Armada Argentina - Argentine Navy
The interests over the sea zones located next to its coasts or beyond them, whether acting jointly with other countries or independently, requires a wide range of military capabilities. The dimension of the areas involved and the requirement of naval forces to perform those functions are significant and the resources are always proportionally scarce. The geography and the maritime and fluvial interests that Argentina needs to defend form the basis to design a desirable Navy; resources and smartness will determine the actual Navy.
Bluebird Marine Systems noted that "The Argentine Navy is under-funded and struggling to meet maintenance and training requirements, as a result only 15 out of a total of 42 navy vessels are in a condition to sail. The 2013 defence budget allowed for the 15 operational vessels to each spend less than 11 days at sea, whilst the submarines averaged just over 6 hours submerged in the whole of 2012."
It is difficult to design an intermediate Navy such as that of the Argentine Republic, especially because of the size of the geographical scenario. As it cannot be prepared for everything, it is necessary to assign priorities to the resources selected. The Navy of the Argentine Republic grants absolute priority in his to drive to the fulfillment of the basic mission to contribute to the National defense; despite this, complementarily it satisfies also other missions and functions contributors when driving of the State in different areas. These activities tie to the Navy with diverse organisms and state and deprived institutions in the national and international order, by means of multiple plans, programs or agreements of interchange, support and cooperation.
The size of the main mission assigned and the vast maritime spaces encompassing the Argentine jurisdiction and area of interest where the Navy must exercise Control over the Sea and Force Projection lead to consider that this Navy should have the characteristics of an oceanic navy. This means that the core of the operational forces should be able to separate itself from land-based logistics facilities and carry out its operations with the resources on board.
Logistical autonomy optimizes deterrence, because it provides not only the capability to defend territorial integrity but also facilitates the use of the resources far from the country's territory. A navy lacking oceanic characteristics would not provide the required deterrent capability.
The involvement in international naval blockade or maritime interdiction operations such as those of the Gulf War and Haiti implies the need for longdistance projection capability. No naval resource, whether ground, submarine, air or marines, can by itself satisfy all the requirements which the Navy is called upon to meet. All these resources have their own characteristics which, when combined, optimize their strengths and mitigate their weaknesses.
The adequate combination of systems with different but complementary capabilities creates a multiplier effect. The removal of a part of that force can affect overall capability. While individual platforms can be oriented towards the performance of specific tasks, the whole must form a balanced naval force.
The control of the sea is the means by which the Argentina Navy assures the use the marine spaces to protect and to guarantee the interests of the Nation, and complementarily, by means of the negation of these spaces, it prevents that they do it that they try to affect them. Although this concept involves the required control to be able to carry out naval operations before threats of military nature, includes as well the idea of presence through operations that in situations of low level of conflict, allow to monitorear the marine and fluvial spaces of interest, providing information and capacity of answer, before incidents or situations that require the exercise of the authority or to be necessary the use of the force.
|TOTAL - 1999||17,200|
The education and training of the various groups of personnel is carried out in the Schools and Institutes reporting to the Naval Education and Training Directorate. Some of them are the Naval University Institute, the Naval Academy, the Naval Command and Staff College, the Navy Officers Academy, the Navy Non-Commissioned Officers Academy and the Marine Corps Academy.
The command headquarters of the Argentine Navy was located at the Libertad Building in the city of Buenos Aires. Naval forces in mid-1985 were divided among four naval zones that corresponded to the coastal and riverine territory incorporated in the first, second, and fifth military regions. The Puerto Belgrano naval base, located in southern Buenos Aires Province near BahIa Blanca, was the Argentine Navy's most important facility. In April 1985 a new naval zone, named the Puerto Beigrano Naval Zone, was created there as part of the navy's reorganization.
Other major bases of the Argentine surface fleet included installations at Dársena Norte, in the province of Buenos Aires; Rio Santiago, also in Buenos Aires Province; Comodoro Rivadavia, in Chubut Province; and Ushuaia, in the National Territory of Tierra del Fuego. The navy's submarine fleet was based in Buenos Aires Province at Mar del Plata.
On 19 March 2006 the Buenos Aires-based think tank CELS (Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales) charged that the officials at the Admiral Zar Naval Airbase in Trelew, Chubut Province, Argentina, were spying on Argentine lawyers, politicians, union leaders and journalists. Following the public accusation made by CELS, the Argentine Navy Chief Admiral Jorge Godoy closed ten intelligence offices in the area, dismissed two officers, and suspended all Naval intelligence activity in the country to facilitate the investigation lead by Defense Minister Nilda Garre. Chubut Governor Mario Das Neves appeared in court on March 20 representing the Province as plaintiff in the case. On March 23 it was announced that the entire naval airbase would be closed.
Due to the difficult economic situation in Argentina, several ships were "disembodied" at the end of 2014 - the first on the list was the ARA Murature (P20), retired from service on September 23. The other units of the list are the tanker ARA Engineer Julio Krause (B13) and notice ARA Gurruchaga (A3). As a result of the fire in his wheelhouse, the transport ship Bahía San Blas (B4) can join the list, along with the notice Alferez Sobral (A9), veteran of the Falklands War.
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