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1919-1920 - Treaty of Sevres

On Jan. 10 1919 the Peace Conference at Paris began its deliberations, from which, when Eastern problems could be reached, it was hoped that a satisfactory settlement of Armenian affairs might emerge. Each of the Caucasian republics was permitted a delegation to lay its claims before the Conference. Meanwhile the Supreme Council, acting as an executive body, despatched an Allied High Commissioner to Erivan to compose, if possible, the urgent differences between the rival republics.

Armenians of Erivan had agreed to join Armenians of Turkey in seeking the creation of a single Armenian state; the Armenian delegation at Paris therefore represented the whole Armenian race. The claim advanced by the delegation was, in brief, that to Erivan should be added the eastern districts of Asia Minor in which a considerable Armenian population had existed prior to 1914, and that these districts should include Cilicia as being the "Lesser Armenia" of mediaeval history.

But this comparatively moderate proposal bristled with difficulties, and traversed principles to which the Conference professed adherence. Ancient and mediaeval history offered feeble arguments for the recovery of territory from a race which could show effective occupation for the past 400 years. Nor did any juggling with ethnological figures assist the Armenian case, for the plain fact remained that in no vilayet of Asia Minor, even before the massacres and deportations, was there an Armenian majority over Moslems. The principle of self-determination by inhabitants would therefore, if applied, destroy Armenian claims.

The Armenian case stood, indeed, on firmer ground than doubtful historical sanctions and self-determination by a mosaic of local populations. Based on justice and high expediency it becomes a cause which no amount of theory can set aside. Stated plainly the case for Armenia put forward by the delegation was that by race, language, faith, old history, services in the Allied interest, and barbarous treatment at the hand of the Ottoman Government over a long period, the Armenian people had shown themselves entitled to separate existence as an independent nation. And further, owing to their numbers having been artificially reduced by calculated and systematic massacre, justice required that their dead should be taken into account against the principle of self-determination within any Turkish territory to be allotted to an Armenian state. Expediency lay in the prospect that by the erection of an effective Greater Armenia a definite settlement of the Armenian problem would follow - a problem likely, otherwise, to remain insoluble. And yet more, that an Armenian state, extending from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, would, with Allied aid, soon become a stable, self-reliant, civilized power in the midst of one of the chief danger-zones of the world.

The chief difficulty confronting the Armenian proposal was that the state to be created could not at first stand alone. It would require large financial and military support to set it on its feet and to maintain it during the earlier years of its existence -it was doubtful even if it could police its own territory at the outset. These difficulties were to be overcome, it was hoped, by placing the proposed state in the charge of a mandatory Power.

Throughout the year 1919 and the earlier half of 1920 the prospect of finding a Power who would undertake the onerous and costly task of mandatory grew less and less favourable. It had been hoped that America would accept the responsibility. The American people had shown much sympathy with the Armenian cause; politically America was disinterested and stood outside the jealousies of European powers; her prestige was great; her resources unimpaired; to the Armenian people she would have been their first choice as mandatory power. But the American Senate rejected the offer, fearing entanglement in Old World affairs. Great Britain, France, Italy, each felt unable to undertake the position-war had left them more or less exhausted; and their peoples would not incur the certainty of additional outlay of blood and resources. The Supreme Council proposed that Armenia, should be placed Under the League of Nations; the League decided that the acceptance of mandates did not fall within its purpose. And when, at a later date, Armenia applied for admission to the League membership was refused her.

The Treaty of Sevres, imposed upon Turkey and signed on Aug. 20 1920, provided for the creation of an enlarged Armenian state and for the settlement of its boundaries. In Caucasia they were to be adjusted by direct agreement between the states concerned or, in failure of that method, by the Allied Powers. In Turkey they were to be denned by President Wilson as arbitrator; and the Treaty bound Turkey to accept his decision, but limited the area subject to award to the whole or parts of the vilayetsof Trebizond, Erzerum, Van and Bitlis. The interests of Armenians remaining in Turkish territory were safeguarded under the Protection of Minorities clauses of the Treaty. The award defining the Turkish frontiers of Armenia was given by President Wilson in March 1921. It assigned to Armenia the greater part of the vilayets of Trebizond and Erzerum, and the whole of the vilayets of Bitlis and Van - in all an area of about 30,000 sq. miles. The award gave the territory essential to the creation and development of a self-supporting state. It included the greater part of the eastern districts of Asia Minor containing the bulk of the Armenian population in Turkey. It provided a coastline for the state of about 150 m., and included the historic seaport of Trebizond on which north-eastern Asia Minor depends for access to the sea. And while fulfilling these conditions it brought within Armenian territory as small a proportion of Turkish Moslems as might be.