History - 2001-2021 - Western Interlude
The United States was supporting a sustainable transition to Afghan leadership by partnering with the Afghans to build capacity, generate economic growth in support of fiscal sustainability, and foster efficiency between the national and sub-national governments. Transition was an essential pillar of the United States, NATO, and international community’s long-term commitment to Afghanistan, and was a conditions-based process that was based on the assessment by a joint Afghan-international board that selected areas have achieved a level where they can effectively take charge of their own security.
On March 22, 2011, President Karzai announced the first group of provinces and cities where primary security responsibility would be transferred from the international community to the Afghan National Security Forces. Afghan forces took the lead on security responsibilities in these areas in July 2011. A second group of provinces, cities, and districts for transition was announced in November 2011. With the completion of the first and second stages of transition, almost half the Afghan population will live in areas where primary security rests with the Afghan National Security Forces. By the end of 2014, it was intended that Afghan forces would have the lead for security across the entire country.
Through 2014, the international community estimates that Afghanistan will require at least $9 billion a year to sustain current operations and fund development. It will take about $5 billion to cover the costs of the Afghan security forces at current levels and another $4 billion to support the Afghan budget and provide economic assistance.
In early 2012 Afghanistan and the United States finalized a strategic partnership agreement outlining their relationship following the 2014 withdrawal of Western combat troops. The deal insures American military and financial support for the Afghan people for at least a decade beyond 2014, the deadline for most foreign combat forces to withdraw. Beyond 2014, the United States shall seek funds, on a yearly basis, to support the training,equipping, advising, and sustaining of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). While the executive branch may seek such funds, it seems improbably that the US Congress will in fact appropriate funds for a country that America would rather forget entirely.
The Afghan National Security Force, with a goal of 352,000 uniformed personnel (both Army and Police), was the eleventh largest Army in the world [Afghanistan was the world's tenth poorest country]. This force, bolstered by 130,000 NATO troops and another 10,000 American troops [as of 2012], was barely adequate to fight the Taliban to a draw. Budgetary constraints would cause the Afghan force be rapidly cut back starting around 2015 to 228,500, at which time any residual Western force would be not much more than a tenth the 2012 number.
President Ashraf Ghani announced in February 2018 that the Afghan government was willing to hold peace talks with the Taliban without preconditions if the Taliban would stop committing acts of terror and accept the Afghan constitution. Following this development, U.S. Defense Secretary James Mattis made a surprise visit to Kabul in mid-March 2018 and said “We do look toward a victory in Afghanistan. . . . Not a military victory—the victory will be a political reconciliation.” Secretary Mattis explained that the goal of the United States was to strengthen the Afghan security forces enough to convince the insurgents that they cannot win on the battlefield, driving them to choose reconciliation.
Although the Government of National Unity (GNU) remained relatively stable, it continued to face political, ethnic, and tribal challenges. If serious divisions emerged, they may threaten the capability and coherence of the government. Ethnic minorities remained concerned that President Ghani was excluding them from government and consolidating power around the Pashtun elite. This concern had grown with the inclusion of the Pashtun-dominated Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) militant group into the government.
Most Afghans saw the government as corrupt and ineffective at every level. Corruption continues to be a significant impediment to reconstruction efforts, and progress in Afghan investigations and prosecutions of corrupt officials remained stagnant. The United States and the international community had developed a number of programs and committees to help officials counter government corruption. These efforts continued to face a fair amount of resistance from some high-level officials.
A surprise-free mid-term scenario for Afghanistan might have included a Pakistani sphere of influence in the Pashtun South and East of the country, and Iranian sphere of influence in the northwestern part of the country dominated by Shia Hazara and Chahar Aimak, and a Russian sphere of influence in the northern part of the country with predominate Uzbek, Turkmen and Tadjik populations. Possibly the Americans would control airports at Kabul and Kandahar to support a residual counter-terrorist man-hunting presence by CIA and special operations units.
The implosion of Lon Nol's regime in Cambodia in 1975 was a plausible preview of the prognosis for Afghanistan.
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