• Military Menu                       

• Introduction
• Systems
• Facilities
• Agencies
• Industry
• Operations
• Countries
• Hot Documents
• News
• Reports
• Policy
• Budget
• Congress
• Links

• WMD
• Intelligence
• Homeland Security
• Space

Royal Australian Navy - Early Years

Australia began its career in favor of a separate naval force on the theory that small craft like torpedo boats would be an effective and very cheap means of defence. The development oi the use of submarines and aircraft in the Great War rendered widespread the belief that by the free use of these means the Dominions may protect their shores against attack, leaving it to the United Kingdom to supply the fleets necessary for offensive action at sea. Prior to the Federation of the Australian states the naval defense was chiefly provided by a British squadron located in Australian waters with Sydney as its base, Australia and New Zealand providing a portion of the expense to the British government. In addition to this the states had provided at their own expense several small vessels, gunboats, etc.

No colonies had ever been planted within coasts so apparently immune from foreign attack, and it is not to be wondered if, for the first fifty years of their existence, the Australian communities went about their business as though peace were a natural condition of human society. The stern fact that peace rests on continuous effort and sacrifice was first brought home to them by the rejoinder of the Imperial Government to their request for increased protection to their coasts.

The cost had been borne by the taxpayers of the United Kingdom, and the British Government, warned by the mistakes of their predecessors in the eighteenth century, made no attempt to shift any part of the burden to the colonies, so long as those colonies accepted without question the provision made for their protection. But the moment colonies demanded a further expenditure on their local defence, it was clearly impossible for the British Government to avoid asking them how much they were prepared to contribute towards the cost of meeting their own demands. The problem which had slept since the American revolution was thus inevitably revived.

In the 1880s Australia was neither a nation nor independent. Australia was a geographical expression. Six quarrelsome colonies waged tariff war upon one another, discussed their military relations with one another, disputed who should pay least towards the defence of Australia, and agreed that a British government that did not willingly pay these expenses out of the pockets of British taxpayers was a government of Little Englanders.

In 1881 a conference of Colonial Premiers had unanimously expressed the opinion that, " considering the large Imperial interests involved, the naval defence of these colonies should continue to be the exclusive charge of the imperial Government, and that the strength of the Australian squadron should be increased." The Premiers pledged themselves " to use all legitimate endeavours to procure the efficient fortification and land defence of the several ports of the Australian colonies at the expense of the several colonies interested." But their argument was that King George's Sound and Thursday Island were not colonial ports but Imperial fortifications and coaling stations, which the Imperial Government should protect as it protected, for example, Gibraltar.

In the year 1885, when the great Russian war scare occurred. Admiral Tryon commissioned and armed two mail steamers to act as warships on the Australian trade routes. This showed the" deficiency of the Australian squadron in these sea's. Admiral Tryon was the first to suggest the establishment of a sea going Colonial fleet, consisting of six cruiser catchers, and eight torpedo boats, to1 be furnished, manned and maintained by the Admiralty at the cost of the Colonies and to be located in Australian waters. In 1887, Admiral Tryon proposed a naval force to be managed by the Colonies in times of peace and to be under the Admiralty in time of war. These proposals resulted in the Naval Agreement of 1887-1891 by which Australian Colonies granted a subsidy of £126,000 to the Admiralty towards the up-keep of an auxiliary squadron in Australasian seas.

Before the year 1887 the several Colonies of Australasia had made some modest provision for naval defence in the shape of gunboats, torpedo-boats and small cruisers In that year an agreement was arrived at by the Australian Colonies and New Zealand, with the Admiralty for the supply and maintenance, of an auxiliary squadron in the Australasian seas According to the terms of this agreement, which was ratified by the Colonial Legislatures between 1887 and 1891, a naval force additional to the British war vessels of the Australasian station, was to act as auxiliary squadron. The total annual contribution of the Colonies towards this new naval force was to be £120,000 (at most) and the agreeraenl was to last for ten years.

At the first Colonial Conference in 1887, they heard with undisguised amazement the opinion of the British Government that Australia ought to pay the expense of defending King George's Sound (Albany) and Thursday Island, and ought to contribute £126,000 a year towards the defence of Australian trade. With vehement argument Australians demanded that the British Government should undertake a brilliant colonial policy, and with eloquence they explained that "struggling dependencies" must, of course, be exempt from the brilliant expenses. "It has come upon us with surprise," said Sir Graham Berry at the Conference of 1887, " to learn that the Imperial Government treats King George's Sound differently from the other coaling stations of Imperial importance," and the Premiers said "Hear, hear!" They agreed that they now heard "for the first time " that the Imperial Government did not " admit the principle of sharing at all in the cost of the lahd defences of Australia."

Though Australian statesmen in the eighties were somewhat slow to recognise the obligation to share in naval expenses, they astonished British statesmen by the generosity of their expenditure on local land defence. Small, also, as was the Australian naval contribution after 1887, it was the flrst recognition of the duty of colonies to take permanent share in naval defence, and Mr. Deakin rightly foretold that this " new departure" would lead to a "gradual assumption of all the responsibilities of maturity." Australians would not accept a Constitution which deprived them of independent control of army and navy. That independent control was an essential part of Australian nationalism as it had grown since 1900. It meant that Australians perceive the duty of putting national strength into national defence. But it meant, further, that they perceive that Australian policy may differ from British policy even in directions which touch the question of peace and war.