2009 Defence White Paper
On 22 February 2008, The Minister for Defence, the Hon Joel Fitzgibbon MP, announced the commissioning a new Defence White Paper. He also announced the structure of the White Paper along with the appointment of the personnel who will be responsible for the development and delivery of this key strategic document. During the announcement at the Australian Defence Force Academy, Mr Fitzgibbon said the White Paper is a vital planning document that will form the foundation of our future Defence capabilities. "We owe it to the Australian people to get this planning right. The White Paper will help the government make fully-informed and cost-effective decisions about the military capabilities we need to defend Australia and to promote our interests," said Mr Fitzgibbon. Mr Fitzgibbon has also commissioned a series of accompanying reviews (Companion Reviews) to be conducted across a range of Defence areas to underpin the new White Paper. These critical studies will be a key input to developing Defence business and budget priorities out to 2030.
The preface of Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030 released on 02 May 2009, stated "The last Defence White Paper was developed a decade ago yet the world has changed significantly over that period of time. The decade brought the terrorists attacks of September 11, 2001 in the United States and subsequent events in London, Madrid, Bali, Jakarta and more recently, Mumbai. Over the same period wars raged in Iraq and Afghanistan and fragility in Pacific Island countries grew more apparent.... the biggest changes to our outlook over the period have been the rise of China, the emergence of India and the beginning of the end of the so-called unipolar moment; the almost two-decade-long period in which the pre-eminence of our principal ally, the United States, was without question.
"Ultimately, armed forces exist to provide Governments with the option to use force. Maintaining a credible defence capability is a crucial contributor to our security, as it can serve to deter potential adversaries from using force against us or our allies, partners and neighbours. It is the Government's policy that the main role of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) should continue to be an ability to engage in conventional combat against other armed forces.
"If we take the view that the risk of war in the traditional sense, especially among the major powers, is remote to the point of being unthinkable, we would be able to radically change the way we think about our armed forces. We would be able to free up at least some of the significant resources required to maintain sophisticated armed forces and use those resources for other purposes.... After careful examination, it is the Government's view that it would be premature to judge that war among states, including the major powers, has been eliminated as a feature of the international system. While growing economic and other interdependencies between states will act as a brake on the resort to force between them, and high-intensity wars among the major powers are not likely over the period to 2030, such wars cannot be ruled out.
"A defence policy founded on an implicit bargain that others would come to our aid with combat forces if we were threatened or attacked is simply too uncertain a basis for providing for our security and an irresponsible abrogation of Australia's strategic sovereignty.
"Australia has an enduring strategic interest in ensuring that any attempt by nearby states to develop the capacity for sustained military operations against us would be detected with as much warning time as possible. This would preferably be at least a decade, given the amount of lead-time involved in building defence capabilities.
"Australia's most basic strategic interest remains the defence of Australia against direct armed attack. Our next most important strategic interest is the security, stability and cohesion of our immediate neighbourhood, which we share with Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, East Timor, New Zealand and the South Pacific island states.... what matters most is that they are not a source of threat to Australia, and that no major military power, that could challenge our control of the air and sea approaches to Australia, has access to bases in our neighbourhood from which to project force against us. Beyond our immediate neighbourhood, Australia has an enduring strategic interest in the stability of the wider Asia-Pacific region, which stretches from North Asia to the Eastern Indian Ocean.
"The principal task for the ADF is to deter and defeat armed attacks on Australia by conducting independent military operations without relying on the combat or combat support forces of other countries. This means that the ADF has to be able to control our air and sea approaches against credible adversaries in the defence of Australia, to the extent required to safeguard our territory, critical sea lanes, population and infrastructure. After ensuring the defence of Australia from direct attack, the second priority task for the ADF is to contribute to stability and security in the South Pacific and East Timor. This involves conducting military operations, in coalition with others as required, including in relation to protecting our nationals, providing disaster relief and humanitarian assistance and, on occasion, by way of stabilisation interventions. The next most important priority task for the ADF is to contribute to military contingencies in the Asia-Pacific region, including in relation to assisting our Southeast Asian partners to meet external challenges..."
"China will also be the strongest Asian military power, by a considerable margin. Its military modernisation will be increasingly characterised by the development of power projection capabilities. A major power of China's stature can be expected to develop a globally significant military capability befitting its size. But the pace, scope and structure of China's military modernisation have the potential to give its neighbours cause for concern if not carefully explained, and if China does not reach out to others to build confidence regarding its military plans. China has begun to do this in recent years, but needs to do more. If it does not, there is likely to be a question in the minds of regional states about the long-term strategic purpose of its force development plans, particularly as the modernisation appears potentially to be beyond the scope of what would be required for a conflict over Taiwan."
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