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Apache Wars - 1865-1886

During the Apache Wars of 1865 to 1886, rRule of law, economic resources, and social structure too slowly followed the fast-paced western expansion, creating a security vacuum on the western frontier that affected both Indians and settlers. The US Army, victorious in the Civil War, was tasked with simultaneous stabilization of the frontier, and reconstruction of southern states. The small, overstretched US Army became not so much a little army as a big police force.

In many ways, the label ‘Apache’ was as ambiguous as the label ‘American’ during the Apache Wars, with one major difference. Like their American counterparts, Apaches shared a common language, and had similar customs and values. For the Apache, family was the most important social group. The Apache family structure was matriarchal; young men would join their wife’s family upon marriage. Multiple families joined into local groups, which organized primarily for common interests, such as hunting and gathering. Likewise, local groups formed into larger bands, primarily based on proximity. Generally, bands occupied a distinct geographic region, such as the Dragoon Mountains, or Tonto Basin. Multiple bands in contiguous geographic areas formed into tribes. The four major tribes of Apaches were the Mescaleros, Jicarillos, Chiricahuas, and Western Apaches, although many different systems of classification have been used for the Apaches.

The Apache sense of honor and loyalty came from duty to the family. The individual Apache simply did not consider decisions at the tribe, band, or even local group level as binding. The only important Apache social organization was the family. As a result, the broader American concept of loyalty to social organizations was perpetually misplaced upon the Apache, and created uncertainty and anger during the Apache Wars. Apache custom required family members to avenge the death of their kin, so violent retribution on behalf of the raided led to a cycle of violence.

Warfare for the Apaches was also a way of life. By 1700, lands inhabited by Apache tribes, called Apacheria, were threatened by the Spanish to the south, the powerful Comanches to the northeast, the Pueblos and Utes to the north, and the Pimas, Opatas, Seris, and Tarahumaras to the south.60 Consequently, the Apaches became excellent warriors. The warriors chose leaders based on military effectiveness and bravery, and had no fixed allegiance. So, in warfare, the loss of a leader was unlikely to end a conflict. The nomadic lifestyle of the Apaches, coupled with abundant food sources throughout the region, refuted the common Indian tactic of destroying villages. And, finally, the enduring existence of war made the warriors extremely cunning, capable of enduring extreme hardships, and cruel. The Apaches also considered themselves a chosen people, and consequently had little regard for non-Apaches.

The War Department published one influential manual that assisted troopers during the Apache insurgencies, The Prairie Traveler, by CPT Randolph Barnes Marcy. The Prairie Traveler covered essential field craft specific to operations on the frontier, such as fording rivers, packing mules, and jerking meat. Marcy drew comparisons from Turkey’s experiences in Algeria to the Army’s situation on the frontier. Marcy advocated attacking Indians in their camps and destroying their economic resources. On warfare with the Indians, Marcy was critical of conventional tactics:

“To act against an enemy who is here to-day and there to-morrow; who at one time stampedes a herd of mules upon the head waters of the Arkansas, and when next heard from is in the very heart of the populated districts of Mexico, laying waste haciendas, and carrying devastation, rapine, and murder in his steps; who is every where without being any where; who assembles at the moment of combat, and vanishes whenever fortune turns against him; who leaves his women and children far distant from the theater of hostilities, and has neither towns or magazines to defend, nor lines of retreat to cover; who derives his commissariat from the country he operates in, and is not encumbered with baggage wagons or pack-trains; who comes into action only when it suits his purposes, and never without the advantage of numbers or position-with such an enemy the strategic science of civilized nations loses much of its importance, and finds but rarely, and only in peculiar localities, an opportunity to be put in practice.”

The Western Apache’s compliance was so complete that, after subjugation, they provided indispensable assistance to the US Army in countering the Chiricahua insurgencies. Excepting a breakout of renegades in 1874, which was defeated in the same manner as in 1872-1873, the Western Apaches did not fight in significant numbers again. In contrast, the Chiricahua Apaches continued an insurgency for over twenty-five years against US rule, caused mainly by negligent US policy, and the lack of security provided by the US Government.

The official history of conflict between the Chiricahua Apaches and the US started with Brigadier General Stephen W. Kearney’s bloodless seizure of New Mexico in August 1846. From 1879 through 1886, the US Army fought almost continuously against Chiricahua bands under Victorio and then Geronimo. In October 1880, Victorio was cornered by a combined US-Mexico effort, and his band of Mimbres Chiricahuas was destroyed. In September 1882, Brigadier General George Crook, an experienced Indian fighter with experience against the Sioux and Apache Indians, reported to New Mexico to counter the insurgency. Crook’s resultant ‘Sierra Madre’ campaign was relatively efficient. d, Crook personally led 193 Apache scouts, one cavalry troop of 42 troopers and 2 officers, and a pack train of 350 mules into Mexico and tracked down Geronimo’s 325 Chiricahuas and made peace bloodlessly. Crook ensured security by instituting reforms that addressed the Chiricahua grievances.

In 1885, the lack of social development for the Chiricahuas again created discontent on the San Carlos reservation. Geronimo and his Chiricahuas yet again departed the reservation for Mexico, committing depredations along the way. General Crook used the same techniques to end the final Apache insurgency. Finally arranging a meeting with Geronimo in Mexico, Crook convinced him to surrender. Unfortunately, Geronimo was deceived on the way back to San Carlos by a liquor trader, and again fled to Mexico. Geronimo surrendered at Skeleton Canyon on September 3, 1886, and began the long trek into captivity in Florida.

Crook’s Tonto Basin Campaign forced the Western Apaches onto reservations where he encouraged social and economic development. The lack of consistent US policy regarding Chiricahua land, most notably in the frequent shifting of reservations, amplified the social difficulties that led to sustained Chiricahua insurgencies.