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Kosovo Congressional Debate

  • PAUL - KOSOVO WAR IS ILLEGAL (House of Representatives - May 05, 1999) NATO's war against Serbia left the Congress and the American people in a quandary, and no wonder. The official excuse for NATO's bombing war is that Milosevic would not sign a treaty drawn up by NATO, which would have taken Kosovo away from the Serbs after the KLA demanded independence from Serbia. This war is immoral because Serbia did not commit aggression against us. We were not attacked and there has been no threat to our national security. This war is illegal. It is undeclared. There has been no congressional authorization and no money has been appropriated for it.
  • Randy `Duke' Cunningham - KOSOVO (House of Representatives - May 05, 1999) Rambouillet was an agreement. I would ask you, Mr. Speaker, would you take this agreement in hand? First of all, if you were going to allow a foreign power to occupy what you considered your country. Secondly, that that foreign power would hold that country, yours, in its hand for 3 years and then turn it over to a country like Albania that since 1880 has not only tried to take Kosovo in expansionism but also Macedonia, Montenegro and even parts of Greece. That is why the Greeks are so petrified. The ad hoc air campaign is no strategy. It is a disaster in my opinion. The strategy of bombing until they capitulate is poor foreign policy and is not a strategy. For us that have fought in wars, unlike many of my colleagues in this body, it is easy to kill but it is very, very difficult to work to live.
  • McINNIS - REPORT ON RESOLUTION PROVIDING FOR CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 1664, KOSOVO AND SOUTHWEST ASIA EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 1999 (House of Representatives - May 05, 1999) I am going to talk a little more extensively about the KLA as we get into it, but what we are intervening in here is not a genocide. We are intervening in a war of which we know very little about, a civil war. To me, it makes as much sense as having the Mexican Army come across the borders of the United States to try and resolve the battle between the North and the South. How well do you think that would have gone over?
  • SHERMAN - KOSOVO (House of Representatives - May 05, 1999) I want to thank the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon) for his hard work. It did not just start recently. He has been building bridges between the United States Congress and the Russian Duma for many years. And I think he speaks well of the need for us to break out of this stranglehold that our policy is in where it seems like not only are we reluctant to compromise, we may even be reluctant to take `yes' for an answer.
  • S. Res. 94 - COMMENDATION OF THE EFFORTS OF THE REVEREND JESSE JACKSON (Senate - May 05, 1999) The resolution (S. Res. 94) was agreed to.
  • GUTKNECHT - WE ARE SPREADING OUR MILITARY TOO THIN (House of Representatives - May 04, 1999) We currently have troops in 135 different countries. We are prepared to fight a war in Korea, we are prepared to fight a war in the desert, and now we are apparently going to have to fight a war in Kosovo. The problem is we are spreading ourselves too thin.
  • SOUDER - CRISIS IN KOSOVO (House of Representatives - May 04, 1999) The American people need to understand the air war cannot solve the problem of getting the refugees back. The ground war cannot, either.
  • H. Res. 156 - COMMENDING THE REVEREND JESSE L. JACKSON, SR., ON SECURING THE RELEASE OF U.S. SERVICEMEN FROM CAPTIVITY IN BELGRADE, YUGOSLAVIA (House of Representatives - May 04, 1999)
  • COMMENDING THE REVEREND JESSE L. JACKSON, SR., ON SECURING THE RELEASE OF U.S. SERVICEMEN FROM CAPTIVITY IN BELGRADE, YUGOSLAVIA (House of Representatives - May 04, 1999) The Reverend Jackson has a distinguished record of utilizing his considerable powers of persuasion in the service of humanitarian objectives. When American citizens and others find themselves held in captivity in a hostile country as a result of circumstances beyond their control, Reverend Jackson has proven on several occasions against the odds that he can secure their release.
  • Report of the Meetings of the U.S. Congress and Russian Duma - Vienna, Austria 30 APRIL--1 MAY 1999 (House of Representatives - May 04, 1999) The composition of the armed international forces which would administer Kosovo after the Serbian withdraw should be decided by a consensus agreement of the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council in consultation with Macedonia, Albania, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and the recognized leadership of Kosovo.
  • SHERWOOD - END THE HOSTILITIES BEFORE OUR MILITARY RESOURCES ARE FURTHER DEPLETED (House of Representatives - May 04, 1999)
  • GIBBONS - GIVE PEACE A CHANCE IN THE BALKANS WAR (House of Representatives - May 04, 1999)
  • BROWN - VIENNA PEACE TALKS (House of Representatives - May 04, 1999)
  • SANDERS - A FRAMEWORK FOR SETTLING THE KOSOVO CRISIS (House of Representatives - May 04, 1999)
  • ABERCROMBIE - BIPARTISAN DELEGATION TRAVELS TO BRUSSELS TO SEEK PEACE IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (House of Representatives - May 04, 1999)
  • SENATE RESOLUTION 94--COMMENDING THE EFFORTS OF THE REVEREND JESSE JACKSON TO SECURE THE RELEASE OF THE SOLDIERS HELD BY THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA (Senate - May 04, 1999) The Senate commends the Reverend Jesse Jackson for his successful efforts in securing the release of Sergeant Ramirez, Sergeant Stone, and Specialist Gonzales, and for his leadership and actions arising from his deep faith in God.
  • S.J. Res. 20 DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. ARMED FORCES TO THE KOSOVO REGION OF YUGOSLAVIA (Senate - May 04, 1999) Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the President is authorized to use all necessary force and other means, in concert with United States allies, to accomplish United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization objectives in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).

  • Mr. McCAIN -- The President of the United States is prepared to lose a war rather than do the hard work, the politically risky work, of fighting as the leader of the greatest nation on Earth should fight when our interests and our values are imperiled. We all know why in a few minutes this resolution is going to lose. It is going to lose because the President and members of his Cabinet have joined with the opponents to the war and lobbied hard for the resolution's defeat.
  • VOINOVICH - MCCAIN RESOLUTION REGARDING KOSOVO (Senate - May 03, 1999) In my opinion, our State Department, President and NATO are allowing their egos to get in the way of their common sense and good judgment. I believe it is time to stop the bombing, reduce hostilities on both sides and resume negotiations to bring about peace and restore stability to the region.
  • DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. ARMED FORCES TO THE KOSOVO REGION IN YUGOSLAVIA (Senate - May 03, 1999) Today the Senate should begin a constructive, long overdue, and thorough debate on America's war with Serbia. But we will not. We will not because the Senate leadership, both Republican and Democrat, with the passive cooperation of the President of the United States, has determined that we will limit debate on war and peace to a few hours this afternoon. Apparently, the hard facts of war need not inconvenience the Senate at this time, and the solemn duties that war imposes on those of us privileged to lead this nation can be avoided indefinitely. I heard my friend, the Democratic Leader, say the other day that now is not the time for this debate. When is the right time? After the war ends? Shall we wait to declare ourselves until the outcome is known?
  • DEPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES TO THE KOSOVO REGION IN YUGOSLAVIA (Senate - May 03, 1999) KERRY - It seems to me that this is not a time for the Senate to engage in covering its own posterior, not a time for the Senate to engage in a wholesale set of contradictions. It is rather the time for the Senate to declare, as unequivocally as it declared 40 days ago, that we are prepared to move forward with the bombing, that the same goals and the same objectives are viable today. I have heard some of my colleagues come to the floor and say this is going to affect our capacity to fight some other war somewhere. What war? Where? What are they talking about? I mean, are we planning suddenly some other war of which we are not aware?
    This is staring us in the face. It is here. It is now. We are at war. The question we must ask ourselves is whether or not we are prepared to win or whether we are going to put obstacle after obstacle in front of ourselves to deprive ourselves of the capacity to achieve the goals that are achievable. I believe that the imperatives of intervention outweigh the alternatives so far that it is hard to really measure the counterarguments.
  • STEVENS - GENERAL HAWLEY'S COMMENTS ON READINESS (Senate - May 03, 1999) Gen. Richard Hawley, who heads the Air Combat Command, observed that the current build up in Europe has weakened our ability to meet our other global commitments. General Hawley added that the air operation in Kosovo would require a reconstitution period of up to five months.
  • MOYNIHAN - ON NATO INTERVENTION IN KOSOVO (Senate - May 03, 1999) The KLA's strategy was very simple: Target Serbian policemen and thus provoke the inevitable brutal Serb retaliation against Kosovo Albanian civilians, all in the hopes of bringing NATO into the conflict. They have succeeded brilliantly in this goal, but have not proved to be much a fighting force themselves.
  • DURBIN AMENDMENT NO. 300 (Senate - May 03, 1999) An amendment intended to be proposed by him to the preamble to the joint resolution (S.J. Res. 20) concerning the deployment of the United States Armed Forces to the Kosovo region in Yugoslavia.
  • DURBIN AMENDMENT NO. 301 (Senate - May 03, 1999) No ground forces of the Armed Forces of the United States may be used to invade the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) unless specifically authorized by statute.
  • LOTT - DRAFT RESOLUTION ON YUGOSLAVIA (Senate - April 30, 1999) None of the funds available to the Department of Defense may be used to deploy the Armed Forces of the United States in or adjacent to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) for the purpose of conducting offensive ground operations unless and until the President submits a written request seeking specific statutory authorization for any such deployment or a declaration of war against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).
  • SPECTER - DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. ARMED FORCES IN KOSOVO (Senate - April 30, 1999) I supported the resolution for airstrikes with a specific limitation that there would not be a deployment of ground forces. What we have in Kosovo, what we have with NATO, what we have in our military action against the Republic of Yugoslavia is really a constitutional crisis. It is a constitutional crisis of major import, if anybody would pay attention to the Constitution. Only by ignoring the Constitution are we able to ignore the constitutional crisis.
  • DODD - WHEN HISTORY ASKS WHO STOOD UP TO EVIL IN KOSOVO, THE ANSWER WILL BE: NATO (Senate - April 29, 1999) NATO has had to bring its military might to bear on Slobodan Milosevic. This sentiment was poignantly expressed in a recent statement by the American Jewish Committee, one of the organizations actively worked to alleviate both the European genocide of today and that of a generation ago.
  • WOLF - PROVIDING FOR CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 1569, H. CON. RES. 82, H. J. RES. 44, AND S. CON. RES. 21, MEASURES REGARDING U.S. MILITARY ACTION AGAINST YUGOSLAVIA (Extension of Remarks - April 29, 1999) It is important for the world, for the U.S. and for NATO that we prevail in today's Balkan conflict. If NATO were to walk away it would be inhumane to the million-plus refugees. It would dangerously destabilize eastern Europe, leaving a huge refugee problem.
  • WELDON - REMOVAL OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES FROM THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA (Extension of Remarks - April 29, 1999) Ironically, the President argued that airstrikes were needed in order to keep this very action from taking place. Unfortunately, the airstrikes only heightened these atrocities.
  • SOUDER - KOSOVO (House of Representatives - April 29, 1999) The American people need to be told that if we go to a ground war, between 20 and 50,000 Americans are going to lose their lives. We have to understand what we are faced with here. We bluffed. We should not bluff when we do not have the ability to execute. It is time to cut off the funding for this war.
  • SHERMAN - INTERPRETING THE VOTES ON KOSOVO (House of Representatives - April 29, 1999) The third vote, and, unfortunately, the vote that is getting the press, was a vote of 213 to 213 as to whether this House would go on record authorizing the air strikes. Now, our own press is misinterpreting this vote, for it came just a few hours after, by a 2-to-1 majority, my colleagues and I voted not to stop what is going on now.
  • H. Res. 151 -- PROVIDING FOR CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 1569, H. CON. RES. 82, H. J. RES. 44, AND S. CON. RES. 21, MEASURES REGARDING U.S. MILITARY ACTION AGAINST YUGOSLAVIA (House of Representatives - April 28, 1999) H. Res. 151 provides for the consideration of four separate measures relating to the deployment of U.S. Armed Forces in the Republic of Yugoslavia, each under a closed amendment process with 1 hour of debate. The first measure made in order by the rule is H.R. 1569 which prohibits the use of funds appropriated to the Department of Defense from being used for the deployment of ground elements of the U.S. Armed Forces in Yugoslavia unless that deployment is authorized by law. The next two resolutions were introduced by Mr. Campbell and reported unfavorably yesterday by the Committee on International Relations. Both resolutions, H. Con. Res. 82 and H.J. Res. 44, have a unique procedural status under the War Powers Resolution of 1973. The fourth resolution is S.Con.Res. 21, authorizing the President to conduct military air operations and missile strikes against Yugoslavia.
  • DEPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES IN AND AROUND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA (House of Representatives - April 28, 1999)
    Mr. GEJDENSON: Do not blame NATO for the acceleration or the deaths in Kosovo. As the American troops headed towards the concentration camps, the Nazis increased their production rate. They killed more people. We cannot use that as an argument for not going after them. Milosevic would have been happy to kill these people at a lower percentage, try to chase them out more slowly if he was not threatened.
    Mr. CHAMBLISS: Our military is already overextended and under funded. They are brilliantly executing a questionable policy. It is clear that the President has failed to plan for the possible contingencies and the unintended consequences of military action in the Balkans, he has failed to demonstrate clear and decisive leadership in leading this military campaign to a successful conclusion, he has failed to provide the necessary resources to adequately support our brave men and women serving in the military.
  • H.R. 1569 - MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA LIMITATION ACT OF 1999 (House of Representatives - April 28, 1999) Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, None of the funds appropriated or otherwise available to the Department of Defense may be obligated or expended for the deployment of ground elements of the United States Armed Forces in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia unless such deployment is specifically authorized by a law enacted after the enactment of this Act. The prohibition in subsection (a) shall not apply with respect to the initiation of missions specifically limited to rescuing United States military personnel or United States citizens in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or rescuing military personnel of another member nation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as a result of operations as a member of an air crew. AYES--249 NOES--180 So the bill was passed.
  • H. Con. Res. 82 - REMOVAL OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES FROM THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA (House of Representatives - April 28, 1999) Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), Pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1544(c)), the Congress hereby directs the President to remove United States Armed Forces from their positions in connection with the present operations against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia within 30 days after the passage of this resolution or within such longer period as may be necessary to effectuate their safe withdrawal. YEAS--139 NAYS--290 So the concurrent resolution was not agreed to.
  • H.J. Res. 44 - DECLARING STATE OF WAR BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND GOVERNMENT OF FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA (House of Representatives - April 28, 1999) Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That pursuant to section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1544(b)), and article 1, section 8 of the United States Constitution, a state of war is declared to exist between the United States and the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. YEAS--2 NAYS--427 So the joint resolution was not passed.
  • S. Con. Res. 21 - AUTHORIZING PRESIDENT TO CONDUCT MILITARY AIR OPERATIONS AND MISSILE STRIKES AGAINST FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA (House of Representatives - April 28, 1999) Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That the President of the United States is authorized to conduct military air operations and missile strikes in cooperation with our NATO allies against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). NAYS--213 YEAS--213 Mrs. BONO changed her vote from `yea' to `nay', so the Senate concurrent resolution was not concurred in.
  • OBEY - CONGRESS IRRESPONSIBLE IN DEALING WITH KOSOVO ISSUE (House of Representatives - April 28, 1999) Tomorrow, after they have turned down their authorization for what is going on in Kosovo, we will be marking up the supplemental appropriation bill in the Committee on Appropriations. The same crowd that voted `no' on authorizing this military operation today will be going into that committee and demanding that we double the amount of money that the President asked to spend on it.
  • GRASSLEY -- KOSOVO (Senate - April 28, 1999) Do Americans understand that while we fight one dictatorship, fumbling around trying to heighten the war and somehow end it at the same time, three other dictatorships more dangerous to American interests are walking away with America's pants?
  • SANFORD -- THOUGHTS ON KOSOVO (Extension of Remarks - April 27, 1999) The military power of our country is being applied to solve the world's humanitarian problems and we are creating more problems in the process. We need to stop this madness and return to the values that have made this country great.
  • WELDON -- ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS FOR SOLVING THE CONFLICT IN KOSOVO (House of Representatives - April 27, 1999) Russia has made overtures to us that they would like to provide the assistance of both the government and the parliamentarians to help bring Milosevic to understand that this conflict must end and that he must agree to world opinion and the NATO guidelines.
  • INHOFE -- THE BALKANS (Senate - April 26, 1999) I have been saying for quite some time--even though the President denies it, the President has planned all along to send American ground troops into Kosovo. . If a person wanted to start World War III, based on the model that took place for World War I, they would do exactly what we are doing. One scenario is you just send the troops in as far as Kosovo, and that would be about 60,000 troops, according to what I found out over there, 30,000 of which would be Americans. Or the next step, if we went all the way and took Belgrade, that would take 200,000 troops, of which half would be U.S. troops. The cheap way, going into Kosovo, would cost from $5 billion to $10 billion--this is the United States cost--and would take from 500 to 2,000 American casualties. The second, going into Belgrade, would be $10 billion to $20 billion. It would take a toll of 5,000 to 10,000 American casualties.
  • SPECTER -- NATO ACTION INVOLVING UNITED STATES AGAINST FEDERATION OF YUGOSLAVIA (Senate - April 26, 1999) The Senate of the United States passed a resolution on March 23 authorizing airstrikes, but strictly guarding against ground forces. The airstrikes constitute a clear-cut act of war, and the resolution of the Senate of the United States is not sufficient under the Constitution. There has to be a joinder with the House of Representatives.
  • VOINOVICH -- NATO, KOSOVO AND SLOVENIA (Senate - April 22, 1999) I would like to draw attention to a recent Washington Post article that gives an excellent historical reference for my colleagues and NATO on the perils of introducing ground troops into the Balkan region.
  • LANDRIEU - KOSOVO (Senate - April 22, 1999) I believe there is one central reason that justifies our actions, and that is the price, the tremendous price, we have already paid for freedom in America and in Europe. Our parents' generation and their parents were asked to risk their lives to fundamentally alter the way the world operates. In World War I, President Wilson asked our grandparents to fight to make the world `safe for democracy,' and they did. In World War II, when fascism threatened to conquer the democracies of Europe, President Roosevelt asked America to become `the arsenal of democracy,' and we were.
  • DURBIN - KOSOVO (Senate - April 22, 1999) Some people ask a question: Why is the United States involved in this? Why do we care? What does this have to do with America? Come on, these are people in Serbia and they always fight, don't they? I think there is more to the story because what is at stake here is Europe, and Europe has always had a special meaning to the United States. In this century, we fought two World Wars, we have given the best of our country in defense of causes that we felt were right against Nazism, against communism, to make certain that Europe was peaceful, had stability, was there, and they were friends of the United States.
  • GORTON - WAR IN THE BALKANS (Senate - April 21, 1999) I believe that the United States should engage in armed conflict only when its vital interests are at stake, and the Serb repression of the Kosovar Albanians did not involve any of our vital national interests. When we do engage our Armed Forces in conflict, we should do so decisively and with overwhelming force aimed at the cause of the conflict--in this case, the Milosevic government in Belgrade. This conflict, to the contrary, was begun in too limited a fashion to be likely to bring the Serbs to heel, with no contingency plans should the early bombing not work, and with no anticipation of the brutal Serb reaction in driving hundreds of thousands of Kosovars out of home and country. Does any Senator believe for a moment that this administration will wage or is capable of waging a real war with victory as its goal? No. We have only four realistic alternatives, all unpalatable.
  • VOINOVICH - NATO, KOSOVO AND SLOVENIA (Senate - April 22, 1999) I oppose the introduction of ground troops. I reiterate that opposition today. I would like to draw attention to a recent Washington Post article that gives an excellent historical reference for my colleagues and NATO on the perils of introducing ground troops into the Balkan region.
  • LANDRIEU - KOSOVO (Senate - April 22, 1999) I believe there is one central reason that justifies our actions, and that is the price, the tremendous price, we have already paid for freedom in America and in Europe. The only way that we can have peace in the Balkans is for people like Milosevic and the thugs underneath him to understand that there are real and personal consequences for their barbaric atrocities.
  • DURBIN - KOSOVO (Senate - April 22, 1999) We do not get engaged in wars to pick up territory or to come back with loot and booty. We get engaged in wars for values. That is what it was all about in World War II; to make sure that Hitler and his genocide would come to an end once and for all, to make certain in the cold war that we stopped the spread of communism in Europe. Now, today, in this mission in Kosovo, we say we are standing again for values that are important, not only in the United States, but in Europe and around the world.
  • WOLF - ADMINISTRATION SHOULD CALL ON OUTSIDE COUNSEL TO HELP DEVELOP BALKAN STRATEGY (House of Representatives - April 21, 1999) The Clinton administration has so many times ruled out the use of ground troops that Milosevic may have been emboldened by what he perceives as a lack of commitment by the other side to win. I fear that the Clinton administration has no clear strategy or idea as to what it will take to win in the Balkans.
  • KASICH - WE MUST EXAMINE THE KOSOVO CRISIS IN LIGHT OF OUR VITAL NATIONAL INTERESTS (House of Representatives - April 21, 1999) It would be a grave error to replace no long-term policy, which is what I believe the administration has executed thus far, with the wrong long-term policy. The administration's absolute requirement for a NATO implementation force and the probability of independence for Kosovo after 3 years were conditions of Rambouillet that neither Yugoslavia or any other sovereign country was likely to accept. I have come to the conclusion that military escalation is neither in the national interest nor can it achieve a stable long-term peace in the region. Those who have called for ground troops have not specified the goal.
  • PAUL - U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND NATO'S INVOLVEMENT IN YUGOSLAVIA AND KOSOVO (House of Representatives - April 21, 1999) Without the Soviet enemy to justify the European military machine, NATO had to find enemies and humanitarian missions to justify its existence. The centuries-old ethnic hatreds found in Yugoslavia and the militant leaders on all sides have served this purpose well. Working hard to justify NATO's policy in this region has totally obscured any objective analysis of the turmoil now raging. Whether or not one is sympathetic to Kosovo's secession is not relevant. I for one prefer many small independent governments pledged not to aggress against their neighbors over the international special interest authoritarianism of NATO, the CIA, and the United Nations.
  • McCAIN - CONCERNING THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES TO THE KOSOVO REGION IN YUGOSLAVIA (Senate - April 20, 1999) I am concerned that the force the United States and our NATO allies have employed against Serbia, gradually escalating airstrikes, is insufficient to achieve our political objectives there, which are the removal of the Serb military and security forces from Kosovo, the return of the refugees to their homes, and the establishment of a NATO-led peacekeeping force. Silence and equivocation will not unburden us of our responsibility to support or oppose the war.
  • HUTCHISON - KOSOVO POLICY (Senate - April 20, 1999) A resolution has been introduced this morning that would give the President all of the authority to use whatever force, take whatever steps he sees as necessary. I think it would be vastly premature to take an action before the President has laid out a plan. When I hear our NATO allies saying they would not consider ground troops, the last thing I think we should do is encourage ground troops.
  • WELLSTONE - KOSOVO (Senate - April 20, 1999) I want to press very hard on the question of whether or not we should be airlifting some humanitarian relief to people who are obviously going to starve to death otherwise. I am trying to understand why we are not doing that now. I do not understand why we are not prosecuting more of this air war and more of these airstrikes in Kosovo.
  • GREGG - KOSOVO (Senate - April 20, 1999) We are now engaged in a war in Kosovo. This administration could not explain, and has certainly not explained very well, why we decided to step off on this route of military action. One has to wonder, what was our national interest in that region in Kosovo? We have managed to dramatically undermine and, in my opinion, destabilize the process of evolution towards democracy in Russia. If we were to pursue a course of invasion of Yugoslavia, it would clearly make it very difficult for the forces of moderation and reason within Russian society to overcome the forces of nationalism and jingoism. As a result of this administration's continuous reduction in defense activity and its basic antipathy towards the Defense Department for the first 4 to 5 years of this Presidency, we no longer have the capability to fight effectively in an extensive engagement on two fronts. Let's try to negotiate a resolution of this, a resolution which would probably involve some sort of multifinanced force, not NATO related, in the Kosovo region.
  • DURBIN - THE SITUATION IN KOSOVO (Senate - April 20, 1999) I am a product of the Vietnam era. I came to the conclusion, as a result of that experience, that war is the last resort; that there is no such thing as a military adventure. When military is involved, people die. It should be taken ever so seriously. Yet, I believe we find ourselves in the Balkans in a situation where, frankly, there was no alternative but the use of force. America does not go to war for territory or for treasure. We go to war for values. And the values at stake in this conflict are values that Americans can take at heart.
  • It troubles me to hear some of my friends on the other side of the aisle suggest that after 25 days of bombing in Serbia and Kosovo somehow or another the American military might has been decimated. But we cannot succeed when a television program like `Nightline,' 7 days into the war, has a program entitled `The Kosovo Crisis: Still no end in sight.' Seven days--7 days into the war they want it over with, and all the political pundits are coming on television on Sunday and saying, well, we must have lost that war. It is a good thing they were not around during the Battle of the Bulge.
  • DUNCAN - SITUATION IN KOSOVO (House of Representatives - April 20, 1999) The President has put us in an impossible situation. If we go into a ground war, they estimate that is going to be $10 or $15 billion and that before it is all over, if this thing drags out, we could spend $40 or $50 billion.
  • SPECTER - THE WAR IN KOSOVO (Senate - April 19, 1999) We have seen the U.S. military preparedness decline very markedly in the past decade and a half. That raises some very, very important questions as to the adequacy of our defense and our ability to deal with a crisis in Kosovo, where we are at war, notwithstanding the fact that a declaration has not been filed.
  • MURKOWSKI -- KOSOVO POLICY (Senate - April 19, 1999) We are now into the fourth week of the NATO bombing campaign, and so far things are far worse for the Albanian Kosovars. When it became apparent to the Administration that its policy of protecting the Albanian Kosovars had failed, the Administration in early April shifted the message and claimed that the bombing was designed to `degrade' Serbia's military capacity. While the Serbian war machine continues to roll south unimpeded, it is the American military that has been substantially degraded by the shortsighted policies of the Clinton administration. Now that we are engaged in this very serious mission in Kosovo, the shortfalls in our military spending are becoming dangerously obvious.
  • DORGAN - NATO ACTIONS IN KOSOVO (Senate - April 19, 1999) I have supported the airstrikes, and I hope and pray they succeed in driving Mr. Milosevic back. I have said before and I reiterate today that I do not and will not support the introduction of U.S. ground troops to the Balkans. I think that would be a horrible mistake.
  • CLELAND - KOSOVO POLICY (Senate - April 15, 1999) Unfortunately, I think that no real military, or so far diplomatic, approach we have come up with can really fully guarantee our goals in the Balkans. I understand that the price tag, through October, for our involvement now in Kosovo will cost some $8 billion.
  • CUNNINGHAM - THE KOSOVO CONFLICT, NO END IN SIGHT (House of Representatives - April 15, 1999) 75 percent of all strikes in Kosovo are being flown by the United States. That does not include the B-2s, the tankers, the support aircraft like C-17s and C-130s. That brings it up to 82 percent. We are dropping 90 percent of all the weapons, so we are paying for over 90 percent.
  • DUNCAN - SENDING GROUND TROOPS TO KOSOVO WOULD COMPOUND A HUGE FOREIGN POLICY ERROR (House of Representatives - April 15, 1999) We are now being told that we will soon be asked to approve $4 billion for the costs of our air war. One estimate is that ground troops and reconstruction costs could soon total $10 billion.
  • DeLAY - PEACE HAWKS--WITH EYES ON THE GROUND (House of Representatives - April 15, 1999) Former `doves' are cheering but traditional `hawks' appalled by Mr. Clinton's command blunders, don't know what to say. The Kosovo operation is different and oxymoronic. It is a `peace war' waged by `peace hawks' pursuing a dovish social agenda.
  • PAUL - THE BOMBING IN SERBIA MUST STOP (House of Representatives - April 15, 1999) Serbia is involved in a bloody civil war of which we should have no part, and have not declared war, as the Constitution requires. That makes this war both immoral and illegal. Not only has the bombing done no good, it has made the situation much worse and the world more dangerous.
  • LEAHY - KOSOVO (Senate - April 14, 1999) I supported NATO's decision to attack Serbian President Milosevic's forces. But, like many others, I have been disappointed by the way this air campaign has been carried out. But I certainly expected that we would hit him with enough firepower so that among the first targets bombed would be those Serbian forces. Instead, they encountered almost no resistance as they emptied Kosovo of its inhabitants. , I am also concerned about a disturbing report I received this morning that United States forces have used landmines against the Serbs. I am told that these are anti-tank mines, but they are mixed with anti-personnel mines, which are prohibited under an international treaty which unfortunately the United States has not signed. I am hoping this report is not true.
  • PAUL - CRISIS IN KOSOVO (House of Representatives - April 14, 1999) The war in Yugoslavia now pursued by our administration and with NATO is both immoral and illegal and it should not be pursued.
  • PITTS - NO CONFIDENCE IN THE ABILITY OF LIBERALS TO WAGE WAR (House of Representatives - April 14, 1999) I have no confidence in the ability of liberals to wage war. That is the truth that most of us believe and cannot deny. From the nonsensical way that Johnson and McNamara fought the Vietnam War, to Carter's humiliation in Iran, to our latest misadventure in Kosovo, the truth is there for all to see. The liberal mentality simply is not equipped to deal with the harsh realities of war. They do not understand the first thing about using military force, about protecting America's national interest or about what is required to defeat a determined enemy.
  • DODD - TRIP TO MACEDONIA AND NATO HEADQUARTERS IN BRUSSELS (Senate - April 13, 1999) Our efforts to restore these people to their rightful home, bring an end to this conflict, and thus save the lives of thousands and prevent the spread of this conflict throughout the Balkans area are most assuredly the right thing to do.
  • VOINOVICH - THE CRISIS IN KOSOVO (Senate - April 13, 1999) I rise today to vehemently oppose sending American ground forces into Kosovo and to demand that if the President contemplates sending in ground troops, that decision be deliberated and authorized by the Congress of the United States. I am an American of Serbian-Slovenian ancestry. I don't oppose sending ground troops into Kosovo because I am Serbian. I oppose it because it is bad policy.
  • GORTON -- KOSOVO (Senate - April 13, 1999) I voted against authorizing the air war in Yugoslavia. I did so because it seemed to me that the goal was a goal not worthy enough, not grave enough to begin what amounts to a war, even though under the President's leadership it has only been half a war.
  • WELDON - KOSOVO AND THE INVOLVEMENT OF U.S. TROOPS (House of Representatives - April 13, 1999) Now is the time for us to let Russia know that we expect, for the assistance that we give them, that they play a significant and vital role in bringing Milosevic, an ally and close confidante of the Russian government and certain Russian leaders, to the table to help us resolve this conflict peacefully. We are going to have to pass a massive supplemental. I saw the report today where the long-term projected cost of Kosovo could exceed $10 billion to $15 billion alone. I hope we continue to understand that every day we are there is costing us, by one estimate I saw, $30 million an hour.
  • TANCREDO - THE FOLLY OF COMMITTING GROUND TROOPS TO KOSOVO (House of Representatives - April 13, 1999) Before we engage the Serbs in a limited war over Kosovo, it would be wise to review the experiences of the 22 German divisions that were committed to stamping out Serb resistance between 1941 and 1945.
  • WOLF -- KOSOVO REFUGEES: AN EXODUS OF BIBLICAL PROPORTIONS (House of Representatives - April 13, 1999) This report provides details of my trip to Albania on April 4-7, 1999. I met briefly with Albanian leaders in Tirana and spent the bulk of my time at the Kosovo-Albanian border near Morina and the nearby town of Kukes. Thousands upon thousands of refugees streamed across the border, 24 hours a day. They desperately need lifesaving care now and will require sustaining aid for a long time until all the problems resolving around Kosovo are solved, and they can once again return home.
  • GOODLING - U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN KOSOVO (House of Representatives - April 13, 1999) why I introduced legislation that calls on the Congress to be full partners when we determine which civil war we will enter or which we will not. That certainly is the responsibility of the Congress. My legislation basically says that no DOD money can be used to send ground troops into Kosovo unless approved by the Congress of the United States.
  • SHERMAN - REGARDING THE CRISIS IN KOSOVO (House of Representatives - April 12, 1999) I believe that we should involve Russia in the diplomatic efforts to the maximum possible degree. Second, we should signal now that we are willing to reach peace on the basis that the Rambouillet agreement would apply to roughly 80 percent of Kosovo territory rather than all of Kosovo. Third, we should begin training an army of Kosovar Albanians. This army should be independent of the KLA, and for now U.S. troops should control custody of the weapons while the training proceeds.
  • WELDON - ONGOING KOSOVO CRISIS (House of Representatives - April 12, 1999) Even though I did not agree with the President's initial position to get us involved in a NATO-sponsored air campaign, I do think that we need to have a discussion about where we go from here. In the years from World War II until 1990 and 1991, all of those Presidents, Republicans and Democrats alike, committed our troops just 10 times, 10 deployments in 40 years, only where it was absolutely essential to put our troops in harm's way. From 1991 until today with the Kosovo deployment, we have seen our troops deployed 33 times. Ten times in 40 years, 33 times in the last 8 years. Kosovo, in the short period of time we have been deployed there, has cost the American taxpayer $2 billion, and the daily price tag for Kosovo is increasing exponentially. Some Russians proposed that the international peacekeeping force that would be put into Kosovo would not involve the militaries of any of those nations that are today bombing Serbia.
  • DUNCAN - SENDING GROUND TROOPS TO KOSOVO WOULD COMPOUND A HUGE FOREIGN POLICY ERROR (House of Representatives - April 12, 1999) I believe it was a terrible mistake to start bombing in the first place, and it certainly would be compounding a huge error to place many thousands of ground troops in there now. NATO bombings have made this situation much worse than it ever would have been if we had simply stayed out.
  • JACKSON-LEE - OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO (House of Representatives - April 12, 1999) I believe that as we sustain these air strikes, we should still be calling for return to the peace table. Nothing should be excluded or precluded, but we certainly should not move precipitously into the use of ground troops.
  • PAUL - IF NATO HAS ITS WAY, ALBANIAN KOSOVARS WILL NOT REMAIN PART OF SERBIA (House of Representatives - April 12, 1999) The U.S.-NATO war against Serbia is illegal by all standards. Congress has not declared war. Therefore, the President has no authority to wage war. Attacking a sovereign nation violates long-standing international law as well as the NATO and U.N. charters. NATO's aggression is immoral as well.
  • GOODLING - U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN KOSOVO: WHY THIS HUMANITARIAN CRISIS? (House of Representatives - April 12, 1999) I introduced legislation that will prohibit the use of appropriated funds to the Department of Defense from being used for the deployment of U.S. ground troops in Kosovo unless deployment is specifically approved by Congress and authorized by law.
  • STEARNS - MISADVENTURE IN YUGOSLAVIA (House of Representatives - April 12, 1999) I rise today to speak about the ongoing military action against Yugoslavia and the reservations that many of us have concerning U.S. involvement. The President has propagated ever-shifting political objectives. By my own calculations, he has had at least three different stated political objectives in Kosovo.
  • GOODLING - GROUND TROOPS IN KOSOVO (Extension of Remarks - April 12, 1999) I am introducing a bill that will prohibit the use of Department of Defense funds for the deployment of U.S. ground troops into Kosovo unless authorized by law and approved by Congress. The intent is to require the Executive Branch to seek the advice and consent of Congress before sending our troops into harms way within the borders of Kosovo.
  • DORGAN - KOSOVO (Senate - April 12, 1999) I think probably everyone here in the Senate is concerned and nervous about what is happening. There is discussion now about whether ground troops ultimately will be needed in that region in order to complete the mission of NATO. I do not know the answer to that, but I do feel very strongly that the introduction of U.S. forces on the ground in the Balkans could be a very, very significant mistake.
  • PAUL - CLOSER TO EMPIRE (Extension of Remarks - March 25, 1999) Our involvement in Kosovo and in Iraq, and in Bosnia--when combined with America's role in Korea, and in the Middle East and other places around the world, is now lurching our republic ever closer to empire. Empire is something that all Americans ought to oppose.
  • HORN - LET US NOT SEND TROOPS TO KOSOVO (Extension of Remarks - March 25, 1999) The conflict in Kosovo is taking place within a sovereign nation. If we are going to go to war with a sovereign nation, we ought to provide a declaration of war.
  • JOHNSON - SUPPORT FOR U.S. TROOPS IN KOSOVO (Senate - March 25, 1999) In the case of Kosovo, our country's interests are clear and warrant the current military action. A lasting peace is directly linked with stability in Europe, and it is our duty to participate in a multi-national effort to prevent the ethnic cleansing currently occurring in Kosovo.
  • SENATE RESOLUTION 74--EXPRESSING THE SUPPORT OF THE SENATE FOR THE MEMBERS OF THE UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES WHO ARE ENGAGED IN MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA (Senate - March 24, 1999)
  • U.S. IS EMBARKING ON VERY DANGEROUS AND WRONG COURSE IN KOSOVO (House of Representatives - March 24, 1999) We are dropping bombs and making enemies out of people who want to be our friends. And we are doing all this in places where there is absolutely no threat to our national security and no vital U.S. interest at stake.
  • PAUL - U.S. MILITARY ACTION TAKING PLACE IN SERBIA IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL (House of Representatives - March 24, 1999) Our responsibility as U.S. Members of Congress is to preserve liberty here at home and uphold the rule of law. Meddling in the internal and dangerous affairs of a nation involved in civil war is illegal and dangerous. Congress has not given the President authority to wage war.
  • H. Res. 130 - EXPRESSING SUPPORT OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FOR MEMBERS OF U.S. ARMED FORCES ENGAGED IN MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA (House of Representatives - March 24, 1999) The House of Representatives supports the members of the United States Armed Forces who are engaged in military operations against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and recognizes their professionalism, dedication, patriotism, and courage.
  • LEACH - PRESIDENTIAL DECISION-MAKING RELATED TO KOSOVO (House of Representatives - March 23, 1999) There may be a humanitarian case for intervening on the ground in Kosovo as part of a small NATO peacekeeping operation. But this case disintegrates if we unleash air power against one of the sides.
  • STEARNS - FOREIGN POLICY AMBIGUITIES (House of Representatives - March 23, 1999) If the President issues orders to begin an air assault against Yugoslavia, the United States would, in effect, be at war with this country. The President has yet to explain what our strategy is aimed to achieve.
  • SPECTER - KOSOVO (Senate - March 23, 1999) The Senate of the United States took up its constitutional responsibility to make a decision as to whether Congressional authority would be given for the United States to commit an act of war in Kosovo following a request by the President of the United States for such a vote. In modern times, we have seen the erosion of the congressional authority to declare war. Tonight in the Senate, we reaffirmed the basic constitutional responsibility and authority of the Congress on that very subject, after the President had made a significant request for authorization to use force.
  • AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TO CONDUCT MILITARY AIR OPERATIONS AND MISSILE STRIKES AGAINST THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA (SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO) (Senate - March 23, 1999) The President of the United States is authorized to conduct military air operations and missile strikes in cooperation with our NATO allies against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). The result was announced--yeas 58, nays 41.
  • SENATE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 21--AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TO CONDUCT MILITARY AIR OPERATIONS AND MISSILE STRIKES AGAINST THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA (SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO) (Senate - March 23, 1999)
  • INHOFE - THE KOSOVO QUAGMIRE (Senate - March 23, 1999) The President wants us to send the U.S. military into Kosovo, not to enforce a peace agreement--we do not have a peace agreement, as we were told 2 weeks ago--but to inject ourselves into the middle of an ongoing civil war, with no clearly defined military objective, no assurance of success, no exit strategy and great, great risk to our pilots and men and women in uniform.
  • HUTCHISON - THE SITUATION IN KOSOVO (Senate - March 22, 1999) The President has committed the United States to a policy in NATO to which he really does not have the authority to commit. The President has gone out with a commitment before he talked to Congress about it, and now we have really changed the whole nature of NATO without congressional approval. We are going to bomb a sovereign country because of their mistreatment of people within their country, the province of Kosovo, and we are going to take this action, basically declaring war on a country that should not be an enemy of the United States.
  • ROBERTS - KOSOVO (Senate - March 22, 1999) Some support airstrikes and some do not. Some support ground troops; more do not. But we all agree, I think, that the Congress and the American people certainly deserve a better explanation of the administration's policy in the Balkans.
  • GORTON - KOSOVO (Senate - March 19, 1999) , The U.S. national security interests in Kosovo do not rise to a level that warrants military operations by the United States. It goes on to point out that any intervention on our part would be to engage the Armed Forces of the United States in a civil war inside the truncated but still nation of Yugoslavia.
  • SPECTER - KOSOVO (Senate - March 19, 1999) The United States is considering, in conjunction with NATO forces, air attacks. In the context of what is likely to go on in Kosovo, these are in fact, acts of war which call for authorization by the Congress of the United States under the U.S. Constitution.
  • HUTCHISON - THE KOSOVO COMMITMENT (Senate - March 19, 1999) I think many are not prepared to go into a full-scale altercation with a sovereign country until we have looked at the entirety of that commitment.
  • LOTT - CONSULTATION WITH CONGRESS ON KOSOVO (Senate - March 19, 1999) The Senate, the Congress, must be involved and consulted if a decision is made to take military action, certainly if it is an action that could lead to being an act of war.
  • GREGG - KOSOVO (Senate - March 19, 1999) . It appears that the administration and the President have decided to use American military force in Kosovo in conjunction with NATO. This, to me, is a serious mistake.
  • BUNNING - PRESIDENT CLINTON SENDING AMERICAN SOLDIERS TO KOSOVO (Senate - March 19, 1999) I do not believe that any amount of American involvement is going to end these ethnic conflicts that have raged for centuries. We have tried to resolve this problem for three years and have gotten nowhere. I do not understand why we think we can end this civil war by sending 4,000 additional troops. President Clinton has not given us any answers as to why sending these troops to Kosovo is so vital.
  • MURKOWSKI - INVOLVEMENT IN KOSOVO (Senate - March 19, 1999) I am concerned that we have not given enough consideration to what we will do if the initial plan fails, or is somehow miscalculated. I am astonished that we do not have an end game for this exposure of our young men and women whom we would send into battle. Some have suggested it could be the beginning of World War III. I am not going to dramatize, but do want to emphasize that I do not believe that we have given sufficient attention and strategic analysis to the alternatives to intervention, or to a withdrawal plan should we proceed to send troops to Kosovo.
  • BENNETT - KOSOVO (Senate - March 19, 1999) We are on the verge of actions that are the equivalent of the United States going to war. The justification we are receiving for taking those warlike actions is that the administration has made commitments to foreign governments. Yet the administration does not bother to talk to Congress about this and gain congressional authority for these actions. Instead, the administration spends its time talking to our allies.
  • ENGEL - KOSOVA KILLINGS CALLED A MASSACRE (House of Representatives - March 17, 1999) An independent forensic report into the killings of 40 ethnic Albanians in the Kosovo village of Racak in January has found that the victims were unarmed civilians executed in an organized massacre, some of them forced to kneel before being sprayed with bullets.
  • GREEN - PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO RESOLUTION (Extension of Remarks - March 17, 1999) To involve U.S. troops in this operation without laying out clear guidelines and objectives--both for the peacekeeping forces and for future U.S. policy--would serve little purpose other than to place American fighting men and women adrift in harm's way. The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 424, nays 1, not voting 9.
  • GRANGER - PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO RESOLUTION (Extension of Remarks - March 16, 1999) I remain deeply troubled by the possibility of deploying United States troops in Kosovo. Can we really make a difference in this far away land? At this point, I have my doubts.
  • RYUN - PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO (Extension of Remarks - March 16, 1999) A Kosovo peacekeeping mission will place a heavy burden on America's armed forces compromising their readiness levels, the quality of life of their families, and the national security of the United States. We cannot continue to ask our military to do more with less.
  • COLLINS - PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO RESOLUTION (Extension of Remarks - March 15, 1999) I rise in strong opposition to the deployment of U.S. ground forces in Kosovo. I base my opposition on three principles: first, that the administration must abide by U.S. law in the event of a deployment; second, that the Kosovo issue represents a threat primarily to European, rather than American interests; and third, that intervention in Kosovo at this time would set a dangerous precedent for NATO and the U.S. armed forces by providing military support to an independence movement within a sovereign nation--a far different mission than that currently underway on the Balkan Peninsula.
  • SMITH - STATEMENT ON THE SUPPRESSION OF RIGHTS IN SERBIA (Extension of Remarks - March 11, 1999) Slobodan Milosevic, President of an unrecognized Yugoslav state of which Serbia and Montenegro are part, is using Kosovo to perpetuate his regime, to rally Serbia's public opinion around him, and to label as `traitors' not only his opponents but anyone who thinks independently.
  • PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO RESOLUTION (House of Representatives - March 11, 1999) House Concurrent Resolution 42, the Peacekeeping Operations in Kosovo Resolution, authorizes the President to deploy United States armed forces to Kosovo and just as importantly it makes possible congressional discussion of this very complex situation. Some Members as well as other foreign policy experts have questioned the timing of this debate while peace negotiations have not been concluded. But if Congress is to deliberate these serious issues prior to the possible deployment of U.S. troops, now is the time. March 15, the proposed deadline for a peace agreement for Kosovo, is this Monday, and U.S. troops could be on their way to Kosovo Monday night if agreement is reached. The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 219, noes 191, answered `present' 9, not voting 15.
  • SMITH - THE SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO DEMOCRACY ACT OF 1999 (Extension of Remarks - March 10, 1999) The Serbia and Montenegro Democracy Act of 1999 will target much needed assistance to democratic groups in Serbia and Montenegro.
  • NICKLES - ADMINISTRATION POLICY IN KOSOVO (Senate - February 25, 1999) I am very, very concerned about the administration's policy, or objective, where they are talking about committing 4,000 U.S. troops out of a contingency of 28,000, where they are sending our military in without a militarily achievable objective and without an exit strategy.
  • SPECTER - USE OF FORCE IN KOSOVO (Senate - February 23, 1999) I had intended to offer a joint resolution on the subject of the use of force in Kosovo for this bill, but events have overtaken this issue as the picture is now unfolding. The concern I have is on the repeated use of force that constitutes acts of war by the President of the United States without authorization by Congress, in violation of the constitutional provision that only the Congress of the United States has the authority to involve the United States in war.
  • ROBERTS - KOSOVO (Senate - February 23, 1999) Each time we make a peripheral deployment, the administration is constrained to insist that the danger to American forces is minimal. Such comments have two unfortunate consequences: They increase the impression among Americans that military force can be used casualty-free, and they send a signal of weakness to potential enemies. For in the end our forces will be judged on how adequate they are for peace imposition, not peace implementation.
  • GILMAN - MILOSEVIC DEFIES INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY ON KOSOVO (Extension of Remarks - January 20, 1999) This past weekend we once again heard of despicable, unspeakable crimes committed by Serbian police against unarmed men, women, and children. More than 40 ethnic Albanians were murdered in cold blood in the village of Racak in southern Kosovo. Now, in further defiance, Milosevic has ordered Ambassador William Walker, the American diplomat who heads the OSCE's Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) to leave Serbia.
  • WARNER - SERIOUS SITUATION IN KOSOVO (Senate - January 20, 1999) On September 3, 1998, having just returned from Kosovo I said it was my belief that the types of atrocities that the world has witnessed in the past few days would quickly unfold, unless NATO placed in the Pristina region a ground force to serve as a deterrent. What little gain has been achieved in Bosnia could be lost with this instability in Kosovo.
  • TRAFICANT - RESOLUTION ON THE INDEPENDENCE OF KOSOVA (Extension of Remarks - January 07, 1999) today I am introducing a House Concurrent Resolution urging the Clinton Administration to publicly declare that the Albanians of Kosova have a legal right to self-determination and independence from Serbia.
  • 1998

  • D'AMATO - SERBIAN CRACKDOWN ON INDEPENDENT MEDIA (Senate - October 21, 1998) I rise today to call to my colleagues' attention an ominous and entirely predictable development--Slobodan Milosevic is closing the independent media in Serbia.
  • WARNER - KOSOVO (Senate - October 20, 1998) In my judgment, there are no clean hands in this situation. The preponderance of the atrocities obviously have been committed by the Serbian forces under the direction, either indirectly or directly, of Slobodan Milosevic. But there also are some attacks being perpetrated by the KLA, which is that disparate group, relatively undefined, whose leadership changes from time to time, whose organization has very little coordination between the various bands of the KLA, but nevertheless they have perpetrated atrocities and, apparently, there are reports that some atrocities are continuing to be perpetrated by the KLA.
  • BYRD - KOSOVO: A CRISIS AVERTED OR A CRISIS POSTPONED? (Senate - October 14, 1998) [Page: S12488] The bottom line here is that Congress has a duty to authorize the use of force if and when offensive military action is called for. By blinking at the prospect of an authorization of force resolution, we are abdicating our responsibility to the Executive Branch and shirking our duty to the nation.
  • BIDEN - THE SITUATION IN KOSOVO (Senate - October 14, 1998) [Page: S12486] I had originally intended today to introduce a resolution authorizing United States airstrikes against Yugoslavia in connection with the Kosovo crisis because I believe our Constitution requires the President to come to us for that authority. I have decided, however, not to offer the resolution because of recent developments, not on the constitutional front, but recent developments on the ground. The reality is that we are about to go out of session, and my ability to get a vote on this issue is problematic, at best.
  • DASCHLE - KOSOVO (Senate - October 12, 1998) [Page: S12436] The United States and our NATO allies must be prepared to carry out airstrikes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia if such action is determined to be the only means of enforcing the U.N. resolution.
  • DODD - CALLING FOR CONCERTED ACTION BY NATO TO STOP ONGOING ATROCITIES IN KOSOVO (Senate - October 09, 1998) [Page: S12243] What we are witnessing in Kosovo now is potentially the most dangerous conflict in the Balkans since 1991. The Congress must put aside election year politics and speak with one voice in support of the United States utilizing all necessary means to put an end to these atrocities that threaten a wider war in the Balkans. I hope that the Republican leadership will allow a vote in the Senate to signal our strong support for the use of air power against Serbian targets in the coming days.
  • WARNER - KOSOVO (Senate - October 08, 1998) [Page: S11896] A very decisive series of airstrikes, which I support. I believe, and others believe, that a necessary second component of any military action, to back up the airstrikes, has to be the quick placement of a stabilization ground force into Kosovo, into the region, primarily the capital, Pristina. If that is not done, the goals of the airstrikes can not have been fulfilled in my opinion.
  • WELLSTONE - DEVELOPMENTS IN KOSOVO (Senate - October 08, 1998) [Page: S11901] I am disappointed that the Senate has not brought a resolution to the floor and had a debate about what our response should be as a Nation to what is happening in Kosovo. If the killing resumes or if Milosevic prevents relief from getting to the displaced Kosovars and fails to comply with the UN resolution and the demands of the international community, we may have to resort to military action.
  • SENATE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 125--EXPRESSING THE OPPOSITION OF CONGRESS TO ANY DEPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES GROUND FORCES IN KOSOVO (Senate - October 08, 1998) [Page: S11991] Congress hereby expresses its opposition to any deployment of United States ground forces into the Serbian province of Kosovo for peacemaking or peacekeeping purposes.
  • DOMENICI - KOSOVO AND MILITARY READINESS (Senate - October 07, 1998) [Page: S11644] I wish to be very clear. Developments in Kosovo may compel the United States and our allies to intervene. However, this intervention should not be paid for by further hollowing out of the Armed Forces.
  • McCAIN -- CONCERN ABOUT THE DEVELOPMENTS IN KOSOVO (Senate - October 07, 1998) [Page: S11651] While I am inclined to support military action, I understand the basis for my colleagues' reservations, and I believe it is imperative that prior to ordering any military strike on Serbia you take all necessary steps to ensure both Congress and the American people that the action is necessary, affordable, and designed to achieve clearly defined goals.
  • DeWINE - VIOLENCE IN KOSOVO (Senate - October 06, 1998) [Page: S11529] I believe we cannot escape the fact that, in the short term, some form of NATO or United Nations presence on the ground will be needed to police any cease fire or withdrawal, or to ensure the transport of needed food, medical and other supplies to the refugees. In addition, war crime investigators will need to be able to determine the actual atrocities committed and who is responsible.
  • SKAGGS - CONGRESS MAINTAINS POWER TO DECLARE WAR (House of Representatives - October 05, 1998) [Page: H9350] Unfortunately, the history of the post World War II era in the United States is a history of the disuse and the disregard of this very important responsibility provided for in the Constitution and assigned to the Congress. Basically we have had a succession of Presidents who have asserted an ever broader definition of their exclusive authority to initiate military action.
  • DUNCAN - AMERICA SHOULD NOT RUSH TO WAR (House of Representatives - October 05, 1998) [Page: H9508] We should be very careful about rushing to war in Kosovo. NATO's plans are directed less at resolving the Kosovo crisis than at making the about-to-be expanded alliance look relevant. In Belgrade, bombing will strengthen the hard men around Milosevic and sound the death knell of the brave Serbs who dare to oppose him.
  • WARNER - KOSOVO (Senate - October 02, 1998) [Page: S11328] Never should the United Nations be put in the position, nor NATO allow itself to be put in a position, where the United Nations has a veto power over the decisionmaking of NATO. But I think the annunciations by the Security Council recently give adequate cover for those nations who wish to collectively act, if necessary, to back up their diplomacy with military action. I support the use of force if diplomacy fails, and that is a tough position to take, because I have had grave reservations through these many years about our continued participation and expenditure and deployment of troops in Bosnia.
  • MILITARY ACTION AGAINST YUGOSLAVIA REQUIRES AUTHORITY FROM CONGRESS (House of Representatives - October 01, 1998) [Page: H9193] I want to remind my colleagues that under our Constitution, Congress has the responsibility to decide whether America goes to war, even a limited war. It may well be that if this body voted on military action against Yugoslavia, we would support it overwhelmingly. But there is no doubt in my mind that attacks by U.S. forces, whether under NATO or not, against a sovereign nation, even if it is Milosevic's Yugoslavia, constitute an act of war.
  • ENGEL - CRISIS IN KOSOVO (House of Representatives - October 01, 1998) [Page: H9212] We need to have immediate NATO air strikes on Serbian positions in Kosovo so that the innocent civilians will not continued to be slaughtered.
  • ROBERTS - KOSOVO (Senate - September 30, 1998) [Page: S11146] The attack plan calls for U.S. cruise missiles to be launched first against Serb military targets in Kosovo; then, if needed, NATO would mount a wider air campaign outside Kosovo against security facilities in Serbia.
  • McCONNELL - CATASTROPHE IN KOSOVO (Senate - September 24, 1998) [Page: S10901] What Milosevic and his mafia have figured out is--we bluster and threaten, we issue ultimatums and condemnations, but the policy is hollow, the threats are empty, the show is a charade.
  • McCAIN - THE SITUATION IN KOSOVO (Senate - September 23, 1998) [Page: S10796] By conducting that aerial show of force back in June without following-through, and by repeatedly allowing the regime of Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic to employ his tactics from Bosnia of professing compliance with United Nations demands one day only to return to his policy of ethnic cleansing the next, the United Nations has failed to accomplish the overriding goal for which it was created: the resolution of conflict.
  • WELLSTONE - KOSOVO (Senate - September 23, 1998) [Page: S10829] . Unless immediate and determined action by the U.S. and our western allies is taken to address this situation, it is clear we will begin to face a catastrophic loss of civilian lives with the onset of winter in the region as early as mid-October.
  • SMITH - ATROCITIES IN KOSOVO - (Extension of Remarks - September 18, 1998) [Page: E1765] We all learned from the Bosnian conflict that diplomacy alone will not work. Nor will more and more humanitarian assistance, as welcomed as such help might be. Decisive outside intervention is what is required, and NATO is the most likely organization to do this.
  • BEREUTER - H. Con. Res. 304 SENSE OF THE CONGRESS REGARDING SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC (House of Representatives - September 14, 1998) [Page: H7649] Expressing the sense of the Congress regarding the culpability of Slobodan Milosevic for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide in the former Yugoslavia, and for other purposes.
  • GILMAN - S. Con. Res. 105 SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC (House of Representatives - September 14, 1998) [Page: H7674] Expressing the sense of the Congress regarding the culpability of Slobodan Milosevic for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide in the former Yugoslavia, and for other purposes.
  • WARNER - KOSOVO (Senate - September 03, 1998) [Page: S9929] In my view, the short time between now and winter, will not permit a solution that will embrace a form of limited government acceptable to Belgrade. That must come in time, but for the present, we must get a framework solution for the refugee relief program.
  • ROBERTS - U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN KOSOVO (Senate - July 20, 1998) [Page: S8552] I think the United States and the rest of our allies in Western Europe are on the verge of a deep and expensive and very dangerous involvement in yet another area of the Balkans. I think you could probably make a case for our involvement in Kosovo, but I have yet to hear from anybody in the administration other than reacting to news accounts or to questions. On the other side of it, we don't want to back into a situation where there is no end in sight, no exit strategy, and no real consideration in terms of cost and involvement.
  • D'AMATO - SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE CULPABILITY OF SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC FOR WAR CRIMES (Senate - July 17, 1998) [Page: S8456] What we do today is the least we should be doing; and that is calling for the United States to utilize the provisions that the United Nations set up in terms of Security Council Resolution 827 creating the International Criminal Tribunal.
  • D'AMATO - SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC IS A CRIMINAL (Senate - July 17, 1998) [Page: S8448] The situation is deteriorating. And behind it all, the motivator, the prime mover in all of this, is one man. That doesn't mean that there aren't others who are responsible on all of the sides for having had their people undertake horrific acts against humanity. But there is one person--a hard-core Communist dictator who has been able to keep power by way of appealing to the worst prejudices of people--by the name of Slobodan Milosevic.
  • LEVIN - NEED FOR ACTION ON KOSOVO (Senate - July 08, 1998) [Page: S7677] I applaud NATO's decision to conduct an air exercise in Albania and Macedonia to demonstrate its capability to project power rapidly in the region. I regret that Russian President Yeltsin was unable to gain Milosevic's commitment to withdraw Serbian special units from Kosovo, when they met in Moscow on June 16. Milosevic has already defaulted on his commitment to President Yeltsin to carry out no repressive actions against civilians.
  • D'AMATO - SENATE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 105--EXPRESSING THE SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE CULPABILITY OF SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC FOR WAR CRIMES IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (Senate - June 24, 1998) [Page: S7019] I submit a resolution that calls for President Slobodan Milosevic of the rump Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to be indicted publicly by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (the War Crimes Tribunal), under its jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide committed on the territory of the former Yugoslavia on or after January 1, 1991.
  • BIDEN - RESOLUTION OF THE KOSOVO PROBLEM (Senate - June 17, 1998) [Page: S6462] I would use force to stop massacres of innocent civilians. I would use force to prevent cross-border invasions. I would use peacekeepers backed up by force to guarantee the rights of minorities. But I would not risk American lives in a cause of a `greater Albania' which would probably destroy the Macedonian state and set off a chain reaction of incalculable proportions in the south Balkans. On the other hand, I cannot imagine asking the Kosovars to accept a return to the pre-1989 autonomy with Serbia. Therefore, my own preference as a political goal would be giving Kosovo full republic status within the Yugoslav federation, on an equal footing with Serbia and Montenegro.
  • REPORT CONCERNING THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA (SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO) IN RESPONSE TO THE SITUATION IN KOSOVO--MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT--PM 139 (Senate - June 11, 1998) [Page: S6178]
  • IMPOSITION OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ON REPUBLICS OF YUGOSLAVIA, SERBIA, AND MONTENEGRO--MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (H. DOC. NO. 105-273) (House of Representatives - June 11, 1998) [Page: H4484]
  • ENGEL - KOSOVA (House of Representatives - June 05, 1998) [Page: H4232] We must strike with NATO air strikes. Today Serbian tanks and artillery are leveling villages, setting houses ablaze, and slaughtering innocent civilians. We should now utilize our assets in the region by destroying these weapons of war in the field and as they sit in their staging compounds. We must declare a no-fly zone over Kosova.
  • HAMILTON - U.S. POLICY ON KOSOVO (Extension of Remarks - May 12, 1998) [Page: E825] ... it is also necessary to make clear to the leaders of the Kosovo Albanians and to the Albanian people of Kosovo in general that the United States and its partners in the contact group do not support independence of Kosovo as a realistic solution to this crisis.
  • BIDEN - CALLING FOR AN END TO THE VIOLENT REPRESSION OF THE PEOPLE OF KOSOVO (Senate - March 18, 1998) [Page: S2203] - The United States in concert with its allies must act immediately to prevent a resumption of the brutal repression of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and to get real--not sham--negotiations started.
  • NICKLES - SENATE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 85--CALLING FOR AN END TO THE VIOLENT REPRESSION OF THE PEOPLE OF KOSOVO (Senate - March 18, 1998) Pursuant to the terms set forth by the Contact Group, the United States should demand that the Serbian government and the ethnic Albanian leadership and the representatives of all ethnic and religious groups in Kosovo immediately begin unconditional talks to achieve a peaceful resolution to the conflict in Kosovo and to provide for the exercise of the legitimate civil and political rights of all persons in Kosovo.
  • One Balkan Quagmire Is Enough KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, MAR. 13, 1998 - The administration's response to the crisis in the Balkans has been consistent with the Clinton Doctrine, which calls for decisive action with overwhelming American force only where our national security interests are poorly defined or nonexistent, as in Somalia and Haiti. In contrast, where the U.S. does face a clear threat to its longstanding interests--as in the case of North Korea's development of nuclear weapons or Saddam Hussein's saber-rattling--the Clinton Doctrine dictates cutting a deal and declaring victory, preferably with the help of the United Nations. As Congress considers additional funding for the mission in Bosnia, it should insist that the U.S. not add Kosovo to the long list of far-off places where American forces are present but American interests are absent.
  • GILMAN - H. Con. Res. 235 CALLING FOR AN END TO VIOLENT REPRESSION OF LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE OF KOSOVA (House of Representatives - March 17, 1998) [Page: H1201] With this resolution, Congress places on the record its concern over the worsening situation in Kosova and points to constructive measures that could lead to an improvement. In particular, the resolution urges all parties to refrain from violence.



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