Weapons Acquisitions: Guided Weapon Plans Need to Be Reassessed (Chapter Report, 12/09/98, GAO/NSIAD-99-32)
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined the Department of
Defense's (DOD) major guided weapon programs, focusing on whether: (1)
the services' plans for developing or procuring guided weapons can be
carried out as proposed within relatively fixed defense budgets; (2) the
number of guided weapons the services plan to buy is consistent with
projected threats and modernization needs; (3) the current and planned
guided weapon programs duplicate or overlap each other; and (4) DOD is
providing effective oversight in the development and procurement of deep
attack weapons.
GAO noted that: (1) DOD's planned increase in procurement spending for
guided weapons is based on overly optimistic funding projections; (2) to
acquire all the guided weapons now planned over the next 10 years, DOD
plans to spend more than twice as much as it has on average between
fiscal years 1993 and 1997; (3) without an increase in overall defense
spending, increased resources may not be available as expected; (4) for
the past several years, DOD has been unable to increase its procurement
budgets as planned, and other programs could more than absorb any
available increases; (5) while DOD has enough deep attack weapons in its
inventory today to meet national objectives, the services plan to add
158,800 additional guided weapons to the inventory; (6) each of the new
weapons has been justified by the services on a case-by-case basis and
is projected to provide significant advantages in accuracy, lethality,
delivery vehicle safety, and control of unintended damage; (7) in
calculating the number of weapons needed, the services use assumptions
which overstate the potential threat and target base; (8) as a result,
the quantity requirements for guided weapons appear to be inflated,
particularly in today's budgetary and security environment; (9) when
reviewing the services' planned programs in the aggregate, GAO found:
(a) widespread overlap and duplication of guided weapon types and
capabilities; (b) questionable quantities being procured for each target
class; and (c) a preference for longer standoff and more accurate
weapons when other options may be as effective and less costly; (10) in
contrast, DOD's Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study and Quadrennial Defense
Review suggested only minor changes in guided weapon programs and did
not address possible instances of duplication and overlap; (11) GAO
believes that DOD does not yet have a sound basis to ensure that it has
the proper and cost-effective mix of deep attack weapon programs; (12)
DOD's oversight of the services' guided weapons programs has not
prevented inflated requirements or program overlap and duplication; (13)
the central oversight bodies and mechanisms already in place do not
address requirements and capabilities on an aggregate basis and have had
a very limited effect on guided weapon programs; and (14) some DOD
officials believe improved oversight is needed, and a proposal is under
consideration to expand the purview of the Joint Tactical Air-To-Air
Missile Office to include the coordination of air-to-ground weapon
requirements and programs.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: NSIAD-99-32
TITLE: Weapons Acquisitions: Guided Weapon Plans Need to Be
Reassessed
DATE: 12/09/98
SUBJECT: Missiles
Redundancy
Air warfare
Procurement planning
Defense capabilities
Military procurement
Weapons systems
Weapons research and development
Military cost control
Military budgets
IDENTIFIER: DOD Quadrennial Defense Review
DOD Future Years Defense Program
AGM-130 Missile
ALCM
DOD Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study
Tomahawk Cruise Missile
Standoff Land Attack Missile
Joint Direct Attack Munition
Wind Corrected Munitions Dispenser
Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile
Joint Standoff Weapon
Air Launched Cruise Missile
SLAM
JDAM
JASSAM
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Cover
================================================================ COVER
Report to Congressional Requesters
December 1998
WEAPONS ACQUISITIONS - GUIDED
WEAPON PLANS NEED TO BE REASSESSED
GAO/NSIAD-99-32
Weapons Acquisitions
(707274)
Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV
AGM - Air-to-Ground Guided Missile
ATACMS - Army Tactical Missile System
BAT - Brilliant Anti-Armor Submunition
BLU - Bomb/Live Unit
CALCM - Conventional Air-Launched Cruise Missile
CEM - combined effects munition
CINC - Commander in Chief
DIA - Defense Intelligence Agency
DOD - Department of Defense
GAM - GPS-Aided Munition
GBU - Guided Bomb Unit
GPS - Global Positioning System
HARM - High Speed Antiradiation Missile
JASSM - Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile
JCS - Joint Chiefs of Staff
JDAM - Joint Direct Attack Munition
JROC - Joint Requirements Oversight Council
JSOW - Joint Standoff Weapon
SFW - Sensor Fuzed Weapon
SLAM - Standoff Land Attack Missile
SLAM-ER - Standoff Land Attack Missile-Expanded Response
TASM - Tomahawk Anti-Ship Missile
TLAM - Tomahawk Land Attack Missile
WCMD - Wind-Corrected Munitions Dispenser
Letter
=============================================================== LETTER
B-278306
December 9, 1998
The Honorable C.W. Bill Young
Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
The Honorable Curt Weldon
Chairman, Subcommittee on Military
Research and Development
Committee on National Security
House of Representatives
As you requested, this report addresses the affordability and
cost-effectiveness of guided weapons currently in development and
production. We have concluded that the acquisition plans for guided
weapons are based on optimistic funding projections, guided weapon
requirements appear to be inflated, there is a proliferation of
guided weapon capabilities and acquisition programs, and oversight of
guided weapon requirements and acquisition programs needs
improvement. The report makes a number of recommendations to the
Secretary of Defense, including one to reevaluate the planned deep
attack weapon acquisition programs in light of existing capabilities
and the current budgetary and security environment.
We are sending copies of this report to the other defense committees
and subcommittees; the Secretaries of Defense, the Army, the Air
Force, and the Navy; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; the
Director, Office of Management and Budget; and other interested
parties. We will also make copies available to others upon request.
Please call me at (202) 512-4841 if you or your staff have any
questions concerning this report. Major contributors to this report
are listed in appendix II.
Louis J. Rodrigues
Director, Defense Acquisitions Issues
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
============================================================ Chapter 0
PURPOSE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1
Over the next 10 years--from fiscal year 1998 to 2007--the Department
of Defense (DOD) plans to invest about $16.6 billion (then-year
dollars) to procure guided weapons that can be used for deep attack
missions.\1 Concerned about the affordability and cost-effectiveness
of guided weapons currently under development and in production, the
Chairmen of the National Security Subcommittee, House Committee on
Appropriations, and of the Subcommittee on Military Research and
Development, House Committee on National Security, requested that GAO
examine major guided weapon programs. Specifically, the Chairmen
requested that GAO determine whether (1) the services' plans for
developing and/or procuring guided weapons can be carried out as
proposed within relatively fixed defense budgets, (2) the number of
guided weapons the services plan to buy is consistent with projected
threats and modernization needs, (3) the current and planned guided
weapon programs duplicate or overlap each other, and (4) DOD is
providing effective oversight in the development and procurement of
deep attack weapons.
--------------------
\1 Deep attack missions are operations carried out beyond the areas
where friendly ground forces operate.
BACKGROUND
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2
Guided weapons can be delivered more accurately to a target than
unguided weapons because they have the capability for in-flight
guidance correction. The choice of a specific guided weapon depends
on the type of target, the target's distance from the launching
platform, and the target's location.
Following the Persian Gulf War, DOD identified a number of
improvements to its weapons that could increase the effectiveness of
U.S. forces. These improvements were needed to ensure target
destruction and yet minimize the number of missions and weapons used,
unwanted collateral damage, and exposure of friendly aircraft to
enemy defenses. Thus, in the 1990s, the services initiated several
programs to upgrade existing weapons and produce new guided weapons.
The acquisition programs now underway are expected to cost about
$16.6 billion (then-year dollars) from fiscal
year 1998 to 2007. These programs would almost double the existing
inventory of guided weapons through the acquisition of 158,800 new
guided weapons. For about 127,000 of the new guided weapons to be
acquired, a guidance kit will be added to an existing unguided
weapon.
In 1997, DOD released the results of a congressionally directed study
on the size and mix of its deep attack weapons and subsequently
issued its Quadrennial Defense Review, which based its
recommendations on the study's results.
RESULTS IN BRIEF
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3
DOD's planned increase in procurement spending for guided weapons is
based on overly optimistic funding projections. To acquire all the
guided weapons now planned over the next 10 years, DOD plans to spend
more than twice as much as it has on average between fiscal year 1993
and 1997. Without an increase in overall defense spending, increased
resources may not be available as expected.\2
In addition, for the past several years DOD has been unable to
increase its procurement budgets as planned, and other programs, such
as tactical aircraft, could more than absorb any available
increases.\3 Further, with rapid advances in weapons technology, more
capable weapons are expected to be available in the coming years and
will probably compete for the same resources. In the past, such
resource conflicts were resolved by stretching out planned
production, thus increasing unit costs and delaying deliveries.
While DOD has enough deep attack weapons (guided and unguided) in its
inventory today to meet current national objectives, the services
plan to add 158,800 additional guided weapons to the current
inventory. Each of the new weapons has been justified by the
services on a case-by-case basis and is projected to provide
significant advantages in accuracy, lethality, delivery vehicle
safety, and/or control of unintended damage. However, it is
difficult to understand DOD's rationale for doubling its inventory of
guided weapons in today's budgetary and security environment.
Further, in calculating the number of weapons needed, the services
use assumptions that overstate the potential threat and target base.
As a result, the quantity requirements for guided weapons appear to
be inflated, particularly in today's budgetary and security
environment.
Most of the weapon types being developed or improved are unique to
each service. Further, when reviewing the services' currently
planned programs in the aggregate, GAO found (1) widespread overlap
and duplication of guided weapon types and capabilities, (2)
questionable quantities being procured for each target class, and (3)
a preference for longer standoff\4 and more accurate weapons when
other options may be as effective and less costly. In contrast,
DOD's Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study and Quadrennial Defense Review
suggested only minor changes in guided weapon programs and did not
address possible instances of duplication and overlap. GAO believes
that DOD does not yet have a sound basis to ensure that it has the
proper and cost-effective mix of deep attack weapon programs. While
the Deep Attack Study was certainly a step in the right direction,
independent reviewers of the study both within and outside the
services have criticized its methodology and cite its reliance on
computer models that have significant shortcomings.
DOD's oversight of the services' guided weapons programs has not
prevented, among other things, inflated requirements or program
overlap and duplication. Lacking an analysis of overall deep attack
capabilities, including the incremental contribution of each new
weapon, acquisition programs have proliferated and quantities have
been overstated. The central oversight bodies and mechanisms already
in place do not address requirements and capabilities on an aggregate
basis and have had a very limited effect on guided weapon programs.
No office is responsible for reviewing the services' aggregate needs
and capabilities of guided weapons programs. The Office of the
Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff currently examine
programs on a case-by-case basis but mostly defer to the services'
requirements processes. Therefore, each of the services has
justified unique weapons with relatively low production rates, thus
increasing acquisition and logistics costs and inhibiting
interoperability. Some DOD officials believe improved oversight is
needed, and a proposal is under consideration to expand the purview
of the Joint Tactical Air-to-Air Missile Office to include the
coordination of air-to-ground weapon requirements and programs.
Expanding the Air-to-Air Office's purview should, in GAO's view,
provide some assurance that decisions in the deep attack area have
been assessed from the perspective of the services' combined
requirements, capabilities, and acquisition plans.
--------------------
\2 Future Years Defense Program: DOD's 1998 Plan Has Substantial
Risks in Execution (GAO/NSIAD-98-26, Oct. 23, 1997).
\3 Aircraft Acquisition: Affordability of DOD's Investment Strategy
(GAO/NSIAD-97-88, Sept. 8, 1997).
\4 Standoff range is the distance between the weapon launcher and the
target.
PRINCIPAL FINDINGS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4
ACQUISITION PLANS FOR GUIDED
WEAPONS BASED ON OPTIMISTIC
FUNDING PROJECTIONS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.1
According to the fiscal year 1999 Future Years Defense Program and
longer term program plans, planned annual expenditures for guided
weapon procurement are slated to increase from about $775 million in
fiscal year 1998 to more than $2 billion in fiscal year 2003. From
fiscal
year 1998 to 2007, planned annual expenditures for guided weapon
procurement will average about $1.7 billion. Such expenditures would
be more than twice the average annual expenditures for such weapons
over the past 5 fiscal years. GAO believes these cost projections
are conservative because historically, acquisition programs have
typically experienced cost growth of 20 percent or more.\5 At the
same time, other proposed major guided weapon procurement programs,
if approved, could compete for the same resources.
This increase in guided weapon procurement funding is planned as
other major procurement programs are also forecasting major
increases. However, the overall defense budget is expected to remain
relatively constant in real dollars, and DOD's infrastructure
reductions have not yet generated the savings expected to fund the
increased weapons procurement. GAO believes there will be a major
imbalance between the funds needed and the funds likely to be
available for DOD's planned procurement programs, including the
guided weapon programs. In the past, funding shortfalls have been
dealt with by reducing annual procurement quantities and stretching
out programs. However, this has significantly increased the unit
cost of weapons and delayed deliveries. Of particular concern is
DOD's possible inability to start procurement of weapons with
potentially revolutionary capabilities because of excessive
commitments to older weapon programs.
--------------------
\5 The services are attempting to manage cost growth through
initiatives such as "cost as an independent variable." We have not
evaluated the effectiveness of these initiatives.
DOD GUIDED WEAPON
REQUIREMENTS APPEAR INFLATED
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.2
While DOD has enough deep attack weapons in its inventory today to
meet current national objectives, the services plan to add 158,800
guided weapons to the inventory. Each program has been justified by
the services on a case-by-case basis, but in the aggregate, DOD has
not demonstrated the overall cost-effectiveness of almost doubling
the total quantities of guided weapons. In today's budgetary and
security environment, it is difficult to understand the rationale for
DOD's guided weapon plans.
In a 1997 report, GAO discussed the use and effectiveness of guided
and unguided weapons and other aspects of the air campaign during the
Persian Gulf War.\6 Neither guided nor unguided weapons were as
effective as expected because, among other things (1) higher altitude
deliveries were used, (2) aircraft sensors had inherent limitations
in identifying and acquiring targets, (3) DOD failed to gather
intelligence information on some critical targets, and (4) DOD was
unable to collect and disseminate timely battle damage assessments.
Since the War, DOD has undertaken initiatives to address many of
these problems, including the development of specific design features
of new guided weapons. However, the effectiveness of these
initiatives has not yet been fully demonstrated. Nevertheless, DOD
projects that its new guided weapons will significantly improve its
warfighting capability.
Further, the assumptions used by the services to estimate individual
weapon requirements, overstate the potential threat and target base,
favor long range and accurate guided weapons, and require large
quantities of reserve weapons. As a result, the quantity
requirements for guided weapons appear to be inflated, particularly
in today's budgetary and security environment.
--------------------
\6 Operation Desert Storm: Evaluation of the Air Campaign
(GAO/NSIAD-97-134, June 12, 1997).
PROLIFERATION OF GUIDED
WEAPON CAPABILITIES AND
ACQUISITION PROGRAMS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.3
The services have substantial quantities of many different guided
weapons to attack most, if not all, targets. Taken individually, the
services' acquisition plans for guided weapons can be justified and
are expected to add significant capabilities. However, acquisition
plans for most of these weapon types are largely service-unique and
the services have missed several opportunities to consolidate the
development and procurement of deep attack capabilities and create
more efficient acquisition programs. For example, the Air Force and
the Navy are developing the Joint Air-to- Surface Standoff Missile,
while the Navy is developing the Standoff Land Attack
Missile--Expanded Response, even though either missile could be used
by both services.
When reviewing the services' planned programs in the aggregate, GAO
found (1) widespread overlap and duplication of guided weapon types
and capabilities, (2) questionable quantities being procured for each
target class, and (3) a preference for longer standoff and more
accurate weapons rather than for other options that may be as
effective and less costly. For example, the services plan to acquire
four new types of standoff guided weapons--at a cost of about $7.2
billion for over 12,000 weapons--to attack fixed hard and soft
targets. Each of these weapons has similar capabilities, and a
variety of weapons are already available to attack these types of
targets.
DOD's 1997 Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study stopped short of recognizing
cases of overlap or duplication and did not recommend curtailing or
canceling any guided weapons programs. DOD's Quadrennial Defense
Review, which based its recommendations on the study's results,
determined that the current deep attack weapon acquisition plans
could continue with only minor adjustments. However, the Air Force,
the Navy, and two DOD-sponsored independent reviews all conclude that
the computer models used in the weapons mix study featured outdated
assumptions from the Cold War and did not accurately represent modern
warfare. In GAO's view, while the study was certainly a step in the
right direction, DOD still does not have a sound basis to ensure that
it has the proper and cost-effective mix of deep attack weapon
programs. While modeling has a role, the ultimate decisions on the
best mix will require sound military and business judgment.
Officials from the Joint Chiefs of Staff said that they plan to
reassess deep attack weapons mix and affordability issues in 1998.
OVERSIGHT OF GUIDED WEAPON
REQUIREMENTS AND ACQUISITION
PROGRAMS NEEDS IMPROVEMENT
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.4
DOD is not providing effective management oversight and coordination
of its deep attack capabilities and programs to contain development
costs, control logistics impacts, maximize warfighting flexibility,
and avoid production stretch-outs. Instead, the task of developing
and procuring weapons rests with the services. DOD's oversight has
not prevented duplication of development, service-unique programs,
and production schedule stretch-outs.
DOD has no central oversight body or mechanism to examine guided
weapon programs in the aggregate and to assess how many weapons are
needed to meet national objectives or how many weapons DOD can
afford. The central oversight bodies and mechanisms already in place
do not address requirements and capabilities on an aggregate basis
and have had very limited effect on guided weapon programs. Some DOD
officials believe improved oversight is needed, and a proposal is
under consideration to expand the purview of the Joint Tactical
Air-to-Air Missile Office to include the coordination of
air-to-ground weapon requirements and programs. The Air-to-Air
Office has shown that the services can effectively coordinate
requirements and establish joint programs for the acquisition of
similar weapons. Expanding its purview to include guided weapons
should, in GAO's view, provide some assurance that decisions in the
deep attack area have been assessed from the perspective of the
services' combined requirements, capabilities, and acquisition plans.
RECOMMENDATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:5
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretaries of the
Army, the Navy, and the Air Force,
-- establish an aggregate requirement for deep attack capabilities;
-- reevaluate the assumptions used in their guided weapon
requirements determination processes to reflect better and more
cost-effectively the new international situation, realistic
target sets, enhanced weapon effectiveness, proper weapon
selection, and the use of advanced tactics; and
-- reevaluate the planned deep attack weapon acquisition programs
in light of existing capabilities and the current budgetary and
security environment to determine whether the procurement of all
planned guided weapon types and quantities (1) is necessary and
cost-effective in the aggregate and (2) can clearly be carried
out as proposed within realistic, long-term projections of
procurement funding.
Further, as GAO recommended in 1996 in its combat air power reports,
the Secretary of Defense, along with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, should develop an assessment process that yields more
comprehensive information on procurement requirements and aggregate
capabilities in key mission areas such as deep attack. GAO has
pointed out that this can be done by broadening the current joint
warfare capabilities assessment process or by developing an
alternative mechanism. One such alternative would be the
establishment of a DOD-wide coordinating office, modeled after the
Joint Tactical Air-to-Air Missile Office, to consider the services'
combined requirements, capabilities, and acquisition plans for guided
weapons.
AGENCY COMMENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:6
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially
concurred with GAO's recommendations, stating that the Joint Staff
will conduct a follow-up to the Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study and
that a coordinating office will be established to assess joint weapon
requirements. DOD stated that the report does not recognize its
significant efforts to improve its requirements, acquisition, and
oversight processes.
The follow-on study to the Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study that DOD is
conducting would be useful and GAO urges DOD to conclude the study
with decisions on which programs to cut back and which to end, in
order to ensure that its programs are fully executable within
expected budgets. Also, as a partial solution to the need for more
comprehensive assessments, DOD's agreement to establish a body to
review and deconflict joint air-to-surface requirements should be
helpful. Also important is the agreement of DOD that a body such as
this might better resolve issues among the services, with less DOD
intervention. GAO urges DOD to pursue the establishment of such a
body but believes the body should address all deep attack
requirements, not just air-to-surface requirements.
GAO has considered DOD's efforts to improve its processes. In the
recent past, GAO has examined in considerable depth DOD's
requirements, acquisition, and oversight processes.\7 While GAO
acknowledges DOD's efforts and progress to date in improving those
processes, the problems discussed in this report of optimistic
funding projections, inflated requirements, overlapping and
duplicative programs, and service-unique programs continue. As GAO
points out in the report, DOD needs to reexamine the oversight
process in ways aimed at providing more discipline and fewer programs
in order to be able to procure its requirements in the most
cost-effective manner.
DOD officials told GAO that, due to the mismatch between commitments
and resources, DOD plans to reduce fiscal year 2000 procurement
quantities for several guided weapon programs. GAO believes that
reductions in annual procurement quantities and stretch-outs in
procurement schedules should not be the inevitable solutions to the
mismatch between its commitments to programs and expected resources.
It is important that every effort should be made to avoid these "pay
more for less" outcomes.
DOD's comments on the draft report are included in their entirety in
appendix I with GAO's responses.
--------------------
\7 High Risk Series: Defense Weapon Systems Acquisition
(GAO/HR-97-6, Feb. 1997) and Combat Air Power: Joint Mission
Assessments Needed Before Making Program and Budget Decisions
(GAO/NSIAD-96-177, Sept. 20, 1996).
INTRODUCTION
============================================================ Chapter 1
Following the Persian Gulf War, the Department of Defense (DOD)
identified a number of problems with its deep attack weapons and
suggested improvements designed to ensure target destruction with
minimum casualties, delivery sorties, weapons, and unwanted
collateral damage. In response, the services initiated a number of
programs to upgrade existing guided weapons and to acquire new ones.
However, because the defense budget, in accordance with the balanced
budget agreement, is likely to be relatively fixed for the
foreseeable future, Congress expressed concern about the need and
affordability of all these programs.
BACKGROUND
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1
The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) acknowledge that they are facing flat
budgets and increasingly expensive readiness and modernization and
that to retain effectiveness, the services must integrate their
capabilities. The JCS anticipate leveraging technological
opportunities to reach new levels of effectiveness in joint military
operations.\1 The current military doctrine also recognizes that new
technologies are a key component in increasing the effectiveness of
military operations. Guided weapons play an important role in
implementing this doctrine.
Guided weapons are more accurate than unguided weapons because they
have the capability for in-flight guidance correction. They can be
powered or unpowered. The range from which they can be launched
varies from a few miles for the unpowered Guided Bomb Unit (GBU)
series of weapons to several hundred miles for the Tomahawk cruise
missile and the Conventional Air-Launched Cruise Missile (CALCM).
Most guided weapons are launched from aircraft or helicopters, but
the Tomahawk is launched from Navy surface ships and submarines; and
the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) is launched from the
Multiple Launch Rocket System. They can be guided by the Global
Positioning System (GPS), infrared sensors, electro-optical sensors,
or lasers. Some weapons have single warheads, others carry many
antipersonnel or antiarmor submunitions.
The specific guided weapon used depends on the type of target, the
defenses around the target, and whether areas adjacent to the target
must be avoided. Deep attack guided weapons are used for operations
carried out beyond the areas where friendly ground forces are
operating. These weapons can be released very close to the target or
at standoff ranges many miles from the target, either vertically or
horizontally. "Standoff" range is the distance between the weapon
launcher and the target.
--------------------
\1 Joint Vision 2010, America's Military: Preparing for Tomorrow,
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
PERSIAN GULF WAR, LESSONS
LEARNED
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:2
Guided weapons were first used in the Vietnam War to destroy targets
that previously required tons of unguided general purpose weapons.
However, guided weapons proved their value in the Persian Gulf War,
when the world watched them make precision attacks against targets in
Iraq. Guided weapons were subsequently recognized as having the
potential to revolutionize warfare.
Before the Gulf War, aircrew training focused on a potential Central
European conflict and emphasized low-altitude tactics using aircraft
and weapons designed for such missions. However, Iraqi air defenses
included large numbers of antiaircraft artillery that could put up a
"wall of iron" against low-flying aircraft. After several aircraft
losses, and to avoid the risk of losing a B-52H to antiaircraft
artillery, pilots were ordered to drop weapons from higher altitudes
than anticipated. At these altitudes, however, bombing with general
purpose bombs was not accurate, and wind forces became a factor.
While guided weapons achieved better results, a relatively small
number of them were used, and their effectiveness was often limited
by weather, target location uncertainty, and other factors.\2 As a
consequence, bombing accuracy was poor, and multiple weapons--in some
cases multiple attacks--were used on each target. Incomplete and
delayed bomb damage assessments were also a factor in the need for
multiple attacks.
Following the Gulf War, several DOD studies identified a number of
changes that could improve the accuracy, standoff range, and
lethality of its guided weapons as well as target identification and
damage assessment capabilities. The aim of these improvements is to
ensure target destruction with the minimum number of delivery sorties
and weapons and to avoid unwanted collateral damage and minimize
exposure of friendly aircraft to enemy defenses.
In response, the services initiated a number of programs to upgrade
existing guided weapons--such as CALCM, the Tomahawk cruise missile,
the Standoff Land Attack Missile (SLAM), and Air-to-Ground Guided
Missile (AGM) 130--and to acquire new guided weapons, including the
Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), the Wind-Corrected Munition
Dispenser (WCMD), the Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW), and the Joint
Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM). Still more guided weapon
programs are planned.
To take full advantage of new and improved guided weapons, launch
aircraft capabilities are improving. More than nine times as many
F-16s and many more F-15E fighters can employ guided weapons today
than in 1991. All DOD combat aircraft will be able to use GPS by the
end of fiscal year 2000 (GPS allows precise positioning and
navigation and permits weapon release in all types of weather).
Additionally, the number of aircraft with night-fighting and target
acquisition capabilities has increased significantly since fiscal
year 1991. Currently, more than 600 Air Force fighters can use all
or part of the Low-Altitude Navigation Targeting Infrared for Night
System, and hundreds of Navy F/A-18 aircraft have forward-looking
infrared pods for night vision.
--------------------
\2 Operation Desert Storm: Evaluation of the Air Campaign
(GAO/NSIAD-97-134, June 12, 1997).
RECENT STUDIES AND REPORTS ON
GUIDED WEAPON ISSUES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:3
DOD's management of its guided weapon capabilities, requirements, and
acquisition programs has been of interest to Congress and others for
many years. In 1995, we reported that the services had bought or
were developing 33 types of guided weapons with over 300,000
individual weapons to attack surface targets.\3 We also stated that
the services had initiated development programs both to increase the
number of guided weapons and to gain additional capability through
technical improvements to weapons in the inventory.
The 1995 Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed
Forces recommended an assessment of the services' deep attack systems
to determine the appropriate force size and mix. The report
questioned whether DOD had the right mix, asserted that DOD may have
greater quantities of deep attack weapon systems than it needs, and
recommended a DOD-wide cost-effectiveness study to determine the
appropriate mix. The report concluded that "only by approaching
capabilities in the aggregate, from the Commanders in Chiefs' (CINC)
perspective rather than the services', can this particular `who needs
what' question be answered."
The 1996 National Defense Authorization Act\4 required DOD to report
to Congress on (1) the process for approving development of guided
weapons, (2) the feasibility of the services' jointly developing
weapons and integrating them in multiple aircraft, and (3) the
cost-effectiveness of developing interim weapons or of procuring
small quantities of weapons. DOD was also asked to provide a
quantitative analysis of deep attack weapons mix options. In April
1996, the Secretary of Defense issued a report\5 informing Congress
of the steps DOD was taking to avoid duplicate and redundant guided
weapon programs and explaining how requirements and inventory levels
were being determined. DOD also responded to congressional concerns
regarding the economy and effectiveness of the continued acquisition
of smaller quantities of some guided weapons whose unit costs had
increased over 50 percent since December 1, 1991. DOD's report to
Congress is discussed in chapter 5.
In May 1997, DOD issued its report on the Quadrennial Defense
Review.\6 The review was a comprehensive examination of America's
defense needs from 1997 to 2015 and included military modernization
programs and strategy. It was intended to serve as DOD's overall
strategic planning document and made several recommendations
involving guided weapons modernization programs. In November 1997,
DOD reported on the results of its Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study.\7
The results of this study and the recommendations of the review are
discussed in chapter 4.
In December 1997, the National Defense Panel reported on its
congressionally directed assessment of DOD's Quadrennial Defense
Review. The Panel considered the review a significant step in the
adjustment of U.S. forces to reflect the collapse of the Warsaw
Pact. However, the Panel differed over emphasis or priorities in a
number of areas. We discuss the Panel's assessment in chapter 5.
--------------------
\3 Weapons Acquisition: Precision Guided Munitions in Inventory,
Production, and Development (GAO/NSIAD-95-95, June 23, 1995).
\4 P.L. 104-106, sec. 261.
\5 Precision Guided Munitions Acquisitions Process Report, April
1996.
\6 The review was required by the Military Force Structure Review Act
(P.L. 104-201, sec. 923).
\7 The results of the study were issued in November 1997 in two
parts. Part 1 is the Weapons Mix Analysis, which we discuss in this
report. Part 2 is the B-2 Force Tradeoff Analysis, which was
directed by the President.
OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND
METHODOLOGY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:4
In response to the request of the Chairmen of the National Security
Subcommittee, House Committee on Appropriations, and of the
Subcommittee on Military Research and Development, House Committee on
National Security, we sought to determine whether
-- the services' plans for developing and/or procuring guided
weapons can be carried out as proposed within relatively fixed
defense budgets,
-- the number of guided weapons the services plan to buy are
consistent with projected threats and modernization
requirements,
-- the current and planned guided weapon programs duplicate or
overlap each other, and
-- DOD is providing effective oversight in the development and
procurement of deep attack weapons.
To determine whether the services' plans for developing and/or
procuring guided weapons can be carried out as proposed within
expected defense budgets, we obtained program cost and schedule
information from weapon program offices and compared current weapon
procurement plans with previous procurement history. We discussed
and obtained copies of weapon program plans at the Aeronautical
Systems Center, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida; Ogden Air Logistic
Center, Hill Air Force Base, Utah; and Naval Air Warfare Center,
Point Mugu Naval Air Weapons Station, California.
To determine whether the numbers of guided weapons the services plan
to buy are consistent with projected threats and modernization
requirements, we obtained information on DOD's weapons inventories
from the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C. We
reviewed the Navy's nonnuclear ordnance requirement process and the
Air Force's nonnuclear consumables annual analysis model with
personnel from those offices in Washington, D.C. Worldwide threat
information was obtained from the Defense Intelligence Agency,
Washington, D.C. We discussed targeting procedures and weapon
employment tactics with officials at the U.S. Central Command and
Navy Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, and the Air
Force Central Command, Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina. We also
obtained and analyzed information from the Commander of U.S. Forces
Korea on guided weapon requirements, capabilities, tactics, and
operational plans. We visited the Office of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff to determine its role in establishing weapon requirements, and
we discussed out-year threats with personnel from the Defense
Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C. We also had discussions with
DOD Inspector General personnel who were auditing the Navy and the
Air Force requirements models.
To determine whether current and planned guided weapon programs are
duplicative and/or overlapping, we compared weapon capabilities such
as range, potential target sets, and warhead types of similar
weapons. In the course of this examination, we visited the JASSM
program office at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida; the JSOW program
office at Patuxent River Naval Air Station, Maryland; and the
Standoff Land Attack Missile--Expanded Response (SLAM-ER) test site
at Naval Air Warfare Center, Point Mugu Naval Air Weapons Station,
California. We also discussed acquisition responsibilities with
personnel from the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Navy
Aviation Requirements Branch, Washington, D.C., and the Air Combat
Command, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia.
To assess DOD's oversight of the services' deep attack weapon
requirements and acquisition programs, we evaluated oversight
processes and procedures in place and the extent to which guided
weapon requirements and programs were assessed in the aggregate. We
discussed the effectiveness of the current oversight processes--as
well as alternative processes--with officials from the Joint Chiefs
of Staff and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
(Acquisition & Technology). We also reviewed DOD's Deep Attack
Weapons Mix Study and obtained documents and interviewed officials
from the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller/Chief Financial Officer), Program
Analysis and Evaluation directorate; and the Institute for Defense
Analyses.
We conducted our audit work from July 1997 through October 1998 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
ACQUISITION PLANS FOR GUIDED
WEAPONS BASED ON OPTIMISTIC
FUNDING PROJECTIONS
============================================================ Chapter 2
To acquire the guided weapons now planned during fiscal years
1998-2007, DOD plans to spend about $16.6 billion (then-year dollars)
for 158,800 weapons--doubling its average yearly spending compared
with fiscal years 1993-97. The current investment strategy for
guided weapons may not be executable as proposed because of the
potential imbalance between funds likely to be available for actual
procurement and projected spending. The projected imbalance may be
greater than it appears because acquisition programs have
traditionally cost more than originally projected, and several other
weapons programs are expected to be approved for procurement.
Furthermore, technology improvements will likely offer better weapon
investments in the years ahead, generating even more programs to
compete for the same resources.
In the past, when faced with similar funding shortfalls, DOD's
approach has been to stretch out programs, delay procurement, and
reduce annual production quantities. These strategies increased unit
production costs and delayed deliveries. They could also limit DOD's
flexibility to shift resources from older weapons to more innovative
systems.
DOD'S ACQUISITION PLANS FOR
GUIDED WEAPONS ARE AMBITIOUS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1
According to the fiscal year 1999-2003 Future Years Defense Program
and longer-term program plans, the services plan to continue
procuring guided weapon systems now in low-rate initial or full-rate
production such as WCMD, JDAM, the Sensor Fuzed Weapon (SFW),
SLAM-ER, the Baseline version of JSOW, the ATACMS Block I, and the
Longbow Hellfire missile. The services also plan to begin production
of several guided weapon systems now under development. These
include JASSM, the Brilliant Antiarmor (BAT) submunition, the
Bomb/Live Unit (BLU)-108 and Unitary versions of JSOW, and the ATACMS
Block II and IIA. For about 127,000 of the 158,800 guided weapons to
be acquired, a guidance kit will be added to an existing unguided
weapon. These weapons include JDAM and WCMD.
As shown in table 2.1, these programs range in dollar value from the
$26-million procurement of AGM-130s to the $3.3-billion procurement
of the ATACMS Block II and IIA, which includes the BAT submunition.
Nine of these programs are expected to cost over $1 billion each.
Table 2.1
Planned Guided Weapon Procurement
Programs (fiscal years 1998-2007)
(Dollars in millions (then-year))
Planned Planned
production production
Weapon systems\a costs quantity
---------------------------------------------- ---------- ----------
ATACMS Block II/IIA\b $3,335 1,806
JSOW/Unitary 1,692 3,194
Longbow Hellfire 1,643 11,497
JSOW/Baseline and BLU-108 (Navy) 1,639 6,536
JSOW/Baseline and BLU-108 (Air Force) 1,356 4,496
JDAM (Air Force) 1,336 61,063
Tomahawk\c 1,278 1,253
JASSM 1,278 2,245
SFW 1,150 \d
WCMD 508 40,000
JDAM (Navy) 641 25,496
ATACMS Block 1A 392 406
SLAM-ER 265 423
Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM) 54 100
GBU-28 36 255
AGM-130 26 30
======================================================================
Total $16,629 158,800
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a The Air Force plans to convert additional Air-Launched Cruise
Missiles to a conventional attack role, but the quantities and costs
are classified.
\b Includes the estimated procurement cost of $1.8 billion for 19,700
BAT submunitions.
\c Reflects the Navy's plan to acquire a new Tactical Tomahawk.
\d SFW quantities (3,413 units) are included in the WCMD total.
According to their procurement plans, the services plan to spend an
average of $1.7 billion a year to procure guided weapons over the
next 10 years--doubling the $848-million average yearly spending
during fiscal years 1993-97. Figure 2.1 shows the planned annual
procurement funding for guided weapons during fiscal years 1998-2007.
Figure 2.1: Planned Guided
Weapon Procurement Funding
(fiscal years 1998-2007)
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Table 2.1 and figure 2.1 do not include all of the costs for the
services' planned modifications or upgrades to several existing
guided weapons. For example, the Air Force and the Navy plan to
equip approximately 500 GBU-24s and 500 GBU-27s with GPS guidance
(which guides the weapon more accurately under all weather
conditions). Additional quantities of these weapons may be upgraded
in the future.
Also, table 2.1 and figure 2.1 do not include funding requirements
for proposed guided weapon programs that have not yet been approved
for procurement. For example, DOD has potential requirements for the
Small Smart Bomb, Low Cost Autonomous Attack System, Unmanned Combat
Air Vehicles, Land Attack Standard Missile, and the Navy's Vertical
Gun. Further, rapidly evolving weapons technology could offer better
weapon investments in the years ahead, generating even more programs
to compete for the same resources.
Last, acquisition programs, including guided weapon programs, have
historically cost more than originally projected. Unanticipated cost
growth has averaged at least 20 percent over the life of acquisition
programs.\1 Any cost growth in DOD's guided weapon programs will
increase the amount of funding needed to support them. (In the 1999
Future Years Defense Program, DOD included an acquisition program
stability reserve to address unforeseeable cost growth that can
result from technical risk and uncertainty. We have not evaluated
the program stability reserve or the way DOD plans to implement it.
However, the fund is budgeted at about $2.4 billion for fiscal years
2000-2003 to address possible cost growth in all defense programs.
Further, the services are attempting to manage cost growth through
initiatives such as "cost as an independent variable." We have not
evaluated the effectiveness of these initiatives.)
--------------------
\1 CBO Papers: An Analysis of the Administration's Future Years
Defense Program for 1995-99 Congressional Budget Office, January 1995
and The Effects of Management Initiatives on the Cost and Schedules
of Defense Acquisition Programs, Institute for Defense Analyses,
November 1992.
AVAILABILITY OF FUNDING NEEDED
FOR GUIDED WEAPON PROCUREMENT
PROGRAMS IS UNCERTAIN
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2
DOD's planned investment strategy for guided weapons is based on
projections of increased procurement funding, as shown in figure 2.2,
even though DOD's overall budget is expected to remain relatively
fixed. In the balanced budget agreement, the President and Congress
agreed that the total national defense budget\2 will remain
relatively fixed in real terms at least through fiscal year 2002.
While Congress has not discussed the defense budget beyond fiscal
year 2002, DOD officials said their long-term planning now assumes no
real growth in the defense budget.
Within a relatively fixed defense budget, any proposed increase in
spending for a particular account or project must be offset
elsewhere. However, DOD has not identified specific budget
reductions to offset the proposed increases in procurement funding
for guided weapons. Furthermore, DOD's other procurement programs,
such as aircraft, shipbuilding, and missile defense, are also
anticipating increases in procurement funding.
Figure 2.2: DOD's Planned
Procurement Funding During
Fiscal Years 1998-2003
(See figure in printed
edition.)
DOD expects to increase its overall procurement spending to about
$63.5 billion in fiscal year 2003 from the fiscal year 1998 level of
about $44.8 billion while keeping overall defense spending at current
levels at least through fiscal year 2003. This is an increase of
about 42 percent. DOD's planned procurement spending for guided
weapon programs is projected to increase about 169 percent during the
same period.
To increase procurement funding and keep overall defense spending
unchanged, DOD proposes to reduce personnel, make some modest changes
in force structure, achieve infrastructure savings through
fundamental reforms and base realignments/closures, and continue to
improve its business operations. However, we recently reported that
by 2002, funding for military personnel, operations and maintenance,
and research, development, testing, and evaluation is projected to be
higher while procurement funding is projected to be lower than
anticipated.\3 And for the fourth straight budget year, DOD in 1998
did not achieve the procurement goals established in the previous
Future Years Defense Programs. DOD consistently projects increased
procurement funding for the latter years in each Future Years Defense
Program but, as subsequent Future Years Defense Programs are
developed, significantly reduces those projections in response to
budget-year realities.
Savings from infrastructure reductions too often have not been as
high as anticipated and have been absorbed by unplanned or
underestimated expenses in day-to-day operations. According to DOD,
the most common underestimated expenses are for depot and real
property maintenance, military construction, and medical care.
Because of unrealized savings, weapons modernization plans have
repeatedly been underfunded.
In its review of the Quadrennial Defense Review, the National Defense
Panel concluded that DOD's modernization plan has more budget risk
than it acknowledges. The Panel considered DOD's key assumptions for
maintaining a $60-billion annual procurement goal somewhat tenuous
and concluded that, collectively, the assumptions represent a budget
risk that could potentially undermine DOD's entire strategy.
--------------------
\2 The national defense budget includes the military activities of
DOD, the atomic energy defense activities of the Department of
Energy, and defense-related activities of other agencies.
\3 Future Years Defense Program: DOD's 1998 Plan Has Substantial
Risk in Execution (GAO/NSIAD-98-26, Oct. 23, 1997).
OPTIMISTIC FUNDING PROJECTIONS
HAVE OFTEN LED TO SCHEDULE
STRETCH-OUTS AND HIGHER UNIT
COSTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3
Weapon programs have typically projected annual procurement
quantities and costs based on optimistic assumptions about funding
availability. Our work has shown that the funds actually made
available for procurement have often been much less than those
projected when the program was proposed. When faced with funding
shortfalls, DOD's traditional approach has been to reduce annual
procurement quantities and extend production schedules, without
eliminating programs. Such actions have usually resulted in
significantly higher average unit procurement costs and delayed
deliveries to operational units. For example, in 1997, we reported
that production costs for 17 of 22 weapon systems we reviewed had
increased by $10 billion (fiscal year 1996 dollars) above original
estimates through fiscal year 1996 because completion of the weapons'
production had been extended an average of 8 years (170 percent)
longer than originally planned.\4 We found that actual production
rates averaged less than half the originally planned rates. These
stretch-outs were caused primarily by funding limitations.
The services' procurement of guided weapons between fiscal year 1993
and 1998 also had higher unit costs because of schedule slippage,
reduced procurement quantities, and cost growth. For example, the
Air Force at one time planned to procure about 4,000 AGM-130s but now
plans to buy only 711. As a result, the unit procurement cost is
about $832,000 versus earlier projections of under $300,000.
Reductions in planned procurement funding for the SFW have forced the
program to reduce annual procurement rates and stretch out the
schedule. As a result, SFW unit costs have increased from about
$320,000 to over $358,000. The BAT program has also been unstable,
and its schedule has been extended by 5 years. BAT's procurement
quantities have also dropped by 36 percent, while program costs have
increased by almost 8 percent.
--------------------
\4 Weapons Acquisition: Better Use of Limited DOD Acquisition
Funding Would Reduce Costs (GAO/NSIAD-97-23, Feb. 13, 1997).
DOD REQUIREMENTS FOR GUIDED
WEAPONS APPEAR TO BE INFLATED
============================================================ Chapter 3
The existing inventory of 1.3 million weapons, which could be used
for deep attack, contains many guided munitions and hundreds of
thousands of general purpose bombs. The current inventory is
considered sufficient to meet current national defense objectives.
The deep attack weapons used in the Gulf War would represent about 17
percent of the current inventory. Yet DOD plans to add 158,800
guided weapons over the next
10 years, almost doubling its existing inventory of guided weapons.
DOD expects the new weapons to enable warfighters to accomplish the
same objectives with fewer weapons and casualties and less unintended
collateral damage. We believe some new weapons may indeed be needed
to resolve specific performance problems and to replace those retired
or used in training. However, since DOD has not prepared an overall
requirements estimate for weapons capable of deep attack (see chs. 4
and 5), we question DOD's rationale for nearly doubling its inventory
of guided weapons.
The higher projected effectiveness of these new systems--in terms of
accuracy, standoff range, and lethality--along with the employment of
advanced tactics is expected to allow wartime objectives to be
accomplished with fewer weapons. Further, changing world conditions
have altered, perhaps for many years, the nature of the threats to
U.S. interests. However, we believe the assumptions used by the
services to estimate individual weapon requirements are conservative,
overstate the potential threat and target base, favor long range and
accurate guided weapons, and require large quantities of reserve
weapons. As a result, the quantity requirements for guided weapons
appear to be inflated, particularly in today's budgetary and security
environments.
DOD'S CURRENT INVENTORY IS
CONSIDERED ADEQUATE TO MEET
DEFENSE NEEDS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1
DOD retains about 1.3 million weapons that could be used for deep
attack missions. They range from the accurate, long-range Tomahawk
cruise missiles to hundreds of thousands of relatively inexpensive
general purpose bombs. The total inventory of these weapons today is
about 15 percent smaller than it was in 1992, soon after the end of
the Cold War. Guided weapons currently account for about 12 percent
of the total inventory of deep attack weapons. The guided weapons on
hand or in procurement totaled over 170,000 units as of the end of
fiscal year 1997. The current inventory includes AGM- 130, AGM-142,
CALCM, Harpoon, GBU-10, GBU-12, GBU-15, GBU-24, GBU- 27, GBU-28,
Maverick, SFW, ATACMS Block I, Hellfire II, High-Speed Anti-Radiation
Missile (HARM), SLAM, Tomahawk Anti-Ship Missile (TASM), and Tomahawk
Land Attack Missile (TLAM). As discussed in chapter 2, the services
plan to add about 158,800 guided weapons to the existing inventory
through fiscal year 2007. Although some weapons would be used for
testing, training, and other purposes, planned acquisitions would
approximately double the current inventory.
To place the existing inventory in perspective, about 227,000 deep
attack weapons, or about 17 percent of the current inventory, were
used in the Persian Gulf air war. Of these weapons, 92 percent were
unguided and 8 percent were guided. Of the guided weapons used,
about half were laser-guided (GBU-10, 12, and 24) and the remainder
used other types of guidance such as preprogrammed maps for the
Tomahawk and an electro-optical sensor for the Maverick.
According to two recent Defense studies and discussions with U.S.
Central Command officials, the current inventory of guided and
unguided weapons is sufficient to accomplish current defense
objectives. The national defense strategy directs the services to
retain the capability to fight and win two overlapping major theater
wars. Two regions containing significant military threats to U.S.
interests are (1) East Asia and the Pacific Rim with its increased
strategic significance and (2) the Middle East and South Asia where
the United States has vital and enduring interests.
We believe some new weapons may indeed be needed to resolve specific
performance problems and to replace those retired or used in
training. The services, however, justify each of their weapon
acquisition programs on a case-by-case basis, and DOD does not assess
the DOD-wide capabilities and programs on an aggregate basis.
Moreover, an overall requirements estimate for weapons capable of
deep attack has not been established. As a result, DOD has not
specifically justified doubling its inventory of guided weapons, as
the services' current acquisition plans would do.
MODERN GUIDED WEAPONS HAVE BEEN
JUSTIFIED AS SIGNIFICANTLY MORE
EFFECTIVE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2
New and improved guided weapons are expected to enable warfighting
objectives to be accomplished with fewer weapons, lower aircraft
attrition, and less unintended damage. Major improvements are
projected in the areas of accuracy, standoff range, and lethality. A
study by the Center For Naval Analysis examined the potential impact
of guided weapons on the battlefield and concluded that substantially
fewer weapons would be required when guided weapons are used
extensively. The study estimated that guided weapons offer a 10 to 1
advantage over unguided general purpose bombs for strategic targets
such as airfields or chemical storage facilities and about a 20 to 1
advantage for battlefield targets such as armored vehicles and rocket
launchers. Projecting these efficiencies to the Gulf War, the study
estimated that had guided weapons been used extensively, the same
damage levels could have been achieved with 60 percent fewer weapons.
Other recent studies have come to similar conclusions. A Rand study,
for example, found that for most targeting situations, one guided
weapon could achieve the same destruction as 35 unguided weapons.
In our 1997 report, we discussed the use and effectiveness of guided
and unguided weapons and other aspects of the air campaign during the
Gulf War. Both guided and unguided weapons were less effective than
expected because, among other things, (1) higher altitude deliveries
were used to avoid Iraqi air defenses, (2) aircraft sensors had
inherent limitations in identifying and acquiring targets, (3) DOD
failed to gather intelligence information on some critical targets,
and (4) DOD was unable to collect and disseminate timely battle
damage assessments. DOD has undertaken initiatives since the war to
address many of these problems, including the introduction of
specific design features for new guided weapons. However, the
effectiveness of some of the new guided weapons has not yet been
fully demonstrated. Nevertheless, DOD projects that its new guided
weapons will significantly improve warfighting capability in the
areas of accuracy, standoff range, and lethality.
ACCURACY
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2.1
Accuracy is an important element of a weapon's effectiveness. A more
accurate weapon can be smaller and carry less explosive power and yet
still achieve desired damage levels. Since the Gulf War, the
services have been acquiring GPS-based guidance kits for existing
weapons (such as AGM-130, SLAM-ER, JDAM, and Tomahawk) and
integrating this technology into new weapons (such as JSOW and JASSM)
to improve accuracy from higher altitudes and greater distances and
in bad weather. GPS is a global, day-night, all- weather,
space-based navigation system that can provide highly accurate
position, velocity, and time information to both civilian and
military users. For military users, GPS is accurate to 9 to 12
meters and insensitive to weather or battlefield conditions. By
using auxiliary systems such as ground based locators, the accuracy
of GPS-based guidance systems can be further improved.
Under the JDAM program, GPS guidance systems are being added to over
86,000 unguided bombs. Some laser-guided bombs and long-range cruise
missiles like SLAM-ER, Tomahawk, and CALCM either have or are to
receive GPS guidance systems. (Once in the target area, some
weapons--such as SLAM-ER and Tomahawk--use other guidance systems to
more precisely attack their targets.) DOD also plans to acquire 7,800
new JSOW-unitary guided weapons and 2,400 new JASSMs with GPS-aided
guidance systems.
The services are also developing new weapons with submunition
dispensers that use GPS guidance to reach mobile armor and other
targets. These include ATACMS and JSOW. These systems carry
submunitions that autonomously identify and attack specific targets
after they are released in the battle area.
STANDOFF RANGE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2.2
Standoff range, as used in this report, is the distance between the
launch vehicle and the target. Greater standoff range is important
for the survival of the launch vehicle when enemy defenses are active
in the target area. Some powered guided weapons such as CALCM and
SLAM-ER have a standoff range of well over 100 miles, providing a
high degree of launch vehicle safety. Launch vehicle safety is also
enhanced by JSOW's long glide range, which enables launch aircraft to
stand off outside the range of most target-area surface-to-air threat
systems. Some protection is also obtained from antiaircraft guns and
hand-held missile launchers through medium altitude launches of
unpowered weapons such as JDAM. Similarly, the Air Force's WCMD kit
is expected to provide some protection for launch aircraft from
medium altitudes.
LETHALITY
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2.3
In addition to better accuracy and longer range, the services are
increasing the lethality of guided weapons by improving warhead cases
and fuzes. This is accomplished by designing warhead cases that can
withstand high-velocity impact and penetrate earth, reinforced
concrete, and other barriers to reach a protected target before
exploding. Unitary and submunition warheads are also being designed
to maximize their blast effects on or above the battlefield, and
improved fuze technology is expected to provide more control over
warhead detonation. For example, modern warheads and fuzes can
destroy a command bunker or an aircraft shelter by penetrating the
protective structure and then exploding. Similarly, a warhead can be
detonated above the battlefield to destroy a missile site, radar, or
fuel cell. In addition, submunitions have been developed that are
expected to autonomously identify and attack separate armored
vehicles. Specially designed submunition dispensers and carriers
have been developed to carry and launch submunitions over the target
area. Such improvements to weapon lethality are expected to act as
force multipliers, allowing fewer weapons to achieve the results of
many.
INCREASED EFFECTIVENESS OF
WEAPONS IS EXPECTED TO PERMIT
THE USE OF ADVANCED TACTICS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3
The improved accuracy and lethality of the new deep attack weapons
are expected to facilitate the use of advanced tactics, such as nodal
targeting. Nodal targeting can be defined as attacking critical
infrastructure targets that cripple an adversary's capability to
attack with its forces. Nodal targets could include, for example,
command centers, power plants, or logistics choke points such as
bridges. Such tactics are also expected to reduce unwanted
collateral damage and post-war reconstruction hardships. For
example, to destroy a power plant in Iraq during the Gulf War,
several 1-ton bombs were dropped over a 3-day period. The facility
was completely destroyed, causing significant hardship to the
residents of the neighboring town. Air Force officials told us they
could have achieved the same objectives using one accurate weapon,
thus allowing the facility to be repaired more quickly after the war.
This strategy is possible only if there is high confidence in the
precise location of the targets and the accuracy and the amount of
damage that can be achieved from a given weapon. With its modern
guided weapons and better battlefield information, DOD hopes to have
this confidence in future conflicts.
CHANGING WORLD CONDITIONS HAVE
ALTERED THE NATURE OF THREATS
TO U.S. INTERESTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:4
Recent international trends, according to the Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA), argue against the likelihood of a large-scale regional
war in the foreseeable future. The most pressing current challenges
(terrorism, narcotics trafficking, and other criminal activity with
national security implications) and the biggest emerging threats
(weapons of mass destruction and missile proliferation) have limited
use as the basis for sizing and defining future force requirements.
Instead, it is more probable that U.S. involvement will occur along
the lower end of the conflict spectrum with military assistance,
various peacekeeping contingencies, or operations other than war.
Limited local or regional conflicts may also occur.
The DIA Director reported to Congress in February 1997 (and
reiterated again in January 1998) that the world is in the midst of
an extended post-Cold War transition that will last at least another
decade. From a national security standpoint, the threats facing the
United States have diminished by an order of magnitude, and the
Director believes the United States is unlikely to face a global
military challenger on the scale of the former Soviet Union for at
least the next two decades. World expenditures for military hardware
are significantly less today than they were during the height of the
Cold War. Despite these developments, the Director views this period
of transition as complex and dangerous.
According to DIA, Iraq and North Korea are currently the most likely
U.S. opponents in a major theater conflict, with weapons of mass
destruction developing as an emerging threat.
-- Iraq will remain a threat to U.S. regional policies and
interests as long as the current government remains in power.
However, its military capability continues to erode. There are
significant weaknesses in leadership, morale, readiness,
logistics, and training that would limit Iraq's effectiveness in
combat. Iraq has rebuilt some key installations destroyed in
the Gulf War, but their location, construction characteristics,
and other factors are well known.
-- North Korea is characterized as a failing state, and the
potential for internal collapse, instability, and leadership
change is rising. In the meantime, its overall military
readiness continues to erode in line with its worsening economic
situation.
-- Some nations are building or acquiring weapons of mass
destruction (i.e., nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons).
Many states view the acquisition of these weapons as vital to
countering U.S. conventional warfighting superiority and to
providing a measure of power, respect, and deterrent value
within a regional context. Chemical weapons are relatively easy
to develop, deploy, and conceal and are based on readily
available technology. The proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction constitutes a direct threat to U.S. interests
worldwide.
SERVICES' REQUIREMENTS SYSTEMS
INFLATE QUANTITIES OF
INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS NEEDED
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:5
We believe the assumptions used by the services to estimate
individual weapon requirements are conservative, overstate the
potential threat and target base, favor long range and accurate
guided weapons, and require large quantities of them among reserve
weapons. As a result, the quantity requirements for each weapon
appear to be inflated, particularly in today's budgetary and security
environments.
The services use the capabilities-based munitions requirements
process to determine their requirements for weapons procurement.
Each year, the services analyze how many weapons and of what type are
needed to fully support the CINCs' war plans and provide for post-war
reserves, storage requirements, and other needs. These weapon
requirements become the basis for the services' weapon procurement
programs and budget requests.
The services rely on DIA to identify specific military targets in
those regions specified in defense guidance for the period included
in the Future Years Defense Program. The resulting out-year threat
report is used by the CINCs responsible for those regions to
determine attack objectives for each type of target and to assign
responsibility for target destruction to the services. Using this
allocation of targets and destruction objectives, the services
simulate combat to estimate the number of weapons needed.
Each of the services uses its own battle simulation models and other
tools to determine the number of weapons needed to meet the CINCs war
objectives. The models receive performance information for each type
of weapon and delivery vehicle, as well as the construction
characteristics of each type of target. The models then determine
how many weapons of a specific type, delivered by a particular
vehicle under various battle conditions, are needed to damage each
target to a particular level. The factors influencing the modeling
results include target lists and characteristics, weapon
effectiveness, choice of weapons, and reserve requirements.
TARGET LISTS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:5.1
Despite DIA's projections on recent international trends, the sizable
inventory of capable weapons, and the current budgetary situation,
the services determine their weapons requirements and, in turn, the
weapons to be acquired each year using worst-case scenarios for each
of the two major theaters of war. Navy and Air Force requirements
models include nearly all the targets identified in the regions
specified by defense guidance. The target list includes thousands of
mobile targets, including ships, surface-to- air missile batteries,
armored combat vehicles, tanks, aircraft, artillery, trucks, and
troops on the battlefield. It also includes thousands of fixed
targets such as airfields, bridges, buildings, port facilities, radar
sites, and power plants.
Central Command officials told us it is unlikely that all or even
most of the identified targets would be attacked in a potential war
in Southwest Asia (in the case of the Gulf War, the targets struck
represented only a small portion of all identified targets). DIA has
prepared a smaller list of critical targets with the highest military
value, but the Central Command includes nearly all of the identified
targets in its most comprehensive war plans and service allocations.
We believe the effects of including such a large target base are
significant. For example, the Air Force and the Navy estimate that
the number of guided weapons needed to damage and/or destroy all the
potential targets in the Central Command target base for Southwest
Asia would be significantly higher than the number of guided weapons
used during the Gulf War. It should be noted, however, that only a
small fraction of the target base was attacked during the Gulf War.
Central Command and service officials explained that including nearly
all targets in the service models may inflate weapon requirements,
but they do not want to risk having insufficient weapons, should some
unforeseen conflict require them. After examining the CINCs' target
distribution in 1997, the DOD Inspector General reported that more
needs to be done to improve the threat distribution input provided to
the services for generating munitions requirements. Specifically,
the Inspector General recommended that the CINCs establish procedures
that (1) identify and include the capabilities of emerging weapons,
(2) identify post-major theater war missions, (3) distribute threats
to coalition forces, and (4) establish procedures that document and
coordinate the rationale for final threat distributions. Following
the Inspector General's logic, we believe that using a smaller target
list would reduce the number of weapons the services' models identify
as required.
CHOICE OF WEAPONS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:5.2
The Air Force and Navy requirements models show a strong preference
for using guided weapons against most targets. The models place a
premium on avoiding any aircraft or aircrew losses or collateral
damage. As a result, the models select weapons that are most
effective in meeting those objectives. The weapons' target
destruction capabilities and costs are secondary considerations.
The models tend to select the most accurate and longest standoff
weapons, even though these may not have the best target-killing
characteristics and may be much more costly than alternatives with
better target-killing characteristics. For example, the Navy's model
selects Tomahawk missiles, costing about $1 million each, for many
types of targets, even against certain targets where its
effectiveness is poor. While the specific situation may dictate the
use of a Tomahawk due to target location or threat, other weapon
choices could be more effective and less costly, if other factors
such as aircraft attrition do not overcome the weapon's cost
advantage.
According to service officials, this outcome reflects the models'
tendency to use standoff weapons versus direct attack weapons
(thereby avoiding enemy air defenses) and their preference for more
accurate weapons. As a result, the models fail to recognize the full
impact of defense suppression and may overstate the need for the more
costly, highly precise standoff guided weapons. While these types of
weapons are more effective against some types of targets, direct
attack guided weapons as well as unguided weapons are quite adequate
against other targets, particularly when enemy defenses have been
suppressed.
RESERVE REQUIREMENTS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:5.3
The services' models also calculate the weapons needed by U.S.
forces not directly engaged in major theaters of war and those needed
to ensure U.S. forces are able to deter or, if necessary, fight a
limited conflict following two major theaters of war. While these
reserves represent only a portion of the total weapons requirement,
they include several times more guided weapons than were used in the
entire Gulf War. We believe strategic reserves of that magnitude are
questionable in the current international security environment and
would likely be reduced significantly if the models were revised to
better reflect realistic target lists, weapon effectiveness factors,
and choices of weapons.
PROLIFERATION OF GUIDED WEAPON
CAPABILITIES AND ACQUISITION
PROGRAMS
============================================================ Chapter 4
DOD currently has substantial quantities of many different guided
weapons to attack most, if not all, targets. Taken individually,
DOD's acquisition plans for guided weapons can be justified and are
expected to add significant capabilities. However, DOD reviews and
justifies its deep attack weapon acquisition programs on a
case-by-case basis and does not assess its existing and projected
capabilities in this area on an aggregate basis. Although they are
good candidates for joint programs, most of these new types of
weapons are being integrated into only one service's platforms. When
reviewing the services' currently planned programs in the aggregate,
we found (1) widespread overlap and duplication of guided weapon
types and capabilities, (2) questionable quantities being procured
for each target class, and (3) a preference for longer standoff and
more accurate weapons rather than for other options that may be as
effective and less costly. When the services acquire multiple
systems for similar purposes, they pay higher costs to develop,
integrate, procure, and maintain these systems.
DOD's 1997 Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study was expected to critically
review overall deep attack capabilities and to provide an analytical
basis for recommendations about specific programs. However, the
study stopped short of recognizing overlap and duplication and did
not recommend curtailment or cancellation of any programs. DOD's
Quadrennial Defense Review, which based its recommendations on the
study's results, recommended that current acquisition plans for
guided weapons continue with only modest adjustments. The Air Force,
the Navy, and two DOD-sponsored independent reviews concluded that
the computer models used in the study were outdated and did not
adequately represent modern warfare. Accordingly, while we believe
the study was certainly a step in the right direction, DOD still does
not have a sound basis to ensure that it has the proper and
cost-effective mix of deep attack weapon programs. While modeling
plays a role, the ultimate decisions on that mix will require sound
military and business judgment.
DOD PLANS TO ADD TO ITS
CAPABILITIES TO ATTACK ALL
CLASSES OF TARGETS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:1
DOD categorizes ground and naval surface targets in five target
classes. Two classes are for mobile targets--one for heavily armored
targets such as tanks and artillery and a second for lightly armored
or unprotected trucks, vans, and personnel. Two classes are for
fixed targets--one for bridges and underground or heavily reinforced
facilities and one for general purpose buildings, manufacturing
facilities, roads, and rail yards. The fifth class is for maritime
surface targets and includes ships at sea.\1 DOD has several types of
guided weapons in the inventory to attack each of the five target
classes. DOD also has additional types of guided weapons in
development and production to attack each of the five target classes.
Table 4.1 lists the guided weapons in inventory, production, and
development by target class. The list includes air-to-surface and
surface-to-surface weapons.
Table 4.1
Guided Weapon Options by Target Class
Target class In inventory In production In development
------------------ ------------------ ------------------ --------------------
Mobile hard Maverick (AF/N) SFW/WCMD (AF) ATACMS Block II/IIA
(includes tanks GBU-10 (AF/N) Gator/WCMD (AF) /BAT Submunition /
and artillery) GBU-12 (AF/N) JDAM (AF/N) Improved BAT
GBU-24 (AF/N) Hellfire II (A) Submunition (A)
GBU-27 (AF) Longbow Hellfire JSOW/BLU-108 (AF/
Walleye (N) (A) N)
GPS aided munition
(AF)
SFW (AF)
Hellfire II (A)
Mobile soft Maverick (AF/N) AGM-142 (AF) ATACMS Block II/
(includes trucks, GBU-15 (AF) SFW/WCMD (AF) IIA/BAT Submunition
vans, and GAM (AF) CEM/WCMD (AF) /Improved BAT
personnel TLAM (N) TLAM (N) Submunition (A)
carriers) AGM-142 (AF) JDAM (AF/N) JSOW/BLU-108 (AF/
ATACMS Block I JSOW Baseline (AF/ N)
(A) N)
Hellfire II (A) ATACMS Block 1A
SFW /WCMD (A)
Gator/WCMD Hellfire II (A)
JSOW/Baseline (N/ Longbow Hellfire
AF) (A)
Fixed hard Maverick (AF/N) AGM-130 (AF) JSOW/Unitary (N)
(includes bridges GBU-10 (AF/N) AGM-142 (AF) Tactical Tomahawk
and underground or GBU-12 (AF/N) GBU-28 (AF) (N)
heavily reinforced GBU-15 (AF) TLAM (N) SLAM-ER (N)
facilities) GBU-24 (AF/N) SLAM (N) JASSM (AF)
GBU-27 (AF) SLAM-ER (N)
GBU-28 (AF) JDAM (AF/N)
Walleye (N)
GAM (AF)
AGM-130 (AF)
AGM-142 (AF)
TLAM (N)
SLAM (N)
Fixed soft Maverick (AF/N) AGM-130 (AF) ATACMS Block II/
(includes general CALCM (AF) ATACMS Block 1A IIA/BAT Submunition/
purpose buildings, GBU-10 (AF/N) (A) Improved BAT
manufacturing GBU-12 (AF/N) AGM-142 (AF) Submunition (A)
facilities, roads, GBU-15 (AF) TLAM (N) JSOW/Unitary (N)
and rail yards) GBU-24 (AF/N) SLAM (N) Tactical Tomahawk
GBU-27 (AF) SLAM-ER (N) (N)
HARM (AF/N) JDAM (AF/N) SLAM-ER (N)
Walleye (N) Gator/WCMD (AF) JASSM (AF)
GAM (AF) SFW/WCMD (AF)
AGM-130 (AF) CEM/WCMD (AF)
AGM-142 (AF) JSOW Baseline (AF/
TLAM (N) N)
SLAM (N)
ATACMS Block I (A)
Maritime surface Maverick (AF/N) AGM-142 (AF) JSOW/Unitary (N)
(includes ships) Harpoon (AF/N) SLAM (N) Tactical Tomahawk
Penguin (N) SLAM-ER (N) (N)
TASM (N) JDAM (AF/N) SLAM-ER (N)
Walleye (N) JASSM (AF)
GAM (AF)
SLAM (N)
AGM-142 (AF)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: The service or services that use each of the weapons are
indicated in parentheses.
A = Army, N = Navy, AF = Air Force, and CEM = Combined Effects
Munition.
According to Air Force and Navy officials, none of the guided weapons
in the inventory will be retired in the foreseeable future.\2 The
services are producing more types of available guided weapons and
plan to add even more types when those currently under development
transition to production.
--------------------
\1 There are also target classes for airborne aircraft, tactical
missiles, and maritime subsurface targets but they are not included
in this review. DOD also has a target class for sites that emit
radio frequency signals. However, when not emitting, these are
considered in either the fixed or mobile soft classes.
\2 A small portion of the inventory of unguided weapons will be
retired or converted to guided weapons.
SERVICES FAVOR SINGLE-SERVICE
VERSUS JOINT PROGRAMS FOR
PROCUREMENT OF GUIDED WEAPONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:2
Most of the guided weapon types in the inventory or in production and
development are expected to be used by only one service. While the
JDAM, the BLU-108 and Baseline versions of JSOW, and the Hellfire are
expected to be joint programs, all of the other development and
production programs listed in table 4.1 involve only one service.
Guided weapons are good candidates for joint programs because the
services plan to use them for similar purposes and in similar ways.
In addition, most guided weapons can be launched from several
different platforms with relatively minor, if any, modifications.
Each service is responsible for identifying its own deficiencies in
meeting the CINCs' target destruction allocations and for developing
and obtaining approval of its mission need statements. If a service
determines that a new weapon is required, its requirements branch
establishes the operational requirements for the weapon. According
to requirements personnel, both mission need and operational
requirement documents are reviewed by the other services, making
joint requirement plans possible. However, for most guided weapons
now in development and production, a joint requirement either was not
established or was not sustained.
For example, although the JASSM was designated as a joint program,
Navy requirements officials have stated that the Navy does not
currently plan to integrate the weapon in its aircraft and is not
currently planning to buy any. Similarly, the Air Force plans to
procure two JSOW variants (Baseline and BLU-108) but is not currently
planning to integrate the Navy's Unitary variant of the JSOW in its
aircraft and is not planning to buy any. Other single-service guided
weapons (such as the WCMD and the SLAM-ER) could be modified and
integrated for use with another service's platforms. But the
services have not favored this option.
QUESTIONABLE ACQUISITION PLANS
FOR GUIDED WEAPONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:3
DOD reviews and justifies its guided weapon acquisition programs on a
case-by-case basis and does not assess its existing and projected
capabilities in this area on an aggregate basis. When reviewing the
services' currently planned programs from an aggregate perspective,
we found (1) widespread overlap and duplication of guided weapon
types and capabilities, (2) questionable quantities being procured
for each target class, and (3) a preference for longer standoff and
more accurate weapons rather than for options that may be as
effective and less costly. Table 4.2 provides details of quantities,
status, and production costs for the guided weapons planned to be
acquired for use against four target classes.
Table 4.2
Capabilities Overlap in Guided Weapons
Total
Unit estimated
production production
cost cost
Planned ($ in ($ in
Target class Munition Status quantity thousands) millions)
------------ --------------- --------- -------- -------------- ------------
Fixed hard JSOW/Unitary Developme 7,800 $509.4 $3,973.1
Fixed soft (N) nt
JASSM (AF) Developme 2,400 537.0 1,288.8
nt
Tactical Developme 1,253 1,120.8 1,404.4
Tomahawk (N) nt
SLAM-ER (N) Productio 700\a 709.1 496.4
n
================================================================================
Total 12,153 $7,162.7
Mobile hard SFW/WCMD (AF) Productio 5,000 377.4\b 1,887.1
n
Gator/WCMD (AF) Productio 5,000 19.2\c 96.1
n
JSOW/BLU-108 Developme 4,200 366.9 1,540.8
(N/AF) nt
ATACMS Block 1,806 1,875.9 3,387.9
II/BAT (A)
================================================================================
Total 16,006 $6,911.9
Fixed soft Combined Productio 30,000 19.2\c 576.0
Fixed hard Effects n
(area) Munition CEM/
WCMD (AF)
JSOW/Baseline Productio 11,800 225.3 2,658.0
(N/F) n
ATACMS Block 1A Productio 652\d 929.3 605.9
(A) n
================================================================================
Total 42,452 $3,839.9
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: The service or services that use each of the weapons are
indicated in parentheses.
A = Army, N = Navy, and AF = Air Force.
\a Of the 700 units, 135 SLAM-ER were procured prior to fiscal year
1998.
\b Includes Sensor Fuzed Weapon production costs.
\c The CEM and Gator mine submunitions are already in the inventory.
\d Of the 652, 237 ATACMS Block 1A were procured prior to fiscal year
1998.
GUIDED WEAPONS TO ATTACK
FIXED TARGETS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:3.1
The total procurement cost for the Unitary version of the JSOW,
JASSM, Tactical Tomahawk, and SLAM-ER is projected to be about $7.2
billion for 12,153 weapons. These weapons do not constitute all of
the weapons potentially available against the fixed hard and soft
target sets from a standoff distance. As shown in table 4.1,
additional weapons such as the TLAM, AGM-130, AGM-142, and CALCM are
also available.
Three weapons--SLAM-ER, Tactical Tomahawk, and JASSM--are designed to
attack targets from outside the range of long-range enemy air
defenses. A fourth weapon, the Unitary variant of the JSOW, is a
Navy-developed weapon designed to attack targets outside mid-range
enemy air defenses. Each of these weapons will be used by a single
service because only the developing service is currently planning to
buy or integrate the weapon on its platforms.
Each of the weapons, considered alone, was justified by the services
within DOD's system acquisition process as adding capability to the
existing force. But considered in the aggregate and in terms of
economy and efficiency, four new types of standoff guided weapons may
not be needed to attack this target set in addition to other standoff
guided weapons that are already available. The services also have
several types of guided and unguided direct attack weapons that could
be effectively used in a reduced threat environment against these
targets. In addition, the Air Force has the F-117 stealth fighter
for delivery of direct attack guided weapons against critical targets
and has invested over $40 billion in the development and procurement
of the B-2 bomber to penetrate heavily defended areas to attack
high-value targets.
DOD's key directive on defense acquisition matters encourages
modifying a current system to meet operational requirements before
beginning development of a new system.\3 It would thus have been
reasonable and technically feasible for the Navy to acquire
additional SLAM-ERs in lieu of beginning development and production
of the Unitary version of JSOW. Likewise, it would have been
reasonable and technically feasible to modify SLAM-ER for the Air
Force requirement for a long-range standoff weapon rather than
develop and produce JASSM.
In addition, the need to add 12,153 new standoff guided weapons to
those already in the inventory for this target set is questionable,
particularly when the number of critical targets in defense guidance
scenarios have declined and are projected to continue to do so. DOD
has many guided weapons--mostly laser-guided bombs--in the inventory
capable of attacking critical fixed targets. In addition to the new
standoff weapons discussed above, DOD also plans to buy over 86,000
JDAMs (a direct attack weapon) for possible use against this same
target set.
While the long-range, highly accurate, and expensive standoff weapons
that DOD plans to procure are most effective in the early stages of a
conflict--when enemy air defenses are expected to be most
potent--they may not be needed in large numbers throughout an entire
conflict.\4 As enemy air defenses decline, less costly but still
accurate and effective direct attack weapons such as laser-guided
bombs or JDAMs can be used. Using this generally accepted strategy,
DOD developed a mix of weapons. However, the services plan to
acquire both large numbers of new standoff guided weapons (2,400
JASSMs and 7,800 Unitary versions of JSOW) and new direct attack
guided weapons (86,000 JDAMs and 40,000 WCMDs).
Furthermore, the services have not fully addressed the possibility of
improving the accuracy of less costly direct attack guided weapons so
as to reduce the number of more expensive standoff weapons. The Air
Force planned to increase the accuracy of the JDAM, but the program
is not currently funded. The Navy also expressed an interest in
improving the JDAM's accuracy and has provided some funding for
research. Both the Air Force and the Navy are funding an effort to
add GPS to a limited number of GBU-24s and GBU-27s. The Air Force is
buying some new GBU-28s with GPS guidance capability. DOD
acknowledges the potential benefits of improving the accuracy of
these guided weapons but has not assessed the potential effect on the
numbers of weapons needed.
--------------------
\3 DOD Directive 5000.1, Defense Acquisition.
\4 A critical objective early in a conflict is to aggressively
destroy and/or suppress the enemy's air defenses in order to minimize
friendly aircraft losses. DOD plans to use highly accurate standoff
weapons as well as high-speed antiradiation missiles and electronic
attack assets in this role.
GUIDED WEAPONS FOR ATTACKING
AREA AND MULTIPLE ARMORED
TARGETS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:3.2
The weapons planned for attacking area targets\5 and multiple armored
targets from medium ranges present a similar case of duplicative
procurement plans when viewed in the aggregate. Together, the Army,
the Navy, and the Air Force plan to buy over 58,000 weapons to attack
these targets for an estimated cost of over $10.7 billion.
The Navy has begun production of the Baseline variant of JSOW, which
can be used to attack area targets (such as runways and motor pools),
and plans to start production in fiscal year 1999 of the BLU-108
variant, which can be used to attack multiple armored targets (such
as tanks and armored personnel carriers). The Air Force and the Navy
together plan to buy 16,000 of these two JSOW variants. However,
since the JSOW variants were developed, the Air Force has also
developed the WCMD tail kit for higher altitude release of weapons
such as the SFW, the CEM, and the Gator mine munition. Each of these
weapons, with the WCMD tail kit, can be used to attack the same
target classes as the Baseline and BLU-108 versions of JSOW. The Air
Force plans to buy 40,000 tail kits.
Also, the Army is buying 652 ATACMS Block IA missiles with
antipersonnel, antimateriel submunitions for attacking area targets,
and it is developing the BAT submunition to be carried in 1,806
ATACMS Block II/IIA missiles against multiple armored targets. With
unit costs of about $929,300 for each ATACMS Block IA missile and
$1.9 million for each ATACMS Block II/IIA missile with the BAT
submunitions, these weapons are the most expensive of the three.
Each of these weapons has been justified as offering advantages, but
when assessed in the aggregate, their combined capabilities overlap
and duplicate each other and may be unnecessary, particularly when
likely threats are in decline. In addition, the Air Force and the
Navy have many Maverick missiles to attack individual armored targets
after longer range air defenses are suppressed. The Army and the
Marine Corps have procured over 13,000 Hellfire II missiles and plan
to buy over 11,000 Longbow Hellfire missiles that could be used by
attack helicopters against individual armored targets. Furthermore,
the Army has procured over 1,800 ATACMS Block 1 missiles to attack
area targets.
The 40,000 WCMD-equipped weapons are planned to be integrated only
with Air Force aircraft. The Air Force configurations have several
advantages over the Navy-developed JSOW variants: the WCMD/CEM
variant for area targets costs less per unit\6 ($19,200 versus
$225,300); the WCMD/SFW variant costs slightly more ($377,400 versus
$366,900) but holds more antiarmor submunitions (40 versus 24); and
more WCMD-equipped weapons can be carried on the B-1 bomber (30
versus 12). These facts would appear to make the Air Force variant
more cost-effective and operationally efficient than its
Navy-developed counterpart and could reduce the number of JSOW
variants procured by the Air Force and the Navy together. The Navy,
however, is not planning to modify its aircraft to carry the
WCMD-equipped weapons.
--------------------
\5 An area target is a large parcel of ground on which there are many
individual targets such as truck parks.
\6 The Air Force configuration uses CEM dispensers already in the
inventory, while the Navy weapon features an entirely new weapon
dispenser.
MULTIPLE WEAPON TYPES RAISE
ACQUISITION AND SUPPORT
EXPENDITURES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:4
Officials from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and CINCs told us that
having a variety of weapons allows flexibility in countering threats.
These officials also acknowledged that the current deep attack
capability is adequate to meet the current objectives of defense
guidance. However, in terms of acquisition economy and efficiency,
questions arise about duplicative development costs, higher than
necessary unit production costs, larger than necessary procurement
quantities, higher than necessary logistics costs, and reduced
interoperability.
First, each of these weapons has a distinct development cost. The
total development cost for the weapons in production and development
shown in table 4.2 is estimated at $5.2 billion (then-year dollars).
If even just two or three development programs had been avoided, the
savings could have been substantial. Considered singly, each of
these weapons offers incrementally different capabilities, but
considered in the aggregate, the services have individually incurred
development costs for substantially similar capabilities. For
example, each of the four weapons being acquired to attack fixed hard
and soft targets is projected (1) to be launched beyond the range of
at least mid-range if not long-range enemy air defenses, (2) to have
pinpoint accuracy, and (3) to have improved lethality over currently
available weapons. Moreover, there is a distinct cost to integrate
each weapon into the aircraft\7 that will deliver it to the target
area.
Second, the services have bought some weapons in extremely small
quantities at high unit costs. For example, the Air Force procured
711 AGM-130s during fiscal years 1990-98 at an average unit cost of
$832,000. It had originally planned to buy as many as 600 a year at
an average unit cost of under $300,000, but it never bought more than
120 per year. In fiscal year 1998, the Navy plans to buy only 45
SLAM-ERs, fewer than it bought in fiscal year 1997. It also plans to
buy an average of about 40 missiles per year until fiscal year 2011
at an average unit cost of about $709,100. The high average
production unit cost is due at least in part to the low annual
procurement quantities, which in turn are a result of the
proliferation of individual systems being procured each year and the
relatively fixed defense budget situation described in chapter 2.
Third, associated logistics costs increase if more types of weapons
must be supported. For example, providing sufficient quantities of
many weapon types to major theaters of war increases the resources
that must be used in fuel and lift capacity.
Fourth, overall procurement quantities could be reduced with fewer
weapon types because not all of the production quantity is used to
support combat requirements. For example, for seven munitions cited
in the Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study, an average of about 36 percent
of the production units are expected to be used for reserves,
training, and testing. With fewer types of weapons, quantities for
testing and training could be reduced.
Fifth, fewer types of weapons increase interoperability among the
services. By using the same weapon, the services have more
opportunities for common training, preparation of training,
maintenance manuals, and test equipment.
--------------------
\7 The Tactical Tomahawk is not launched from aircraft.
WEAPONS MIX STUDY AND
QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW
RECOMMEND LITTLE CHANGE IN
ACQUISITION PROGRAMS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:5
The Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study was a significant undertaking by
the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff (with
input from the services) to assess the overall mix and affordability
of existing and planned weapons. The study based its analysis on
wartime scenarios defined by defense guidance and on threat levels
and numbers of targets established by DIA. The study used 2006 as a
base year and also developed results for conflicts in 1998 and 2014.
The study used two primary computer models: the tactical warfare
model, which simulates air and ground combat, and the weapons
optimization and resource requirements model, which provides an
optimized weapons mix using predetermined budget constraints,
weather, range, altitude, and the different phases of the war.
(These models are used throughout DOD for a variety of purposes,
including the determination of weapons quantity requirements.) The
major variables used were weather, air defense threats, target
identification, and force levels at the start of a conflict. The
selection of weapons was limited to those in the inventory or in
production and new ones already in development. The number and type
of weapons bought were limited by a $10.5-billion ceiling for
purchases from fiscal year 2005 for the baseline case. Cost data
were supplied by the services.
The unclassified portions of the study's analysis concluded that the
programmed weapon investment budget of about $10.5 billion was
sufficient to maintain a qualitative advantage over potential
aggressors. It recommended only modest adjustments to current
programs and did not recommend the termination of any guided weapon
programs.
DOD's Quadrennial Defense Review based its recommendations on the
weapons mix study and determined that the current guided weapon
programs, with modest adjustments, would provide the capability to
defeat potential aggressors in the years ahead. Accordingly, the
review recommended no change in procurement plans for the WCMD with
CEM and SFW submunitions, the ATACMS with BAT and BAT improved
submunitions, and the Unitary version of the JSOW. The review said
DOD would consider decreasing procurement quantities of the Baseline
and BLU-108 versions of JSOW, increasing procurement quantities of
JASSM and laser-guided bombs, and changing the mix of JDAM variants.
Finally, DOD stated that it would continue procuring Hellfire II
missiles while the Army analyzed the appropriate mix of Hellfire II
and Longbow Hellfire missiles.
We compared the review's recommendations with DOD's most current
plans in the fiscal year 1999 budget. We found little change in
procurement plans for guided weapons as compared to previous plans.
For example, the procurement quantities for the Baseline and BLU-108
variants of JSOW were unchanged, the number of ATACMS Block 1A
missiles was reduced from 800 to 652, and no programs were
eliminated. Further, DOD later concluded that it would continue as
planned with its Longbow Hellfire procurement. While we believe the
weapons study (and by extension the defense review) was a step in the
right direction in the assessment of DOD-wide requirements for
weapons, its impact was, at best, limited.
INDEPENDENT REVIEWS QUESTION
RELEVANCE OF COMPUTER MODELS
USED IN WEAPONS MIX STUDY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:6
We did not make an independent review of the models used for the Deep
Attack Weapons Mix Study, which provided the basis for DOD's strategy
for developing and procuring deep attack weapons. According to
several observations, however, the weapons study used outdated
computer models and assumptions in developing its recommendations.
According to a congressionally directed assessment of the Quadrennial
Defense Review by the National Defense Panel, one of the key models
used in the weapons mix study was developed for the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization-Warsaw Pact scenario and 10 years ago was seen as
having significant shortcomings.\8 The Panel also found that the two
models used in the study are even less relevant today because of
improved weapons technology and changes in warfare. The Panel
concluded that the Quadrennial Defense Review sees major theater
warfare as a traditional force-on-force challenge (such as that
envisioned in Central Europe during the Cold War) and "inhibits the
transformation of the American military to fully exploit our
advantages as well as the vulnerabilities of potential opponents."
The 1997 Defense Science Board Task Force on the Deep Attack Weapons
Mix Study\9 and the services' official comments on the weapons mix
study also contended that the models were limited in their analysis
of potential future conflicts. The Task Force Board stated that the
weapons mix study models were very limited in their representation of
modern warfare maneuvers. The Board concluded that while the study
was conducted with the best available methods, "our confidence in the
modeling results must be limited, and our conclusions and acquisition
plans must be shaped by military experience and common sense."
The Air Force concluded in its official remarks that the study
clearly illustrated the limited ability of DOD's current models to
analyze critical components such as suppression of enemy air defenses
and the impacts of strategic attack and interdiction; nodal target
analysis; logistics; and command, control, communications, computers,
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. The Air Force said
that such impacts, "if properly captured in future modeling efforts,
may reduce the numbers of weapons required to achieve CINC
objectives."
In its official statement, the Navy reported that any computer model
output attempting to replicate the dynamic environment of the
battlefield must be tempered with military judgment, experience, and
common sense. The Navy further stated that the JCS conceptual
doctrine of the future should be considered when developing a future
weapons mix but that the models were incapable of doing this.
Instead, an attrition, force-on-force war in direct opposition to
Joint Vision 2010 was modeled.
The National Defense Panel, the Defense Science Board, and the Air
Force recommended that new models be developed for future studies and
decisions concerning ongoing force structure. DOD is developing a
new warfighting model called the Joint Warfare System, but its
introduction is several years away. The National Defense Panel said
the Joint Warfare System and other potential models are essential for
ongoing force structure decisions and recommended that DOD broaden
the range of models and accelerate their availability. The Defense
Science Board stated that its members know of no existing model that
can assess the relative value of multimission weapon systems over a
range of conflicts. The Board recommended that DOD develop
innovative concepts for rapid evaluation of broad military force
structure issues and concluded that the Joint Warfare System may
provide the modeling capability to overcome shortcomings in the
current analytical process. The Air Force stated that, if properly
developed, future modeling efforts may reduce the number of weapons
needed to meet the CINCs' objectives. The Air Force also said that
DOD's Joint Warfare System model may address some of these concerns
but that, in the end, sound military judgment is the remedy for
modeling limitations that may never be resolved.
Coupled with our findings of optimistic funding projections, inflated
weapon requirements, duplicative guided weapon programs, and
questionable quantities, we believe that DOD does not yet have a
sound basis to ensure that it has the proper and cost-effective mix
of deep attack weapon programs. While modeling is an important
aspect in evaluating alternative mixes of weapons and associated
risks, the ultimate decisions on the proper and cost-effective mix of
weapons will require sound and disciplined military and business
judgment.
--------------------
\8 The National Defense Panel: Assessment of the May 1997
Quadrennial Defense Review, May 15, 1997.
\9 Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Deep Attack
Weapons Mix Study (DAWMS), Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition and Technology, January 1997.
JOINT STAFF PLANS ANOTHER
WEAPONS MIX/AFFORDABILITY STUDY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:7
The JCS Strike Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment working
group will conduct another deep attack weapons mix/affordability
assessment in 1998. This group, according to a JCS official, was not
directly involved in the Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study. While plans
for this assessment are not complete, it is not expected to re-do the
weapons mix study. However, it will consider the weapons mix needed
to meet CINC requirements and will also review the weapons
requirement determination process. The results of the study will be
presented to the JCS.
OVERSIGHT OF GUIDED WEAPON
REQUIREMENTS AND ACQUISITION
PROGRAMS NEEDS IMPROVEMENT
============================================================ Chapter 5
DOD does not have a central oversight body or mechanism to examine
weapon programs in the aggregate and to determine how many weapons it
needs or how many it can afford. The task of developing and
procuring weapons rests with the services, and DOD examines weapon
requirements and capabilities on an individual basis rather than in
the aggregate before beginning production. DOD's oversight has not
prevented, among other things, duplication of development,
service-unique programs, and production schedule stretch-outs. Some
DOD officials believe improved oversight is needed, and DOD is
considering a proposal to expand the Joint Tactical Air-to-Air
Missile Office's responsibilities to include the coordination of
air-to-ground weapon requirements and programs.
OVERSIGHT OF SERVICES' GUIDED
WEAPON CAPABILITIES AND
PROGRAMS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 5:1
DOD is not providing effective management oversight and coordination
of the services' guided weapon capabilities and programs to contain
development costs, control logistics impacts, maximize warfighting
flexibility, and avoid production stretch-outs. This problem is not
new. In 1996, in our review of combat air power, we reported that
DOD has not been adequately examining its combat air power force
structure and its modernization plans from a joint perspective.\1 We
found that DOD does not routinely develop information on joint
mission needs and aggregate capabilities and therefore has little
assurance that decisions to buy, modify, or retire air power systems
are sound. We concluded that the Chairman could better advise the
Secretary of Defense on programs and budgets if he conducted more
comprehensive assessments in key mission areas. We added that
broader assessments that tackle the more controversial issues would
enable the Chairman to better assist the Secretary of Defense in
making the difficult trade-off decisions that will likely be
required.
The Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces reported
that it is not clear that DOD has the correct balance of deep attack
weapons and stated that "currently, no one in DOD has specific
responsibility for specifying the overall number and mix of deep
attack systems." The report concluded that this situation illustrates
the lack of a comprehensive process to review capabilities and
requirements in the aggregate. Current institutional practices
"allow the Services to develop and field new weapons without a
rigorous, DOD-wide assessment of the need for these weapons and how
they will be integrated with the other elements planned for our
arsenal."
The individual services have always been the primary players in the
acquisition process and have been given broad responsibilities to
organize, train, and equip their forces under title 10 of the U.S.
Code. Officials in both the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
the Office of the Secretary of Defense view their own role in
determining weapon requirements and acquisition programs only as
advisory. Neither office has taken responsibility for critically
assessing the overall capability of the guided weapons in
development, production, and inventory or for determining the
long-term cost-effectiveness of the services' guided weapon
acquisition plans.
To achieve a stronger joint orientation within DOD, Congress enacted
the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of
1986. This act gave the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
the CINCs of the combatant commands stronger roles in DOD matters,
including the acquisition process. As principal military adviser to
the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman is now expected to assess
military requirements for defense acquisition programs from a joint
warfighting military perspective and to advise the Secretary on the
priority of requirements identified by the CINCs and the extent to
which program recommendations and budget proposals of the military
departments conform to these priorities. The Chairman is also
expected to submit to the Secretary alternative program
recommendations and budget proposals to achieve greater conformance
with CINC priorities. Subsequent legislation has given the Chairman
additional responsibilities to examine ways DOD can eliminate or
reduce duplicative capabilities.\2
Within the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the J8 Directorate tracks the
progress of weapon acquisition programs, assesses the current
capabilities available to CINCs, and advises the services of apparent
deficiencies. In addition, a second group associated with JCS--the
Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC)\3 --has the authority to
advise the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of
Defense on CINC requirement priorities, assess military requirements
for defense acquisition programs,\4 submit alternative program and
budget recommendations, and prepare net assessments of capabilities.
JROC validates the mission need statement required for initiating
major acquisition programs as well as the key operational performance
parameters for the proposed weapon. Finally, the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff evaluates the extent to which the services'
proposed guided weapon budgets conform to the priorities established
in DOD's strategic plans (such as the Quadrennial Defense Review) and
to CINCs' requirements and makes recommendations to the Secretary of
Defense.
The Defense Acquisition Board, chaired by the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition and Technology, is the senior advisory group
within DOD chartered to oversee the defense acquisition process. The
Board's mission is to help define and validate new system
requirements, examine trade-offs between cost and performance,
explore alternatives to new research and development, and recommend
full-scale development and full-rate production. The Board has broad
review responsibility for decision milestones during critical
acquisition phases. In addition to reviewing the mission need
statements and operational requirements documents in the initial
phases of development, the Board also reviews the detailed analyses
of alternative solutions prepared by the services. These analyses
provide the rationale for one alternative over another and should
include a comparison of current and upgraded weapons with new
proposed weapons.
In 1996, Congress, in addition to asking DOD to conduct its Deep
Attack Weapons Mix Study, requested a report on how DOD approves
development of new guided weapons and avoids duplication and
redundancy in guided weapon programs.\5 It also sought information on
the feasibility of carrying out joint development and procurement of
guided weapons. In response, the Secretary of Defense issued a
report to Congress in April 1996 on the process for approving and
initiating development programs.\6 The report noted that through
reviews by JROC and the Defense Acquisition Board, several major
guided weapon acquisition programs had been designated as joint
programs. DOD concluded that redundancies and duplication in the
services' weapon acquisitions had been minimized as a result of
reviews by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff.
To the contrary, DOD's oversight approach to the services' weapon
acquisition and procurement has had very limited effect on guided
weapon programs. DOD's oversight has not prevented inflated funding
projections for guided weapons, as discussed in chapter 2; inflated
requirements for guided weapons, as discussed in chapter 3; and
instances of service-unique weapons, overlap and duplication,
production inefficiencies, increased logistics burdens, and reduced
interoperability, as discussed in chapter 4. For example, JROC and
the Defense Acquisition Board have approved the acquisition of
several guided weapon programs with very similar capabilities--JASSM,
SLAM-ER, the Tactical Tomahawk, and the Unitary version of the
JSOW--without adequate consideration of available aggregate
capabilities or aggregate requirements for such weapons.
--------------------
\1 Combat Air Power: Joint Mission Assessments Needed Before Making
Program and Budget Decisions (GAO/NSIAD-96-177, Sept. 20, 1996).
\2 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 (P.L.
102-484, sec. 901).
\3 JROC is a cross-service, decisional council chaired by the Vice
Chairman, JCS. Members include the Vice Chiefs of the Army, the
Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps.
\4 JROC is required to review the requirement for any program
designated as a major acquisition program and can choose to review
the requirement for other programs.
\5 P.L. 104-106, sec. 261.
\6 Precision Guided Munitions Acquisitions Process Report, April
1996.
LIMITED RECOGNITION OF THE NEED
TO IMPROVE OVERSIGHT AND
COORDINATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 5:2
Some DOD officials have recognized a need for increased oversight of
guided weapon programs. According to these officials, the Department
established an office to oversee acquisition of air-to-ground weapons
within the Air Force Office of Requirements and within the Navy's
Aviation Requirements Branch. However, these oversight
responsibilities are adjunct to the regular duties of these offices,
and no meetings have taken place in over 4 years.
DOD has had more success in providing oversight of air-to-air missile
programs. In fiscal year 1989, in response to congressional
concerns, the Joint Tactical Air-to-Air Missile Office was
established to eliminate duplication in air-to-air missile programs.
The Office has representatives from the Navy and the Air Force
requirements branches, and its operations are guided by a memorandum
of agreement and a charter. Representatives are assigned to the
Office rather than fulfilling their duties as adjunct
responsibilities. In recent years, the Office was successful in
avoiding duplication in the services' air-to-air missile programs by
ensuring the continued joint development and procurement of the
Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile and the Air Intercept
Missile-9X by the Navy and the Air Force.
Currently, no joint coordinating office exists for the requirements
and acquisition of deep attack weapons. A proposal is circulating
within the Air Force and the Navy to expand the responsibilities of
the current Joint Tactical Air-to-Air Missile Office to include the
coordination of air-to-ground weapons. Although the scope of such an
office would have to be expanded significantly to address all guided
weapons, the success of the Air-to-Air Missile Office has shown that
the Air Force and the Navy can effectively coordinate their
requirements and establish joint programs for the acquisition of
similar weapons. Expanding the Office's purview to include guided
weapons would, in our view, provide some assurance that decisions in
the deep attack area have been assessed from the perspective of the
services' combined requirements, capabilities, and acquisition plans.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
============================================================ Chapter 6
CONCLUSIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 6:1
DOD's current investment strategy for guided weapons may not be
executable as proposed because it is contingent on sizable increases
in procurement funding within a relatively fixed defense budget. As
major commitments are made to the initial procurement of the planned
guided weapon programs over the next several years, a significant
imbalance is likely to result between funding requirements and
available funds. As a result of understated cost estimates and
overly optimistic funding assumptions, more programs have been
approved than can be supported by available funds. Such imbalances
have historically led to program stretch-outs, reduced annual
procurement rates, higher unit costs, and delayed deliveries to
operational units. Every effort needs to be made to avoid these "pay
more for less" outcomes. Further, these imbalances may be long-term
and may restrict DOD's flexibility to respond to unexpected
requirements or to procure potentially innovative systems.
The current inventory of deep attack weapons (guided and unguided) is
both large and capable, and DOD is improving some weapons to make
them even more effective. Although the existing inventory is
considered sufficient to support the current objectives of defense
guidance, DOD's plans for individual weapons will, in the aggregate,
almost double the size of the guided weapon inventory at a time when
worldwide threats are stable or declining. DOD expects the new, more
modern weapons to enable warfighters to accomplish the same
objectives with fewer weapons and casualties and less unintended
collateral damage.
DOD needs to establish an aggregate requirement for deep attack
capabilities and assess the incremental contribution of its guided
weapon acquisitions. Without such a requirement and analyses, it is
difficult to understand DOD's rationale as to why, in the aggregate,
it needs to almost double the size of its guided weapon inventory,
particularly in today's budgetary and security environment. Further,
the services' requirement processes are focused on individual systems
and appear to inflate the quantity of each system needed. For
example, the services use conservative assumptions concerning threats
and target lists, appropriate weapon choices, the use of advanced
tactics, and strategic reserves. The use of more realistic
assumptions would lead to lower weapon requirements.
The services have had numerous opportunities to develop and procure
guided weapons in a more cost-effective and economical manner.
However, when reviewing the services' currently planned programs in
the aggregate, we found (1) widespread overlap and duplication of
guided weapon types and capabilities, (2) questionable quantities
being procured for each target class, and (3) a preference for longer
standoff and more accurate weapons rather than for options that may
be as effective and less costly.
DOD's Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study was an opportunity for DOD to
critically assess its weapons procurement programs and provide a
basis for restructuring them. However, despite the significant
effort that went into the study, it still does not, in our view, give
DOD the assurance that it has the proper and cost-effective mix of
deep attack weapon programs. Therefore, DOD cannot be confident that
force structure and modernization decisions will result in the most
cost-effective mix of forces to fulfill the national military
strategy.
Because DOD does not routinely develop information on joint mission
needs and aggregate capabilities, it has little assurance that
decisions to buy, modify, or retire deep attack weapons are sound.
Broader assessments that tackle the more controversial deep attack
issues would enable the Secretary of Defense to make the difficult
trade-off decisions that will likely be required. Broadening the
current joint warfare capabilities assessment processes would be a
good starting point. Alternatively, the establishment of a DOD-wide
coordinating office for requirements and possible joint programs for
the acquisition of deep attack weapons, modeled after the Joint
Tactical Air-to-Air Office, would provide some assurance that
decisions in the deep attack area have been assessed from the
perspective of the services' combined requirements, capabilities, and
acquisition plans.
RECOMMENDATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 6:2
DOD's planned spending for guided weapons will escalate rapidly over
the next few years, and key decisions will be made to start
procurement of some very costly and possibly unneeded guided weapons.
Instead of continuing to start procurement programs that may not be
executable as proposed, DOD should determine how much procurement
funding can realistically be expected to be available for guided
weapons over the long term and cost-effectively execute those
programs within that level of funding. In doing so, DOD should also
consider the already large inventory of guided weapons and the
advances in technologies that are expected to increase the
effectiveness of future weapons as well as the current and projected
decline in threat.
Therefore, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense, in conjunction
with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretaries of
the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force,
-- establish an aggregate requirement for deep attack capabilities;
-- reevaluate the assumptions used in guided weapon requirements
determination processes to better reflect the new international
situation, realistic target sets, enhanced weapon effectiveness,
proper weapon selection, and the use of advanced tactics; and
-- reevaluate the planned guided weapon acquisition programs in
light of existing capabilities and the current budgetary and
security environment to determine whether the procurement of all
planned guided weapon types and quantities (1) is necessary and
cost-effective in the aggregate and (2) can clearly be carried
out as proposed within realistic, long-term projections of
procurement funding.
Further, we recommend, as we did in 1996 in our combat air power
reports, that the Secretary of Defense, with the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, develop an assessment process that yields more
comprehensive information on procurement requirements and aggregate
capabilities in key mission areas such as deep attack. This can be
done by broadening the current joint warfare capabilities assessment
process or developing an alternative mechanism. One such alternative
could be the establishment of a DOD-wide coordinating office to
consider the services' combined requirements, capabilities, and
acquisition plans for deep attack weapons. This office could be
modeled after the Joint Tactical Air-to-Air Missile Office.
DOD COMMENTS AND OUR EVALUATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 6:3
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially
concurred with our recommendations, stating that the Joint Staff will
be conducting a follow-up to the Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study and
that a coordinating office will be established to assess joint weapon
requirements. However, DOD stated that our report takes a snapshot
of today's inventory and ignores how and why DOD got there and how it
is profiting from that experience. DOD said our report fails to
recognize its significant efforts to improve its requirements,
acquisition, and oversight processes.
A follow-on study to the Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study is a good step
but we urge DOD to conclude the study with decisions on which
programs to cut back and which to end in order to ensure that its
programs are fully executable within expected budgets. Also, as a
partial solution to the need for more comprehensive assessments, we
see DOD's agreement to establish a body to review and deconflict
joint air-to-surface requirements as important. We agree with DOD
that such a body might better resolve issues among the services with
less DOD intervention. We urge DOD to pursue the establishment of
such a body and believe it should address all deep attack
requirements, not just air-to-surface requirements.
This report focuses on DOD's plans to acquire additional guided
weapons for deep attack missions within the context of the existing
inventory of deep attack weapons. DOD has a variety of acquisition
reform initiatives underway that may have an impact on the structure
and management of individual acquisition programs. However, these
initiatives have little bearing on the determination of DOD-wide
requirements for deep attack weapons or on how to procure those
requirements in the most cost-effective manner possible.
We have also considered DOD's efforts to improve its processes. In
the recent past, we have examined in considerable depth DOD's
requirements, acquisitions, and oversight processes.\1 While we
acknowledge DOD's efforts and progress to date in improving those
processes, the problems reported here of optimistic funding
projections, inflated requirements, overlapping and duplicative
programs, and service-unique programs continue. We urge DOD to
continue its acquisition reforms and other initiatives but also to
reexamine the oversight process to determine ways to provide more
discipline in its processes and to fund fewer programs.
Although DOD's official comments do not address the mismatch between
commitments and resources, DOD officials stated at the exit meeting
on this report that, due to the mismatch between commitments and
resources, DOD plans to reduce fiscal year 2000 procurement
quantities for several guided weapon programs. Reductions in annual
procurement quantities and stretch-outs in procurement schedules
should not be the inevitable solutions to the mismatch between its
commitments to programs and expected resources. Every effort should
be made to avoid these "pay more for less" outcomes.
(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix I
--------------------
\1 High Risk Series (GAO/HR-97-6, Feb. 1997) and Combat Air Power
(GAO/NSIAD-96-177, Sept. 20, 1996).
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
============================================================ Chapter 6
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
The following are GAO's comments on the Department of Defense's (DOD)
letter dated September 16, 1998.
GAO COMMENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 6:4
1. As we point out in the report, the Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study
is not, in itself, a solution but a tool to help defense
decisionmakers make the difficult but necessary decisions in the
current budgetary and security environment. Nevertheless, the
Weapons Mix Study was important in that it attempted to address the
DOD-wide requirement for deep attack weapons; we urge DOD to continue
and improve on the process.
2. We recognize that DOD has a number of initiatives underway to
control the cost of ongoing programs. However, as our report points
out, DOD needs to fully address the affordability of programs before
they are approved. Even if DOD were to address the cost of each
program, there are too many guided weapon procurement programs to be
effectively supported with the limited amount of available
procurement funding. This problem results in DOD stretching out its
procurement programs and consequently increasing unit costs. We
believe that this is an outcome DOD should work to avoid.
3. We believe that DOD could do much better in terms of following
its policy on joint guided weapon programs. For example, the Joint
Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) and the unitary variant of
the Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW) are joint in name only.
4. In the report, we have addressed the roles and responsibilities
of those involved in oversight of requirements for and acquisition of
guided weapons. As we stated in the report, the oversight processes
need to be improved. The Office of the Secretary of Defense and the
Joint Chiefs need to use not only military judgment but exercise
sound business practices in their evaluation of the services' guided
weapon plans.
5. We also believe that the weapons mix study process should
continue and be improved. However, the process should rely on models
for information, not answers, or as a substitute for sound military
judgment and business practices.
6. We recognize that much effort has been exerted to improve the
services' requirements processes. However, we believe that much more
needs to be done. The current processes and models permit the use of
conservative assumptions that unnecessarily inflate requirements.
7. DOD does not explain in its written comments how it believes it
can execute its guided weapon acquisition programs as planned within
budget limitations. However, at the exit conference for this report,
DOD officials told us that they fully expect to reduce annual
procurement quantities and stretch-out procurement schedules, thereby
accepting higher unit costs.
8. We believe DOD's agreement to establish a body to review and
deconflict joint air-to-surface requirements is a partial solution to
the need for more comprehensive assessments. As DOD states, a body
such as this might better resolve issues among the services with less
DOD intervention. While we urge DOD to pursue the establishment of
such a body, we believe it should address all deep attack
requirements, not just air-to-surface requirements.
MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
========================================================== Appendix II
NATIONAL SECURITY AND
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
David B. Best
William J. Gillies
ATLANTA FIELD OFFICE
William R. Graveline
Carol T. Mebane
Dana S. Solomon
CHICAGO/DAYTON FIELD OFFICE
Matthew R. Mongin
Myra A. Watts
Gerald W. Wood
*** End of document. ***
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