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Vietnam - The Final Campaign

By late 1972, the United States concentrated on obtaining a cease-fire and the release of American prisoners of war, whatever the cost. To gain Saigon's consent to a settlement that would leave North Vietnamese forces in control of territory captured in 1972, the Nixon administration combined the threat of abandonment with a promise of decisive aerial intervention in the event North Vietnam renewed the war. But when the fighting resumed in the spring of 1975, the United States stood aside as North Vietnam conquered the South, ending, finally, the active involvement of the United States in this long and bloody conflict.

American military activities in Cambodia and Laos, which had continued after the cease-fire in South Vietnam went into effect, ended in 1973 when Congress cut off funds. Although the terms of the peace agreement were less than the communists had hoped for, the accords did permit them to participate in the new government legally and recognized their right to control certain areas. Most important, the removal of United States forces gave the communists a welcome breathing space, allowing them to concentrate on political efforts.

In the initial period after the signing of the agreement, the party leadership viewed armed struggle as a last resort only because it was feared that the United States might reintroduce its forces. PLAF troops were instructed to limit their use of force to selfdefense . Meanwhile, the Thieu government embarked on pacification efforts along the central coast and in the Mekong Delta, which resulted in a reduction of the area under official communist control to about 20 percent of the South. The Saigon government, however, faced serious difficulties, including the negative effect on the economy of the withdrawal of United States forces and a critical refugee problem. During the course of the war, several million Vietnamese had been evacuated or had fled from their villages to find safety and jobs in urban areas. Most of these remained unemployed and, together with militant Buddhist groups, the Cao Dai, and the Hoa Hao, represented a sizable wellspring of discontent with the Thieu government.

During the early months of 1974, the North Vietnamese army advanced from the north and west on the southern capital. They soon surrounded Saigon with an ever-tightening perimeter. In early 1974, the communists launched a campaign to regain the territory they had lost since the cease-fire. Raids were conducted on roads, airfields, and economic installations; the flow of supplies and equipment from the North was stepped up; and a 19,000-kilometer network of roads leading from the DMZ in Quang Tri Province to Loc Ninh, northwest of Saigon, was completed.

By summer 1974 the communists were moving cautiously forward, seizing vulnerable areas in the Central Highlands and in the provinces around Saigon. There was no direct response from the United States, and the resignation of Nixon in August convinced the party leadership that further United States intervention was unlikely. ARVN forces continued to deteriorate, suffering high casualties and facing a lack of ammunition and spare parts. The party leadership met in October 1974 to plan a 1975 military offensive concentrating on the Cambodian border area and the Central Highlands. The taking of the Phuoc Lang province capital, Phuoc Binh (now Ba Ra in Song Be Province), in early January was followed by a surprise attack in March on Ban Me Thuot, the largest city in the Central Highlands.

President Thieu ordered ARVN units at Pleiku and Kontum to leave the highlands and withdraw to the coast to regroup for a counter attack on Ban Me Thuot. The ARVN strategic withdrawal became a rout, however, because PAVN units had already cut the main roads to the coast and fleeing civilians clogged the secondary roads as panic ensued. By the end of March, eight northern provinces had fallen to the communist forces, including the cities of Hue and Da Nang. Buoyed by this stunning victory, the party leadership directed the commander of revolutionary forces in the South, General Van Tien Dung to prepare for an offensive against Saigon.

In early April, PAVN and PLAF troops moved south and began an encirclement of the capital. On April 20, after ten days of stiff resistance, the ARVN Eighteenth Division, stationed thirty kilometers north of Saigon, finally crumbled under the attack of three PAVN divisions. With Saigon in a state of panic, President Thieu resigned the following day and was replaced by Vice President Tran Van Huong. Duong Van Minh, thought to be more acceptable to the communists, took over the presidency on April 28. The communists refused to negotiate, however, and fifteen PAVN battalions began to move toward Saigon.

Saigon fell to the Communists on 29 April 1975. On April 30, communist forces entered the capital, and Duong Van Minh ordered ARVN troops to lay down their arms. On the morning of April 30, 1975, the last Marine boarded a CH-46 helicopter atop the American Embassy in Saigon and took off eastward disappearing into the blue horizon. It was 21 years after the first advisors arrived in country and nearly three years after the last combat troops withdrew.

Nearly thirty years had passed since Ho Chi Minh first declared Vietnam's independence as a unified nation in September 1945. In the interim, an entire generation of Vietnamese had endured a divided Vietnam, knowing only continuous warfare. The events of April 1975 not only abruptly concluded the war but also prepared the way for the official reunification of the country the following year, when the Vietnamese people were brought together under one independent government for the first time in more than a century.

South Vietnam's military defeat tended to obscure the crucial inability of this massive military enterprise to compensate for Saigon's political shortcomings. Over a span of nearly two decades, a series of regimes failed to mobilize fully and effectively their nation's political, social, and economic resources to foster a popular base of support. North Vietnamese main force units ended the war, but local insurgency among the people of the South made that outcome possible and perhaps inevitable.

Some saw the setback suffered by the United States in the Vietnam War as rooted in a failure of strategy. To some, perhaps no war in American history showed more clearly both the difficulties of making sound strategic judgments and the dire consequences of a lack of clear strategic vision. The Vietnam War thus provided some a cautionary tale for American political and military decision-makers about the crucial importance of thinking clearly about strategy. By incorrectly relating military strategy to national policy and by improperly understanding the nature of the conflict, the United States seemingly exhausted itself against a secondary enemy in South Vietnam. Part of the American failure in Vietnam also stemmed from initially trying to fight a traditional conventional war when the conflict's nature demanded a counterinsurgency effort. Top military commanders, unable to fathom the problem, refused to implement such a strategy despite evidence of its effectiveness.

The extent of the American victory in Vietnam was not apparent at the time. American strategic objectives in Vietnam were complex, and evolved over time as leaders in Washington came and went and as the situation on the ground matured. In general however, it was clear that Vietnam itself was not worth fighting for except as a battleground in the far larger struggle against global communism. In Vietnam, America demonstrated to other allied countries that it was prepared to sacrifice blood and treasure in that struggle. Vietnam eventually fell, but the Free World alliance system scarcely quivered, and within two decades Communism had been consigned to the ashbin of history.

Some thought that Afghanistan would be the Soviet's Vietnam, but it was not. The contrast could not be more striking. The USSR began its invasion in 1979 to support its puppet prime minister, who failed to extend power much beyond Kabul. The Soviets deployed more than 100,000 troops to Afghanistan [a fraction of the 500,000 American troop level in Vietnam]. In 1989, the final Soviet troops withdrew from an embarrassing war in Afghanistan that was seen as a waste of lives and money.

The Soviet defeat in Afghanistan was an important turning point contributing to the collapse of the Soviet Empire. In 1988, President Gorbachev announced his intention to withdraw Soviet forces from Afghanistan. Over 15,000 Soviet troops were killed in Afghanistan in the 1980s, not even a third of the American losses in Vietnam. The last Soviet soldier left on 15 February 1989. The Berlin Wall came down on 09 November 1989, and with it crumbled the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union itself collapsed two years later, in December 1991.