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Mobile Protected Gun System

The MPGS would be lighter weight and smaller size than the main battle tank and would be used with forward deployed forces and in operations from the lodgement area by contingency forces. A three-man crew would consist of a commander, a driver, and a gunner. The primary armament would be a 75MIA anti-armor automatic cannon. The power train would provide approximately 20 hp per ton of vehicle weight. The fire control system would be stabilized in two axes and have a video screen display.

The Armored Gun System, or AGS, can trace its roots to the development of a Mission Needs Statement in 1981 for a Mobile Protected Gun System or MPGS. After years of disenchantment with the Army's 105mm Sheridan Gun System in Vietnam, the MPGS was believed to be the right system to replace the Sheridan for infantry and airborne roles. The Sheridan was the only rapidly deployable, air-droppable armored combat vehicle in the Army inventory. Leaders of both the XVIII Airborne Corps and the 82d Airborne Division were adamant that any system proposed as a replacement for the Sheridan had to be capable of low-velocity airdrop insertion along with the initial assault forces to provide immediate direct fire support to the task force.

The Armored Gun System [AGS] can trace its roots to the development of a Mission Needs Statement in 1981 for a Mobile Protected Gun System or MPGS. After years of disenchantment with the Army's 105mm Sheridan Gun System in Vietnam, the MPGS was believed to be the right system to replace the Sheridan for infantry and airborne roles. The Sheridan was the only rapidly deployable, air-droppable armored combat vehicle in the Army inventory.

In November 1980 the U.S. Army Infantry School completed its cost and operational effectiveness analysis (COEA) on what it christened the Mobile Protected Gun (MPG). The study investigated light anti-armor weapons systems for the new light infantry d visions (LID). The original concepts of using agility and speed in order to outrun an enemy tank’s fire control system or a missile’s guidance system, as well as to take advantage of horizontal terrain masking of enemy generally were and still are worthy in themselves. However, they are somewhat shortsighted in that they neglect basic engineering facts, which implies that it is easier to overcome smaller systems, such as hydraulic motors for turret traverse, and guided missile fins or thrusters, than larger sydmns such as the tank itself. Furthermore, they also neglect the third dimension of engagement (vertical) represented by mines, bomblets, and aircraft delivered ordnance.

Design studies on the Mobile Protected Gun System suggested that a three-man system can weigh as little as 15+ tons. The Mobile Protected Gun System went through several iterations. The MPGS program originated in the armored combat vehicle technology program. At one time the system was planned to weigh 19 tons with a 75 mm automatic cannon. Later plans moved toward a 19 to 21 ton system with a 105 mm cannon.

In September 1980, TRADOC approved a separate organization and operation plan (0 & 0) submitted by the Infantry School for a Mobile Protected Gun System (MPGS) for the light divisions that was not based on the LAV-25, but rather on a 75mm gun. The solution proposed two steps: a non-developmental item (NDI) approach for five years, and a separate, long-term developmental solution. This proposal was approved by the Chief of Staff, Army in September 1981 before separate study recommendations could be briefed by the Armor School. Efforts were hopelessly intermixed, and a subsequent General Officer review conducted in November 1982 recommended deferral of the MPGS pending development and demonstration of required technologies - the recommendation was approved. Following the Army's decision to defer MPGS, additional time was made available to examine advanced technologies and the MPGS initial required operational capability (RO) was readjusted to encompass a viable technology to encounter a revised threat.

In the 1985 Required Operational Capability statement, several recommendations emerged that influenced AGS requirements: first, a 105mm main gun was preferred over smaller calibers, both to "bust bunkers" in support of the infantryp as well as for its superior tank-Killing power; second, air transportability was highlighted as critical for rapid deployment; and finally, tracked vehicles were preferred over wheeled.

In August 1987, OSD approved the AGS program initiative for 600 NDI vehicles - 166 for the 9th Infantry Division (Motorized), 54 for the 82d Airborne Division, 217 for reserve component Tow Light Anti-tank Battalions (TLAT) and 163 for war reserves and floats - at an estimated cost of $800 million. The ROC was approved for the second time in September. In October, a Joint Staff Operational Requirement (JSOR) was drafted, and a joint USMC/Army cooperative progr,%m was explored. However, in December the AGS was dropped from the Long-Range Research, Development and Acquisition Plan (LRRDAP) as unaffordable and the Army program was killed.

The Sheridan's performance during the U.S. invasion of Panama in 1989 was dubious at best, which created the energy to quickly field the AGS. Due to this urgent need to put the AGS into Soldiers' hands, the Army Acquisition Executive approved the acquisition strategy proposed by the program manager that would have an initial fielding of the system in 1997.

Nevertheless, the Pentagon's leadership killed the AGS program in 1996 and redirected the funding for other priorities. In that same year, the Army retired the Sheridan system. And so, what was once one of the Army's and the Arsenal's Best Practices was moved off of the Arsenal's production line and into historical files.

The truth is, the AGS languished for years as a "back burner" issue low on the Army's priority list. Neither the Infantry School, which referred to the system as the Assault Gun, nor the Armor School, which favored the more "tank-likie" title of Armored Gun, seemed ready to champion the AOS as its own. The Infantry School knew something was needed, but was not sure exactly what that was-- while there were some in the Armor community who viewed the AGS as a potential threat to the main battle tank, especially the future Block III.

The ending of the MPGS and the AGS systems may be due to the consequences of the "tyranny of time." In essence, the longer a proposed future weapon system languishes between the points for a request for proposal to source selection to low-rate production, the more challenges -- such as other funding priorities and loss of political pressure -- have time to build that may eventually overcome the program.