Dmitri Arkadievich Mazepin
Dmitry Mazepin (born 1968) is a Russian businessman born in Belarus. He is the largest shareholder of Russian fertilizer companies Uralchem and Uralkali. These positions make him one of the most important players in the Russian chemicals and fertilizer industries, which are among the most important industries in Russia. Forbes magazine in 2015 put his net worth at $1.3 billion. In 2021, after not having been listed by Forbes for the previous five years, Forbes Russia listed Dmitry Mazepin as the 150th richest Russian with a net worth of $800 million.
Uralkali is a Russian potash producer that has substantial investments in Africa. Both Uralchem and Uralkali have been designated as "strategic assets" by the Russian state under an initiative spearheaded by Putin to bring strategic Russian companies under state control. Like other oligarchs within Putin's inner circle, Mazepin and his company Uralkali have attracted the attention of Western governments.
The European Union imposed sanctions on Dmitry Mazepin on March 9, 2022, on the basis that he is part of Putin's inner circle, and that his company Uralchem provides a substantial amount of revenue to the Russian state. Shortly after the European Union took measures, Switzerland followed suit by sanctioning multiple Russian oligarchs, including Mazepin. On March 25, 2022, the United Kingdom mirrored sanctions passed by the European Union and sanctioned Mazepin with an asset freeze and travel ban. Mazepin and his son were added to Australia and New Zealand's sanctions lists on April 7, and Canada added them to its list on May 20, 2022. Earlier, Uralkali was mentioned during a U.S. Congressional Human Rights Commission hearing in May 2021 as a company that the U.S. government should consider for sanctions due to its attempts to profit from unrest in Belarus. Mazepin was also described by the U.S. think tank Atlantic Council as someone that the U.S. government should consider for sanctions due to his attempt to profit from the unrest in Belarus, and his apparent intention to take over the Belarusian fertilizer giant Belaruskali.
Immediately after the imposition of sanctions, Mazepin engaged in a transaction whereby he purported to sell 52% of his Uralchem empire to two executives, Dmitry Konyaev (4%) and Dmitry Tatyanin (48%), both of whom have been part of Uralchem's management nearly since its establishment. Mazepin and Tatyanin's relationship appears to have preceded the establishment of Uralchem. Tatyanin was the director of legal affairs for the Russian petrochemical company SIBUR when Mazepin was the President of SIBUR from June 2002 to approximately January 2003. Tatyanin and Konyaev have no reported source of wealth to justify their sudden acquisition of one of Russia's largest fertilizer empires. Shortly thereafter, Tatyanin and Konyaev transferred their purported stake in Uralchem, located at that time in the opaque Russian Kalingrad special economic zoned, to an unknown purchaser, which is widely assumed to be Mazepin or an entity which he controls.
In addition to his purported divestiture of 52% of Uralchem, Mazepin took similar measures to publicly divest his assets in Latvia, where he controls two major fertilizer export terminals. On March 21, 2022, an article appeared in the Latvian press titled "Suspicions of sanctions evasion by Russian businessmen in Latvia," which referenced reporting by a Latvian investigative television program which stated that Dmitry Mazepin was no longer the principal beneficiary of SIA Riga Fertilizer Terminal (RFT) and SIA Ventamonjaks. A person whose LinkedIn profile identifies him as working for Uralchem and as Chairman of the Board of Directors of RFT, Arturs Skadata, issued two statements that said that both Latvian companies had made changes in the structure of their shareholders. A company registered in Switzerland, Svizraa SA, was listed as co-owner of the terminals. Skadata declared that Mazepin ceased to be the principal beneficiary in the terminals as of that date. However, the Latvian courts and authorities blocked the transaction. In November, Mazepin held a meeting with President Putin, during which he announced that the sale of the Riga port terminal, which Uralchem owns, to a Swiss trading company, had not actually taken place.
However, according to the Latvian enterprise register, Arturs Skadata has not been a board member of the Fertilizer terminal since 01.12.2021., so there is no way that he can be a board member in 2022.
The source of funds for Mazepin's acquisitions of major Russian chemical companies is unknown, beyond lending from or led by Russian state banks, is unknown. Mazepin did not not come from a wealthy background. There is little information regarding the participation of co-investors in his early investments dating back to 2004-2005. Prior to Mazepin's substantial asset acquisitions, he was CEO of the chemical company SIBUR from around 2003-2004, where he was dismissed after a little more than six months. Prior to joining SIBUR, Mazepin worked from 1999 to 2003 at the Russian Federal Property Fund, the agency tasked with managing and privatizing Russian state assets.
During Mazepin's time at the Russian Federal Property Fund, he worked with Nikolai Gornovsky, who eventually became the CEO of Gazprom subsidiary Mezhregiongaz. Gornovsky was ultimately jailed for stripping assets away from the Gazprom subsidiary. Those assets would eventually become property of Uralchem.
Mazepin's first asset was the Kirovo-Chepetsk Chemical Plant (KCCW), acquired through privatization around 2005. He initially purchased 18% of the plant, which shortly thereafter was purchased by a Russian company called Fintrascom, which was managed by the Swiss investment manager Credit Prive SA, who then ultimately sold a majority stake of KCCW back to Mazepin. At the time of the KCCW purchase, Mazepin was in the process of acquiring 50% of another chemical company in Perm called OJSC Halogen. The ultimate beneficial owners of Fintrascom have not been identified, but are reported to be a "pool of Russian and foreign investors."
Mazepin's path to acquiring a majority stake in Uralkali was incremental over an eight-year period. For several years prior to 2013, when Suleiman Kerimov was the majority owner of Uralkali, Belaruskali and Uralkali had an agreement that potash would be sold and traded exclusively under a joint venture called BPC, essentially forming a cartel over the world's potash market. However, in December 2012, Belarusian President Aleksander Lukashenko canceled BPC's exclusive right to export Belaruskali potash. On July 30th 2013, the then-CEO of Uralkali announced that the company was exiting the cartel as Belaruskali was accused of selling potash outside the cartel's initial agreement. Uralkali's CEO Vladislav Baumgertner was then lured to Belarus by an invitation from the Prime Minister and arrested at Minsk airport on charges of "abuse of power" as the chairman of BPC.
Belarus later agreed to extradite Mr. Baumgertner to Russia, but it was reported that the extradition was arranged on the understanding that Suleiman Kerimov would sell his shares of Uralkali to new owners. It has been reported that the changes to Uralkali's ownership may have been a political move directed by the Russian Government to satisfy a souring relationship between Uralkali and Belaruskali. The finalized 2013 agreement resulted in a 20% and 21.75% share sale of Uralkali to Mazepin and Mikhail Prokhorov, respectively. A Reuters article quotes a partner from a Moscow hedge fund as saying that Mazepin has "good" connections in Belarus, and that an Uralkali deal including a Russian, Mikhail Prokhorov, and Mazepin helps heal the relationship between Russia and Belarus on a political level. In December 2020, a Belarussian businessman and close friend of Mazepin, Dmitry Lobyak, sold his Uralkali shares to Mazepin, resulting in the latter consolidating an 81% ownership stake in Uralkali.
Mazepin and his company Uralchem remained defendants in an ongoing conspiracy case in Ireland where the majority owners of the chemical company TogliattiAzot (ToAZ) are seeking damages for a long-running government-sponsored corporate raid which culminated in the state seizure and auction of their shares to Mazepin-controlled entities. ToAZ, which was the last independently owned fertilizer company in Russia, was the subject of a years-long illegal takeover, which was finally completed by Mazepin on November 27, 2021 – just three months before Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
To perform the raid, Mazepin's company Uralchem, which owned a minority stake in ToAZ, requested an emergency meeting of ToAZ's shareholders. The meeting took place in a facility that was surrounded by armed guards, including members of the Russian Special Police Force, OMON. Just one day before the meeting, the then-CEO of ToAZ was arrested and detained without charge, making it impossible for him to attend the shareholder's meeting. The majority shareholders of ToAZ attempted to register for the meeting but were refused access to the meeting by one of Mazepin's senior lieutenants. Mazepin's proxies then took their place in the meeting and improperly voted the shares of the majority shareholders. Thus the raid was essentially completed when Uralchem effectively placed control of ToAZ in Mazepin's hand by replacing the ToAZ Board of Directors with Uralchem nominees.
Prior to the armed raid, Mazepin's efforts to acquire the asset had long been the subject of extensive press attention and featured in a series of legal skirmishes. For instance, in 2016 a Westminster magistrate judge, in the context of a Russian effort to extradite a former ToAZ executive from the United Kingdom, called Mazepin "a corporate raider" for his attempts to seize ToAZ. In a case brought against Mazepin in Ireland, Mazepin has faced allegations that Uralchem and other defendants engaged in a conspiracy in Russia involving unlawful abuses of its prosecutorial and judicial system to rule against ToAZ, its officers and shareholders. These included Mazepin allegedly procuring improper arrest warrants and INTERPOL Red Notices (international arrest warrants) against ToAZ officers and those perceived to be connected with it. INTERPOL then withdrew each of these Interpol Red Notices as inconsistent with its rules, an action it takes for cases involving political abuses of Red Notices.
In a separate dispute involving the purchase and ownership of a Formula 1 racing team, Mazepin brought a case against bid administrators claiming that he made the highest bid to acquire the team, and that confidential information was disclosed to rival bidders. The Judge dismissed the claims in their entirety and found that the bid administrators had conducted the sales process "fairly and properly."
Russian state banks Sberbank and VTB have generously funded Mazepin through state-sponsored loans that have and continue to allow him to strengthen his control over the Russian fertilizer industry by consolidating assets. In October 2008, Sberbank loaned Uralchem $700 million to consolidate ownership over chemical plants in which it had a minority stake. In December 2013, VTB gave Uralchem a $4.5 billion loan to acquire shares in Uralkali. In December 2020, Sberbank provided a $4 billion loan to Uralchem for the purchase of further shares in Uralkali.
Mazepin is believed to be a close ally to, and possibly a proxy in his ownership of Uralchem and Uralkali for, Sergey Chemezov, CEO of the Russian defense and technology company Rostec. Chemezov, who is part of Vladimir Putin's inner circle, was added to the U.S. Department of Treasury's OFAC sanctions list on April 28, 2014. According to a press release by the Department of Treasury, he was listed as a sanctioned person because he was an official of the Russian Government. The press release mentions his close relationship with Putin, his leadership of Rostec, and his role on the board of Rosneft. The E.U. similarly sanctioned Chemezov in September 2014 for his close relationship with Putin and his leadership role in Rostec.
In March 2014, one month before he was sanctioned by the US, Chemezov was elected as chairman of the Board of Directors of Uralkali. In 2021, Chemezov's chairmanship of Uralkali's Board of Directors was renewed and additionally he was named Independent Director. He also serves as chairman of the board on the export arm of Rostec, Rosoboronexport, and VSMPO-AVISMA, a Russian titanium company partially owned by Rostec. Several senior Uralkali executives have taken up senior positions at VSMPO-AVISMA since 2019. This includes former Uralkali CEO Dmitry Osipov and former Uralkali CFO Anton Vishchanenko.
In the Russian media, Kommersant speculated that Chemezov was appointed to the Board of Directors of Uralkali to ensure the smooth functioning of management between Rostec and Uralkali. A Reuters article suggested that the changes to Uralkali's ownership during the Uralkali-Belaruskali BPC cartel dispute in 2013 may have been a political move directed by the Russian Government to bring Uralkali closer to Russian state control, and to satisfy a souring relationship with Uralkali's counterpart in Belarus, a country where Mazepin is a native.
Both Uralchem and Uralkali's governance have become centralized and significantly less transparent since the imposition of sanctions against Sergey Chemezov and Rostec in 2014, and the enactment of CAATSA in 2017. Over a period of just three years, Uralchem and Uralkali delisted from financial markets in both London and Moscow. Moreover, three months after CAATSA was signed into law in August 2017, Uralkali's Board of Directors recommended to delist the company from the Moscow Stock Exchange. Moreover, the Board of Directors agreed that 10% of shares from Uralkali's subsidiary "Uralkali-Technology", would be sold to Mazepin, raising his ownership in Uralkali to approximately 30%. In December 2017, Uralkali delisted from the Moscow Stock Exchange, making it solely a private enterprise. In October 2021, Mazepin was named CEO of Uralchem, a company he principally owns, and he today also sits on the Board of Directors of both Uralchem and Uralkali.
There is extensive evidence of Mazepin's close political and professional relationship with Putin. Mazepin has long acted at Putin's express and direct personal instruction. On January 13, 2022, shortly after completing the ToAZ takeover, Mazepin and Russian President Putin had a one-on-one meeting at the Kremlin, during which Mazepin acknowledged receiving instructions from Putin on how to price fertilizer sales for Russia's domestic markets. He then reaffirmed that he was carrying out Putin's instructions.
Since the start of Russia's invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, Mazepin and Putin have attempted to leverage the global food crisis caused by the invasion to conduct food diplomacy around the world and unlock a new revenue stream for Uralchem and Russia. Following the UN-brokered deal which enabled Ukrainian grain to be shipped to the world, alleviating the looming global hunger crisis, Putin and Mazepin pushed for a separate UN-led agreement to re-open the Togliatti-Odessa pipeline linking ToAZ's ammonia plant in Samara to the Ukrainian Black Sea port of Pivdenny. The pipeline carried about 2.3 million tons of Russian ammonia per year through Ukraine prior to its closure following the Russian invasion. Russia has threatened to pull out of the Ukraine grain deal unless the U.N., Ukraine and the West allowed ammonia shipments to resume, thereby unlocking a critical revenue stream for ToAZ and Uralchem. In late 2022, Mazepin undertook a diplomatic and media-focused campaign to push the deal through in the face of opposition from Ukraine and several European countries. As a deal was being considered, Uralchem and Uralkali undertook efforts to donate frozen fertilizer supplies to African countries as part of Russia's soft power initiative in the region. In partnership with the World Food Programme (WFP) Russia offered to donate 300,000 MT of fertilizer to African countries in need. The vast majority of this fertilizer belonged to Uralchem and Uralkali, and had been frozen in various European ports due to the sanctions on Mazepin.
Mazepin met again with Putin on November 23, 2022, immediately after Russia signed an extension to the Ukraine grain deal. During the meeting, they discussed the donations made by Uralchem and Uralkali and Putin's support for unblocking the Togliatti-Odessa pipeline. In the meeting, Putin promised Mazepin that Russia would work with the U.N. on this issue, according to the transcript of the meeting issued by the Kremlin.
For several years before the start of the war, Uralchem and Uralkali had already embarked on an aggressive expansion in Africa, with operations in Zambia, Angola, Zimbabwe, Sudan, and most recently Nigeria. In Zambia and Zimbabwe, Uralchem and Uralkali plan to build a distribution hub in both countries as the governments struggle to provide fertilizers at an affordable cost to farmers (Zimbabwe). In Angola, Uralchem plans to build a fertilizer production plant, and in Nigeria it is planning to open a representative office and potentially establish a production plant focused on the West African fertilizer market. Dmitry Mazepin is chairman of the Russia-Zimbabwe Business Council as part of the Kremlin's efforts to expand Russian influence through fertilizer sales, at a time when fertilizer imports are becoming increasingly expensive in local currencies.
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