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1989-1991 ASM Armored Systems Modernization

The Armored Systems Modernization (ASM) Program consisted of the Armored Family of Vehicles Task Force (AFVTF), the Heavy Force Modernization (HFM) Program, and the ASM Acquisition Program. Rather than spend increasingly limited dollars on evolutionary improvements of the Abrams tank, the Army opted to take the limited short-term risk of not having enough M1s in the event of war. Instead, funds would be used to develop a more technologically advanced armored vehicle for the long term through the Armored Systems Modernization (ASM) plan. In the near term and midterm, the ASM plan outlined product improvements for application to the current fleet of combat vehicles.

The ASM plan's second phase focused on modernizing all armored systems to maximize operational capabilities and interoperability. The key to this phase was the procurement of several vehicles developed to be built on similar chassis. For example, the ASM plan called for a common heavy chassis for the Block III tank, the Combat Mobility Vehicle (CMV), the Advanced Field Artillery System (AFAS), and the Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV). In a similar case, the Armored Resupply Vehicle (ARV)- ammunition, and the Line-Of-Sight Antitank (LOSAT) vehicle would share a medium protection chassis.

ASM's acquisition environment directly contributed to and was the principal cause of major program modifications and revisions. Determination of the factors that produces program changes and an understanding of their impact provide the basis for important insights and add to acquisition manager's body of knowledge.

The ASM Program represented the Army's modernization master plan for its combined arms combat systems. The principal goal of ASM was to significantly increase force effectiveness through the synergistic impact achieved by employing an armored "family" of vehicles. The vehicle family was based upon innovative, non-traditional, leadingedge design and development concepts and was to be produced using a tailored acquisition strategy. This fleet of vehicles was expected to result in substantial cost savings, programmatic economies, and organizational efficiencies. Due to program changes precipitated by a fluctuating acquisition environment, ASM was totally restructured, negating many of its stated advantages and benefits.

Official ASM policy statements indicated that "ASM is not just a name change but a plan to respond to the changing world situation ... [the] Soviets will remain the most capable competitor for the foreseeable future but the Army must field capabilities that can defeat other threats around the world. ASM provides the near term solution for contingency forces and will continue to preserve the Army investment for the future."

The Army concluded that if OEM/VAL prototypes were mandated, the ASM schedule would have to be "slipped" an estimated two(+) years. That would significantly add to the low cost of the overall program, a major advantage of the ASM program. The Army indicated that its plan assumed success but was flexible.

In March 1990, the Conventional System committee [CSC] conducted a review of the foundation of the ASM effort, the common chassis program. The CSC raised its own concerns over the Army's justification for the ASM in light of the rapidly changing Soviet threat and the need to counter new, less dangerous regional threats. Other issues included CSC concern over program affordability in light of the decreasing Army budget and that a common chassis ATTD might constrain development of the four heavy variaftts, not all.owing designers to take full advantage of future technologies.

Congress admonished the Army for failing to properly reevaluate the decreasing threat and for using the Block III as the lead ASM system. The Army maintained that reduced funding was driving the order of ASM development and production. Further, the tank required development first due to its technical challenges and stringent operational requirements.

The Army still considered all systems to be high priority and Block III remained the lead ASM system. Congress, however, indicated that it wanted to see AFAS-C fielding accelerated based on the current US artillery deficiencies as being experienced in the HIP program. The Block III common chassis had to be designed and developed from the beginning to accommodate the tanks more stringent operational requirements and ultimately supported all heavy vehicles. In an attempt to satisfy Congress, AFAS-C development was accelerated to the second priority position but the Army kept the tank as the priority system. The Army 1980's production-based acquisition system was on the verge of becoming a 1990's research-only based acquisition system.

In December 1990, based on the review of the proposals submitted by the three industry teams, development contracts were awarded for competitive development of the common, heavy protection level chassis to AVTA and TCM. GMC did not receive a contract and subsequently filed a formal protest with the GAO in March 1991, arguing that it submitted the low bid while meeting all technical parameters. Program chassis development activity was suspended on the common chassis until the protest was overturned in June 1991.

For the first several months of 1991, the Army continued to extol ASM as a counter to Soviet modernization. But it became clear that the Soviets were slowing weapons production and becoming more involved in internal political changes. The often maligned M1/M1A1 Abrams tank and the Bradley infantry fighting vehicle performed much better than expected in Desert Storm; high operational rates and action against Iraqi, top-line Soviet equipment raised additional questions about the need for Block III and the FIFV. The performance of these systems provided Congress with the rationale needed to further demand current production be continued and up-grades efforts be undertaken.

In October 1991, the Army informed Congress that it intended to restructure ASM to align itself with Congressional directives to delay Block III and accelerate development of AFAS-C and to match its procurement plans with projected reductions in funds. It appeared that ASM was caught in a "program death spiral". Decreasing system quantities and spiraling costs would be labeled inefficient by OSD, and thus become a prime candidate for the budget-cutters "axe".

By December 1991, the prospect of a near-term Soviet threat had greatly diminished and the pace of Soviet conventional force modernization had also drastically slowed. In early 1992 the ASM program was completely restructured.