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Dual Role Fighter

In the Dual Role Fighter program, the Air Force evaluated the capabilities of F-15 and the F-16 derivatives to perform both air-to-air and air-to-ground missions. The Air Force established a minimum configuration for both the F-15 and the F-16 derivatives (reFerred to as F-15E and F-16E). Both configurations incorporated ongoing product improvement programs and added a rear cockpit for a second crew member to share the workload, thereby improving mission performance.

The F-16E configuration includes other major changes to the aircraft's structure. The landing gear is strengthened, the fuselaqe was extended 56 inches, and a cranked-arrow wing (modified delta wins) replaced the current wing and horizontal stabilizers. The new wing is designed to provide additional lift and greater internal fuel capacity, and will permit weapons to be tucked in rows close to the wings to reduce drag. The F-15E configuration also included structural changes to the landing gear and the wings. However, the changes are not as great as those included in the F-16E configuration.

On 28 January 1982 Air Force Systems Command directed ASD to establish a derivative fighter comparison organization to evaluate the F-15E and F-16E aircraft. The organization would evaluate proposals for a dual-role fighter with air-to-air and air-to-ground capabilities. Between August 1982 and September 1983 Air Force Flight Test Center at Edwards AFB, California, conducted flying qualities tests of an F-15C equipped with conformal fuel tanks. In conjunction with the proposed F-15E dual-role fighter, Edwards' officials also evaluated the F-15C with various air-to-ground stores. As of January 1984 the Air Force had not completely defined its operational concepts and requirements for the dual role fighter and compared the F-15 and the F-16 derivatives against a uniform set of criteria to determine if each meets a common set of minimum performance specifications. The Air Force hoped to select either the F-15E or the F-16E for full-scale development in 1984, before congressional hearings commence on the fiscal year 1985 budget. Delivery of the first production aircraft was targeted for 1987. The Air Force planned to buy 400 aircraft.

On 24 February 1984 the Air Force chose the F-15E over the F-16E as the new dual-role fighter. Plans called for the McDonnell Douglas Corporation to integrate production modifications to the aircraft to provide the additional air-to-ground capability. The USAF planned to procure 393 aircraft with modifications amounting to $1.5 billion. The Air Force expected delivery of the dual-role F-15E in 1988.

The Air Force's approach to the dual role fighter selection hampered its ability to determine which aircraft would better serve in that role. The Air Force had not compared the F-l5E and the F-16E against any uniform set of criteria to determine if each meets a common set of minimum performance. Air Force Regulation 57-1 regulations establish procedures for defining and documenting operational requirements. The process, which should flow from mission area analyses, calls for a Statement of Need which identifies an operational deficiency and states the need for a new or improved. The System Operational Concept describes the intended purpose, employment, deployment, and support of a system, with quantitative and qualitative levels of system performance for elements such as range and payload.

Air Force Regulation 70-15 establishes procedures for selecting sources for development, production, and modification of major defense systems. The regulation sought to insure that an equitable and objective selection of the proposal which affords the optimum satisfaction of the Government's stated reauirements at reasonable cost. The procedures require that specific evaluation criteria be established as standards for use in measuring the acceptability of the contractor's proposal to fulfill the need. The evaluation criteria should identify areas of major concern to the slrstem's mission, and should be ranked in relative order of importance to the selection decision. The evaluation areas should further refined to identify factors or characteristics, such as range and payload, which serve as measurable objective standards for evaluating proposals. These standards, which should flow from the process of refining operational reauirements, are to be quantitative where practical and serve as the required minimum accentable performance.

Department of Defense Directive 5000.1, the primary Department of Defense directive on major systems acquisition, requires that essential operational requirements be established to validate or demonstrate the performance of a candidate system before it is selected for full-scale development.

The Air Force outlined in general terms its dual role fighter requirement for the Congress in March 1982 in a briefing to the House Aimed Services Committee, Research and Development Subcommittee. According to that briefing, a new dual role fighter was needed in the late 1980s and early 1990s to assist the F-111 in the deep interdiction role, to assist the F-15 in the air superiority role, and to partially replace the aging F-4, which was the only dual role fighter in the Air Force inventory. The dual role fighter whould be capable of a broad range of air-to-air and air-to-ground missions. The requirement included long--range, large payload, day/night low altitude terrain following caoability, and a rear cockpit for air-to-ground missions and long-range/endurance and a rear cockpit for air-to-air missions.

However, since March 1982, the Air Force had progressed slowly in refining the dual role fighter requirement. The Tactical Air Command drafted a "Statement of Operational Need" document including Performance thresholds and goals for the dual role fighter and a "Systems Operational Concept" document for the F-15E and the F-16E candidates. In July 1983 the Command submitted a revised statement of operational need to Headquarters, Air Force, but in December 1983, it had not yet been approved. At the same time, the F-15E and the F-16E System Operational Concepts were still being coordinated at Tactical Air Command. Significantly, the performance thresholds and goals incorporated in the earlier draft of the requirement document had been withdrawn as inappropriate, because they might influence or predetermine selection of one aircraft over the other.

The Air Force prefered to consider the F-15E and the F-16E as separately proposed aircraft, each to be judged individually on its own possible contribution to satisfying the Air Force's need for a dual role fighter. Air Force officials planned to determine whether the F-15E or the F-16E is the more cost-effective, using such measures as targets killed per sortie or targets killed per cost. They compared the F-16E and F-15E in evaluation areas based on the general dual role fighter requirement, as outlined by the Tactical Air Command in their requirement briefing and their draft "Dual Role Fighter Statement of Operational Need".

Air Force officials did not intend to rank the evaluation areas in order of their importance to the comparison and they did not plan to establish specific dual role fighter criteria which would serve as the minimum acceptable performance for characteristics such as range and payload. The Tactical Air Command dual role fighter thresholds and goals, which could have served as evaluation criteria, had been withdrawn.

According to the Air Force, the standard source selection procedures relating to establishing specific performance criteria as set forth in Air Force Regulation 7O-15 did not apply to 8the dual role fighter comparison. Usually, source selection would start with a common request for proposals. In this case, however, separate proposal instructions, respectively tailored to the F-15 and the F-16, were used to accommodate inherent differences in those aircraft. Air Forces officials also said that ranking the evaluation criteria and further refining and quantifying them might predetermine results or the comparison and defeat their objective of determining the most cost-effective enhancement.

The Air Force prepared cost estimates for the F-15E and the F-16E in August 1982 as part of cost analyses for the entire F-15 and F-16 programs. Because of program changes since August 1982, actual cost would be hiqher for whichever aircraft is selected. However, the estimates continued to serve as indications of relative program costs. The Air Force cost estimates include both (1) incremental costs (additional cost to add the dual role fighter capability) and (2) the total cost of the dual role fiqhters.

The estimated F-16 development costs and incremental costs were greater than estimated F-15E development and incremental costs. This largely reflected the additional costs of the major airframe changes to the F-16E. However, the estimated total cost of an F-16E was considerably less than the F-15E (approximately $10 million per aircraft).

The dual role capability would be built into aircraft that were already planned under the regular F-15 or F-16 acquisition programs. Thus, the Air Force viewed the dual role fighter cost as essentially incremental cost. The Air Force view of the program costs as essentially incremental was based on Air Force planning assumptions that enough of each aircraft (either F-15 or F-16) will be bought in future vears to satisfy the 400 dual role fighter reauirement. In this regard, if F-15 production were stablized at 36 aircraft per year, as intended by the conferees on the 1984 Authorization Act, it would be difficult to select the F-15 as the dual role fighter. If the F-l5 were selected, actual numbers procured would have to be considerably greater than 36 to meet the dual role schedule.