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Suriname - Political Parties

Political party structures are generally very weak, making it difficult for the people to put great confidence in civilian leaders. There are some 40-50 political parties in Suriname, but fewer than 25 meet the minimum size to participate in the elections. For many, whom they choose to partner with before and after the upcoming elections will determine how many National Assembly seats they get, and whether they are a member of the ruling coalition.

In Suriname, politics are personal, and coalitions are often formed and dissolved based on personal relationships and/or feuds rather than on political platforms. Several observers have opined that Suriname is actually moving backwards rather than forward when it comes to parties formulating policies and platforms for their campaigns. They even go so far as to say that elections are a mechanism for parties to redistribute the wealth they have accumulated to their patrons.

Because parties and coalitions in Suriname are based little on belief systems, political relationships can easily morph into unexpected alliances. Where the parties and coalitions stand in their partnerships can and is evolving quickly. Who they will choose as bed fellows - temporary or longer term - remains to be seen.

Most of Suriname's political parties took shape during the autonomy period and were overwhelmingly based on ethnicity. For example, the National Party of Suriname found its support among the Creoles, the Progressive Reform Party members came from the Hindustani population, and the Indonesian Peasant's Party was Javanese. Other smaller parties found support by appealing to voters on an ideological or pro-independence platform; the Partij Nationalistische Republiek (PNR) was among the most important. Its members pressed most strongly for independence and for the introduction of leftist political and economic measures. Many former PNR members would go on to play a key role following the coup of February 1980.

The National Party of Suriname was originally founded as a multi-ethnic party, but lost members to other political parties over time until it became the "dark Creole party" it is today. Because ethnicities tend to group in certain localities or regions, political parties need to appeal to more than one ethnicity if they want to expand their support base. Pertjaja Luhur is one example of a party that made great strides to shed its "Javanese-only" identity, including using the slogan "From ethnic to national. That is Pertjaja Luhur. Now completely" and paying to bus in representatives of all ethnicities to its charity events.

By around 2010 the usual ethnic support base for the National Party of Suriname (NPS) and the United Reform Party (VHP), among Creole and East Indian voters, respectively, was eroding. These two prominent parties has begun to decline with the emergence of a younger electorate that takes its higher education and economic opportunities for granted. This is in contrast to political parties catering to Javanese and Maroon ethnicities. Because these population groups remain by comparison less affluent, the voters still remain mostly loyal to the ethnic-based political parties that promise them better opportunities.

The opposition was permanently weakened by its heavy defeat in 2010. The NPS, which was supposed to represent the elites of the Creole component (25% of the population), was in marked decline. The other opposition group, the VHP, representing the interests of the Hindustani community (35% of the population), appeared more dynamic but suffers from its image as an economically dominant group and little open to other communities.

Suriname has much in common with the Commonwealth Caribbean countries. The dominant ethnic groups are Creoles and East Indians, as in Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago. Among most ethnic groups the Christian religion has come to occupy a dominant position comparable to that in the Commonwealth Caribbean. The colonial background to Suriname's democracy is similar in that the Netherlands, like England, was one of the first countries to develop democratic institutions.

Dutch institutions were extended to the Caribbean somewhat later than the British, yet Suriname came to independence in the mid-seventies with a fully functioning democratic system, buttressed by a literate, largely urban, and comparatively prosperous population. Labor unions were well developed and closely integrated with the political process. And like much of the Caribbean, its small population suffered from a continual drain of talent to larger and wealthier countries.

In important ways Suriname also differs from the countries of the commonwealth Caribbean. First, as a former Dutch colony, its relations have been with the Netherlands and the other Dutch West Indian colonies: its lingua francas are Dutch and Creole. Secondly, the population mix contains a significant group of Javanese background. In addition, about 10% of the population is "Bush Negro". Living in the interior and little affected by Western civilization, this group does not identify with the larger Creole or black population. In both suriname and Guyana, the unassimilated Amerindian population, while small in numbers, dominate extensive areas.

The political and economic condition of Suriname deteriorated more rapidly than that in Commonwea1th Caribbean states. In this respect its record is like that of Guyana, though for different reasons. After independence, Suriname's ethnically based political parties muddled through several years of not very effective coalition government. Finally, their inattention to the country's small army, and particularly their inability to respond to the demands of its rank and file, led to a coup by noncommissioned officers in 1980. In 1982, this group assassinated 14 of the leading political, labor, and educational leaders of the country.

Nevertheless, civilian governments were elected in largely free elections in 1987 and, after another military coup, in 1991.

Since the 1987 Decree "Law on Political Parties," although political parties are required to publish an annual report on their finances, political parties now void this by keeping their money in "foundations." Funding sources for these foundations are not transparent (whether it is from foreign donors, from international businesses, or from illicit activities such as narcotics trafficking or money laundering), nor is it transparent to whom favors will later be owed. Political parties are sometimes not even transparent on sources of funding within their leadership, and even the party's treasurer may not know the source of the funding.

In most Suriname political parties the chair of the party can retain his/her position as long as desired. Often the party seems to exist primarily to support the chair's political aspirations. In addition, with the exception of two political parties, regular internal elections for party leadership are not held, preventing any leadership change or development of up-and-coming leaders within the party.

This arose from Suriname's political history of emancipation politics. Democracy within the party was not the priority; rather, the priority was to improve the political and socioeconomic status of the party's (usually ethnic) constituents. The constituents tended to be loyal to the party in exchange for the progress of their ethnic, socioeconomic class. This system of emancipation politics served an important role in democratizing and equalizing Suriname's society (in essence, according to Breeveld, moving power from the whites and mulattos and redistributing it more evenly.) This system helped keep Suriname stable and at peace despite the many ethnic groups in the country.

By 2010 the ruling government, the "New Front Plus" coalition, was composed of eight political parties. In the 2005 campaign, the New Front coalition was formed in January and ran as a group of four parties: National Party of Suriname (NPS), United Reform Party (VHP)(Note: another common translation of the party name is the Progressive Reform Party), Pertjajah Luhur (PL), and Surinamese Labor Party (SPA). When the coalition failed to garner a majority of National Assembly seats, the New Front combined with an additional four parties to form the current government. Three of the four were Maroon parties that ran as the A-1 Combination coalition - General Liberation and Development Party (ABOP), Union of Brotherhood and Unity in Politics (BEP), and SEEKA. The fourth party was Democratic Alternative 91 (DA91), which originally ran as a member of the Alternative Forum Coalition and, post-election (2005), abandoned its coalition members to join the "New Front Plus" ruling coalition. (2005 seats per party: NPS-8; VHP-7; PL-6; SPA-2; A-Combination-5; and DA91-1).

The lion's share of talk about the New Front Plus coalition centers on its relationship with Pertjajah Luhur (PL). It was widely believed that long-time concerns about PL politicians' reportedly corrupt practices have damaged NPS and VHP standing with the voting public. The PL, on the other hand, stresses its contributions to the ruling government. Although PL brought six National Assembly seats, the PL maintained it helped the NPS gain an additional 4 National Assembly seats in 2005 by swinging Javanese ethnic voters to the NPS.

The SPA party, which ran as a coalition partner and won two National Assembly seats in 2005, suffered from massive internal problems after its party chair, Siegfried Gilds, was convicted of money laundering in 2009. Gilds stepped down as chair, which led to a heated contest between party leaders as to who his successor would be -- a fight which ended up in court.

The A-Combination coalition is a thorn in the side of the New Front Plus because it cannot credibly campaign against Bouterse as a former military dictator due to the terrible track record of its own partner, ABOP chair Ronny Brunswijk, during the Interior War and after. The A-Combination also has grown increasingly vocal about its dissatisfaction with its ruling coalition partners.

A key policy initiative for the A-Combination has been a new national health insurance scheme, and the A-Combination has threatened to withdraw from the ruling coalition if it is not set in place before the elections. Several other A-Combination initiatives proposed by the ministries they control, and which favor their constituents, have not been approved by the vice president. After the A-Combination criticized its coalition partners during a January mass rally, President Venetiaan responded that he is looking forward to seeing if the A-Combination submits its resignation from the coalition and, if so, he is fine with that.

In 2005, when the National Democratic Party (NDP), led by Desire Bouterse, ran solo for the National Assembly, it landed the most National Assembly seats of any single party -- 15. In preparation for 2010, the NDP took to heart the lesson that the proportional seat assignment system favors larger coalitions and formed the Mega-Combination Coalition. That is now the largest of the formal political coalitions, including the Democratic National Platform 2000 (DNP-2000), New Suriname (NS), Kerukunan Tulodo Pernatan Inggil (KTPI), Pendawa Lima (PeLi), Party Pembangungan Rakjat Suriname (PPRS), and Progressive Laborers and Agrarians Union (PALU).

The Mega-Combination supplanted the main 2005 opposition coalition, the People's Alliance for Improvement (VVV). The VVV, which only won five National Assembly seats in 2005, was composed of DNP-2000, PPRS, KTPI, PeLi, all of which have since joined the Mega-Combination. Another VVV member, the Basic Party for Renewal and Democracy (BVD) originally joined the Mega-Combination but withdrew membership (or was kicked out) after allegations the BVD was recruiting NDP members. Not a member of the old VVV, the New Suriname Party (NS) joined the Mega-Combination and subsequently withdrew. The Progressive Laborers and Agrarians Union (PALU), also a non-VVV member, joined the Mega-Combination as well.

There was little room for Wijdenbosch's political aspirations in the Bouterse-led Mega-Combination.

The Union of Progressive Surinamers party (UPS) and the Alternative 1 (A1) Coalition formed a new coalition, the Midden Blok (Middle Block) in preparation for the 2010 elections. In 2005, the UPS party had partnered with the Party for Democracy and Development in Unity (DOE), which is now running alone. The A1 coalition, which ran as its own coalition in 2005, is made up of several smaller parties: Democrats for the 21st century (DN21), Alternative Forum (AF), Political Wing of the FAL (PVF), and Trefpunt 2000. Of the A1 Coalition, only the PVF won National Assembly seats (two) in 2005.

Both the BVD and DOE planned to enter the 2010 elections without partners. The DOE, a political party chaired by the brother of the Director of the Democracy Unit at the Anton de Kom University of Suriname, has high ideals for party management and a political platform, which may account for why it cannot find a suitable partner. The BVD, which is headed by one of Suriname's richest men, Dilip Sardjoe, withdrew from the Mega-Combination in fall 2009.