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DDL Light Destroyer project

The RAN Light Destroyer program was an ambitious attempt to replace the aging Battle class destroyers with something capable of combatting the full range of threats as envisioned at the times. The DDL project was started in the mid 1960’s to produce an Australian designed and built replacement for the older destroyers of the Daring and Battle classes. Originally the project had aimed to produce a class of ships with varying equipment fits which could be used effectively in the difficult Confrontation operations that the RAN was involved in at the time.

The design study started in 1966, and detailed design work started in 1970. In 1967 the Royal Navy showed an interest in the project, but it quickly became apparent that requirements would not sufficiently similar for a joint project to be possible. In 1969 it was decided to emphasise anti-air warfare more in the design requirements which inevitably led to a larger more sophisticated design. Finally between 1970 and 1971 YARD Australia (Yarrow Admiralty Research Department Australia) produced a preliminary design. In its final incarnation the ship had grown from a simple 1,500 ton vessel to one in the order of 4,200 tons. The ships were armed with a Standard SAM system, medium gun (probably the United Defence 5in/52cal Mk.45) advanced electronics and a pair of embarked medium helicopters (despite a stated RAN requirement for only one). Also to be noted was a propulsion system consisting of two Olympus and two Tyne gas turbines (the same machinery set as the Type 42 DDGs under design in the UK at the time).

In August 1972, the approved build of three DDL destroyers 'promised a significant level of work for the Australian industry…that would enhance and sustain project and construction skills over time'. The first keel-laying was to start in June 1975 (others at two year intervals) at Williamstown DYd. The cost was estimated as $A 118 million (59.2 million pounds) each in 1972 currency (includes design and support costs). The estimated project cost was $355 million in 1972 prices, with construction on the lead ship planned to commence in 1975 and the others at two year intervals thereafter. In 1973, the Williamstown dockyard began a program of extensive modernisation to prepare for the build. At this point (1971-3) it was intended to build 3 to start with (direct replacements for the Daring class, expected to be completed in the late 1970s) and to follow this with further vessels later to replace the River class DEs. Jane’s 1972-73 gave an estimate of 8 to 10 vessels in total.

Initially the program was a joint effort of the Royal Australian Navy [RAN] and the Royal Navy [RN]. The basic falling out between the RAN and RN was that the RAN wanted American weapons, having just accepted three US Charles F. Adams DDGs in 1965 (2) and 1967 (1). The RN wanted the Sea Dart, while the RAN wanted the US mk 13 "Tartar" SAM launcher. They had different internal requirements, and with the differences in radar, sonar, and other systems (the RAN wanted to install its home-designed Mulloka sonar, and US radar), there was too much difference to keep the costs down as far as desired. The RN pulled out, and instead ordered the type 22 frigates (the first, HMS Broadsword was ordered 8 February 1974 & laid down 7 February 1975).

The project was deferred when the Labour party won the 1973 elections. Williamtown Naval Dockyard was a byword for ineptness, inefficiency and featherbedding at that time. Cost and timeframe were both guaranteed to increase if built there. It became increasingly clear in Australia that the entire project was in trouble, with the cost of the vessels escalating rapidly. This lead to a decision on 22 August 1973 by Lance Barnard, the Defence Minister of the Whitlam Government, to defer the order for the first 3 vessels, with the program reassessed in 1974 while looking into foreign designs. Translated this meant that they had cancelled an indigenous option and were now looking into foreign alternatives.

The RAN then ordered their version of the US Oliver Hazard Perry FFGs. The US Navy was in series production of the FFG7, and Australia's order slotted straight into the US production schedule which meant that the RAN got the four FFGs faster and cheaper than if it had built them here. The RAN plugged into the USN's own support network to support the FFG's, rather than having to re-invent the wheel here with sole navy support of an orphan design.

Despite the cost, in the DDL, the RAN had the preliminary design for a vessel that was every bit as capable as any contemporary foreign design and tailor made for Australian service. In 1973 the Australian shipbuilding industry had completed a successful series of 6 DEs and were ready for further work to keep the yards going. The cancellation of the DDLs meant a lot of lost jobs, and what little design experience there was in Australia moved overseas. In effect the Whitlam Government put an end to indigenous escort development.

The DDL Project Director, Commodore G. Willis, explained: "In the interest of providing a stable workload, and thus retraining the skills and techniques required with a build of this size it is desirable to confine DDL construction to one yard which can be kept fully employed. This has the added advantage that an improvement in productivity can be expected as the yard learns from its experience and thus reduces costs...Although local building costs are higher than those overseas…local construction…minimises future logistic support problems…simplifies management of the project…increases our technical knowledge…[and] provides the skills and facilities we should need in any case for the repair of battle damage in an emergency."

However, the Department of Defence faced rising cost estimates for the vessel and was unable to settle on its specifications. The Navy reviewed the DDL project and found that it would prove unduly expensive. A Joint Parliamentary committee also found that there was technical risk from an Australian design. The Whitlam Government called for a review of the DDL project. The review was carried out by Navy, who considered the DDL would prove unduly expensive, and made the recommendation for acquiring FFGs, which the Labor Government endorsed. The Labor Government elected to buy the US-built FFG-7 class instead of the RAN-proposed DDL class designed in (Australia). In August 1973, the government cancelled the DDL project and instead initiated the foreign order of Guided Missile Frigates.

Mr John C. Jeremy, a council member of the Royal Institution of Naval Architects, later stated that the cancellation of the DDL project: " …tended to swing the pendulum towards accepting existing designs with a minimum of technical risk. That tends to mean that, within your organisations in-country, you lose the ability to start with a blank sheet of paper. You are taking something from someone else and modifying it. In my personal opinion, during the 1970s we lost a lot of the [design] capability that we had built up in the decades after World War II."

One of the lessons drawn from the DDL project was the need for tighter controls on Navy's design requirements. Part of the problem was that those involved with the specifications for the project were without responsibility for cost and schedule. Mr Stanley S. Schaetzel has argued in reference to the DDL project that specifications should have been established between industry and the Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO) according to mutually agreed broad requirements, with close consultation between the prime contractor and Defence on issues of cost and performance.

The failure of the DDL destroyer project and the shortcomings of the FFG 01–04 and HMAS Success projects can be attributed to contractual disputes between Defence, shipbuilders, foreign designers, suppliers and workforces. Defence lacked contractual rigor in its specifications while shipbuilding companies suffered from poor handling of their inventories and their labour. It was in this context that the Australian Frigate Project targeted — and succeeded in developing — the capability and competitiveness of the Australian naval shipbuilding sector.