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Military Options for Overthrowing Castro

Fidel Castro is in good health, and his family has a history of longevity. Consequently, there was little discussion of regime change scenarios during the 1990s. There were few foreseeable situations in which Cuba could present a threat to the US greater than migration pressures. Barring Castro's accidental death, security and economic stability (albeit at low levels) were regarded as well within the regime's grasp.

During his tenure in power, Castro prevented the growth of democracy or an open economic system on the island. Cuba's political stability has remained constant for decades, with small periods of unrest during times of economic stress (the 1980 Mariel boatlift, the 1994 migration crisis). But the stability is a strained one, backed up by the communist regime's willingness to use repression and force.

The Clinton Adminstration's policy towards Cuba was to "enable a peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba" or to "hasten a peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba."

On 06 May 2002 Secretary Of State Colin L. Powell said Cuba "cannot remain forever the sole holdout from the hemisphere's march of democracy." The regime of Cuban dictator Fidel Castro "makes a mockery of freedom," he charged. "It impoverishes the Cuban people. As President Bush has said on many occasions, our goal is to promote a rapid, peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba. The people of Cuba deserve no less." On 10 October 2003 President Bush returned to the somewhat softer Clinton formula, when he announced several new initiatives "intended to hasten the arrival of a new, free, democratic Cuba."

Transition Scenarios

Should Castro be removed from the equation, stability will be determined by the ability of a credible successor to take power and maintain institutional continuity.

A military coup against Fidel by is practically impossible, given the organizational structure of the armed forces and the effectiveness of Cuban counterintelligence. Elimination of Castro by assassination is also improbable, given the tight security surrounding him.

The assassination of Castro, or the decision by the US to force him out of office, could turn Cuba into the bloodiest flashpoint in the region.

His departure could lead to demands for an end to US sanctions. Castro's death could lead to a violent struggle for power, provoking massive migration and involving Cuban exiles from the US, as well as demands for US intervention.

Castro's Cuba seems to be rather similar to Romania under Nicolae Ceauçescu. Many observers suggest that Cuba's Communist system cannot, survive the death of 77-year-old Fidel Castro. There is almost universal uncertainty among Cubans concerning the issue of political succession. Everyone, from the regime's strongest supporters to its harshest critics, has no clear idea as to what would follow Fidel Castro.

Initially there was little indication that Castro has groomed anyone as a successor, though by 2001 it was clear that he had designated brother Raul to govern in the event of his demise. Chances for change under Raul are slim, though a period of instability can be expected from his brother's departure, be it natural or violent. Yet even Fidel Castro's death by accident or illness might not cause a major crisis, given the inherent stability of the regime. Raul Castro would most likely assume office, and maintain order for several years. Castro's appointed successor, his 72-year-old younger brother Raul, lacks the ability, the health and even the ambition to be more than a brief "transition" figure. There seems to be broad agreement that Raul Castro cannot fill his older brother's shoes. Indeed, Raul seems to be in poorer health and may depart from the scene before Fidel.

The Armed Forces constitute the most effective institution in modern Cuba. The military would be the pivotal institution, providing a substantial stabilizing influence on any regime change, and other government institutions would most likely also survive initial reorganizations. Given recent commercial experiences, the leadership of the Armed Forces may look favorably on a further opening towards capitalism after the death of Fidel Castro. The military leadership might reach agreements with the US and the less bellicose sectors of the Cuban exile community to structure a peaceful transition in order to justify the end of the Cuban blockade and normalize relations with the US.

A less likely trantionsional scenario suggests that Fidel Castro's death will bring about a collapse of the system, civil war and chaos. After the death of Fidel Castro, civil war nay errupt around Cuba. Castro's successors, in a move widely seen as repeating the use of the "migration bomb" against President Carter during the Mariel Boat Lift of 1980 and President Clinton in August 1994, may announce that the government would not interfere with persons who wished to leave Cuba by sea.

Wild-card scenarios involve a peaceful (but unstable and unpredictable) transition to another communist party leader after a power struggle; peaceful transition to an opposition political party acceptable to all; and a less than peaceful transition with interference from the emigré community in Miami.

US Policy Choices

The degree of stability would depend in part on the reaction of the US to events in Cuba. Distrust of US and of Cuban exile intentions remains strong in Cuba, and Cuban perceptions of US reaction -- as being either hostile or constructive -- will be particularly important.

The position taken by countries considered friendly to Cuba, such as Canada and Mexico, could be especially influential in determining the level of post-Castro stability in Cuba. Should the communist regime disintegrate, the new leaders would most likely seek technical support from socialist parties in Mexico or Spain (but not from the US) in order to regain stability and reform the government. Conflicting views about how to deal with Cuba are one of the principal differences in the foreign policies of the US, Canada, and Mexico. US attempts to pressure and isolate Castro have constantly been countered by Canadian and Mexican diplomatic and economic policies perceived by Washington as support for Havana. While all three countries have the same goal of democratic reform in Cuba, Canada and Mexico believe active engagement is a more effective means of achieving that goal than are sanctions and pressure. Their reaction to US intervention in internal conflict in Cuba is difficult to gauge, but it would be met at the least by diplomatic silence and at the worst by linkage to trade issues and condemnation in international forums. Thus, what to do with Castro is possibly the most divisive regional issue affecting the three countries, and is likely to remain so for the foreseeable future.

US policy choices will make the situation better or worse, even if unintentionally. US reaction (indifference, diplomatic engagement, or intervention) would dictate the level of crisis, because Cuba would react to US action, rejecting any overtures and blaming instability on the US.

Party elites have not received any clear, unmistakable pledges of non-retribution. They are concerned that US policies of economic denial geared to bring down the entire apparatus, not just the diehard Stalinists. These policies are interpreted as intending to destroy everyone ever associated with the regime. Ordinary citizens are not looking forward to ending four decades of revolution only to fall into the hands of extremists and arrivistes from the other end of the spectrum.

The primary concern in any scenario involving Castro's abrupt departure would be dramatically increased instability. Specifically, deteriorating conditions would increase the poverty and misery on the island; increased repression or the start of a civil war would spark massive migration (most of it to the US) as well as increased pressure on the US to intervene.

Any dramatic increase in instability is cause for concern, because it could lead to pressure from human rights groups demanding aid for refugees; anti-Castro groups demanding direct military intervention; and regional organizations and neighboring nations in general demanding intervention or non-intervention, depending on how close each is to the problem.

In the event of crisis, the emigré population in the US and neighboring Caribbean nations will demand a US response. Castro's death, whenever it may occur, will elicit a response from a sizable exile community. Many of the nearly one million Cuban exiles believe that this single event will be the signal that the Revolution has collapsed. The nature of the US involvement would be determined by reactions to the method of Castro's departure from the scene.

As of 2001, there were 5,911 certified claims for expropriated property in Cuba filed with the US Foreign Settlement Claims Commission. Calculated at a simple 6 percent annual rate of interest [the rate authorized by the Commission], Cuba owes uncompensated American property owners something like $6.4 billion. The Cuban exile community has spent over four decades waiting for the death of Fidel Castro and a chance to reclaim family businesses in Cuba. The Cuban exile community may organize a massive reverse boatlift, claiming to be the the legitimate government of Cuba, inviting the US to send military assistance. The possiblity that exiles will return demanding the return to the homes were they live at present is a declining issue, and the Helms-Burton legislation explicitly excludes them. Cuban regime propaganda has exploited -- very effectively it appears -- the frequent claims of exiles for the return of their previous homes to threaten those occupying them at present.

US naval and air support of the various pro-democracy forces could involve naval and marine air power and naval bombardment. This would expose US pilots to risk. It could level the playing field, giving the pro-democracy emigre forces a good fighting chance but would not guarantee their victory.

A US invasion would involve US Marines already on the island at Guantanamo Bay Naval base as well as airborne troops from offshore. It could need 60,000 or more US troops. It would be a major commitment on the level of the US activity in the Second Gulf War of 2003.

With normalization of relations and travel restrictions lifted, there would be more than 50 flights a day from Florida to Cuba, up from the present 25 - 30 flights per week from Florida, New York and California. There could be approximately 1 to 2 million visitors per year from Florida to the Island, an estimate that does not include cruise ship passengers or foreign tourists visiting Florida and Cuba. With normalization, foreign trade between Cuba and Florida could reach $5 to $6 billion dollars annually.