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1979-1988 - Armored Family of Vehicles

The Armored Family of Vehicles (AFV) effort involved detailed research, analysis, and mandated the start of the complicated program planning and milestone review, documentation process. Initial efforts were primarily conducted by the AFVTF but the assistance of other Army commands, most notably the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), the Tank and Automotive Command (TACOM), and the Army Material Command (AMC), were instrumental in achieving an acceptable AFV concept. AFVTF's collaboration with the AirL,and Battle - Future study groups and the Armor/Anti-Armor Special Study Group were also vital to realizing the approved concept.

Employment of a vehicle family appeared to resolve many of the shortcomings and weaknesses that were being assessed in the research. The Army had long recognized the advantages and utility of planning and developing a fleet of vehicles that stressed maximum chassis and component commonality. Although this was not a new concept, development and procurement of a vehicle family entailed a major departure from the Army's traditional itemby-item development process and its "by eaches" approach (one type of vehicle at a time) to systems procurement. This, however, had long been thought unachievable by Army leaders

In 1976, the Army's heavy armored force had five different armored vehicle chassis (consisting of hull, suspension, and drivetrain), five different types of track, three different engines, and four different transmissions. After ten years of modernization [(through 1986)], the counts were to increase to eight different chassis (with 17 different hull designs), eight different track designs, five different engines (with 14 different propulsion system configurations) and eight different transmissions. Development of a vehicle family provided the Army with the chance to reverse this trend.

A principal component of Soviet modernization had been the steady improvement in design and development of its armored forces. The Soviets had continued to mechanize their ground forces since the end of World War II increasing armored vehicle lethality, survivability, and mobility. This emphasis on mechanization has succeeded in increasing the tempo (accelerated pace) of Soviet ground maneuver warfare. The centerpiece of the Soviet's highly maneuverable form of land warfare is the tank. Soviet support for the tank remained despite debates over its future viability.

Intelligence sources in 1985, indicated that Soviet commitment to the tank as the primary, tactical land system combined with their vast ground vehicle research and development (R&D) organization, would probably lead to a succession of new, highly capable tanks and infantry fighting vehicles over the next two decades. Projections for Soviet armored vehicle design, development, and fielding, through the year 2005, indicated that the tank would remain the key component of armored shock and firepower although the wide use of other specialized armored vehicles would continue.

In October 1985, the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) chartered a study effort to plan the total modernization of the Army's heavy forces. The Armored Family of Vehicles Task Force was given the mission ".... to develop and field an armored vehicle fleet, based on advanced technology and commonality, to defeat the threat of the late 1990s and beyond ....".

A major departure from past design efforts, AFVTF used a requirements-based vehicle design process. This process was predicated upon satisfying a needed battlefield capability (missions and roles) rather than the more traditional vehicle-based design methods. Over 30 family vehicles were designed to fulfill these battlefield roles.

The AFV fleet planned to utilize a minimum number of vehicle chassis and a maximum number of common system components. Eacn vehicle was to be based on a heavy, medium, or light protection chassis according to its mission and location on the battlefield. Systems were subsequently assigned to one of three battlefield echelons: the assault force, assault support force, or battle support force.

The common vehicle chassis and components were to be integrated with an individual mission module designed to optimally perform one or more specific combat tasks or battlefield functions. When combined with a chassis, these mission modules, in effect, created an assault (e.g. tanklike), assault support (e.g. artillery), pr battlefield support (e.g. rearm/refuel) vehicle as required by Army combat tables of organization and equipment (TOE). When employed, the fleet was expected to achieve significant operational (battlefield) synergy.

The Draft AFVTF, Phase I report 1flas released in August 1987 and presented to the Army Requirements Review Council (RRC). An understanding of the future battlefield, emerging technologies, and mission requirements were extremely important to proper development ot the AFV ccmcept. This information had to be developed in the context of Army AirLand Battle operational doctrine and artic:ulated in sufficient detail and depth for use by AFVTF and system proponent material developers. Despite the t:ask force's initial attempts, AFV missions and roles still lacked definition.

AFVTF, Phase I officially concluded with an August 1987 briefing to the RRC. Phase II began in September 1987 and was conducted through February 1989. Concerns over the high cost of developing and fielding the 28 vehicles proposed by the AFVTF resulted in Phase II's constrained, evolutionary approach. The Army approved to slip the AFV timeline to accommodate a full three year DEM/VAL phase (from FY90 through FY92) and move IOC achievement from FY95 to FY98.

TRADOC, AMC, and AFVTF representatives met in May 1988, to identify candidate AFV vehicles to undergo a OEM/VAL phase then stop before FSO. This would determine the development and integration risks involved with technologies related to these systems. The vehicles tentatively chosen for these demonstrations were based on selection criteria proposed by TRADOC. The criteria indicated that the vehicles should display maximum divergence in mission requirements, integrati.on, technology, and producability challenges.

The FACS (Future Armored Combat System - a tank-like vehicle) was targeted as the primary (lead) AFV system due to the complexity and criticality of its chassis design to other heavy vehicles. The ongoing M1 Abrams tank, Block modernization program had expected to integrate electrothermal or electromagnetic weapon systems into the M1A3 (or M1 Block III) tank. With these weapons, the Ml series of upgrades had been considered sufficient to meet the threat. When it was subsequently determined that these weapon system technologies would not be available to meet threat-driven timelines, FACS was placed into package I. As procurement of three (the M1A2, M1A3 and FACS) distinct tanks was unaffordable and would detract from the desired commonality, a determination was made to combine Block III and FACS requirements. This vehicle became commonly referred to as the Block III.

Since the current howitzer improvement program (HIP) was not focused on correcting major chassis mobility and reliability deficiencies, the Advanced Field Artillery System - Cannon [AFAS-C] was added to Package I. The inclusion of AFAS-C, however, remained a contentious issue.