Belarus - Electronic Warfare Directorate
At present, the electronic warfare system of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus meets the requirements for the electronic suppression of the electronic means of reconnaissance and command and control systems for troops and weapons. The equipment of electronic warfare continues to be developed, the use of electronic warfare equipment and means is being introduced, new divisions are being created in accordance with the emerging threats to the national security of the Republic of Belarus in the military sphere. The personnel of the EW military units continues the glorious traditions in maintaining high combat readiness and military discipline established by the front-line soldiers in the initial period of the development of the EW system.
By the end of the 1990s, the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus had three EW military units: 10 separate EW centers, 228 separate EW centers, and 387 CPC units. But the increasing role of information systems in the management of troops and weapons dictated an increase in the impact on communication channels by means of electronic warfare at all levels of command and control of troops and weapons. In the period from 2007 to 2009, three new military electronic warfare units were formed - 48 for EW-N, 15 for EW-C and 16 for EW-C. In 2012, by merging 15 and 16 separate battalions of electronic warfare of the operational-tactical commands, the 16th separate air warfare regiment (with aircraft equipment) of the Air Force and air defense forces was formed.
The emergence and development of electronic warfare (EW) is inextricably linked with the history of the development of radio electronic means (RES) and their introduction into the sphere of warfare.Electronic warfare is considered a relatively young area in military affairs. At the same time, the idea and the first cases of conducting radio intelligence and creating radio interference refer to the time when radio began to be used in military affairs.
The first attempts to interfere with radio communications occurred during the Russo-Japanese War. On April 15, 1904, Japanese cruisers shelled an internal raid and the city of Port Arthur. Artillery fire was corrected by the Japanese ships that stood opposite the harbor entrance. With the help of the ship radio station of the battleship Pobeda and the coastal radio station Golden Mountains, the defenders of Port Arthur successfully suppressed the transmission of radio signals of the ships-spotters.
More intensively, radio intelligence and radio interference began to be applied during the First World War. Radio interference was created to disrupt radio communications between the headquarters of armies, corps and some divisions, as well as between warships. Radio interference was used sporadically during the combat operations of the naval forces and the ground forces, since the warring parties preferred to intercept radio broadcasts rather than disrupting them. To interfere with the use of conventional means of radio communications, and in the German army - special radio interference station.
During World War II, apart from radio communications, radar stations and radio navigation devices began to be widely used. In this regard, in a number of armies, they are beginning to develop jamming stations and create military units to combat the enemy’s electronic facilities.
By this time, the creation of organs and units of electronic warfare of the Red Army. On the basis of a memorandum from the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, on December 16, 1942, the State Defense Committee issued a decree on the organization in the Red Army of a special service for driving German radio stations operating on the battlefield. In accordance with this decree, the first parts of the radio interference were formed: 130, 131 and 132nd separate special-purpose radio divisions. Another division (226th) was created in March 1944. The divisions had a population of 195 people, of which 32 were officers. They were armed with 8 to 10 car radio stations such as RAF-KV and RSB-F, specially equipped with consoles to create interference; 18-20 reconnaissance radios of the type “Virage” and “The Seagull” and four radio direction finders such as 53-PK-3 and “Corkscrew”. In the 130, 131, 132-m radio divisions of SPETSNAZ there were also powerful railway stations of radio interference of the “Bee” type. Subsequently, these units took part in all operations of the Great Patriotic War. They disrupted the transfer of more than 24 thousand radiograms in the operational and operational-tactical levels of enemy control.
The actions of these radio divisions were particularly effective in blocking enemy surrounded groups. Thus, during the defeat of the encircled grouping in Königsberg, the 131st separate special purpose radio division suppressed virtually all radio communications of the enemy groupings with the supreme commander and the Zemland grouping, which, according to the commander of the encircled grouping, was one of the reasons for the surrender of the German forces.
A major role was played by special purpose divisions in the largest offensive operation of the Second World War — Operation Bagration. At the beginning of the operation, the troops of the 1st Baltic Front surrounded and four days later defeated five German divisions west of Vitebsk. At the same time, the troops of the 1st Byelorussian Front eliminated until June 29 the main forces (six divisions) of the 9th enemy army after encircling in the area of Bobruisk. Then, developing the offensive, the Soviet troops liberated Minsk, surrounded and by July 12, defeated its large enemy force, which consisted of the 4th and 9th armies, to the east. By the end of the operation, the Soviet troops, having crushed the main forces of the Army Group Center, liberated Belarus, part of Lithuania and Latvia, entered Polish territory and approached East Prussia.
The 131st Horde Special Forces, received on July 1, 1944, joined the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front, from the regions of B. Soboli (12 km south of Rudnya) from June 8 to June 27 and the village of From June 28 to July 1, Gryazino (25 km north-west of Orsha) violated the radio communications of the 3rd tank army and the 4th army, as well as the radio communication of the interaction between them. Radio interference created by the division in 70 radio networks and radio directions, disrupted the transfer of about 3,700 radiograms, or over 90% of all enemy radio broadcasts. Among them, the reception of 30 very important operational radiograms of a group of troops surrounded east of Minsk and 90 radiograms of military headquarters operating in the Kaunas direction was disrupted. In the process of transmitting 3,700 radiograms in the conditions of radio interference, the German radio operators repeated individual groups 11,000 times and 4,700 times the entire text of the radiograms, 1600 times changed to other frequencies.
At the same time, for the first time, the question arose of organizing interaction in electronic warfare between units and subunits of special forces. In order to improve interaction and reduce the time for transmitting data on unsealed radio communications, the receiving radio centers 131 ordn and 474 ordn OSNAZ from June 8, 1944 operated together, were located in common positional areas, and sometimes in the same premises.
In the same operation, such a method of radio suppression as the transfer of misleading messages was quite successfully applied. The former chief of staff of the 131st Horde Special Forces, Colonel A. Ivanov, recalling the liquidation of the enemy’s surrounded scattered groups east of Minsk, said that the radio operators of the division, using a trophy radio station, entered into radio communication with the main radio station of one of the surrounded divisions, which unsuccessfully For two hours she tried to establish radio communication with the radio station of the corps headquarters, and took over several radiograms intended for the headquarters of the German army corps. The division’s radio operator imitated the handwriting of the radio station of the enemy’s corps radio station so precisely that the radio station’s captive of the divisional radio station who was subsequently captured during interrogation expressed complete confidence.
Since June 24, the 130th Horde Special Forces of the 1st Byelorussian Front violated the radio communication of the formations of the 9th Army in the area of Bobruisk, then the radio communication of the formations of the 4th Army that were retreating under the blows of the front forces. Special attention was paid to the disruption of the radio communications of the 9th Army's units, which, as it became known from the intercepted radiograms, were preparing for a breakthrough from the encirclement to the north-west to unite with the troops of the 4th army. As a result of powerful strikes by aviation and ground forces, by June 28 the Bobruisk group was completely eliminated.
Subsequently, the 130th Division, in cooperation with the 131st Division, violated the radio communication of the headquarters of the 105,000th enemy force formations, surrounded east of Minsk. During the rout of the Minsk group, the division violated the communications of the 12th, 27th and 35th army, 39th and 41st armored corps of the 4th and 9th enemy armies, trying to break through to the south-west.
For success in solving combat missions, the 130th and 131st radio divisions were awarded the orders of the Red Star, and the 132nd were awarded the Order of Bogdan Khmelnitsky.
At the end of World War II, the electronic warfare units were disbanded. Once again, special EW units in the ground forces were created in the 1950s. At the same time, units of 2 types were created: as part of the communications troops — battalions to suppress enemy ground radio and radio communications, and as part of the air defense troops — battalions to suppress airborne avionics for reconnaissance, aiming, navigation and communications.
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