Citizen Military Forces (CMF)
In the 1950s the CMF had been the numerically larger force, bolstered by the first National Service scheme for most of the 1950s. The strategic thinking at the time was centerd around fighting a conventional war which would allow time for an expeditionary force based on the CMF to be raised and sent overseas.
But by 1959 the strategic situation had evolved and the concomitant force structure requirements led to the famous statement from the DCGS at the time that 'in future, the CMF is to be in support of the Regular Army, and not vice versa'. The Pentropic Division was implemented after a landmark strategic reassessment that indicated Southeast Asia, and not the Middle East, would be the most likely theatre for future Australian involvement Moreover, modern conflict would escalate quickly, requiring troops to be more readily available than in the past. This placed greater emphasis on the Regular Army, rather than the CMF.
The Army Reserve's predecessor, the Citizen Military Forces (CMF), did not go to Vietnam. To be sure, the odd CMF soldier went on full-time duty, and some left the CMF and joined the Regular Army, while others saw Vietnam over a two-week period as CMF observers. But the CMF was not called out nor were any of its units or subunits sent to Vietnam. As a result, it struggled to define a role for itself both during, and after, the war. To make matters worse, not only was it relegated further down the military food chain, but the CMF was also plagued by accusations that it harboured so-called 'draft dodgers' who avoided operational service by joining the CMF.
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