Armenia - EU Relations
In September 2013, President Sarkisian angered many Armenians by walking away from three years of successful talks on an Association Agreement with the European Union. Instead, he committed the country to membership of the Eurasian Economic Union.
EU relations with Armenia are governed by the EU-Armenia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (1999), which allows for wide-ranging cooperation in the areas of political dialogue, trade, investment, economy, lawmaking and culture. Armenia's inclusion (as one of the countries of the Southern Caucasus) in the European Neighbourhood Policy (2004) and the Eastern Partnership has demonstrated the EU's willingness to move its cooperation with the EU beyond the terms of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement.
Negotiations on Association Agreement, including a deep and comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), were finalised in July 2013. However, given Armenia's wish to join the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, announced in September 2013, the Association Agreement, incompatible with membership in the Customs Union, will not be initialled nor signed. The European Union will continue cooperation with Armenia in all areas compatible with this choice.
Armenia stunned EU foreign policy watchers when it gave up on its association and free trade deal with the EU just a few weeks after negotiations had been finalised. The move followed Russian demands for Armenia to join the Russia-led Customs Union, thereby excluding the possibility of a free trade agreement with the EU. But even if Armenia’s U-turn was the direct consequence of Russian pressure, it nevertheless touched a raw nerve in the EU.
That a country of 3 million people and a nominal GDP of roughly €7.3 billion would turn its back on the world’s biggest market (with over half a billion people and a GDP of nearly €12 trillion) would have previously been virtually unthinkable. The EU, which has spent the last two decades managing a queue of almost two dozen countries vying to enter the club, is simply not used to being rejected by countries such as Armenia. Armenia’s sudden change of direction seems to suggest that one of the most prized things the EU can offer (access to its market) can be countered by other powers – and offers.
It was not Armenia’s decision per se that shook the EU foreign policy community, but a fear of the possible shape of things to come – and a feeling that a multipolar world was emerging not only at the expense of US power, but also of EU influence.
The real surprise was that Armenia managed to advance so far in its relations with the EU, openly defying Russian preferences in the process. The very fact that a country like Armenia attempted to move closer to the EU and reduce its reliance on Russia through a policy of so-called ‘complementarity’ was indeed cause for greater soul-searching in Moscow rather than Brussels. It is not surprsing that Moscow did not like the idea o an à la carte partnership with Yerevan where the latter cherry-picks what it wants from the alliance whilst attempting to diversify its foreign policy.
As a result of progress in reforms, governance and democracy, Armenia benefitted from an additional allocation of € 15 m under the Eastern Partnership Integration and Cooperation programme (EAPIC) in 2012, in the framework of application of the 'more for more' principle of the revised European Neighbourhood Policy. Armenia also benefits from a number of thematic programmes such as the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR).
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