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Vietnam - Air Mobile Operations

In its broadest sense, the airmobility concept envisages the use of aerial vehicles organic to the Army to assure the balance of mobility, firepower, intelligence, support-and command and control. Landings could be effected deep into enemy rear areas with the capability to attack and withdraw rapidly.

Near the end of the 1950's, the Army staff recognized the overwhelming need to get its "aviation house" in order. One of the most important milestones during this pcriod was the decision to develop the XH-40 Bell Utility Helicopter and to power it with a turbine engine. The final report of the Howze Board was submitted on 20 August 1962. The air assault division was the principal tactical innovation. The aircraft of the division could lift one third of its assault elements at one time. A distinct feature of the proposed air assault operations was the requirement for an-increased use of support aircraft to carry supplies as far forward as the tactical situation would permit.

There is no precise method to divide the Vietnam War into convenient phases. However, from the standpoint of an airmobility study, one can consider the first phase as a learning period. On 11 December 1961 the United States aircraft carrier USNS Card docked in downtown Saigon with 32 U. S. Army H-21 helicopters and 400 men. The 57th Transportation Company (Light Helicopter) from Fort Lewis, Wash., and the 8th Transportation Company (Light Helicopter) from Fort Bragg, N. C., had arrived in Southeast Asia. Just twelve days later these helicopters were committed into the first airmobile combat action in Vietnam, Operation CHOPPER. Approximately 1,000 Vietnamese paratroopers were airlifted into a suspected Viet Cong headquarters complex about ten miles west of the Vietnamese capitol. The paratroopers captured an elusive underground radio transmitter after meeting only slight resistance from a surprised enemy.

The second phase of the war was characterized by battalion-size air assaults of selected Vietnamese units, including the paratroopers, the rangers, and the regular infantry. It was the success of this phase that forced the enemy to increase his effort in South Vietnam. This proved to be something that the North Vietnamese Army was quite ready to do, and the improved capabilities of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam were matched step-by-step with increased resistance of the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army, as additional units and supplies poured down the Ho Chi Minh Trail complex and across the border.

In February 1963, the United States Army created the 11th Air Assault Division (Test) at Fort Benning, Georgia to assess a new concept of warfare—airmobility. The intent was to produce faster paced combat by bringing the infantry into battle via helicopter. Lieutenant Colonel Harold G. Moore, Jr., took command of one of the battalions of the 11th Air Assault Division in June 1964.

It was also during this second phase that the Huey came into its own. The turbine engine helicopter with its great power, its reliability, and its smaller requirement for maintenance, was the technological turning point as far as airmobility is concerned. Actually, the key improvement of technology was the trio of the Huey as a troop lift bird, the Chinook with its larger capacity for resupply and movement of artillery, and the fledgling attack helicopter - these three together allowed the Americans to take a giant step forward at this time.

The disadvantages inherent in helicopters were difficult to overcome. If they are flown slow or low they are vulnerable to ground fire; every flying hour must be complemented by 3 hours ground maintenance; they cannot be flown for more than 10 hours in any 2 or 3 days; the helicopter consumed much fuel, carrying a full load of troops its fuel capacity was reduced and as a consequence its range was reduced, as a result the starting point for heliborne operations was usually near the objective and thus the enemy's element of surprise can be compromised.

As the Allied tactics and techniques developed, so did the Viet Cong develop counter tactics and techniques. Consequently, there was always a need for innovation. Experience proved that any set pattern for any length of time was extremely dangerous since the Viet Cong were quick to capitalize on these patterns and strike at the weakest point.

By 1965 the Viet Cong had learned more than a bit about the method of operation of Free World Forces and could well determine probable landing zones and the number of troops which could be brought in by one lift. Their antiaircraft weapons were now being centrally controlled and coordinated to deny the use of the most desirable landing zones and thereby channelize the airmobile forces into landing zones chosen and covered by the Viet Congo In the latter zones, the Viet Cong forces tried to maintain favorable odds of four to one to the amount of Army of the Republic of Vietnam forces available to react against them. Even in 1965 it was envisioned that soon airmobile operations would be opposed by division-size units.

The first major American direct fire conflict took place in November of 1965 in the Ia Drang Valley. On 14 November 1965, the Americans launched the first major division operation of airmobile troops, into Landing Zone X-Ray and LZ Albany in Vietnam's Ia Drang Valley. The engagement is divided into two engagements: the Battle at Landing Zone (LZ) X-Ray and the Battle at LZ Albany.

LTC Harold G. Moore, commander of the 1st Cav. Div.'s 1st Bn., 7th Cav. Regiment 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry (Custer's old battalion) depended on MAJ Bruce Crandall's helicopters to insert his Soldiers of the 1st Bn. into LZ X-Ray. Moore’s philosophy was that the commander should always be the first person into, and the last one out of, a combat area. The Battle at Landing Zone (LZ) Albany — fought between the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry of the U.S. Army and the 8th Battalion, 66th Regiment, along with the 1st Battalion, 33rd Regiment of the Peoples Army of Vietnam (PAVN) on 17 November 1965 — was the deadliest single-day battle during the Vietnam War.

Three battalions of fresh North Vietnamese Army troops had come down the Ho Chi Minh Trail and were waiting. The Americans were some 20 miles in the middle of enemy territory, surrounded by a force seven times larger than their own. In just four days, over two hundred Americans and thousands of North Vietnamese died in combat. The 34-day Pleiku Campaign lasted from Oct. 23 to Nov. 26, 1965. Counting the skirmishes before and after the two major battles, 305 Americans died - more than in the entire first Gulf War.

The Ia Drang Valley battle is depicted in the movie "We Were Soldiers," adapted from the book "We Were Soldiers Once...And Young," by Moore and Joe Galloway, a United Press International war correspondent who experienced the battle at LZ X-Ray with Moore's men.

Airmobile warfare was validated. Afterwards, US military commanders looked at the statistics — a kill ratio of twelve North Vietnamese to one American — and claimed victory. Commanders deduced that they could “bleed the enemy to death.” North Vietnamese leaders claimed a win. The Americans could consider X-Ray a “draw,” at most.

On 2 September 1967, the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) changed the object of its operations. It found a weakness in the American air-assault concept. Realizing the combat forces based at An Khe and Pleiku were entirely dependent upon trucks for fuel and supplies, the NVA decided to sever this vital supply line. As drivers climbed out of their vehicles to return fire, the NVA swarmed down over the trucks. A convoy halted in the kill zone was exactly what the enemy wanted. Since the drivers were support troops, they did not carry much ammunition, and what they did have was fired up quickly. In 10 minutes, the enemy had destroyed or damaged 30 of the 37 vehicles, killing seven men and wounding 17. Spooky, an AC-47 gunship, arrived at 2020 hours, but the enemy had escaped under the cover of darkness.

The deadly nature of the convoy ambushes intensified. The VC and NVA required detailed intelligence on convoy operations and would spend several weeks planning a deliberate ambush. Based on previ- ous patterns of behavior, the Americans knew the enemy carefully selected ambush sites that would force the convoy to slow down, thus gaining the advantage. After two years of fighting against the air-assault concept, the NVA had found the Achilles’ heel of the Americans. The helicopters were entirely dependent upon trucks for fuel; hence, the convoys had become a major target.

One hundred and fifty-three helicopters were lost in 1966 alone to hostile fire, as compared to the two hundred and fifty-five helicopters lost to hostile fire between 1961 and 1965. The number of helicopters lost in Vietnam from all causes was 4,869; of these 2,587 were lost in combat. Of these combat losses, 2,373 helicopters were due to anti-aircraft and small arms fire.

Airmobility worked in Vietnam in spite of the tremendous problems of working in the jungles and the mountains of an undeveloped country. The helicopter overcame the obstacles of limited landing zones, primitive road nets, restricted observation, and high density altitudes as no other vehicle could.