which averaged more than $500 million dollars annually, outside the normal budgetary process controlled by the legislature. The media reported that ALBA-funded contracts were awarded to companies with ties to the Ortega family and noted the funds from Venezuela served as a separate budget tightly controlled by the FSLN, with little public oversight.
Independent media, human rights groups, and opposition parties reported President Ortega’s administration blurred distinctions between the FSLN and the government through its use of FSLN-led family cabinets and party-controlled Sandinista leadership committees (CLSs). The government administered subsidized food, housing, vaccinations, access to clinics, and other government benefits directly through either the family cabinets or CLS system, which reportedly often coerced citizens into FSLN membership and denied services to opposition members. Persons seeking to obtain or retain public sector employment, national identity documents, or voter registration were obliged to obtain recommendation letters from CLS block captains. The government continued to devolve legal responsibilities to Family Cabinets, community-based bodies operating in the same fashion as CPCs, specifically regarding mediation processes in cases of domestic violence.
In 2013 the government awarded a 50-year concession, with the possibility of a 50-year extension, to the Hong Kong Nicaraguan Canal Development Investment Company (HKND) to build and operate an interoceanic canal through the country. The concession was awarded with little or no previous public debate and without an openly competitive process. Civil society organizations, scientists, environmentalists, and indigenous groups expressed concerns over the project, mainly due to lack of information or public consultation regarding the concession process, the potential environmental and social impact, and the technical and economic feasibility of the canal. Additionally, landowners along the canal route protested the law’s provisions that their land is to be bought at cadastral and not market value.
Following the announcement of the concession, more than 50 marches occurred protesting the construction of the interoceanic canal, with the largest occurring in Managua on October 27. On November 5, the Nicaraguan National Commission for the Grand Interoceanic Canal approved an international firm’s environmental and social impact study commissioned by HKND. Independent national and international environmental specialists stated the study was vague in some areas and that it required further scientific studies and public consultations to fully comply with international standards.
The courts remained particularly susceptible to bribes, manipulation, and other forms of corruption, especially by the FSLN, giving the sense that the FSLN heavily influenced CSJ actions. Observers noted delays in the administration of justice, such as in the cases of those arrested in Mina El Limon and Chichigalpa. The judge did not hold the initial hearings, stating he had health problems, but he held other hearings and was present at court during the same period. The time allotted by law to start the hearings expired. Some observers suggested a specific political motivation in keeping those arrested in jail was a concern that the protests endangered economic interests affecting the ruling party.
Nicaragua’s youth gang history can be traced back to the 1940s, but gangs were a relatively small-scale phenomenon up until the 1990s; in fact, the gang phenomenon almost completely disappeared from view during the 1980s, partly because of military conscription and the extensive organized community vigilance in urban neighborhoods promoted by the Sandinista government. There was an explosion in gang formation following the end of the war and change of government in 1990. In many ways, this was less a consequence of the war than of the advent of peace, as most of these new gang numbers were youths aged 16 to 20 who had been discharged from either the army or the contra forces.
Etica y Transparencia (ET) is a non-profit civil society organization that supports institutionalism, democratic principles, sustainable human development, and transparency. ET is affiliated with Transparency International and has worked in Nicaragua since it participated as an electoral observer in 1996. The organization has also participated in electoral observation activities for the regional elections of 1998, municipal elections of 2000, and presidential elections of 2001. ET has also been involved in a promoting national dialogue and conducting a diagnostic study of electoral processes. The election observation activities of ET played a key role in the 1996 elections which were plagued with irregularities and controversy. ET’s systematic observation nationwide, covering more than half of the JRVs in the country, made it possible to quantify irregularities and their affect on the electoral results. At the same time, ET’s quick count of the presidential votes provided another independent version of the result.
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