• Military Menu                       

• Introduction
• Systems
• Facilities
• Agencies
• Industry
• Operations
• Countries
• Hot Documents
• News
• Reports
• Policy
• Budget
• Congress
• Links

• WMD
• Intelligence
• Homeland Security
• Space

Religion in Tibet Under Communism

Most ethnic Tibetans practice Tibetan Buddhism, although a sizeable minority practice Bon, the related traditional Tibetan religion, and a very small minority practice Islam, Catholicism, and Protestantism. According to the June 21, 2009 People’s Daily, there are 3,000 Tibetan Buddhist monasteries with 120,000 monks and nuns in the TAR and Gansu, Qinghai, Sichuan and Yunnan provinces. In the TAR there are 1,789 religious venues with 46,000 monks and nuns. According to statistics collected by the China Tibetology Research Center, a CCP -affiliated research institution, there are 1,535 monasteries in Tibetan areas outside the TAR.

The constitution of China provides for freedom of religion but limits protection of the exercise of religious belief to activities the government defines as "normal." The government's 2005 White Paper on Regional Autonomy for Ethnic Minorities states, "Organs of self-government in autonomous areas, in accordance with the provisions of the constitution and relevant laws, respect and guarantee the freedom of religious belief of ethnic minorities and safeguard all legal and normal religious activities of people of ethnic minorities." Organs of self-government include governments of autonomous regions, prefectures, and counties.

During the Cultural Revolution, nearly all religious sites in China experienced some damage, and the 6,000 monasteries of Tibet were devastated. Some were destroyed by ethnic Han Red Guards, but others were pillaged and vandalized by Tibetans themselves, radicalized under Mao and encouraged by officials to eliminate all vestiges of “feudal” times. Today, hundreds of those monasteries have been rebuilt. Throughout Tibetan regions of China, there are massive investments being made to restore sites of religious and historical significance, and in some cases expand them. Some of the restoration work is being carried out with central government funding, while other efforts, particularly outside of the TAR, are being privately financed by donors and through the revenue generated by tourists.

During 2010, the level of religious repression in the TAR and other Tibetan areas remained high, especially around major religious holidays and sensitive anniversaries. The government remained wary of Tibetan Buddhism and the central role traditionally played by the Dalai Lama and other prominent Tibetan Buddhist leaders. The heads of the major schools of Tibetan Buddhism--including the Karmapa, Sakya Trizin, Kyabje Trulshik Rinpoche, and Gyalwa Menri Trizin--all reside in exile and maintain close ties with the Dalai Lama. Chinese authorities often associated Tibetan Buddhist monasteries with pro-independence activism.

Government control over religious practice and the day-to-day management of monasteries and other religious institutions continued to be extraordinarily tight since the spring 2008 outbreak of widespread protests and unrest in Tibetan regions. Monks and nuns reported that government restrictions continued to interfere with their ability to carry out the teaching and practice of Tibetan Buddhist religious traditions. These restrictions included forcing monks and nuns to undergo extensive "patriotic education" in monasteries and nunneries that included significant amounts of "legal education" which detracted from religious studies. In patriotic education sessions, authorities often forced monks and nuns to denounce the Dalai Lama and to study materials praising the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the socialist system. Monks and nuns fled from their monasteries and nunneries because they faced expulsion for refusing to comply with the education sessions. Overall numbers of monks and nuns in monasteries and nunneries remained at significantly lower levels than pre-March 2008.

The government continued to blame the Dalai Lama publicly for instigating the March 2008 unrest and repeatedly stated that his successor would have to be approved by the government. The newly appointed TAR governor described the Dalai Lama as "the most important cause of instability in Tibet."

Some government officials maintained there was no law against possessing or displaying pictures of the Dalai Lama, but rather that most Tibetans chose not to display his picture. The government also continued to ban pictures of Gendun Choekyi Nyima, whom the Dalai Lama and the overwhelming majority of Tibetan Buddhists recognize as the 11th Panchen Lama. The Implementing Regulations state that "religious personnel and religious citizens may not distribute books, pictures, or other materials that harm the unity of the nationalities or endanger state security." Some officials deemed photos of and books by or about the Dalai Lama and Gendun Choekyi Nyima as materials that violated the Implementing Regulations.

Monks and nuns, as well as lay Tibetans, continued to report difficulties obtaining passports from their local public security bureaus. According to reports, many Tibetans sought to travel to Dharamsala, India, for an audience with the Dalai Lama, which is an important religious rite for Tibetan Buddhists. Likewise, many of the monks and nuns that attempt to travel to Dharamsala, or the other Tibetan communities in India, did so to join religious communities and escape the increased controls over their religious practice at monasteries and nunneries in Tibetan areas. Some attributed the passport restrictions to an official effort to hinder travel for those purposes.

The Pachen Lama is one of the most important figures in Tibetan Buddhism with spiritual authority second only to the Dalai Lama. The 11th Panchen Lama, Gedhun Choekyi Nyima, has not appeared in public since the PRC government abducted him in 1995, at age six. Gyaltsen (Gyaincain, in Chinese) Norbu was named as Panchen Lama by China in May 1995 to replace the candidate who was selected as a young boy by the exiled Dalai Lama, and who vanished into Chinese custody together with his family and has not been heard from since.

Bainqen Erdini Qoigyijabu is officially recognized as the 11th Panchen Lama, the top ranking figure of Tibetan Buddhism currently in China. His secular name is Gyaencaen Norbu. He was confirmed and approved by the State Council, or the Chinese central government, as the reincarnate of the Tenth Panchen Lama on Nov. 29, 1995 after the lot drawing from a sacred,golden urn in strict compliance with religious rituals and conventions.

Chinese authorities have had difficulty persuading Tibetans to accept their candidate as the official face of Tibetan Buddhism in China, though, and ordinary Tibetans and monks in monasteries traditionally loyal to the Dalai Lama have been reluctant to acknowledge or receive him.

Gyaltsen Norbu left his home in Beijing in July 2020 for a three-month tour of Tibet, joining in religious rituals and visiting monasteries in a bid to push the political agenda of the ruling Chinese Communist Party and raise his personal profile, state media and other sources said. Gyaltsen Norbu promoted Beijing’s view of Tibetan Buddhism not as a separate Tibetan tradition with a history of its own, but as “a part of the excellent traditional culture of the Chinese nation,” echoing recent statements by Chinese President Xi Jinping. “[Tibetan Buddhism] should be oriented towards sincization and adapted to socialist society,” Norbu said.

The Panchen Lama selected by the Dalai Lama, and now in Chinese custody, is revered as Tibet’s second-highest religious leader, and the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama have historically been involved in the reognition of each other’s incarnations. Beijing’s hope is that their chosen Panchen Lama will someday sign off on their selection of a successor to Tibet’s exiled spiritual leader the Dalai Lama.