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Dominican Republic - US Relations

The U.S. has a strong interest in a democratic, stable, and economically healthy Dominican Republic. The country's standing as the largest Caribbean economy, second-largest country in terms of population and land mass, with large bilateral trade with the United States, and its proximity to the United States and other smaller Caribbean nations make the Dominican Republic an important partner in hemispheric affairs. The Embassy estimates that 100,000 U.S. citizens live in the Dominican Republic; many are dual nationals. An important element of the relationship between the two countries is the fact that more than 1 million individuals of Dominican origin reside in the United States, most of them in the metropolitan Northeast and some in Florida.

In January 1964, the U.S. intelligence community characterized the Dominican Republic as rife with instability and one of Latin America's least prepared countries for representative democracy, but the intelligence analysts also predicted that "the leftists pose no serious threat to seize control" and that "[f]or the immediate future at least, the present regime, in one form or another, may be able to hold on to power for an indefinite period."

President Johnson's close advisers, however, were not so sanguine. Their immediate and overarching concern was to prevent the Dominican Republic from becoming a "second Cuba." Citing "a deterioration in political and economic conditions which could lead to a Castro-type takeover," White House Special Assistant Ralph Dungan recommended more than simply reacting to the fluid situation as events occurred. (2) After eight weeks at post, the new U.S. Ambassador to the Dominican Republic, W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., underscored this state of crisis. Bennett reported extreme economic misery and proposed a number of financial measures to temper the harsh effects of the widely unpopular austerity program instituted by the ruling Triumvirate's head, Reid Cabral. Bennett also pushed for a full-scale implementation of the Alliance for Progress program in the Dominican Republic as the first step in creating a climate conducive to a return to constitutional and representative government.

The Johnson administration, however, was careful not to align itself too closely with any of the more prominent Dominican leaders, both past and present: Reid Cabral's administration was "erratic"; the exiled Juan Bosch--the first democratically elected President who had been ousted in 1963--exhibited leftist leanings; and Joaquín Balaguer, President from 1960 to 1961, was too colored by his association with the late dictator Trujillo.

In early 1965, Johnson's advisers on the Dominican Republic became increasingly concerned over the activities of deposed President Juan Bosch who was exiled in Puerto Rico. Believing Bosch was "anti-American" and "grossly abusing his status as a political asylee on our shores," Bennett warned Thomas Mann, the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, that Bosch was attempting to "rouse the military against Reid." Mann's response was to take no action, yet he predicted presciently that Bosch's "only chance to regain power probably lies in some kind of upheaval within the Dominican Republic." On April 25, Mann's prediction was nearly proven correct: Reid resigned under pressure from a mixed military group aligned with Bosch's Dominican Revolutionary Party.

The next day, President Johnson turned to his trusted friends Mann and future Supreme Court Justice, Abe Fortas, for advice. Fortas long had an interest in Latin America and maintained close contacts with key Hispanics in Puerto Rico. Fearful that Communist elements were infiltrating the new government and taking advantage of the "constitutionalist" rebels who supported Bosch, Johnson and his advisers worked quickly to prevent a "second Cuba." The first step was to support the "loyalist" Dominican military.

Three days after the ouster of Reid Cabral, the Johnson administration concluded that the conservative loyalist troops were ill-equipped to fight successfully against the leftist constitutionalists who were swiftly gaining ground. The conflict endangered American citizens residing in Santo Domingo. On April 28, 1965, Bennett requested the immediate landing of U.S. Marines in the capital city. Believing that the "judgment of those on the spot" ought to be followed, Mann, McGeorge Bundy and the President agreed to Bennett's request. When Johnson briefed congressional leaders on the decision to intervene militarily, he was careful not to play up the threat of Communist expansion and emphasized instead humanitarian objectives. Privately, however, Johnson was convinced (unlike some of his advisers) of an impending Communist takeover and energetically sought to prevent this "disaster" from happening. After sending in the Marines, President Johnson focused on "legitimizing" the operation.

Today U.S. relations with the Dominican Republic are excellent, and the U.S. has been an outspoken supporter of that country's democratic and economic development. The Dominican Government has been supportive of many U.S. initiatives in the United Nations and related agencies. The two governments cooperate in the fight against the traffic in illegal substances. The Dominican Republic has worked closely with U.S. law enforcement officials on issues such as the extradition of fugitives and measures to hinder illegal migration.

The United States supported the Fernández administration's efforts to improve Dominican competitiveness, to attract foreign private investment, to fight corruption, and to modernize the tax system. Bilateral trade is important to both countries. U.S. firms, mostly manufacturers of apparel, footwear, and light electronics, as well as U.S. energy companies, account for much of the foreign private investment in the Dominican Republic.

U.S. goods exports to the Dominican Republic in 2008 were U.S. $6.6 billion, up 8.4% from 2007, 23.3% from 2006 (pre-CAFTA-DR), and 136% from 1994 (the year prior to the Uruguay Round). The Dominican Republic was the United States' 33rd-largest goods export market in 2008. The Dominican Republic's exports to the U.S. in 2008 were U.S. $4 billion, a 5.6% decrease from 2007 but up 29% over the previous 14 years. The U.S. Embassy works closely with U.S. business firms and Dominican trade groups, both of which can take advantage of the new opportunities in this growing market. At the same time, the Embassy is working with the Dominican Government to resolve a range of ongoing commercial and investment disputes.

The Embassy counsels U.S. firms through its Country Commercial Guide and informally via meetings with business persons planning to invest or already investing in the Dominican Republic. This is a challenging business environment for U.S. firms, especially for medium to smaller sized businesses.

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) mission is focused on improving access of underserved populations to quality health care and combating HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis (TB); promoting economic growth through policy reform, support for CAFTA-DR implementation, and technical assistance to small producers and tourism groups; environmental protection and policy reform initiatives; improved access to quality primary, public education and assistance to at-risk youth; a model rural electrification program; and improving participation in democratic processes, while strengthening the judiciary and combating corruption across all sectors.