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1988 Heavy Force Modernization

Several factors caused the Army to give its highest priority to modernizing its heavy forces-adoption of the AirLand Battle doctrine, a reevaluation of the Soviet armored threat, and the significant growth of armored capabilities among several regional powers. The Abrams main battle tank is the Army's principal weapons system to close with and destroy the enemy, to exploit success, and to serve as an antitank system. Lethality, mobility, and protection from enemy fires allow armored forces to lead offensive operations by ground forces.

The modernization of armor and antiarmor systems is guided by two major Army modernization plans: the Heavy Forces Modernization (HFM) Plan and the Armor/Antiarmor Modernization Plan. The plans evolved from studies undertaken by the Armored Family of Vehicles Task Force and the Armor/Antiarmor Special Task Force, respectively. The HFM Plan replaced the earlier Armored Family of Vehicles (AFV) Modernization Plan, which was slow in getting Congress' approval because of its cost and a reluctance by legislators to cancel production of older-model tanks.

The HFM Plan was the Army's blueprint for future heavy forces that could match or exceed the perceived Soviet threat into the 1990s. It included a new version of the Abrams tank (the Block III MBT), an advanced field artillery system, a future infantry fighting vehicle, a combat mobility vehicle, a line-of-sight antitank weapon, and an armored utility vehicle. Army planners intend to incorporate a high degree of commonality among subsystems of its modernization plans and to upgrade systems through interim product improvement changes and to adopt the AFV Task Force idea to use only two chassis, heavy and medium.

The Army also envisioned the use of common transmissions, engines, and modular armor. Congress, however, has demanded that the Army provide more detailed analysis of the HFM Plan to develop just two chassis before it fully funds their development. To accelerate full-scale development and to minimize costs, the Army planned to telescope traditional demonstration/validation phases of development with Advanced Technology Transition Demonstrations.

During late 1988, the final conversion of Armored Family of Vehicles [AFV] Package I into a component part of the Heavy Force Modernization strategy took place. This move to clearly define the Army's AFV strategy provided the justification for the program's name change from the AFV package I to the HFM strategy and HFM package I. The change decision was partially based on the previous success of name changes in the earlier aviation modernization plans.

The AFV concept as structured in August 1988, represented a fundamental change in the way that the Army would conduct future· medium and high intensity operations and eventually became a cornerstone of the total Army modernization efforts. Unlike the AFVTF experience, however, after the AFV concept transitioned to the HFM program, it became an increasing target for critics and their program challenges. In a 1990 attempt to quell mounting criticisms by Congress and OSO, the program was transformed virtually overnight into the ASM acquisition program and given a broader scope.

ASM struggled for the next two years against environmental factors and circumstances to maintain the program baseline that the Army had based the future of its heavy armored forces on. Increasingly, program concessions began to dilute the innovative and unique elements of the program. Toward the latter part of 1991, the Army and PEO-ASM were compelled to undertake major restructuring of the program in order to keep it alive.

Transition of AFV to HFM was conducted over a four month period, from January through April 1989. During this period, AFVTF continued to manage daily operations while the HFM program office was established and gradually assumed operational control. Existing AFV plans, schedules and documentation were reformatted to the new HFM focus while program analysis efforts began to concentrate on HFM Package I.

PEO-HFM was the first major Army acquisition program to be conducted under the new streamlined program management structure (e.g. Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE), Army Acquisition Executive (AAE), PEO, and program manager (PM» and was structured accordingly to meet the new statutory guidelines. Through active conside!ration of common use solutions and development of a tailored acquisition process, PEO-HFM's compliance wit:h new statutory and regulatory procurement guidelines convinc:ed Army leaders that they had taken the proper steps to ensure that the program would be safe from serious challenges.

Congress believed that HFM was overly ambitious, conceptually flawed, unaffordable, and "would die of its own weight". Congress also noted that the program was additionally complicated by the fact that a light tank program was not an HFM component. OSO expressed similar concerns implying that the program was ill defined, too expensive, had an unrealistic timeline, competed with many other major Army programs, and was the carrier of all program "diseases".

The two different types of ATTDs (Common Chassis Advanced Technology Transition Demonstrator (CCATTD) and Mission Module Advanced Technology Transition Demonstrators (MMATTD) were planned for use in the development and maturation of systems, subsystems, and components. The ATTDs were to be developed by industry as integration and test platforms designed to determine the optimal Chassis, common components, weapon systems and subsystems. Planned HFM ATTD chassis demonstrators were an Ml55 HIP surrogate for AFAS-C, an MLRS surrogate for FARV-A, an· M2 surrogate for FIFV, and an MlAl surrogate for CMV testing. The Block III would use the ATTD common, heavy chassis previously developed for the MlA3 program.

In May 1989, OSD temporarily suspended the further conduct of the HFM operations. OSD indicated that ATTDs were not sufficient to adequately reduce the development and integration risks for HFM systems to by-pass the DEM/VAL phase and enter FSD. Congress was becoming increasingly worried that large amounts of funds would be expended on FSD before a satisfactory product materialized.

Rapidly changing international and domestic events pointed to a quickly changing acquisition environment. Despite indications of the Soviet and Warsaw Pact decline in 1989 and 1990, intelligence appraisals continued to predict rapid erosion of Allied technological superiority and warned of a continued Soviet conventional threat. But in late 1989, political and economic signs pointed to the severe stresses within the Communist Bloc.