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Operation Red Fox
23 Jan 1968 - 05 Feb 1969

By the mid-1960s Pyongyang was engaged in a determined effort to apply its own version of the doctrine of “peoples’ war”: to provoke incidents along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and to carry out terrorist attacks throughout the South in hopes of creating a situation which would, in time, shake the ROK Government’s control of the nation. Pyongyang might be tempted to go well beyond incidents along the DMZ; e.g., it might attempt to seize and hold a piece of territory south of the DMZ or stage a raid into South Korea with fairly large forces. In general, however, the US Intelligence Community believed [Special National Intelligence Estimate SNIE 14.2–68, May 16, 1968] that Pyongyang would consider such moves too risky, especially any attempt to hold South Korean territory.

On 23 January 1968 North Korean patrol boats seized the USS Pueblo, a US Navy intelligence-gathering vessel, in the international waters of the East Sea off Wonsan. One USS Pueblo crewmember was killed in the boarding and 82 were taken POW and held captive. The seizure, which took place a mere two days after a commando intrusion into Seoul, shocked the whole world, and there arose strong public demand in the United States for firm retaliatory action against North Korea. North Korea made the utmost use of the Pueblo incident in its crafty propaganda, believing that the United States, deeply involved in the Vietnam War then, would not be able to use the force of arms on the Korean Peninsula.

Between 26-31 January 1968 several 9th Air Force active units deployed to the Pacific in response to North Korea's seizure of USS Pueblo: the 4TFW sent 72 F-4Ds, the 354TFW sent 18 F-100s, and the 363TRW sent six RB-66s. In addition, several 9AF-gained ARC units were recalled to active duty: the 113TFW and 107th, 113th, 121st and 177TFGs. The 334th and 335th Fighter Squadrons, equiped with F-4 Phantom II fighters, rushed to Korea to support operations during the Pueblo incident. The squadrons returned to Seymour Johnson in June 1968. F-106 fighters were briefly deployed to Osan AFB in Korea in March of 1968 to provide air defense during the Pueblo incident.

The 347th Tactical Fighter Wing was activated at Yokota Air Base, Japan on 15 January 1968 . The mission was to provide air defense for the islands of Japan. Units assigned were the 34th, the 35th, and the 36th Tactical Fighter Squadrons (TFS); and the 556th and the 6091st Reconnaissance Squadrons. Aircraft assigned were the F-105 Thunderchief, the F-4C Phantom II, the EB-57 Canberra, and the C-130 Hercules. Between 23 Ocobert 1968 and 05 February 1969 all of the 347th Tactical Fighter Wing's F-4Cs were deployed to bases in South Korea to participate in the US response to North Korea's abduction of the USS Pueblo.

Six Air Force Reserve units were mobilized in the wake of the Pueblo Incident. The 120th Tactical Fighter Squadron, Colorado Air National Guard was ordered into active Federal service as a result of the Pueblo incident, along with three other F-100 tactical fighter squadrons: 136th Tactical Fighter Squadron, New York, 174th Tactical Fighter Squadron, Iowa, 188th Tactical Fighter Squadron, New Mexico. The 120th Tactical Fighter Squadron entered combat in Vietnam on 5 May 1968, two days after its arrival, and completed its 1,000th mission 51 days later. During the Air National Guard's eleven months of service in Vietnam, the four F-100 squadrons flew 24,124 combat sorties and accumulated 38,614 combat flying hours.

The 445th Military Airlift Wing was activated after the Pueblo was seized, on January 26, 1968. The activation of the 445th found many support personnel stationed at eight different stateside bases and aircrews flying more missions to Europe, the Caribbean, South America, and Southeast Asia. The Wing remained activated in support of the Pueblo incident for seventeen months until released from active military service on June 2, 1969. For superior performance and dedication during the Pueblo incident, the 445th Military Airlift Wing received its first Air Force Outstanding Unit Award.

The seizure of the Pueblo and the attack on the presidential mansion in Seoul, both in late January 1968, were followed by a period of relative quiet. Since mid-April, however, North Korean harassment and infiltration in the area of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) has intensified, and it appears that saboteurs have again been active in Seoul. With the advent of favorable weather, we expect guerrilla teams to begin moving down the coasts of South Korea in a renewed effort to establish bases in the mountainous hinterland. On the propaganda front, the bellicose line adopted by North Korean Premier Kim Il-Song at the October 1966 Korean Labor Party Conference has been maintained, with somewhat greater truculence since the Pueblo incident. It is apparent, therefore, that we are entering another cycle of North Korea’s campaign of violence and intimidation against the ROK.

The US intelligence community reviewed the available evidence and concluded once again that, under present circumstances, Pyongyang did not intend to invade South Korea. Nor do we believe that, at least for the next year or so, Pyongyang will take actions that it considers involve high risk of provoking a new Korean War. This judgment rests in part on the US intelligence community 's view of how North Korea would assess its prospects in a new war. Despite the emphasis on modernizing its armed forces, on training reserves and increasing local militia, and on the protection of key installations against air attack, Pyongyang almost certainly would not expect to overrun South Korea or to escape serious damage in the North. The ROK Army is superior in numbers; Pyongyang would almost certainly consider that the presence of US forces virtually assured their participation and their reinforcement if necessary; and North Korea itself would require material support, and probably manpower, from China or the USSR. Thus, any plans for a deliberate attack leading to a renewal of the Korean War would require the assurance of support from the USSR, China, or both. Under present circumstances, it is extremely doubtful that Pyongyang would receive any assurances in advance from either Communist power that the support required for a large-scale conflict in South Korea would be available.

More directly, the US intelligence community did not see indications of preparations of the nature and scope that would be expected if North Korea were planning war or expected it in the near future. There is, for example, no evidence—in this nation of chronic shortages—of unusually large imports of food or medicines, or other unusual international transactions. There had been rumors of increased draft calls, mobilization of reserves, unusual troop movements and deployments, and the buildup of stockpiles near the DMZ, but none of these or similar indicators of impending large-scale action were supported by reliable evidence. The “war is coming” tone of letters from North Korea to Japan appears to reflect official propaganda; such letters almost certainly suit the regime’s purposes since all outgoing mail is carefully censored. Finally, if North Korea were planning a surprise attack, it would seem unwise to foment tension and keep the ROK and the US on the alert.

Nor did the US intelligence community believe that the North Koreans were trying to provoke the ROK into a resumption of major hostilities. Pyongyang might hope thus to activate its defense treaties with China and the USSR, and also to avoid condemnation by world opinion. But the US intelligence community did not believe that the North Korean leaders would expect either the USSR or Communist China to cooperate in a “counterattack” that could overrun the South.

The US intelligence community did believe, however, that Pyongyang was engaged in a determined effort to create the conditions for a “peoples’ war” in South Korea. We also believe that Pyongyang currently rates the risks of this enterprise as not very high. The North Koreans probably view the US involvement in Vietnam and the resultant discord in the US as limiting the military capabilities and the will of the US to support any serious ROK retaliatory ventures against the North. US restraint in the Pueblo affair probably strengthened this view, and North Korean intelligence probably has a reasonably accurate picture of Washington’s pressures on the ROK to forgo strong retaliatory measures in the Blue House and other affairs.

Thus, Pyongyang probably felt reasonably safe in creating incidents along the DMZ and in carrying out terrorist attacks throughout South Korea. These serve to give some credence at home to its claims of “imperialist aggression” and a developing resistance movement in the South. Pyongyang also intends them to embarrass and distract the ROK Government and to cause a loss of confidence in its leaders which could, in time, loosen their control of the nation. Meanwhile, these actions have caused some misunderstanding and strains between the ROK and the US.

Pyongyang might be tempted to go well beyond incidents along the DMZ. It might, for example, attempt to seize and hold a piece of territory south of the DMZ or stage a raid into South Korea with fairly large forces. We do not entirely rule out such actions. They would depend on how Pyongyang judged the probable reactions of the US and ROK. In general, however, we believe that Pyongyang would consider such moves as too risky, especially any attempt to hold South Korean territory.

Kim’s course of action vis-e-vis South Korea dated from 1966, although some indications of long-range preparations for intensified action were visible earlier. After several years of economic difficulty at home and consistent failure to capitalize on political unrest in the South, the frustrated Kim attempted to inject some dynamism into his regime by securing tighter control over the government and driving the population to greater efforts in its behalf. He seemed to have succeeded in pruning much of what he considered deadwood from the government, the party, the military, and the economy; a series of low-keyed purges reduced his leadership group to a handful of trusted comrades; and Kim demanded and received personal adulation on an unprecedented scale.

Public participation in the regime’s many new programs was fostered (along with acceptance of hardships) by nationalistic exhortations to prepare for “the foremost revolutionary task”—i.e., a Communist takeover of the South and reunification on Pyongyang’s terms. In Kim’s doctrine, the success of the revolutionary struggle in the South required parallel efforts to build up the revolutionary base in the North, to improve its economy so that it will impress the southerners, and to strengthen its defense against the day when reactionary forces in the South, in desperation, strike northward. It was apparent that to make this line credible requires, at a minimum, some evidence of revolutionary struggle in the South and a demonstrably aggressive enemy along the DMZ. War tensions apparently prevailing among the northerners was evidence that the regime had achieved some degree of success in its indoctrination program.

This did not mean that North Korea would be satisfied with the mere semblance of a revolution in the South. Pyongyang’s violent actions in 1967, coupled with its longstanding campaign of political subversion in South Korea, attest to the seriousness of its purpose. But Pyongyang probably had little expectation of developing a revolutionary movement in the South in the near term. North Korean theoreticians tend to emphasize the inadequate basis for revolutionary action in the South and the time and energy required to develop one. Thus, the leadership probably viewed its current efforts as part of a long-term campaign to upset the political equilibrium in the South, meanwhile strengthening in some measure the existing Communist clandestine apparatus there.

It was possible that North Korean leaders had persuaded themselves that political and military conditions in the US and in Korea, as well as in Vietnam, made the year 1968 the best time for a radical intensification of this revolutionary strategy. In the US intelligence community's view, however, North Korea was not committed to any particular sequence of moves nor to any firm timetable. Pyongyang’s propaganda, in contrast to the statements of captured North Korean infiltrators, was invariably vague on timing; the phrase most frequently used is “within our generation.” The North Korean plan of action appeared similarly flexible; ROK and US defense measures and other responses, and the demonstrated effectiveness of various types of North Korean operations are the prime considerations. At any rate, to serve Pyongyang’s current strategy, the campaign of violence need only continue; there seems to be no requirement for escalation to the level of major hostilities.

In this situation, the principal danger in the short term was one of miscalculation—i.e., that North Korea, in the process of probing ROK and US resolve, would overplay its hand and that an increasingly exasperated President Pak would order large-scale retaliation. Pyongyang’s response in this situation would be difficult to predict with any degree of confidence. On the one hand, the North Koreans might feel that they had to accept the ROK retaliation because, at this juncture, the risk of major hostilities would seem too high. It seems more likely, however, that they would feel compelled to respond with commensurate force. Though North Korea would probably stop short of actions certain to provoke a full-scale war, the proximity of hostile armies would make the situation highly volatile and war could result.

In such a crisis, decisions in Pyongyang and Seoul on any further moves would probably be affected, and perhaps decisively, by the attitudes and advice of their major allies. In our view, neither the USSR nor Communist China would consider a war in Korea to be in its interest. Without flatly refusing Pyongyang all military support, they would probably encourage North Korea to limit hostilities.

Eleven months after the seizure North Korea repatriated 82 Pueblo crewmen and one set of remains to the United States through P'anmunjom. Upon signature of the US admitting to espionage in the coastal waters of the Sea of Japan, the 82 POWs were freed. Upon their return on 28 December 1968, the crew was treated poorly by the public and the military and only in 1990 did they receive the POW ribbons to which they were entitled. The ship remained in Wonson Harbor, North Korea.

In any case, a tense and risky situation was likely to continue in Korea well beyond the year 1968. Kim Il-Song was a relatively young man; he appeared to be in firm control in the North; and his hard-line views were likely to hold sway there for many years. Of critical importance will be the ability of the ROK people over the years to stand united against Communist subversion, and the ability of ROK forces to cope effectively with North Korean harassments. ROK confidence in the face of these long-term threats will depend heavily on the US posture in the Far East.

Pyongyang’s openly aggressive tactics were obviously not working. Far from weakening the South Korean regime, the evident threat was serving to solidify support for Park and acceptance of his strong rule. Nor was North Korean brinkmanship generating international pressure on the US to withdraw from Korea. Quite the contrary: it demonstrated the need for continued US military presence in the peninsula, while both Peking and Moscow were clearly reluctant to back up North Korean adventurism.

The North Koreans seem to have read the balance sheet in 1970, and revised their tactics against the South accordingly. The immediate cause of this tactical adjustment seems to have been the failure of their experiment with paramilitary tactics and terrorism from 1966 through 1968. Such large scale disasters as the Blue House raid and the mass landings at Ulchin on the east coast, far from encouraging the people of the South to rise in “people’s war”, only stiffened the South’s resistance, while justifying the presence of US troops in the eyes of the world. Since early 1969, the rate of incidents along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) has dropped by over 80 percent. Meanwhile, the emphasis of Pyongyang’s efforts has shifted to the infiltration of agents for political subversion—i.e., to recruit agents, organize cells, and to develop the political base for revolution in the South. Kim Il-song signaled the continuation of this policy by warning that the people of the South must take the responsibility for their own revolution.