Belarus - Politics
Voting in Belarus was held 11 September 2016, with turnout surpassing the threshold for the parliamentary election to be valid. Although the authoritarian government had introduced some reforms, doubts existed over the vote's credibility. Polling stations closed with officials declaring that the level of voter participation exceeded the 50-percent threshold for the election to be valid. Most of the 110 lower house seats up for grabs were expected to go to pro-government candidates, with 484 candidates vying for a place in the assembly. This time, critics allege, Lukashenka has allowed two candidates with opposition sympathies to be proclaimed winners because of pressure from the West.
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which put in place some 400 monitors to observe the elections, said it would report on 12 September 2016 as to how the election had been conducted. After the last election in 2012, the OSCE called for measures such as including increasing transparency of the vote count and improvement of the right to free expression.
Belarus implemented a number of reforms in recent years in an effort to seek rapprochement with the West. The country was seeking a possible $3 billion (2.7 billion-euro) loan from the International Monetary Fund. Political prisoners were released in 2015r, prompting the EU to lift nearly all of its sanctions and the US to partially scrap its trade restrictions imposed over a perceived lack of democracy.
The former Soviet republic has been labeled Europe's last dictatorship,. Belarus has a strong presidential system, governed by the president who has extensive powers, including the authority to dissolve the lower and upper houses of parliament, to issue presidential decrees which have the force of law when the legislature is in recess, to declare a state of emergency or to impose martial law. The president appoints the prime minister and the government, as well half of the judges of the Constitutional Court, and has the power to dismiss any of them. Furthermore, the president is empowered to appoint and dismiss the judges of all other courts, including the Supreme Court.
The Belarusian state controls all media outlets, meaning that only officially approved views are heard by most of society. At least eight new non-state newspapers were refused registration in 2010. Independent publications still have no possibility of being distributed through the state press distribution system. Independent journalists are frequently harassed. Following the presidential election of 19 December 2010, the independent media was specifically targeted, with premises raided, equipment seized, journalists interrogated and in some cases beaten up. Foreign media outlets have faced problems getting their correspondents accredited.
Arrest and violence are often used to impede assembly, often by individuals in civilian clothes who present no law enforcement identification to the individual being arrested. Pressure against families of those involved in opposition politics can include restricting their right to free movement, threatening removal from jobs, and, in one notable example, threatening to seize the child of Andrei Sannikau, an imprisoned opposition presidential candidate and his wife, Irina Khalip, also a political prisoner.
The media landscape includes a wide range of national and local television and radio broadcasters, as well as a number of print media outlets. State owned media dominate the media landscape and the state controls the distribution networks. Official media -- including the main newspaper, Sovietskaya Belorussia, which belongs to the presidential administration -- invariably portray Lukashenka in a positive light. Nevertheless, there are some media that constitute alternative sources of information, including the Internet. The overall media environment has deteriorated in the recent years due to intimidation, detentions, defamation lawsuits and administrative sanctions imposed on journalists and media outlets.
Western media corporations such as Google and Apple unwittingly make Russian online media presence in Belarus even larger. This happens because of the absence of fully functional geotargeting for Belarus in the automatically generated news services. A growing number of news consumers use such services on their mobile phones without visiting any certain websites. The launch of news aggregators based on recommendation algorithms has had a significant impact on the Belarusian media market. The absence of fully functional geotargeting for the country puts Belarusian journalists in unequal position compared to their colleagues in neighboring countries. By placing Belarusian users into a larger Russian-speaking segment and localizing the news content only partially, internet corporations make the Belarusian media market weaker and hinder its development.
The party system in Belarus is weak, notwithstanding the number of parties registered. The majority of the 15 registered parties support the President and the political opposition to the incumbent is not represented in the parliament. The 2012 parliamentary elections resulted in only five representatives being elected from political parties. Amendments to several laws related to activities of political parties and public associations as introduced in February 2014 were, according to interlocutors in state institutions, intended to simplify the procedure for registration of public associations. In particular, the requirement of securing regional representation in order to be registered was lifted and public associations were allowed to become political parties, provided they did not receive state or foreign financial support up to six months prior to the transformation.
The most significant human rights problems continued to be: citizens were unable to change their government through elections; in a system bereft of checks and balances, authorities committed abuses; and former political prisoners’ political rights remained restricted while the government failed to account for longstanding cases of politically motivated disappearances. Other human rights problems included abuses by the security forces, which reportedly mistreated suspects during investigations and in prisons. Prison conditions remained poor. Authorities arbitrarily arrested, detained, and imprisoned citizens for criticizing officials, participating in demonstrations, and other political reasons. The judiciary experienced political interference and a lack of independence; trial outcomes often appeared predetermined, and trials occurred behind closed doors or in the absence of the accused. Authorities infringed on the right of privacy. The government restricted civil liberties, including freedom of speech, press, assembly, association, and religion.
The government seized printed materials from civil society activists and prevented independent media from disseminating information and materials. The government continued to hinder or prevent the activities of some religious groups, at times fining them or restricting their services. Official corruption in all branches of government remained a problem. Authorities harassed human rights groups, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and political parties, refusing to register many and then threatening them with criminal prosecution for operating without registration.
State-owned media dominated the information field and maintained the highest circulation through generous subsidies and preferences. There was no countrywide private television. The state-owned postal system, Belposhta, and the state distributor of printed publications, Belsayuzdruk, allowed the distribution of at least nine independent newspapers and magazines that covered politics, including Novy Chas, Borisovskie Novosti, and Intexpress, which have been banned from distribution for 11 years.
The exclusion of independent print media from the state distribution system and the requirement that private stores secure registration to sell newspapers and magazines effectively limited the ability of the independent press to distribute their publications.
International media continued to operate in the country but not without interference and prior censorship. Euronews and the Russian channels First Channel, NTV, and RTR were generally available, although only through paid cable services in many parts of the country and with a time lag that allowed the removal of news deemed undesirable.
The government exerted pressure on the vast majority of independent publications to exercise self-censorship, warning them not to report on certain topics or criticize the government. The government tightly and directly controlled the content of state broadcast and print media. Television channels are required to air at least 30 percent local content. Local independent television stations operated in some areas and reported local news, although most were under government pressure to forgo reporting on national and sensitive issues or risk censorship.
Violence and discrimination against women were problems, as was violence against children. Trafficking in persons remained a problem, although prosecution and victim identification slightly improved. There was discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) persons; those with disabilities; Roma and other ethnic minorities; persons with HIV/AIDS; and those who sought to use the Belarusian language. Authorities harassed and at times dismissed from their jobs members of independent unions in state-owned enterprises, severely limiting the ability of workers to form and join independent trade unions and to organize and bargain collectively. Authorities also employed various means of forced labor.
A crackdown on free speech is the latest worrying development amid the deteriorating, “wholescale oppression” of human rights in Belarus, an independent expert told the UN General Assembly 25 October 2018. The UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Belarus, Miklós Haraszti, referred to the “sad fate of freedom of expression” specifically pointing to legal amendments ending anonymity of publications in online media and forcing state registration of all online platforms.
Haraszti, who was concluding his six-year tenure, said human rights abuses that had prompted international scrutiny when he took up his role were worsening in important areas. “The online restrictions close down the last public space where free speech was relatively possible, given the practically total control over speech in the mostly state-owned offline media. The amendments introduce chilling financial liabilities, blocking, or de-licensing without any judicial oversight,” Haraszti said.
The “permission-based” regime remains unchanged, with a legal system and a State apparatus organized to suppress any expression of opinions other than those of the Government. For more than 20 years, the Belarusian governance system has remained based on an all-powerful State, driven by presidential decrees and controlling more than 80 per cent of the economy and the totality of the judicial and information systems.
For the bulk of Belarusians, Lukashenka represented stability. During his two decades in power, Lukashenka has systemically quashed opposition parties, independent media, and civil society groups. Outbursts of political protests have been met with violence.
Regime change in Belarus
Regime change in Belarus is a complex and highly sensitive topic, involving domestic and international dynamics. Belarus has been ruled by President Alexander Lukashenko since 1994, often referred to as "Europe's last dictator." His government has faced criticism for authoritarian practices, including crackdowns on political opposition, civil society, and independent media.
In 2020, after a widely disputed presidential election, Belarus saw mass protests against Lukashenko. The opposition, led by Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, accused him of election fraud. The protests were met with harsh crackdowns, including arrests, violence, and repression. Despite significant opposition, Lukashenko has maintained control due to the loyalty of state institutions, including security forces and the military.
The opposition in Belarus faces severe repression, making it difficult to organize effectively. Many opposition leaders, like Tsikhanouskaya, are in exile. While there is substantial discontent, some segments of the population continue to support Lukashenko, either out of fear of instability or due to his Soviet-style policies that offer economic guarantees to certain groups.
Russia is a key ally of Lukashenko, providing economic, political, and military support. Moscow sees Belarus as a buffer state against NATO and Western influence. Any regime change in Belarus risks disrupting this alliance, which Russia is unlikely to tolerate. In 2022, Belarus became increasingly reliant on Russia, especially after allowing its territory to be used as a staging ground for the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
The West, including the EU and the U.S., has supported Belarusian civil society and opposition movements through sanctions against Lukashenko's regime and financial aid to exiled activists. However, their influence is limited due to Russia's dominant role.
The war in Ukraine further complicated the situation. Belarus's support for Russia in the war has solidified Lukashenko's position but has also made him more dependent on Moscow. A regime change in Belarus would likely impact the regional balance of power, potentially threatening Russia's military and geopolitical interests.
Western sanctions have isolated Belarus economically and politically. While this weakens Lukashenko's regime, it also limits Belarus's ability to pivot away from Russian dependence.
Potential Scenarios for Regime Change:
Popular Uprising: A large-scale, sustained popular uprising could challenge Lukashenko's rule, but such a movement would likely face brutal repression and would need broad-based support, including defections from the security forces.
Elite Defection: Regime change could also come from within, if elites in Lukashenko's government or military lose confidence in his leadership and switch sides.
Russian-Orchestrated Change: Russia could push for a change in leadership to install a more compliant figure if Lukashenko's position becomes untenable but only if it aligns with Moscow's interests.
Western Pressure: Increased Western pressure and support for the opposition could play a role, but this would require significant coordination and could provoke a strong response from Russia.
Lukashenko has created a system with tight control over media, security forces, and political opposition. As long as Russia supports Lukashenko, regime change will be difficult without broader geopolitical shifts. Fragmentation among opposition groups weakens their ability to challenge the regime.
While there are clear forces pushing for change in Belarus, regime change is unlikely without significant shifts in domestic support, elite loyalty, or Russia's strategic interests. Given the geopolitical importance of Belarus, any change in leadership would have far-reaching consequences, especially in the context of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war.
The regime bored and disappointed everyone, even those who, by their duty, are supposed to serve it. Everyone can see that in neighboring countries, where there is no dictatorship, the standard of living is incomparably higher.
The election campaign in Belarus, the final of which is scheduled for 26 January 2025, should demonstrate the unbreakable stability of the Lukashenko regime. Isn't the only intrigue - what figure will the authorities dare to record in the final protocol? The fact that it will be higher than the official figure of 2020 (80.10%) is obvious. But will Lukashenko dare to exceed Putin's last record official result of 2024 (87.28%)? Here is a dilemma for the dictator. On the one hand, there are no longer any restrictions, and subordinates are trying with great enthusiasm to demonstrate the "unprecedented popularity of the leader beloved by all people"; on the other - there is a cautious precaution: how not to irritate the ambitious "older brother" with their records.
The election campaign looked like a complete and unconditional triumph of the regime that holds power. Without any competition from political rivals, with oppositionists and independent journalists exiled abroad or thrown into prison, in hothouse conditions of public apathy and indifference, comfortable for officials and security forces. But in reality, it is precisely such regimes, lulled and self-satisfied by the lack of political competition, which have finally lost their sense of reality and dependence on their own society, that often collapse from the slightest gust of wind of history - suddenly and unexpectedly.
Regimes lulled and complacent by the lack of political competition, which have finally lost their sense of reality and dependence on their own society, often collapse at the slightest gust of wind of history - suddenly and unexpectedly. The Lukashenko regime, in its 31st year of existence, offers society no conceivable attractive future. It is obvious to most people that everything it was capable of is already in the past and no new ideas or achievements can be expected from it.
At the beginning of their existence, young dictatorial regimes are attractive to society. Resolute, daring, lively, dynamic, they are attractive in their own way in the desperate, self-sacrificing challenge they throw at the old world order. It happens that even those who only yesterday swore allegiance to him, chanted asana, raised their hands in unison at rallies, signed up for a pro-government party, unanimously supported him in fake elections, do not come to the defense of dictators in a critical situation... This happens when the regime has bored and disappointed everyone, even those who, according to their duties, are supposed to serve it.
Significant human rights issues included credible reports of: torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment by security forces; harsh and life-threatening prison conditions; arbitrary arrest or detention; serious problems with the independence of the judiciary; political prisoners or detainees; transnational repression against individuals in another country; arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy; punishment of family members for alleged offenses by a relative; serious abuses in a conflict related to Belarus’ complicity in Russia’s war against Ukraine; serious restrictions on freedom of expression and media freedom, including violence or threats of violence against journalists, unjustified arrests or prosecutions of journalists, censorship, and the enforcement of criminal libel laws to limit expression; and serious restrictions on internet freedom.
Other issues include substantial interference with the freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association, including overly restrictive laws on the organization, funding, or operation of nongovernmental and civil society organizations; restrictions on freedom of movement and residence within the territory of a state and on the right to leave the country; inability of citizens to change their government peacefully through free and fair elections; serious and unreasonable restrictions on political participation; serious government corruption; serious government restrictions on and harassment of domestic and international human rights organizations; extensive gender-based violence, including domestic or intimate partner violence; trafficking in persons, including forced labor; crimes involving violence or threats of violence targeting lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, or intersex persons; and prohibiting independent trade unions and systematic restrictions on workers’ freedom of association.
The Committee for State Security (KGB), riot police, and other security forces, often without identification and wearing street clothes and masks, regularly used excessive force indiscriminately against detainees, peaceful protesters, members of the independent media, and ordinary citizens. Security forces also reportedly abused and mistreated individuals during investigations. As reported by human rights nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), police regularly beat and tortured persons during detentions and arrests. Human rights groups also reported abuses in police custody, including severe beatings; psychological humiliation, such as forcing detainees to undress to humiliate them; videotaped forced confessions made public on social media; and other efforts to exhaust detainees mentally and physically.
Reports of torture were prevalent in detention facilities and prisons across the country. In particular, human rights organizations stated the detention facility and prison located on Akrestsina Lane in Minsk were notorious for torturing detainees. They argued that the officers and doctors of those two facilities created dehumanizing conditions amounting to torture during the year. Authorities at these facilities were known to place homeless persons with communicable diseases, fleas, bedbugs, and lice in overcrowded cells with political prisoners.
Among the myriad unpunished abuses by authorities documented after the 2020 election were severe beatings; psychological humiliation; the use of stress positions; at least one reported case of rape and sexual abuse; use of electric shock devices; excessive use of tear gas; and up to three days of deprivation of food, drinking water, hygiene products, the use of toilets, sleep, and medical assistance. Conversely, the government prosecuted former law enforcement and security officers who tried to launch investigations against their colleagues or individuals who advised officials who were dismissed for political reasons or resigned in protest of police violence.
Authorities detained academics, political leaders, human rights defenders, journalists, opposition leaders and members, civil society activists, demonstrators, and ordinary citizens for reasons widely considered to be politically motivated. Authorities permitted and abetted security officers in taking an “arrest first, ask questions later” approach with no accountability or repercussions for security officers who made wrongful arrests or committed other abuses during or after arrests. Security officers could arrest at their own discretion, refused to identify themselves, and did not need to announce the reason for arrests. After detaining an individual, security officers forcefully took their cell phones, including messages, social media, contacts, and videos and photographs, all of which was often used as a pretext to charge detainees with “extremist” or opposition activities.
Lengthy pretrial detention was a significant problem, particularly for those facing politically motivated charges who were regularly held for indeterminate periods with no sense of when their cases would be heard. Observers believed authorities utilized the pretrial detention process to keep political detainees in a state of psychological and emotional uncertainty. They further believed there were several reasons for delays, including political interference and motivations, additional charges being brought against individuals held in pretrial detention and investigations opened, new investigators taking over cases, cases that were complicated because they involved many suspects, and cases that required extensive forensic or other expert examinations and analysis.
Observers believed corruption, inefficiency, and political interference with judicial decisions were widespread. Courts convicted individuals on false and politically motivated charges brought by prosecutors, and observers believed that senior government leaders and local authorities dictated or predetermined the outcomes of trials.
According to human rights groups, prosecutors and investigators wielded excessive and imbalanced authority because they could extend detention periods without the permission of judges. Defense lawyers were often unable to examine investigation files, attend investigations and interrogations, or examine evidence against defendants until a prosecutor formally brought the case to court.
Local human rights groups collectively maintained what was widely considered a credible and authoritative list of political prisoners in the country. During the year the list, which appeared on human rights group Vyasna’s website, contained more than 1,500 names, including leading political opposition figures and their staff. According to human rights defenders, the government regularly and falsely charged peaceful dissidents, journalists, members of the democratic opposition, and ordinary citizens with violence, “extremism” or “attempted extremism,” and other charges without evidence. The number of individuals on the regime’s list of “extremists” increased by more than 1,000 during the year 2023, reaching more than 3,300 by October 2023.
On 16 January 2023, the Investigative Committee reported it had charged political prisoner and former presidential candidate Syarhey Tsikhanouski with insubordination to prison administration’s orders. On February 27, authorities added 18 months to Tsikhanouski’s 18-year term for “malicious disobedience.”
Political prisoners were detained for purportedly committing a number of crimes, including most commonly: incitement of hatred; illegal collection and dissemination of information; defamation; insulting a government official; intentional destruction or damage to property; unlawful acts involving firearms, ammunition, and explosives; malicious hooliganism; money laundering; bribe taking; tax evasion; destruction of official documents; acts of terrorism or attempted acts of terrorism; intentional damage of a vehicle or communication lines; organization and preparation of actions that grossly violate public order, or active participation in them; high treason; unauthorized access to computer information; calls for actions aimed at causing harm to national security; resisting a police officer or other person guarding public order; fraud committed by an organized group or on a large scale; violence or threat of violence against law enforcement and security officials; incitement of hatred; illegal border crossing; participation in a criminal or extremist organization; conspiracy to seize power in an unconstitutional manner; creation of an extremist formation; financing the activities of an extremist group; attempted murder of a police officer; illicit trafficking of narcotic drugs; desecration of state symbols; organization or participation in riots; obstruction of the exercise of electoral rights; justifying Nazism; and abuse of historical and cultural values.
Authorities engaged in acts of transnational repression to intimidate or exact reprisal against individuals outside of the country, including exiled democratic opposition leaders, civil society activists, human rights defenders, trade unionists, lawyers, students, journalists, and others who fled repression in the country. In particular, the regime carried out kidnappings and forced returns; opened politically motivated investigations against prodemocracy activists, members of the democratic opposition, and their family members; held trials in absentia; regularly abused Interpol notices; and frequently harassed exiles, subjecting them to surveillance and threatening them with violence.
The law allowed the KGB, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the special security services, financial intelligence personnel, and certain border guard detachments to use wiretaps. Wiretaps required the permission of a prosecutor, but the lack of prosecutorial independence rendered this requirement meaningless.
According to the 2023 Freedom on the Net Report published by the NGO Freedom House, internet freedom declined following the 2020 presidential election with intensified repression against online journalists, activists, and internet users, whom the regime designated as “extremist” or “terrorist.” The government employed systematic, sophisticated surveillance techniques to monitor its citizens and control online communications at its discretion and without independent authorization or oversight.
The government utilized the Russian-developed System of Operative Investigative Measures, which provided authorities with direct, automated access to communications data from landline telephone networks, mobile service providers, and internet service providers. The country employed a centralized system of video monitoring cameras. Authorities sought surveillance and hacking tools from several countries and developed domestic capacity that linked closed-circuit television cameras in the country and other Commonwealth of Independent States countries and used facial recognition technology.
State-controlled media did not provide balanced coverage and overwhelmingly presented authorities’ version of events, including falsehoods and disinformation released by the Lukashenka regime. State-owned media dominated the information field and maintained the highest circulation through generous subsidies and preferences. There was no countrywide private television, and broadcast media space was dominated by state-owned and Russian stations. Pro-Lukashenka and pro-Russia viewpoints, including those disseminated by Russia’s state-controlled press, dominated the press in the country.
The law prohibited media from disseminating information on behalf of unregistered political parties, trade unions, and NGOs. Authorities eliminated all national and major regional independent media outlets in the country through several rounds of targeted reprisals, forced closures and liquidations, politically motivated prosecutions, website blockages, or other efforts to incapacitate the organizations. Many closed or blocked media operations re-established and continued their operations from outside the country.
Libel and slander were criminal offenses with penalties of up to six years in prison, and authorities acted on these laws, especially to restrict freedom of expression, prohibit expressing opposition to the government, including online, and generally retaliate against journalists and political opponents. The law provided large fines and prison sentences of up to six years for defaming or insulting the president. Penalties for defamation of character made no distinction between private and public persons. A public figure criticized for poor performance while in office could sue both the journalist and the media outlet that disseminated the critical report for defamation.
The law penalized the organization of and participation in unauthorized gatherings, the announcement of an intention to hold a mass event before securing official authorization, training protesters, financing public demonstrations, or soliciting foreign assistance “to the detriment” of the country. The law also criminalized public calls to organize or hold unauthorized gatherings, street marches, and other types of demonstrations, encouraging others to participate in mass events, or paying for participation in mass events. Convictions for some violations were punishable by sentences of up to five years’ imprisonment.
Police violently detained and jailed opposition members, civil society activists, journalists, and ordinary citizens who attempted to organize or participate in political events, rallies, or protests. Security forces physically and psychologically abused individuals while breaking up events, while individuals were in detention vehicles, and once protesters were in detention facilities.
Following the 2020 presidential election and the prodemocracy movement that ensued, authorities forcibly closed, banned, or labeled “extremist” the vast majority of NGOs and civil society organizations, and closed all independent labor unions. At year’s end, the Ministry of Internal Affairs listed more than 1,500 “extremist” organizations and groups, including independent media outlets and opposition chat groups, along with more than 3,600 “extremist” individuals, including most political opposition figures in exile.
Citizens broadly had the right to leave the country without arbitrary restrictions. The government’s database of persons banned from traveling abroad, however, contained the names of individuals who possessed state secrets, faced criminal prosecution or civil suits, or had outstanding financial obligations. The Ministry of Internal Affairs and security agencies, border and customs services, and financial investigation departments were able to place persons on “preventive” surveillance lists.
The law nominally provided citizens the ability to choose their government in free and fair periodic elections held by secret ballot and based on universal and equal suffrage. In practice, however, the government consistently and thoroughly denied citizens this ability by failing to conduct elections according to international standards; falsifying election results; jailing or forcibly exiling genuine opposition candidates; banning independent opposition political parties; and detaining, imprisoning, exiling, or threatening those individuals who sought free and fair elections.
After his election in 1994 to a four-year term as the country’s first president, Alyaksandr Lukashenka steadily consolidated power in the executive branch to dominate all branches of government, effectively ending any separation of powers among the branches. Flawed referendums in 1996, 2004, and 2022 amended the constitution to broaden his powers and further extend his term in office. Subsequent elections, including the August 2020 presidential election, denied citizens the right to exercise their will in an honest and transparent process, including denying freedoms of expression (including for members of the media), peaceful assembly, association, and the ability to seek, receive, and impart information and campaign.
The 2020 presidential election was marred by numerous abuses, including restrictions on a candidate’s ability to be listed on a ballot (including through arbitrarily detaining and harassing opposition candidates and manipulating laws for politically motivated reasons), the use of administrative resources in favor of the incumbent, the absence of impartial election commissions, unequal access to media, coercion of voters to participate in early voting, nontransparent vote tabulation, and restrictions on independent observers.
As the end of 2023, the government shut down five pro-Lukashenka parties and seven opposition parties. Subsequently, authorities reregistered three pro-Lukashenka parties to operate as official parties and also registered the newly established pro-Lukashenka Belaya Rus party on 02 May 2023.
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