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BOSNIA PEACE OPERATION - PACE OF IMPLEMENTING DAYTON ACCELERATED AS INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT INCREASED (GAO/NSIAD-98-138)

Cover
================================================================ COVER
Report to the Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S.  Senate
June 1998
BOSNIA PEACE OPERATION - PACE OF
IMPLEMENTING DAYTON ACCELERATED AS
INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT
INCREASED
GAO/NSIAD-98-138
Bosnia Peace Operation
(711299)
Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV
  CRS - Congressional Research Service
  DOD - Department of Defense
  EBRD - European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
  HDZ - Croatian Democratic Union
  IFOR - Implementation Force
  IMET - International Military Education and Training
  IMF - International Monetary Fund
  IPTF - International Police Task Force
  JCC - Joint Civil Commission
  NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization
  OHR - Office of the High Representative
  OSCE - Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
  SDA - Bosniak Party of Democratic Action
  SDS - Serb Democratic Party
  SFOR - Stabilization Force
  SHAPE - Supreme Headquarters Allied Power Europe
  SNS - Serb People's Union
  SRT - Serb Radio and Television
  UNHCR - United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
  UNMAC - United Nations Mine Action Center
  UNMIBH - United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina
  USAID - U.S.  Agency for International Development
  USIA - U.S.  Information Agency
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Letter
=============================================================== LETTER
B-279046
June 2, 1998
The Honorable Jesse Helms
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Dear Mr.  Chairman: 
This report responds to your request that we update our review of the
Bosnia peace operation, specifically the progress made since mid-1997
in achieving the operation's objectives. 
We are sending copies of the report to the Secretaries of State and
Defense, the Administrator of the U.S.  Agency for International
Development, and to other appropriate congressional Committees.  We
will make copies available to others upon request. 
This report was prepared under the direction of Harold J.  Johnson,
Associate Director, International Relations and Trade Issues, who may
be contacted on (202) 512-4128 if you or your staff have any
questions about this report.  Other major contributors to the report
are listed in appendix XI. 
Sincerely yours,
Benjamin F.  Nelson
Director, International Relations
  and Trade Issues
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
============================================================ Chapter 0
PURPOSE
The December 1995 General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and
Herzegovina and its supporting annexes (also known as the Dayton
Agreement) provided the structure and mandates for an international
operation intended to promote an enduring peace in Bosnia and
stability in the region.  In May 1997, GAO reported that the Bosnia
peace operation had created and sustained an environment that allowed
the peace process to move forward, but reconciliation had not yet
occurred due to the intransigence of Bosnia's political leaders. 
Thus, according to many observers, given the pace of political and
social change in Bosnia at that time, the presence of an
international military force would be required after the current
military mission ends in June 1998 if a resumed conflict were to be
prevented.\1
At the request of the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, this report provides an update on the progress made in
achieving the four key Dayton objectives.  The key objectives are to
create conditions that allow Bosnia's political leaders to (1)
provide security for the people of Bosnia; (2) create a unified,
democratic Bosnia that respects the rule of law and internationally
recognized human rights, including cooperating with the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (hereafter referred to as
the war crimes tribunal) in arresting and bringing those charged with
war crimes to trial; (3) ensure the rights of people to return to
their prewar homes; and (4) rebuild the economy. 
--------------------
\1 Bosnia Peace Operation:  Progress Toward Achieving the Dayton
Agreement's Goals (GAO/NSIAD-97-132, May 5, 1997). 
   BACKGROUND
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1
The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was fought from 1992 through 1995
among Bosnia's three major ethnic/religious groups--Bosniaks
(Muslims), Serbs (Eastern Orthodox Christians), and Croats (Roman
Catholics), the latter two being supported by Serbia and Croatia,
respectively.\2 During the war, Bosnian Serbs and Croats sought to
partition Bosnia and established ethnically pure states,\3 while
Bosniaks claimed to support a unified, multiethnic Bosnia.  United
Nations and other international mediators' attempts throughout the
war to stop the fighting were generally unsuccessful, until U.S.-led
negotiations in 1995 culminated in a cease-fire in October 1995 and
the Dayton Agreement in December. 
The Dayton Agreement declared Bosnia to be a single, multiethnic
state consisting of two entities that were created during the war: 
(1) the Bosnian Serb Republic, known as Republika Srpska; and (2) the
Federation, an entity that joins together Bosniak- and Bosnian
Croat-controlled areas of Bosnia.\4 Most areas within Bosnia, with
the exception of central Bosnia, are populated and controlled by a
predominant ethnic group as a result of population movements during
the war. 
In signing the Dayton Agreement, the parties\5 agreed to implement
numerous security, political, and economic measures.  To assist the
parties in their efforts, the agreement established military and
civilian components of the Bosnia peace operation.  On the military
side of the operation, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
authorized two military forces--first the Implementation Force and
later the Stabilization Force (SFOR)--that had the authority to use
force to separate and control the three militaries in Bosnia and to
ensure that they maintain the cease-fire.  The NATO-led forces also
supported the operation's civilian aspects when requested and if
resources allowed.  On the operation's civilian side, the Office of
the High Representative was established to assist the parties in
implementing the agreement and to coordinate international assistance
efforts.  Other organizations participating in the operation include
the United Nations, with its unarmed, civilian police monitoring
operation--the International Police Task Force; the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe; and the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). 
In light of the slow progress toward achieving the Dayton Agreement's
goals, beginning in late May 1997 the international community began
to intensify pressure on the political leaders of Bosnia, Croatia,
and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and
later supported the decision of the High Representative to expand the
interpretation of his Dayton authority to include imposing temporary
solutions when Bosnia's political leaders were stalemated.  Further,
SFOR began to support more actively the civil aspects of the peace
operation. 
In mid-December 1997, President Clinton announced that the United
States would, in principle, continue to take part in the NATO-led
military presence in Bosnia after June 1998, thereby enabling the
operation's civil aspects to proceed in a secure atmosphere.  The
President did not set a deadline for the new mission; instead, he
said it would be tied to benchmarks that when met would create a
self-sustaining, secure environment and allow NATO troops to be
withdrawn.\6 NATO members and non-NATO participants in the operation
agreed in late February 1998 that the post-SFOR force would retain
SFOR's name, mission, and overall force levels.  According to a
Department of Defense (DOD) official, NATO will approve the operation
plan for the new mission by mid-June 1998. 
Current estimates are that the United States will provide a total of
about $10.6 billion for military and civilian support to the Bosnia
peace operation from fiscal years 1996 through 1999:  about $8.6
billion in incremental costs\7 for military-related operations and
about $2 billion for the civilian sector.  DOD estimates for fiscal
years 1998 and 1999 assume that U.S.  force levels in Bosnia will
stay at around 8,500 through June 1998 and then draw down to about
6,900 by late October 1998.\8 The U.S.  military will also have
deployed an additional 3,750 troops in Croatia, Hungary, and Italy in
support of the operation. 
--------------------
\2 This report defines "Bosniaks" as "Muslims," the definition used
in State Department human rights reports.  The report also refers to
any citizen of Bosnia as a "Bosnian," regardless of ethnic group. 
\3 These states, Republika Srpska and Herceg-Bosna, were never
recognized by the international community, whereas Bosnia and
Herzegovina was granted diplomatic recognition in 1992 and was a
member of the United Nations. 
\4 U.S.  mediation resulted in the establishment of the Federation in
March 1994.  Prior to this, the Bosniak and Bosnian Croat armies were
fighting each other in central Bosnia.  The Federation agreement led
to a cease-fire between these two armies that held throughout the
remainder of the war. 
\5 The parties to the agreement are the political leaders of Bosnia's
three major ethnic groups, Croatia, and the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). 
\6 NATO is in the process of developing criteria for determining when
conditions in Bosnia would allow a substantial reduction in SFOR's
force structure and levels. 
\7 As used in this report, "incremental costs" means those additional
costs that would not have been incurred if it were not for the
operation. 
\8 DOD budget estimates assume that the total NATO force in Bosnia
will likely remain the same but that U.S.  troop commitments will
decrease from 8,500 to 6,900 with the expectation that other
countries will contribute additional resources to meet NATO
operational requirements.  It will not be known what other countries
actually contribute, or whether NATO operational requirements will be
met, until NATO completes its force generation process.  According to
a U.S.  Army document, U.S.  force levels will temporarily increase
in June by about 2,000 troops as units rotate into and out of Bosnia
and by up to about 1,000 troops around the time of Bosnia's September
1998 elections. 
   RESULTS IN BRIEF
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2
The actions taken by the international community starting in mid-1997
accelerated the pace of progress toward reaching the Dayton
Agreement's objectives.  During this period, with the military
situation remaining stable, some advancements were made in providing
security for the people of Bosnia, creating a democratic environment,
establishing multiethnic institutions at all levels of government,
arresting those indicted for war crimes, returning people to their
prewar homes across ethnic lines, and rebuilding the infrastructure
and revitalizing the economy.  Moreover, there has been a weakening
of hard-line Bosnian Serb control over police and the media and the
election of a new, moderate Prime Minister in Republika Srpska. 
However, the goal of a self-sustaining peace process in Bosnia
remains elusive, primarily due to the continued intransigence of
Bosnia's political leaders.  Almost all of the results were achieved
only with intense international involvement and pressure, both
political and military; for example, the High Representative imposed
numerous temporary solutions when Bosnia's political leaders could
not reach agreement.  Further, a substantial NATO-led force is still
needed to provide security for the civil aspects of the operation. 
Conditions will have to improve significantly before international
military forces could substantially draw down; even with the
accelerated pace of implementing the agreement, it will likely be
some time before these conditions are realized.  Bosnia for all
intents and purposes lacks functioning, multiethnic governments at
all levels; a large number of those indicted for war crimes remains
at large; about 1.3 million people have not yet been resettled as
Bosnia's political leaders continue to prevent people from returning
to their homes across ethnic lines; and few economic links have been
reestablished among Bosnia's ethnic groups or between its two
entities. 
   PRINCIPAL FINDINGS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3
      PROGRESS IN PROVIDING A
      SECURE ENVIRONMENT
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3.1
The Dayton Agreement sought "lasting security" in Bosnia based on a
durable cessation of hostilities,\9 civilian police that operate in
accordance with democratic policing standards, and a stable military
balance in the region.  The U.S.  government has sought to achieve a
stable military balance through arms control efforts called for by
the agreement and the train and equip program for the Federation
military that was established outside the Dayton framework.  Under
heavy international pressure, progress continued to be made toward
achieving the goal of a secure environment, but much remained to be
accomplished, particularly in the area of developing democratic
civilian police forces. 
To date, SFOR has continued to monitor and control the three
militaries in Bosnia and ensured that they continue to observe the
cease-fire and remain separated.  Thus, SFOR created general security
that allowed the operation's civilian organizations to implement the
civil aspects of the agreement.  A key event in enhancing the
security environment occurred when, under NATO direction, SFOR
defined and started to control Bosnia's special police units as
military forces in August 1997.  This step was designed to inhibit
their ability to cause security problems and to help accelerate the
pace of civilian police restructuring, particularly in Republika
Srpska. 
Significant early steps were taken in 1997 in certifying, training,
reducing, and ethnically integrating Bosnia's civilian police
forces--estimated at about 45,000 in 1995--in accordance with
democratic policing standards.  For example, Bosniak and Bosnian
Croat political leaders had established joint Bosniak and Bosnian
Croat police patrols in two ethnically mixed cantons\10 in the fall
of 1997.  Further, after almost 2 years of refusing to cooperate with
the International Police Task Force's restructuring program, in
September 1997 both the relatively moderate President Plavsic in
Banja Luka and hard-line Bosnian Serb leaders in Pale agreed to
restructure their police forces in accordance with the task force's
democratic policing standards. 
Despite these positive but limited steps, political leaders of all
three ethnic groups continue to use Bosnia's police forces as a means
of furthering their political aims.  The police forces remained the
primary violator of human rights, often failing to provide security
for people of other ethnic groups.  Some police have protected the
rights of all citizens regardless of ethnicity, according to a State
Department official; however, the development of democratic police in
Bosnia will require a change in Bosnia's political leadership and the
control they still wield over the police.  Further, many observers
told us that the development of democratic police would also require
a generational change in police leadership, as current police leaders
were trained to serve an authoritarian state rather than the people. 
Moreover, according to a State Department official, Bosnian Serb
political leaders in Pale have not consistently followed through on
their commitment to restructure their police forces. 
By the end of 1997, political leaders of Bosnia's three ethnic
groups, as well as Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
had largely complied with arms control measures designed to achieve a
regional military balance, a significant change from the situation in
mid-1997.  Most importantly, the parties destroyed or disposed of
about 6,600 heavy weapons on schedule. 
Further, the U.S.-led international program to train, equip, and
integrate the Bosniak and Bosnian Croat militaries into a Federation
military also made progress.  For example, it established an
integrated Federation defense ministry and joint high command in
1997.  However, the Bosniak and Bosnian Croat armies still respond to
separate chains of command, as the Federation defense law calls for
these two armies to be fully integrated into a unified Federation
military by August 1999. 
--------------------
\9 The Dayton Agreement did not define "a durable cessation of
hostilities."
\10 A canton is a level of government in the Federation that links
together a number of municipalities. 
      PROGRESS IN DEVELOPING A
      UNIFIED, DEMOCRATIC BOSNIA
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3.2
Beginning in mid-1997, progress accelerated slightly in establishing
the institutions, laws, and practices of a unified, democratic Bosnia
that respects the rule of law and adheres to international standards
of human rights.  Nevertheless, continued obstruction by Bosnia's
political leaders impeded the process at all levels.  By the end of
the year, this obstruction required the international community to
impose temporary solutions to break political impasses at the
national and municipal levels.  For example, the High Representative
imposed a number of solutions to resolve outstanding issues such as
the citizenship law and the design of a common currency coupon and
Bosnia's national flag. 
In early 1998 a moderate, pro-Dayton Prime Minister was elected in
Republika Srpska with the support of a multiparty, multiethnic
coalition.  This event holds promise for the development of
institutions, laws, and practices that would link the ethnic groups;
for example, the new Prime Minister was credited with facilitating
agreements to resume interentity postal deliveries and rail traffic. 
However, as of May 1998, questions remained about whether the new
government would have the resources or political will or ability to
fulfill the Prime Minister's pledges.  Several reports in late April
and early May 1998 concluded the the President of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia supported hard-liners attempts to destabilize
the now government. 
Bosnia's municipal elections held in September 1997 resulted in
increased pluralism and the election of many multiethnic local
assemblies; however, strong international involvement was needed to
force the formation and continued functioning of many of these new
governments.  By early May 1998, 133 municipalities had received
final certification, and 3 had received arbitration awards that had
not yet been implemented. 
The delays in forming new municipal governments, as well as the
reluctance of Bosnia's political leaders to develop effective
national and Federation institutions, is a continuing manifestation
of the attitudes of Bosnian Serb and Croats toward a unified
Bosnia.\11
The vast majority of these two groups continued to want to establish
states separate from Bosnia.  Bosniaks, on the other hand, continued
to advocate support for a unified, multiethnic Bosnia, but, according
to some analysts, with Bosniaks in control. 
The overall human rights situation has substantially improved since
GAO's last report, although major problems remained and the overall
situation remained volatile as of April 1998.  For example, Bosnians
were able to move more freely across ethnic boundaries, due largely
to the success of the International Police Task Force policy of
removing illegal police checkpoints, a policy implemented with SFOR
support.  Further, municipal and Republika Srpska parliamentary
elections were held in a much more open political environment than in
1996, as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe more
closely supervised the electoral process and the political situation
improved in Republika Srpska.  Moreover, the international community,
including SFOR, took steps to shut down hard-line, Serb-controlled
media outlets that inflamed ethnic hatreds and instigated violence
against the international community. 
However, strong ethnic animosities and other barriers to freedom of
movement continued to greatly inhibit interaction among the ethnic
groups at the end of the year; people continued to vote largely along
ethnic lines; and, although more open and less vitriolic, the
country's major media outlets remained either under the control of or
heavily influenced by the ruling political parties.  Further,
according to SFOR data, incidents of ethnic conflict increased
significantly from January through April 1998. 
--------------------
\11 According to a State Department official, delays in forming new
municipal governments can also be attributed to interruptions and
diversion of resources caused by the unanticipated parliamentary
elections in Republika Srpska during late 1997. 
      PROGRESS IN SURRENDERING
      INDICTEES TO THE WAR CRIMES
      TRIBUNAL
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3.3
The Dayton Agreement calls for all parties--including Bosnia's Serb,
Croat, and Bosniak authorities, as well as the governments of Croatia
and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia--to arrest people indicted for
war crimes and surrender them to the war crimes tribunal.  Bringing
to justice indictees--particularly Radovan Karadzic, a major alleged
war criminal--is viewed by many participants in the operation as
critically important to the peace process in Bosnia.  Considerable
progress was made toward achieving this goal in 1997 and early 1998,
but the majority of indictees remained at large due to the
noncompliance of Bosnian Serb and Serbian political leaders. 
The pace of surrendering indictees to the international war crimes
tribunal at the Hague accelerated from 8 (of 74 indictees) as of
April 25, 1997, to 30 (of 62 indictees) as of May 27, 1998,\12 and
the number of at-large indictees dropped from 67 to 32.  The increase
in surrenders occurred because United Nations peacekeepers in Croatia
and SFOR troops in Bosnia detained indictees, after not doing so
during 1996 and the first half of 1997; the Croatian government,
under international pressure and threatened with various penalties by
the United States, assisted in arranging the voluntary surrender of
Bosnian Croat indictees; the new Republika Srpska Prime Minister
encouraged indictees to surrender voluntarily to the tribunal; and
Bosnian Croat and Serb indictees became more willing to surrender
voluntarily.  Also, in an attempt to reallocate its resources, the
war crimes tribunal withdrew charges against a large number of
Bosnian Serb indictees who had not been arrested or surrendered,
thereby further reducing the number of at-large indictees.\13
The international community took steps during the second half of 1997
that, combined with Republika Srpska's improving political situation,
weakened the hold of Radovan Karadzic on Republika Srpska's police,
media, revenues, and institutions, thereby decreasing his ability to
obstruct Dayton implementation.  However, as of May 1998 he remained
at large and capable of obstructing the peace process through his
continued, although substantially reduced, control over some of these
levers of power. 
--------------------
\12 Excludes indictees who have died and includes three indictees who
surrendered themselves to the tribunal but were released before trial
for lack of evidence. 
\13 See Former Yugoslavia:  War Crimes Tribunal's Work Load Exceeds
Capacity (GAO/NSIAD-98-134, June 2, 1998) for further information on
the work of the tribunal. 
      PROGRESS IN RETURNING
      REFUGEES AND DISPLACED
      PERSONS TO THEIR HOMES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3.4
The Dayton Agreement mandated the right of Bosnia's nearly 1.3
million refugees and 1 million internally displaced people to freely
return to their prewar homes and to have their prewar property
restored to them.\14 Despite these guarantees and intensive efforts
of the international community, obstruction by Bosnia's political
leaders, particularly Bosnian Serbs and Croats, resulted in most of
the 180,000 returnees in 1997 locating in areas where their ethnic
group represents a majority of the population.\15 As in 1996, fear,
stemming from a lack of personal security; violence triggered by
attempted cross-ethnic returns; poor economic prospects; and a lack
of suitable housing all combined to hinder returns across ethnic
lines. 
According to UNHCR data,\16 the pace of minority returns increased
from an estimated 9,500 in 1996 to 39,000 in 1997, for a total of
about 48,500 since the signing of the Dayton Agreement.  Most
minority returns took place in the Federation, with very few
non-Serbs returning to Republika Srpska.  Many returns occurred in
areas such as Brcko, Stolac, and Drvar, areas that had seen few or no
returns in 1996 and early 1997.  Limited polling and reports from
Bosnians and observers indicate that segments of all three major
ethnic groups, particularly Bosniaks, do want to return to their
homes across ethnic lines.  However, Bosnian Serb and Croat political
leaders often discourage people of their own ethnic groups from
attempting to return home to areas controlled by another ethnic
group. 
The international community supported phased and orderly minority
returns in 1997 by providing an SFOR security presence in many
contentious return areas; helping to establish joint Bosniak-Bosnian
Croat police patrols in the Federation; and targeting economic
assistance to "open" municipalities in which local leaders have
demonstrated a commitment to allowing the return of other ethnic
groups.  The Federation parliament passed three laws in March 1998
that would remove restrictions on minority returns to Sarajevo and
other areas of the Federation.  As of mid-April 1998, however, these
laws were not yet implemented, and Republika Srpska had not revised
its property legislation.  Bosnia's political leaders had not yet
developed integrated return policies and procedures that would allow
phased and orderly returns across ethnic lines without an SFOR
security presence. 
--------------------
\14 They also have the right to be compensated for any property that
cannot be restored to them. 
\15 In 1997, 120,000 refugees returned to Bosnia and about 60,000
people displaced within Bosnia returned home, bringing the total
number of returns to 431,000 since the signing of the Dayton
Agreement.  According to a UNHCR report, during 1997 many refugees
who returned became displaced within Bosnia because they were unable
to go back to their prewar homes across ethnic lines. 
\16 UNHCR numbers are generally acknowledged to be the best available
on minority returns.  However, UNHCR cautions that these numbers
should be considered broad estimates only, as they may understate
minority returns in some areas of the country and overstate them in
others, particularly in Sarajevo. 
      PROGRESS IN REBUILDING THE
      ECONOMY
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3.5
Economic conditions continued to improve throughout Bosnia during
1997 but were threatened by the inaction of Bosnia's political
leaders in developing a common economic framework for the country's
reconstruction.  Bosnia's economy grew by an estimated 35 percent,
according to World Bank data.  However, growth in Republika Srpska
during 1997 still lagged far behind growth in the Federation because
donors continued to withhold assistance for much of the year due to
hard-line Bosnian Serb noncompliance with the Dayton Agreement.\17 In
early 1998, the international community responded to the election of
the new, relatively moderate Republika Srpska government by providing
an increased amount of assistance to the entity.  According to State,
assuming no policy changes on the part of the new government, this
development should continue and should bring increased growth to
Republika Srpska. 
Signs of progress in Bosnia's economic reconstruction included the
reestablishment of some infrastructure and activities that
economically link Bosnia's ethnic groups, such as the return of
limited phone and rail service between the two entities and the
holding of multiethnic trade fairs in Banja Luka and Sarajevo.  The
pace of clearing landmines--an area of critical importance to
economic reconstruction and refugee returns--accelerated during the
year as well.  However, the three parties were still reluctant to
remove landmines from strategically important areas because they
continued to view the current situation in Bosnia as a temporary
cessation of hostilities. 
Despite the progress in rebuilding the economy and economic links,
Bosnia's political leaders continued to obstruct the establishment of
a common economic policy framework.  For example, although Bosnia's
parliament under strong international pressure had passed the "Quick
Start Package" of economic laws\18 in June 1997, as of early 1998
very little had been done to implement the laws, and what limited
progress had been made was mostly ordered by the High Representative. 
Bosnia's political leaders also continued practices such as
nontransparent budgeting for governmental institutions that
threatened Bosnia's economic recovery and could lead to the improper
use of economic assistance going to Bosnia.  The international
community and some of Bosnia's governments recommended actions in
1997 to address shortcomings in the country's public finance system
that could generate opportunities for fraud and corruption. 
By the end of the year, donors' practice of attaching political
conditions to economic assistance had contributed to some important,
positive political changes in Republika Srpska, including the rise of
a more moderate Bosnian Serb leadership.  This practice has also
helped encourage some municipalities to accept returns of refugees
and displaced persons from other ethnic groups.  This type of
conditionality had not, however, increased the cooperation or
compliance of hard-line Bosnian Serb or Croat political leaders in
implementing the Dayton Agreement.  In October 1997 and February
1998, officials from the U.S.  Agency for International Development
told us that they did not have the resources to monitor whether
recipients were fully complying with political conditions attached to
the agency's assistance; in April 1998, these officials said that the
agency intends to hire an individual so that it can adequately
monitor existing and future assistance. 
--------------------
\17 Bosnia's Priority Reconstruction Program is a 3- to 4-year, $5.1
billion program that provides the framework for the economic
reconstruction and integration of Bosnia.  In the program's first
year, 59 donor countries and organizations pledged $1.9 billion to
the program.  During 1997, 31 of the original donors pledged an
additional $1.2 billion to Bosnia's economic reconstruction program. 
In May 1998, according to a State Department official, 30 donors
pledged $1.25 billion, bringing the total amount pledged to $4.35
billion.  No further details on the 1998 pledges were available at
the time this report went to press. 
\18 The "Quick Start Package" included laws establishing the Central
Bank, a national budget execution law for the 1997 budget, uniform
customs tariff and customs policy laws, a foreign trade law, and the
legal framework for external debt management. 
   AGENCY COMMENTS AND GAO'S
   EVALUATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4
DOD, the U.S.  Agency for International Development, and the State
Department provided written comments on a draft of this report.  DOD
generally concurred with the report, and the U.S.  Agency for
International Development commented further on the progress that has
been made in Bosnia over the past year. 
State commented that the report acknowledges and catalogs many of the
significant successes recorded over the last year in the
implementation of the Dayton Agreement but does not sufficiently
convey the momentum, hope, and prospects that the developments of the
last half of 1997 and the first few months of 1998 have brought to
the overall circumstances in Bosnia.  In particular, State identified
a number of changes that have occurred since late spring of 1997 that
give cause for optimism.  These include the ability of Bosnians to
move more freely around the country, further democratization and
pluralism in the political arena, and advances in arms control. 
Although State agreed that caution is in order, it noted its
inclination to be somewhat more optimistic than the report. 
While GAO agrees with State that there is some cause for optimism in
Bosnia, the facts, events, and progress suggest that one may want to
view Bosnia's future with greater caution than State does.  GAO
believes that the report strikes an appropriate balance in describing
the progress in achieving the goals of the Dayton Agreement and the
challenges that remain.  The report discusses in some detail the
events referred to by State and specifically states that the pace of
implementing the Dayton Agreement has accelerated. 
However, as noted in the Executive Summary and throughout the report,
this progress was achieved largely because of intense international
pressure and involvement; the momentum for continued progress is not
self-sustaining; and conditions will have to improve significantly
before international military forces could substantially draw down. 
It is widely accepted in the international community that, even with
the accelerated pace of implementing the agreement, it will likely be
some time before these conditions are realized.  Further, while
events in the last half of 1997 and early 1998 give cause for
optimism, more recent events in March and April 1998--specifically,
an increase in incidents of ethnic conflict associated with people
crossing ethnic lines to visit or return to their prewar
homes--illustrate the difficulties that Bosnians and the
international community still face in implementing key aspects of the
agreement. 
DOD, the U.S.  Agency for International Development, and State also
provided technical comments, updated information, and other
suggestions that have been incorporated where appropriate.  Comments
from DOD and the U.S.  Agency for International Development are
included in
appendixes VIII and IX, respectively.  State's comments, along with
GAO's evaluation of them, are included in appendix X. 
INTRODUCTION
============================================================ Chapter 1
U.S.  support for the Bosnia peace operation is projected to cost an
estimated $10.6 billion from fiscal year 1996 through fiscal year
1999.  The peace operation was established after 3-.  1/2 years of
war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter referred to as Bosnia), when
international intervention culminated in the signing of the Dayton
Agreement in December 1995.\1 In signing the agreement, the parties
to the conflict--political leaders of Bosnia's three major ethnic
groups, Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia\2 --agreed to
implement a number of security, political, and economic measures
intended to bring peace and stability to the region.  To assist the
parties in their efforts, the international community created the
Bosnia peace operation, consisting of an international military force
led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and numerous
international civilian organizations. 
In early May 1997, we reported that the Bosnia peace operation had
created and sustained an environment that allowed the peace process
to move forward, but reconciliation had not yet occurred due to the
intransigence of Bosnia's political leaders.\3 During 1997, important
changes to the operation and its political environment provided
additional authority in some areas and created new opportunities for
accelerating the pace of implementing the Dayton Agreement's
provisions. 
--------------------
\1 The General Framework for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and its
supporting annexes, also known as the Dayton Agreement, were
negotiated near Dayton, Ohio, during November 1995 and signed in
Paris on December 14, 1995. 
\2 The former Yugoslavia republics of Serbia and Montenegro have
asserted a joint independent state with this name.  The United States
has not recognized this entity. 
\3 Bosnia Peace Operation:  Progress Toward Achieving the Dayton
Agreement's Goals (GAO/NSIAD-97-132, May 5, 1997). 
   U.S.  COSTS AND COMMITMENTS FOR
   FISCAL YEARS 1996 THROUGH 1999
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1
Executive branch estimates available as of March 3, 1998, indicate
that the United States will provide about $10.6 billion\4 for
military and civilian support to the Bosnia peace operation from
fiscal years 1996 through 1999:  about $8.6 billion in incremental
costs\5 for military-related operations and about $2 billion for the
civilian sector (see table 1.1).  The Department of Defense (DOD)
estimates assume that the United States will maintain its current
force of about 8,500 in Bosnia through June 1998 and then draw down
to about 6,900 by late October 1998.\6
According to a U.S.  Army Europe document, U.S.  force levels will
temporarily increase by about 2,000 troops in June as units rotate
into and out of Bosnia and by up to about 1,000 troops for a 75-day
period around the time of Bosnia's September 1998 elections.  The
U.S.  military will also have deployed another 3,750 troops in
Croatia, Hungary, and Italy in support of the Bosnia operation. 
                               Table 1.1
                  Estimated U.S. Costs for the Bosnia
                   Peace Operation, Fiscal Years 1996
                              through 1999
                         (Dollars in millions)
                                         Fiscal years
                                ------------------------------
Government branch               1996\a    1997    1998    1999   Total
------------------------------  ------  ------  ------  ------  ======
DOD                             $2,489  $2,271  $1,973  $1,848  $8,581
                                            \b      \c      \c
Civilian agencies\d                560  \500\e  \500\e   500\e   2,060
======================================================================
Total                           $3,049  $2,771  $2,473  $2,348  $10,64
                                                                     1
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a DOD's incremental costs exclude $30.9 million spent on U.S. 
participation in a U.N.  peacekeeping operation in Macedonia, $9.3
million spent on enforcement of the arms embargo and U.N.  sanctions
on Serbia-Montenegro, and $500,000 spent on U.S.  military personnel
and supplies for the operation of a Zagreb hospital in support of the
United Nations.  For the civilian agencies, this amount represents
State's cost estimate as of October 1996.  During fiscal year 1996,
civilian agencies obligated $501 million for activities in Bosnia. 
\b As of February 1998.  This figure excludes costs associated with
U.S.  participation in a U.N.  peacekeeping operation in Macedonia. 
\c From DOD's supplemental request for fiscal year 1998 and budget
amendment request for fiscal year 1999 for military operations in
Bosnia, dated March 3, 1998.  These figures exclude costs associated
with U.S.  participation in the U.N.  peacekeeping operation in
Macedonia ($10.2 million each year). 
\d Includes the U.S.  Agency for International Development (USAID);
the U.S.  Information Agency (USIA); and the Departments of State,
Agriculture, Commerce, Justice, and the Treasury. 
\e GAO estimated U.S.  civilian costs for fiscal years 1997 through
1999 based on fiscal year 1996 obligations, because the Department of
State was unable to provide complete cost estimates as of late April
1998. 
In fiscal year 1997, DOD incurred about $2.3 billion in incremental
costs for its participation in NATO operations in Bosnia.\7 The U.S. 
Army, which is deploying and logistically supporting ground troops in
and around Bosnia,\8 incurred nearly 80 percent of these costs, or
about $1.77 billion.  The U.S.  Air Force spent about $256 million,
while the Navy and Marine Corps together spent about $77 million.  In
addition, about $172 million was spent by the following DOD
components for operations related to Bosnia:  the National Imaging
and Mapping Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Defense
Information Systems Agency, Defense Logistics Agency, the U.S. 
Special Operations Command, the Defense Health Program, and the
National Security Agency. 
U.S.  civilian agencies in fiscal year 1997 obligated about $450
million for programs designed to assist in the economic, political,
and social transition taking place in Bosnia (see table 1.2).  Most
of this assistance, almost $250 million, was funded by USAID.  The
State Department provided about $190 million; the remainder was
obligated by other civilian agencies, including USIA and the
Departments of Justice, Commerce, and the Treasury.  Appendix I
provides more information on U.S.  civilian programs that supported
the Bosnia peace operation in fiscal year 1997. 
                               Table 1.2
                   Fiscal Year 1997 U.S. Funding for
                  Civilian Aspects of the Bosnia Peace
                               Operation
                         (Dollars in millions)
Program/activity                                         Obligations\a
--------------------------------------------------  ------------------
Economic reconstruction                                         $159.3
Humanitarian assistance                                          144.8
Democracy and human rights                                        63.5
Other support for civilian programs/activities                    82.2
======================================================================
Total                                                         $449.8\a
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a As of February 3, 1998, about $70 million of USAID funds budgeted
for Bosnia programs in fiscal year 1997 were unobligated. 
--------------------
\4 In February 1996, the executive branch estimated that the Bosnia
peace operation would cost the United States about $3.2 billion for
fiscal years 1996 and 1997--$2.5 billion in incremental costs for
military-related operations and $670 million for the civilian sector. 
These initial estimates assumed that U.S.  military forces would be
withdrawn from Bosnia when the first NATO-led mission ended in
December 1996. 
\5 As used in this report, "incremental costs" means additional costs
to DOD that are directly related to the Bosnia operation and would
not have otherwise been incurred.  In some cases, incremental costs
are offset by avoiding costs (such as training exercises) that would
have occurred in the absence of the operation. 
\6 DOD budget estimates assume that the total NATO force in Bosnia
will likely remain the same, but that U.S.  troop commitments will
decrease from 8,500 to 6,900 with the expectation that other
countries will contribute additional resources to meet NATO
requirements.  It will not be known what other countries will
actually contribute, or whether NATO operational requirements will be
met, until NATO has completed its force generation process. 
\7 For more discussion of DOD's cost estimates and costs, see Bosnia: 
Operational Decisions Needed Before Estimating DOD's Costs
(GAO/NSIAD-98-77BR, Feb.  11, 1998). 
\8 The U.S.  Army is logistically supporting ground troops for all
services in Bosnia, Croatia, and Hungary. 
   A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:2
The 1992-95 war in Bosnia was part of the violent dissolution of the
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which had been an
ethnically diverse federation of six republics with almost no history
of democratic governance or a capitalist economy.  The war was fought
among Bosnia's three major ethnic/religious groups--Bosniaks
(Muslims), Serbs (Eastern Orthodox Christians), and Croats (Roman
Catholics)\9 --the latter two being supported directly by the
republics of Serbia and Croatia, respectively.  Bosnian Serb and
Croat war aims were to partition Bosnia and establish ethnically pure
states:  Bosnian Serbs created Republika Srpska, and Bosnian Croats
established Herceg-Bosna.\10 In contrast, the Bosniaks claimed to
support a unified, multiethnic Bosnia. 
In March 1994, U.S.  mediation led to the creation of a joint
Bosniak-Bosnian Croat entity--the Federation--and a cease-fire
between the Bosniak and Bosnian Croat armies, which continued to
fight against the Bosnian Serb army.  The United Nations and other
international mediators were generally unsuccessful in their attempts
to stop the war until the U.S.  government took the lead in
negotiations during mid-1995.  By October 1995, a cease-fire among
all three militaries was established.  In December 1995, the Dayton
Agreement was signed, continuing the complex and difficult process of
attempting reconciliation among the parties to the conflict.\11
--------------------
\9 For purposes of this report, the term "Bosnian" refers to any
citizen of Bosnia, regardless of ethnic group.  This report defines
"Bosniaks" as "Muslims," the definition used in State Department
human rights reports. 
\10 These states were never recognized by the international
community, whereas Bosnia and Herzegovina was granted diplomatic
recognition and became a member of the United Nations in 1992. 
\11 For a brief history of events leading to the conflict in Bosnia
and a discussion of the international community's role through the
fall of 1995, see Bosnia Peace Operation:  Progress Toward Achieving
the Dayton Agreement's Goals. 
   DAYTON AGREEMENT AND RELATED
   SIDE AGREEMENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:3
Building on the October 1995 cease-fire, representatives from
Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and Bosnia's three major
ethnic groups signed the Dayton Agreement in Paris on December 14,
1995.  The agreement defined Bosnia and Herzegovina as consisting of
the two entities that had been created during the war--Republika
Srpska and the Bosniak-Croat Federation--and divided them by an
interentity boundary line (see fig.  1.1).  Both entities agreed to
the transfer of some territory they held at the time of the
cease-fire.  Republika Srpska would comprise 49 percent of Bosnia
(and nearly all of the Bosnian Serb-controlled areas), and the
Federation would consist of 51 percent of Bosnia.  The Federation
territory would be made up of noncontiguous areas of Bosniak and
Bosnian Croat control.  Most areas within Bosnia, with the exception
of central Bosnia, are populated and controlled by a predominant
ethnic group as a result of population movements during the war. 
   Figure 1.1:  Map of Bosnia, as
   of June 1997
   (See figure in printed
   edition.)
The Federation consists of 10 cantons, a level of government that
would link together a number of municipalities (see table 1.3).  All
of the cantons are in a very early stage of development. 
                                    Table 1.3
                         A Description of Cantons in the
                                    Federation
Canton                                      Ethnic
number          Canton name                 majority  Key cities and towns
--------------  --------------------------  --------  --------------------------
1               Una Sana                    Bosniak   Bihac, Sanski Most
2               Posavina                    Croat     Odzak, Orasje
3               Tuzla-Podrinje              Bosniak   Tuzla
4               Zenica-Doboj                Bosniak   Vares, Zenica
5               Gorazde                     Bosniak   Gorazde
6               Central Bosnia              Mixed     Jajce, Travnik, Vitez
7               Neretva                     Mixed     Konjic, Mostar, Stolac
8               West Herzegovina            Croat     Ljubuski
9               Sarajevo                    Bosniak   Hadzici, Sarajevo
10              West Bosnia                 Croat     Drvar, Livno, Tomislavgrad
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
At the time the Dayton Agreement was signed, the Bosniaks and Bosnian
Croats also signed a related side agreement on the development of
Federation economic and governmental institutions.  Also, the U.S. 
government initiated a separate program to train and equip a unified
Federation military.  According to State Department officials, the
program is intended to correct an imbalance of military power in the
region and fulfill a commitment the U.S.  government made to the
Bosniaks in return for their approval of the Dayton Agreement. 
In signing the Dayton Agreement and related side agreements,
political leaders of Bosnia's three major ethnic groups pledged to
provide security for the people of Bosnia; create a unified,
democratic Bosnia within internationally recognized boundaries--to
include surrendering indictees to the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia (hereafter referred to as the war crimes
tribunal) at the Hague, the Netherlands; rebuild the economy; and
ensure the right of people to return to their homes (see table 1.4). 
In response to the leaders' request for assistance in achieving these
goals, the international community established the Bosnia peace
operation. 
                               Table 1.4
                  Goals and Specific Agreements of the
                 Dayton Agreement and Related Programs
Operation's
goals             Specific agreements
----------------  ----------------------------------------------------
Provide security  Maintain cease-fire and separate forces; undertake
for the people    arms control; participate in train and equip
of Bosnia         program; maintain civilian police that provide
                  security for all people in jurisdiction and respect
                  human rights.
Create a          Implement national constitution that calls for the
unified,          creation of national institutions; create
democratic        functioning Federation institutions; ensure
Bosnia within     conditions exist for free and fair elections that
internationally   would be a step in country's democratic development;
recognized        secure highest level of human rights for all
boundaries        persons; cooperate with the war crimes tribunal.
Ensure the right  Allow all refugees and displaced persons the right
of people to      to freely return to their homes; take actions to
return to their   prevent impediments to safe return; cooperate with
homes             international organizations; establish an
                  independent property commission.
Rebuild the       Rehabilitate infrastructure and undertake economic
economy           reconstruction; create a central bank; economically
                  integrate the Federation: unify the payments
                  systems, activate the Federation Customs and Tax
                  Administrations, prepare a Federation budget.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
   PRINCIPAL INTERNATIONAL
   ORGANIZATIONS OF THE BOSNIA
   PEACE OPERATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:4
While the Dayton Agreement placed responsibility for implementing the
agreement on the parties, it also gave responsibility for assisting
the parties in their efforts to five principal international
organizations, as well as donor countries and organizations.  The
operation's principal organizations, as they existed in December
1997, are depicted in figure 1.2. 
   Figure 1.2:  Organization of
   the Bosnia Peace Operation in
   1997
   (See figure in printed
   edition.)
NATO-led forces--first the Implementation Force (IFOR) in December
1995 and later SFOR in December 1996--monitored and enforced
implementation of the military aspects of the agreement, including
separating and controlling the Bosniak, Bosnian Serb, and Bosnian
Croat militaries and ensuring the demilitarization of the zone of
separation,\12 as specified by annex 1A of the Dayton Agreement.\13
If resources were available, NATO-led forces were also expected to
(1) help create secure conditions for the conduct of other Dayton
Agreement tasks, such as elections; (2) assist UNHCR and other
international organizations in their humanitarian missions; (3)
observe and prevent interference with the movement of civilian
populations, refugees, and displaced persons and respond
appropriately to deliberate violence to life and person; and (4)
monitor the clearing of minefields and obstacles. 
Although SFOR had an authorized force level of 31,000 troops, about
half the size of IFOR, higher force levels were consistently
maintained throughout 1997.  As of November 17, 1997, SFOR had about
34,300 troops from 16 NATO and 20 non-NATO countries in Bosnia and an
additional 2,500 support troops in Croatia; the United States had
8,300 troops in Bosnia, with an additional 3,400 support troops in
Croatia, Hungary, and Italy.\14 As with IFOR, the United States is
the largest force provider to SFOR, and Americans hold the key NATO
military positions that control the operation. 
On the civilian side of the operation, the Dayton Agreement created
OHR and gave the High Representative many responsibilities.  These
included monitoring implementation of the agreement, coordinating
civilian organizations, maintaining close contact with the parties,
and giving the final interpretation in theater on civilian
implementation of the agreement.  Throughout most of 1997, the High
Representative did not use his authority to enforce the parties'
compliance with the civil provisions of the Dayton Agreement. 
However, in December 1997 the Peace Implementation Council agreed to
support a new, expanded interpretation of the High Representative's
mandate that allows him to resolve difficulties in implementing the
agreement caused by the intransigence of Bosnia's political leaders. 
UNMIBH consisted of three components, including IPTF.  IPTF's mandate
was to (1) monitor, observe, and inspect the parties' law enforcement
activities and facilities; (2) advise governmental authorities on how
to organize effective civilian law enforcement agencies; (3) advise
and train law enforcement personnel; and (4) investigate and report
on any human rights abuses by Bosnia's police.  IPTF's mandate does
not include the power of arrest.  As of December 1, 1997, IPTF
consisted of 2,004 unarmed, civilian police monitors from 40
countries. 
UNHCR's role in the implementation of the Dayton Agreement was to
work with the parties to (1) develop a repatriation plan that would
allow the early, peaceful, and phased return of refugees and
displaced persons and (2) foster returns of refugees and displaced
persons to their homes. 
OSCE supported international and local efforts to promote
democratization and ethnic reconciliation in Bosnia, monitored and
reported on human rights, assisted with negotiation and
implementation of confidence-building measures and arms control, and
supervised the election process.  In 1997, OSCE supervised two sets
of elections:  the nationwide municipal elections originally
scheduled for September 1996 but postponed until September 1997, and
the elections for the Republika Srpska National Assembly that were
called on short notice and held in late November 1997. 
--------------------
\12 The zone of separation is an area generally 2 kilometers wide on
each side of the interentity boundary line between the Federation and
Republika Srpska. 
\13 Both IFOR and SFOR had the authority to use force to ensure
implementation of annex 1A and force protection.  The U.N.  Security
Council provided IFOR's authority to use force in resolution 1031 on
December 15, 1995, and provided SFOR's authority in resolution 1088
on December 12, 1996. 
\14 Actual SFOR and U.S.  force levels varied over time.  For
example, the number of SFOR troops in Bosnia and Croatia increased to
about 39,000 from August through October 1997 because of the support
provided to OSCE for preparations for, and conduct of, Bosnia's
municipal elections held in mid-September.  In October 1997, the
number of U.S.  Army personnel in and around Bosnia peaked at 14,400
due to the planned troop rotation around the scheduled elections. 
   MAJOR CHANGES TO THE
   OPERATION'S ORGANIZATION AND
   POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT IN 1997
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:5
During 1997, important changes in the organization and political
environment of the Bosnia peace operation gave the operation
additional authority in some areas and provided new opportunities for
supporting Bosnia's political leaders who uphold the implementation
of the Dayton Agreement.  Specifically, (1) in April 1997 a
supervisory administration with significant authority was established
in the strategically important area of Brcko; (2) in May and June
1997, as well as later in the year, the international community led
by the United States expressed and demonstrated a much stronger
commitment--both politically and militarily--to full implementation
of the Dayton Agreement's civil provisions; and (3) in late June
1997, a division in the Bosnian Serb political leadership and the
ruling Bosnian Serb political party, the Serb Democratic Party (SDS),
started a process of transforming the political environment and
governmental structures in Republika Srpska and in Bosnia as a whole. 
      BRCKO SUPERVISORY
      ADMINISTRATION ESTABLISHED
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:5.1
At Dayton, the parties were unable to agree on which of Bosnia's
ethnic groups would control the strategically important area in and
around the city of Brcko.  The agreement instead called for an
arbitration tribunal to decide this issue by December 14, 1996.\15 At
the end of the war, Brcko was controlled by Bosnian Serb political
leaders and populated predominately by Serbs due to "ethnic
cleansing" of the substantial prewar Muslim and Croat population, who
had then accounted for 63 percent of the city's population, and
resettlement of Serb refugees there.  Western observers in Bosnia
told us that an arbitration decision that awarded control of the area
to either the Bosniaks or Bosnian Serbs would lead to civil unrest
and would possibly restart the conflict because the location of Brcko
made it vitally important to both parties' respective interests. 
After granting a request for a 2-month extension, the arbitration
tribunal issued a statement on February 14, 1997.  This statement
essentially postponed the hard decision and called for the
international community to designate a supervisor under the auspices
of OHR, who would establish an interim supervisory administration for
the Brcko area.\16 This supervisory organization would be authorized
to oversee the implementation of the civil provisions of the Dayton
Agreement in the Brcko area; specifically, to allow former Brcko
residents to return to their homes, to provide freedom of movement
and other human rights throughout the area, to give proper police
protection to all citizens, to encourage economic revitalization, and
to lay the foundation for local representative democratic government. 
On March 7, 1997, the Peace Implementation Council Steering Board\17
announced that the High Representative had appointed a U.S.  official
as Brcko Supervisor.  On March 31, 1997, the U.N.  Security Council
authorized an increase in the strength of UNMIBH's IPTF by 186 police
monitors and 11 civilian personnel to promote respect for freedom of
movement and to facilitate the orderly and phased return of refugees
in the Brcko area.  The Brcko Supervisor established his office on
April 11, 1997, which was to operate for at least 1 year.  On March
15, 1998, the Brcko arbitrator announced that the decision on the
status of Brcko would be postponed for another 6 to 12 months. 
As described in the arbitration statement and a Peace Implementation
Council document, the Brcko Supervisor had more authority over this
area of operations than the High Representative had in Bosnia at that
time.  The arbitration tribunal's decision gave the Supervisor
authority to issue binding regulations and orders to (1) assist in
implementing the Dayton Agreement in the Brcko area and (2)
strengthen the area's local, multiethnic democratic institutions. 
These regulations and orders would prevail over existing laws in the
area if a conflict existed.  Further, in reaffirming the right of
persons to return to their homes of origin, the Peace Implementation
Council said that any new influx of refugees or displaced persons
should occur only with the consent of the Supervisor in consultation
with UNHCR.  Neither document, however, described how the Supervisor
would enforce his regulations, orders, or decisions if the parties
did not choose to comply. 
--------------------
\15 The agreement called for the Federation and Republika Srpska to
appoint one arbitrator each to the tribunal, and for the third
arbitrator to be appointed by the President of the International
Court of Justice if the parties could not agree to a third member. 
The tribunal consists of a Bosnian Serb, a Bosniak, and an American. 
The American arbitrator was selected by the President of the
International Court of Justice and was granted authority to issue
rulings on his own, including a final award, if the tribunal could
not reach consensus. 
\16 The tribunal decision noted that (1) the national and entity
governments were not sufficiently mature to take on the
responsibility of administering the city and (2) Republika Srpska's
disregard of its Dayton implementation obligations in the Brcko area
had kept the tensions and instability at much higher levels than
expected.  Only the American member of the tribunal signed the
decision. 
\17 The Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council consists
of eight countries and three multilateral organizations.  The board
provides political guidance to the High Representative. 
      COMMITMENT TO IMPLEMENTING
      DAYTON AGREEMENT
      REINVIGORATED
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:5.2
In the spring of 1997, the United States conducted a major review of
U.S.  policy in Bosnia, an effort that helped reinvigorate the peace
process by demonstrating renewed U.S.  commitment to implementing the
Dayton Agreement.  Following the policy review, the Steering Board of
the Peace Implementation Council articulated and SFOR demonstrated
the international community's commitment to achieving Dayton's goals. 
On May 30, 1997, following a meeting in Sintra, Portugal, the
council's Steering Board supported the more vigorous U.S.  approach,
issuing a statement, known as the Sintra Declaration, that
  -- confirmed the Steering Board's long-term commitment to the peace
     process in Bosnia and reaffirmed that the international
     community would not tolerate a resumption of hostilities by
     anyone in the country in the future;
  -- emphasized that Bosnia and Herzegovina will remain a united and
     sovereign country, consisting of two multiethnic entities, and
     that the international community will not tolerate any attempts
     at ethnic partition, in fact or in law, by anyone;
  -- demanded that Bosnia's political leaders and national and entity
     governments significantly accelerate their work toward
     implementing the Dayton Agreement; set specific, near-term dates
     by which Bosnia's political leaders and government institutions
     would have to accomplish specific tasks, such as pass
     citizenship and passport laws, that would link the country's
     ethnic groups and their separate areas of control; and, in some
     cases, described diplomatic consequences if the parties did not
     accomplish the tasks by the specified date;
  -- acknowledged the High Representative's authority to regulate
     Bosnia's media, specifically to curtail or suspend any media
     network or program whose output is in persistent and blatant
     contravention of either the spirit or letter of the Dayton
     Agreement; and
  -- reemphasized that providing economic assistance to Bosnia would
     be conditioned at the municipal level on the parties' complying
     with the Dayton Agreement, particularly those provisions dealing
     with surrendering indictees to the war crimes tribunal and
     accepting the peaceful return of refugees and displaced persons
     to their prewar homes. 
Beginning in mid-1997, SFOR began to more actively support
implementation of the civilian aspects of the peace operation.  For
example, SFOR began to provide general and local security for people
returning to their prewar homes across ethnic lines in June/July
1997; defined and in August 1997 began to control special police as
paramilitary units under annex 1A of the Dayton Agreement, as a step
toward either disbanding and disarming them and/or bringing them
under the IPTF restructuring program for civilian police; and
supported the High Representative's attempts to curtail media that
blatantly and persistently violated the Dayton Agreement by taking
control of five television transmitters in Republika Srpska during
October 1997. 
On December 10, 1997, the Peace Implementation Council reiterated the
international commitment to implement fully the Dayton Agreement. 
The council's conclusions, based on its interpretation of the Dayton
Agreement, also stated that the High Representative could make
binding decisions on (1) the timing and location of meetings and the
chairmanship of Bosnia's common governmental institutions; (2)
interim measures that would take effect when parties are unable to
reach agreement and would remain in force until Bosnia's collective
Presidency\18 or Council of Ministers had adopted a decision
consistent with the Dayton Agreement on the issue concerned; and (3)
other measures to ensure implementation of the Dayton Agreement
throughout Bosnia and its entities, as well as the smooth running of
common institutions.  Such measures may include actions against
persons holding public office or officials who are absent from
meetings without good cause or who are found by the High
Representative to be in violation of legal commitments made under the
agreement or the terms for its implementation. 
--------------------
\18 Bosnia's constitution (annex 4 of the Dayton Agreement)
established Bosnia's collective Presidency of three members:  one
Bosniak and one Croat, each elected from the Federation, and one Serb
directly elected from Republika Srpska. 
      POLITICAL DIVISION OF
      REPUBLIKA SRPSKA
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:5.3
As of mid-1997, Bosnian Serb political leaders had not started to
implement key areas of the Dayton Agreement.  This was in large part
due to Radovan Karadzic's blocking of attempts of more moderate
Bosnian Serb political leaders to work with the international
community in efforts that would link Bosnia's ethnic groups
politically or economically.  Karadzic is a war crimes indictee\19
and unifying force of the then-ruling political party in Republika
Srpska, the SDS.  Because of Karadzic's intransigence, the
international community gave very little economic assistance to
Republika Srpska in 1996 and 1997. 
On June 27, 1997, the President of Republika Srpska, President
Plavsic, announced that she had fired the Republika Srpska Minister
of Interior.  According to an OHR report, Plavsic fired the Minister
because he had attempted to remove police officers and units involved
in compiling a special report on illegal trade and other economic
activities in Republika Srpska.  This action was the first visible
sign of a political division between President Plavsic, whose
political base is in Banja Luka, and Karadzic and his hard-line SDS
supporters, whose political base is in Pale. 
By the end of October 1997, the political struggle in Republika
Srpska had resulted in (1) Plavsic being expelled from the SDS and
gaining control of civilian police in three of nine public security
centers in Republika Srpska (see fig.  1.3); (2) Karadzic and the SDS
losing control of the transmitters of Serb Radio and Television (SRT)
television, the primary Bosnian Serb media outlet; and (3) Plavsic
disbanding the Republika Srpska National Assembly and calling
elections for a new assembly, which were held on November 22 and 23,
1997, and resulted in the formation of a new, more moderate Republika
Srpska government based in Banja Luka.  Appendix II provides
information on key events in the Republika Srpska political crisis
through January 31, 1998. 
   Figure 1.3:  Control of
   Republika Srpska Police, as of
   October 1997
   (See figure in printed
   edition.)
   Note:  Although Prnjavor falls
   under the Doboj public security
   center, the municipal police
   station was controlled by
   Plavsic.
   (See figure in printed
   edition.)
   Source:  IPTF and U.N.  Civil
   Affairs interviews and
   documents.
   (See figure in printed
   edition.)
Many observers told us that President Plavsic is an ardent Serb
nationalist who maintains a long-term goal of a separate Serb state. 
However, she has allowed more open political expression in Republika
Srpska and, unlike Karadzic and the SDS, is willing to work with the
international community to implement at least some civilian measures
called for in the Dayton Agreement, including those that would link
the ethnic groups politically and economically.  President Plavsic
would do so, according to these observers, because (1) she sees the
growing economic gap between the Federation and Republika Srpska and
realizes that to obtain economic aid she must cooperate with the
international community and (2) she intends to build a Serbian state
based on democracy and the rule of law rather than on the corruption
of the hard-line SDS.  According to one observer, Plavsic has not
repudiated all of her former beliefs; however, her actions indicate
that her views appeared to have evolved in a more pro-Dayton
direction. 
By the end of 1997, the political division of Republika Srpska had
affected the operating environment of all aspects of the peace
operation.  The evolving political situation that followed the
initial split provided the international community with many
opportunities to encourage and/or force further implementation of the
Dayton Agreement.  Many specific events in the crisis required SFOR
intervention to prevent or respond to violent situations, such as
when pro-Plavsic police unsuccessfully attempted to take over
Pale-controlled police facilities in Doboj and Brcko. 
--------------------
\19 Radovan Karadzic was indicted by the war crimes tribunal on
charges of violating the laws of war, crimes against humanity, and
genocide. 
   OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND
   METHODOLOGY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:6
At the request of the Chairman, Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, we reviewed the implementation of the Bosnia peace
operation.  Our specific objectives were to determine what progress
had been made in achieving the operation's objectives since mid-1997. 
To do so, we focused on the operation's four key goals, which are to
create conditions that allow Bosnia's political leaders to (1)
provide a secure environment for the people of Bosnia; (2) create a
unified, democratic country, to include the surrendering of indictees
to the war crimes tribunal; (3) ensure the rights of people to return
to their prewar homes; and (4) rebuild the economy.  In addition, we
reviewed the progress of the program designed to train and equip the
Bosniak and Bosnian Croat militaries as they integrate into a unified
Federation military. 
To determine progress, we made field visits to Bosnia in June and
October 1997 and February 1998.  We reported on the results of our
June visit in testimony to the Committee in July 1997.\20 During our
field visits, we did audit work in Sarajevo, Tuzla, Brcko, Banja
Luka, Pale, Mostar, Stolac, Travnik, Jajce, Busovaca, Konjic, Zenica,
Sanski Most, Prijedor, Doboj, Trebinje, and numerous villages
throughout Bosnia.  While in Bosnia, we interviewed officials from
the U.S.  embassy; USAID; USIA; the headquarters of SFOR and two of
its multinational division headquarters; OHR; UNMIBH, including IPTF,
U.N.  Civil Affairs, and the Mine Action Center; the World Bank;
UNHCR; OSCE; government officials; opposition party members; Bosnian
displaced persons, many of whom had returned to their homes in areas
controlled by another ethnic group; and numerous nongovernmental
organizations. 
We also interviewed officials from (1) the Departments of State,
Defense, and the Treasury; USAID; USIA; and the Central Intelligence
Agency in Washington, D.C.; (2) the U.S.  European Command and U.S. 
Army Europe in Germany; (3) the U.S.  mission to NATO, NATO
international staff, SHAPE, and the European Commission in Belgium;
(5) OSCE and the U.S.  mission to the OSCE in Vienna, Austria; and
(6) the U.S.  embassy and U.N.  Liaison Office in Zagreb, Croatia. 
Also to assess progress toward achieving the operation's objectives
and in implementing the train and equip program, we compared
conditions in Bosnia with the goals laid out in Dayton and related
agreements.  We analyzed numerous situation reports and other
documents from U.S.  agencies, NATO, SFOR, OHR, OSCE, IPTF, UNHCR,
and other organizations.  We also interviewed many observers of the
situation in Bosnia to expand upon or clarify information contained
in the documents.  Further, we relied on results of a joint
GAO-Congressional Research Service (CRS) seminar for Congress on
"Bosnia:  U.S.  Options After June 1998," which was held on November
6, 1997.\21
We did not (1) verify the accuracy and completeness of the cost
information DOD or civilian agencies provided to us; (2) evaluate the
methodology of USIA polls or other surveys or polls used in this
report; or (3) assess the reliability or methodology of USAID, OHR,
or World Bank audit reports. 
According to USIA officials, USIA analyses are based on responses
from people belonging to the principal ethnic group in each of the
following sampling areas:  Republika Srpska; predominately Croatian
regions of Bosnia; and predominately Muslim areas of Bosnia. 
Nineteen times out of 20, results from samples of similar size to
USIA samples will differ by no more than 4 percentage points in
either direction from what would be found if it were possible to
interview every Bosnian Serb in Republika Srpska, every Bosnian
Muslim in Muslim-dominated areas of the country, and every Bosnian
Croat in Croat-dominated areas of the country.  Because of this
sampling methodology, USIA cautions against using its poll results to
develop data on attitudes of Bosnia's total population.  Despite
these limitations to USIA samples, we believe the USIA data have
sufficient geographic coverage to provide an adequate approximation
of the attitudes of each of Bosnia's three major ethnic groups
countrywide. 
We conducted our work from June 1997 through May 1998 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.  Our
information on foreign law was obtained from interviews and secondary
sources, rather than independent review and analysis. 
--------------------
\20 Bosnia Peace Operation:  Progress Toward the Dayton Agreement's
Goals--An Update (GAO/T-NSIAD-97-216, July 17, 1997). 
\21 Bosnia Options After June 1998:  Summary of a CRS/GAO Seminar,
CRS document 98-23F (Washington, D.C.:  Library of Congress, Dec. 
23, 1997. 
PROGRESS IN PROVIDING A SECURE
ENVIRONMENT
============================================================ Chapter 2
To promote a permanent reconciliation between all parties, the Dayton
Agreement sought to establish "lasting security" based on a durable
cessation of hostilities,\1 civilian police that operate in
accordance with democratic policing standards, and a stable military
balance in the region.  Under heavy international pressure,
considerable progress has been made toward achieving the goal of a
secure environment, but much remains to be accomplished, particularly
in the area of developing democratic civilian police forces. 
The overall security situation improved somewhat during 1997, but
remains very volatile.  SFOR has continued to ensure the cease-fire
by monitoring and controlling Bosnia's three militaries and in August
1997 started to control Bosnia's special police units as military
forces.  Significant early steps were taken in 1997 in certifying,
training, and ethnically integrating Bosnia's civilian police forces
in the Federation and in starting the certification process in
Republika Srpska.  However, according to U.N.  officials, the police
remained the primary violator of human rights in Bosnia and often
failed to provide security for people of other ethnic groups. 
Also, by the end of 1997, the parties to the Dayton Agreement largely
complied with arms control measures designed to achieve a regional
military balance.  The U.S.-led international program to train,
equip, and integrate the Bosniak and Bosnian Croat militaries into a
unified Federation military\2 also made significant progress. 
--------------------
\1 The Dayton Agreement did not define "a durable cessation of
hostilities."
\2 The Federation defense law calls for Bosniak and Bosnian Croat
militaries to be fully integrated into a unified Federation Army by
August 1999. 
   OVERALL SECURITY SITUATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1
According to data from the SFOR Assessment Cell, an operation
analysis unit at SFOR headquarters, the overall security situation
improved in Bosnia during 1997, but threats to stability increased
during the first few months of 1998 (see fig.  2.1).  The cell's
data--which include incidents related to freedom of movement, ethnic
conflicts, and police abuse\3 --show that threats decreased at an
average monthly rate of 1.5 percent during 1997.  However, the data
also show substantial volatility throughout the year and during early
1998.  For example, the number of incidents increased by 123 percent
between April and May 1997, decreased by 45 percent between September
and November 1997, and then increased again by about 140 percent from
January through March 1998. 
   Figure 2.1:  SFOR Assessment
   Cell Data on Threats to
   Stability in Bosnia, January
   1997-April 1998
   (See figure in printed
   edition.)
Note:  While SFOR believes these data provide a good assessment of
overall trends, they do not include all threats to stability.  This
chart excludes four new measures that were added during the second
half of 1997.  According to an assessment cell officer, the cell is
in the process of developing additional measures that will be
included in this analysis in the future. 
Source:  SFOR Assessment Cell. 
According to an assessment cell report, these threat trends on a
general level reflect the cycle of violence that occurred during
Bosnia's war, with declines in intensity in the spring for planting
and late summer for harvest, and in early winter when movement is
more difficult.  Further, tensions related to returns of refugees and
displaced people contributed to increases from May through December
1997, as well as in early 1998.  While the number of incidents in
January and February 1998 was much lower than during the same months
a year earlier, the number of incidents during March and April 1998
was higher than the prior year, primarily due to an increase in (1)
ethnic incidents, particularly in the Federation, as people crossed
ethnic lines to visit or return to their prewar homes and (2) police
abuse incidents associated with illegal police checkpoints. 
--------------------
\3 The SFOR Assessment Cell tracks "police behavior incidents" as a
means of measuring progress toward "establishing democratic police
forces." This category includes police misconduct such as beatings,
unlawful evictions, illegal search, illegal checkpoints, and the
failure of police officers to do their job.  For purposes of this
report, we refer to these incidents as police-related human rights
abuses or police abuse. 
   SFOR CONTROL OF BOSNIA'S
   MILITARY FORCES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2
In 1997, SFOR continued to contain the three militaries in Bosnia and
started the process of bringing special police units under SFOR
control. 
      THE THREE MILITARIES IN
      BOSNIA
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2.1
SFOR officials and NATO documents state that during 1997 Bosnia's
political leaders generally complied with most military provisions of
the Dayton Agreement, but their militaries continually tested SFOR's
reactions to minor violations of annex 1A of the Dayton Agreement. 
Under SFOR supervision, the three militaries continued to observe the
October 1995 cease-fire; kept their forces separated; and demobilized
additional troops, bringing their combined strength down to 55,500
soldiers by October 1997.  SFOR enforced compliance with the military
provisions of the Dayton Agreement by continually patrolling
throughout the country, including in the zone of separation;
routinely monitoring and inspecting SFOR-approved military storage
sites and installations; and monitoring SFOR-approved military
training and movement activities.  Further, according to a DOD
report, the three military forces surpassed SFOR's requirement that
they reduce their military cantonment sites by 25 percent during
1997.  They reduced the number of sites by about 29 percent--from 770
sites to 545 sites--by December 1, 1997, and further lowered the
number to 534 by January 1998.\4
Minor violations and weapons inventory discrepancies by the three
militaries led SFOR to confiscate and destroy about 10,000 small arms
and some heavy weapons in 1997.  Moreover, according to NATO
documents, SFOR also imposed numerous training and movement bans on
the three militaries throughout the year for violations such as
failing to meet demining requirements, inaccurately reporting troop
movement and training activities, and infringing radar and missile
restrictions. 
Because the fighting has not resumed, the operation's civilian
organizations have been able to continue their work and the people of
Bosnia have been able to proceed with the long process of political
and social reconciliation.  On December 10, 1997, the Peace
Implementation Council stated that the presence of NATO-led forces
has been the greatest single contributor to subregional security
since the signing of the agreement and will continue to be so in the
short to medium term. 
--------------------
\4 On February 16, 1998, SFOR directed that the three militaries
implement a further 25-percent reduction in military cantonment sites
during 1998.  In March 1998, SFOR extended the deadline to the end of
February 1999. 
      SPECIAL POLICE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2.2
On August 7, 1997, the SFOR Commander notified the entity Presidents
that special police units in Bosnia would henceforth be controlled by
SFOR as military forces under annex 1A of the Dayton Agreement.  The
agreement had defined Ministry of Internal Affairs special police as
organizations with military capability and thus subject to Dayton's
military provisions.  The new SFOR policy was to apply to special
police not duly certified and monitored as civilian police under the
IPTF police restructuring program.  The policy was designed to help
accelerate and ensure police restructuring and reform, particularly
in Republika Srpska.\5 The SFOR Commander also issued supplementary
instructions to the parties on August 15, 1997.  These instructions
laid out the procedures to be followed while the special police are
subject to SFOR control before IPTF certifies them as civilian
police. 
NATO documents show that special police in the Federation were
generally in compliance with SFOR requirements as of mid-October
1997.\6 However, Republika Srpska special police, specifically some
units of the Police Anti-Terrorist Brigade,\7 had failed to comply
despite SFOR training and movement bans on all Republika Srpska
special police units that were not in compliance with the
supplementary instructions.  As of November 12, 1997, the two
outstanding issues were (1) the failure of five special police units
to provide monthly duty rosters and of one of these units to submit
its personnel list to SFOR and (2) the failure of the Bosnian Serb
member of Bosnia's collective Presidency, Momcilo Krajisnik of the
SDS, to personally respond and explain to the SFOR Commander the role
of special police in events that took place in Banja Luka in early
September 1997.\8 Because of these problems, special police remained
subject to a training and movement ban and continued to be closely
monitored by SFOR. 
On November 10, 1997, SFOR seized control of the special police unit
in Doboj, in response to special police actions in Banja Luka in
early September 1997 and the subsequent failure of Krajisnik to
adequately explain them.  Specifically, SFOR confiscated weapons,
vehicles, communications equipment, and files from the unit and
decertified the officers assigned there.  On November 20, 1997, SFOR
and IPTF officials reached an agreement with Republika Srpska
representatives on the future role of special police as they become
part of the civilian police structure.  Once certified as civilian
police, some units (about 850 officers) will be allowed to assume
IPTF-approved tasks related to counterterrorism, border control,
organized crime prevention, protection of important people, and crowd
control. 
As of February 8, 1998, according to an IPTF memo, 1,321 special
police officers in Banja Luka (106), Doboj (960), and Bijeljina (255)
had started the initial steps of IPTF's civilian police certification
process.  By that time, according to a NATO document, SFOR had all
Republika Srpska special police under control and surveillance, with
SFOR liaison officers attached to each unit; however, not all units
were in full compliance yet with SFOR's instructions of August 1997. 
--------------------
\5 Bosnian Serb political leaders agreed to participate in IPTF's
police restructuring program in late September 1997. 
\6 The Bosniak-controlled internal security service, the Agency for
Information and Documentation, was not classified as a special police
unit and not subject to SFOR control. 
\7 The units are located in Pale, Sekovici, Bijeljina, Doboj, and
Tjentiste. 
\8 On September 8, 1997, SDS bused in large numbers of people from
throughout Republika Srpska, including police from eastern Bosnia,
for an SDS rally in Banja Luka.  Based on evidence presented by the
Banja Luka Chief of Police, the Principal Deputy High Representative
determined that the buses contained people intending to provoke
disorder and possible violence and requested SFOR assistance in
inspecting and turning back buses deemed as a threat.  The day after
the rally, senior hard line SDS members and their security personnel,
including some with special police identification cards, were
blockaded in a Banja Luka hotel by pro-Plavsic police and a crowd of
local residents, until the Principal Deputy High Representative and
SFOR soldiers assisted the majority of the pro-Pale group in safely
leaving the hotel. 
   PUBLIC SECURITY REFORMS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3
During 1997, under intense international pressure, Bosniak, Bosnian
Croat, and Bosnian Serb political leaders began taking important,
early steps in developing police forces that meet IPTF's standards
for democratic policing.  The Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats began
patrolling together in every municipality of two ethnically mixed
cantons in the Federation; both President Plavsic and SDS hard liners
in Pale allowed their police forces to start the IPTF police
restructuring process late in the year, after almost
2 years of refusing to cooperate with the IPTF;\9 and in Brcko, the
Supervisor began the process of establishing a multiethnic,
democratic civilian police force for Brcko municipality.  The
progress was often slow and halting, however, and police continued to
be the primary violator of human rights in Bosnia.  The program to
train and equip Bosnia's police forces, an integral part of the IPTF
police restructuring program, was strongly supported by the United
States but received limited financial support from other donors. 
--------------------
\9 The agreement, dated September 16, 1997, was negotiated and agreed
to by Plavsic and a pro-Pale Bosnian Serb political leader following
unsuccessful attempts by pro-Plavsic police to gain control over
police in Doboj, Brcko, and Bijeljina in late August 1997.  According
to a senior international official in Bosnia, Bosnian Serb leaders in
Pale agreed to restructure their police in accordance with IPTF's
standards primarily because they feared that the international
community would assist President Plavsic in gaining control over
their police. 
      STATUS OF CIVILIAN POLICE
      RESTRUCTURING
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3.1
By the end of 1997, IPTF was implementing three distinct police
restructuring efforts in Bosnia, specifically, (1) in the Federation
for Bosniak and Bosnian Croat police forces at the canton and
Federation levels; (2) in Republika Srpska, starting with the
entity's public security centers, three of which were controlled by
President Plavsic in Banja Luka and six of which were controlled by
SDS hard-liners in Pale; and (3) in the Brcko area of supervision,
Republika Srpska, under the authority of the Brcko Supervisor. 
Each police restructuring effort consisted of certifying, training,
reducing, and integrating police forces, as well as revising police
standards and procedures so that they are in accordance with
democratic policing standards.  Tables 2.1 and 2.2 provide
information on progress made in these areas in 1997 and early 1998. 
According to a State Department official, although Bosnian Serb
political leaders in Pale consented to police restructuring in
September 1997, they had not consistently followed through on their
commitments; most of the police who had been provisionally certified
by the IPTF were in areas controlled by President Plavsic. 
                                    Table 2.1
                      Progress in Certifying, Training, and
                     Reducing Numbers of Civilian Police, as
                                 of February 1998
                                      Number of
                                      police
                                      trained or
                                      in
Area     Temporary certification\a    training\b    Force reduction
-------  ---------------------------  ------------  ----------------------------
Federat  An estimated 8,314 police    8,258--       Total police in cantonal-
ion      in 8 of 10 cantons were      human         and Federation-level police
         certified or in the process  dignity       forces to be reduced from
         of being certified.\c        course        over 22,000 in 1996 down to
                                                    no more than 11,500.
         \Some Federation Ministry    1,910--       Federation-level police
         of Interior officers had     transition    force limited to 1,000.
         received temporary           course
         certification, but the
         Federation-level police
         force was not completely
         operational.
Republi  Police certified or          1,852--       Police forces are to be
ka       undergoing certification in  human         reduced from as many as
Srpska   eight of nine public         dignity       20,000\ police to no more
         security centers;\ 5,551     course\e      than 8,500.\\f
         police certified (including
         1,321 special police),
         primarily in western
         Republika Srpska.\d
Brcko    Certification started on     Training due  Police reservists cease to
         October 23, 1997, for        to begin in   function in Brcko on October
         current police and on        February      13, 1997.
         November 17, 1997, for       1998.
         candidates not currently                   Brcko supervisor limited
         serving as police officers.                police force to 230 officers
         230 police were certified                  on November 10, 1997.
         by December 16, 1997.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a As a step toward permanent IPTF certification for police duties,
Bosnian police must first receive a temporary certification by (a)
completing an application that is screened for schooling and
background, (b) passing an IPTF-administered written exam on police
knowledge and skills and a psychological test, (c) being screened for
human rights abuses and war crimes, (d) attending a 2-day information
seminar on the restructuring process, and (e) being issued temporary
identification cards with their name, number, and photograph that
allow them to perform police duties for 1 year.  During the 1-year
certification period, IPTF is to conduct a thorough background
investigation on each police officer. 
\b As of January 31, 1998.  Police who are temporarily certified must
attend a 2-day training course an democratic policing standards and
human rights, a 1-week human dignity course, and a 3-week "transition
course" on basic policing skills.  To receive permanent
certification, police lacking at least 3 months of formal police
training must receive it within 1 year of receiving the temporary
certification.  According to a State Department official, no police
had been permanently certified as of February 11, 1998. 
\c As of January 17, 1998.  According to a State Department official,
the delay in temporarily certifying the police in the two remaining
cantons, West Herzegovina and West Bosnia, both Croat-controlled, is
due to an unwillingness on the part of Croat officials to adopt
Federation symbols and integrate their police forces. 
\d As of February 8, 1998.  The Republika Srpska restructuring
agreement calls for the sequential restructuring of the nine public
security centers followed by special police units not subject to SFOR
control, other specialized police units, and the Ministry of Internal
Affairs.  Certification and training began first in
Plavsic-controlled public security centers.  On October 17, 1997,
Trebinje became the first Pale-controlled center to start the
certification process.  As of February 8, 1988, only the center in
Foca (Srbinje) had not begun the process. 
\e As of January 31, 1998, only police in Banja Luka had taken the
human dignity course. 
\f From an October 1997 OHR report.  According to a State Department
official, the IPTF estimate of 7,600 civilian police for Republika
Srpska understates the number of police in eastern Republika Srpska. 
Sources:  U.N., OHR, and IPTF documents; UNMIBH, IPTF, and State
Department officials. 
IPTF's efforts to integrate Bosnia's police forces are viewed by many
observers in Bosnia as critically important for building confidence
among people who have crossed or will cross ethnic lines to return
home and will have to rely on their local police to provide security
for them.  The three police restructuring efforts in 1997 had
different standards for ethnically integrating police forces and made
different amounts of progress toward their goals:  The integration of
Bosniak and Bosnian Croat police in the Federation had made important
progress by the end of 1997; the creation of a multiethnic police
force in Brcko started very late in the year; and the integration
process had not yet started in other areas of Republika Srspka (see
table 2.2). 
                                    Table 2.2
                     Progress in Integrating Bosnian Police,
                                  as of May 1998
Area      Integration standard\a              Progress
--------  ----------------------------------  ----------------------------------
Federati  Allocate and fill slots on police   Allocation of police completed in
on        forces based on prewar population,  8 of the 10 cantons.
          as defined by 1991 census data\
                                               Difficulties in recruiting
                                              police to fill allocation for
                                              Bosnian Serbs and other ethnic
                                              groups in Neretva, Central Bosnia,
                                              Tuzla-Podrinje and Sarajevo, and
                                              for
                                              Croats in Sarajevo.
                                               Joint Bosniak-Bosnian Croat
                                              police patrols in every
                                              municipality of two ethnically-
                                              mixed cantons
                                              (Central Bosnia and Neretva) by
                                              December 1997. By
                                              mid-March 1998, some
                                              municipalities had reverted to
                                              police patrols by the dominant
                                              ethnic group only.
                                              Allocation of police not complete
          Adopt common uniform                in 2 cantons.
                                               Restructuring in West
                                              Herzegovina delayed by disputes
          Adopt common vehicles (color and    over regulations.
          license plates) for all police\c
                                               Restructuring agreement for West
          Integrate Federation Ministry of    Bosnia signed in April 1998;
          Interior                            canton failed to integrate Serb
                                              police
                                              officers in Drvar by early May.\b
                                              Common uniforms fully adopted in 8
                                              cantons and partially adopted in 2
                                              cantons. Bosnian Croat "Herceg-
                                              Bosna" symbols still worn by
                                              police in Croat-controlled areas.
                                              Common vehicles fully adopted in 8
                                              cantons and partially adopted in 2
                                              cantons.
                                              Not integrated; separate chains of
                                              command still exist for Bosniak
                                              and Bosnian Croat police forces.\d
Republik  Changes in the ethnic composition   No progress.
a Srpska  of Republika Srpska population are
          to be reflected in composition of
          police forces.
Brcko     Allocate and fill slots on the      Allocation made on November 10,
          police force based on population    1997: 52.2 percent Serb (120
          composition reflected in voters'    police); 39.1 percent Bosniak (90
          registry and results of September   police); and 8.7 percent Croat (20
          1997 municipal elections.           police).
          Police chief selected from ethnic   Police chief and deputies elected
          group with most citizens residing   by municipal assembly on November
          in Brcko supervisory area. Police   13, 1997.
          chief and two deputies must be of
          different ethnic groups.            Multiethnic police force begins to
                                              function December 31, 1997.
                                              Multiethnic patrols initially
                                              occur only in periphery areas of
                                              Brcko town, such as returns
                                              villages and border crossings.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Standards for integrating police forces were set by (1) the
Federation police restructuring agreement signed by Bosniak and
Bosnian Croat political leaders on April 25, 1996; (2) the Republika
Srpska police restructuring agreement signed by Republika Srpska
President Plavsic and Prime Minister Klickovic on September 16, 1997;
and (3) the Brcko Supervisor's order on multiethnic police in Brcko
municipality of October 13, 1997, and the November 10, 1997, addendum
to that order. 
\b According to the 1991 census data, Bosnian Serbs were the
overwhelming majority in areas of the West Bosnia canton, including
Drvar.  They were driven out of those areas in the summer of 1995 as
a result of a Croatian military offensive, but won the majority of
seats on the Drvar municipal council in the September 1997 election. 
Bosnian Serbs who have returned to Drvar have applied to become
members of the police force.  According to an OSCE official, canton
authorities failed to integrate 15 Bosnian Serb officers into the
Drvar police force by May 9, 1998, as required. 
\c IPTF created a requirement for a common paint scheme for all
police cars in the Federation.  The U.N.  and SFOR agreed that police
cars that are not painted in the joint Federation colors will be
considered illegal and will be seized. 
\d According to a December 10, 1997, U.N.  report, the inauguration
of the Federation Ministry of Interior was delayed for several months
by disagreements between the Bosniak minister and his Croat deputy
over distribution of responsibilities and the collocation of the
ministry and a Bosniak-controlled intelligence agency, mainly due to
Bosniak intransigence. 
Sources:  IPTF and U.N.  reports; IPTF, U.N.  and State Department
officials. 
The joint patrolling by Bosniak and Bosnian Croat police forces was
viewed as a positive development by human rights and other observers. 
During our October 1997 visit to Bosnia, these patrols were just
getting underway in many areas of the ethnically mixed cantons of
Neretva and Central Bosnia.  At that time, a senior OSCE human rights
observer told us that joint Bosniak and Bosnian Croat police patrols
had resulted in a decline in human rights abuses in areas where they
were occurring.  By early December 1997, according to a U.N.  report,
joint Bosniak and Bosnian Croat patrols were taking place in every
municipality in Neretva and Central Bosnia cantons.  However, by
mid-March 1998, some municipalities in these cantons had reverted to
a pattern of police patrols consisting solely of officers from the
dominant ethnic group. 
Despite these positive developments, State Department and IPTF
officials described the progress in integrating Federation police
forces as frustrating, halting, incremental progress, noting many
problems.  For example, police deployed to areas controlled by
another ethnic group at times had been harassed, intimidated, and
threatened, and some had requested IPTF or SFOR protection.  Further,
in early February 1998, according to a State Department official,
IPTF and OHR canceled the inauguration of a restructured police force
in a Croat-controlled canton when they discovered that only Bosnian
Croat flags were to be displayed, and no Bosniak officials or police
were to be present.  This canton is particularly resistant to
implementing reform or integrating, given its proximity and ties to
the Republic of Croatia.  State officials said that political leaders
are the cause of problems in integrating Bosniak and Bosnian Croat
police in the Federation--political will is not coming from Bosniak
and Bosnian Croat political leaders to allow or encourage
integration.\10
Many police forces in the Federation face a serious shortage of
police officers because they cannot fill positions allocated for
Serbs or other ethnic groups, despite offers of housing assistance
and other incentives to attract police from those groups.  For
example, Neretva Canton had filled only 3 of the 260 slots allotted
to Bosnian Serb police as of mid-October 1997.  According to a Police
Chief in the canton, the ability of his force to protect public
safety remains seriously compromised until his station reaches full
strength. 
Further, Bosnia's three ethnically based police forces, which
continue to be controlled by their respective political leaders,
often did little to provide personal security and uphold human rights
of citizens outside their respective ethnic groups.\11
Instead, most human rights violations--by some estimates as high as
50-70 percent, according to a senior U.N.  official--have been
committed by police.  Police forces in many instances during 1997 did
not act to protect people of other ethnic groups who still lived in
their jurisdictions or who wished to travel or return to their homes
across ethnic lines. 
According to a State Department official, some people have protected
the rights of all citizens regardless of ethnicity; however, the
development of democratic police in Bosnia will require a change in
Bosnia's political leadership and the control they still wield over
the police.  Further, many observers told us that this will also
require a new generation of police leaders trained in democratic
policing.  These observers stated that Bosnia's current generation of
police leaders--including those installed by President Plavsic--had
been trained to serve an authoritarian state rather than the people
of Bosnia.  The Federation started the process of developing a new
generation of professional officers trained in accordance with
democratic standards when it opened its new police academy in
December 1997.  The first class of 100 officers includes 58 Bosnian
Croats, 20 Bosniaks, and 22 "Serb or other" students. 
--------------------
\10 The integration process in Mostar, the capital of Neretva Canton,
suffered a setback in September 1997 when a bomb exploded outside the
main Bosnian Croat police station, leading Bosniak officers to
withdraw temporarily from their assigned stations in Bosnian
Croat-controlled areas. 
\11 In mid-October 1997, UNHCR and IPTF officials told us that Konjic
municipality is a notable exception to this general rule--the Konjic
Chief of Police, along with the Mayor and his deputy, is genuinely
committed to providing security for all ethnic groups who live in or
wish to return to Konjic. 
      POLICE RESTRUCTURING AND
      JUDICIAL REFORM ASSISTANCE
      PROGRAMS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3.2
According to a State Department official, IPTF originally estimated
that it would cost about $110 million to provide training and
equipment for Bosnia's civilian police as they participate in IPTF's
police restructuring program:  $60 million for the Federation and $50
million for Republika Srpska.  The United States has pledged about
$30 million in fiscal years 1996 and 1997 and requested an additional
$15 million in fiscal year 1998.  The State Department spent $6.2
million to support efforts to train and equip Federation police in
fiscal year 1996 and obligated or planned to obligate $17.4 million
to support similar efforts for Federation and Republika Srpska police
in fiscal year 1997.\12 The vast majority of the funds were to be
used for the Federation, as Bosnian Serb political leaders did not
agree to restructure their police forces until late in the year. 
Most of the U.S.  police training money in both entities was used to
fund programs administered by the Department of Justice's
International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program,
including the IPTF's human dignity and basic skills (transition)
training courses for thousands of Bosnian police officers (see table
2.1).  The program also (1) helped to establish a model police
station in Sarajevo--one is planned for each canton and five are now
operational--to demonstrate how police stations in a democratic
country should function, (2) provided training and instructor and
curriculum development for the reformed Federation police academy,
and (3) continued forensics and executive development training.  The
United States also spent about $2.3 million to provide uniforms and
12,000 pairs of handcuffs for the Federation police.  Further, the
State Department obligated about $1 million to the Department of
Justice to support similar training programs for Republika Srpska
police in Brcko. 
According to State Department officials, other countries until
recently had not pledged or made major contributions because they
disagree with the United States on how to approach police
restructuring.  They believe that IPTF should be handling all aspects
of police restructuring--monitoring, reorganizing, and training--on
its own.  The U.S.  government, however, believes that even with the
new IPTF focus on recruiting trainers and playing a more active role
in training, the IPTF by itself does not have the training and
equipment required for effective restructuring of the Federation
police.  Up until October 1997, other donors had pledged about $4.2
million and actually contributed $2.8 million to the U.N.  Trust Fund
for police reform, according to State sources.  Beginning in late
1997, according to a State Department document, the European Union
and other countries did pledge additional funds for police
assistance, bringing the total amount promised up to $23.3 million,
although the total amount actually contributed to the U.N.  Trust
Fund is still less than $3 million, as of the end of March 1998. 
According to State Department officials, a shortage of funding for
the program has resulted in delays in providing temporarily certified
police with professional training required for full certification. 
For example, lack of funds delayed the opening of the Federation
police academy from September 1 to mid-December 1997, thereby
postponing the introduction of the IPTF's planned 6-month recruit
training course.  The academy needed an estimated $3 million-$5
million in renovations. 
The international community recognizes that in order to ensure public
security in Bosnia, police reform must be accompanied by reform of
Bosnia's judicial system, an effort that USAID officials acknowledge
will be a massive undertaking for the international community. 
Large-scale efforts to reform the judiciary have not yet gotten
underway, though some donors, including USAID, are funding limited
judicial reform efforts.  According to a USAID judicial reform
grantee, the international community has not yet started to address
problems of the court systems at many levels of government; they
remain undemocratic and corrupt instruments of government control
from the prewar Communist era.  The judiciary in all entities,
according to a State Department human rights report, remains subject
to coercive influence and intimidation by the authorities or dominant
political parties, and close ties exist between courts of law and the
ruling parties in many areas.\13
--------------------
\12 A small portion of the fiscal year 1997 funding went to support
police training conducted by the U.N.  peacekeeping operation in
Eastern Slavonia, according to a State Department official. 
\13 For example, a judge on the Republika Srpska Constitutional Court
was severely beaten by thugs prior to his presiding over a major,
politically related case on the legality of President Plavsic's call
for new parliamentary elections. 
   CREATING A STABLE MILITARY
   BALANCE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:4
A third key element of providing a secure environment in Bosnia is to
create a stable military balance in the region.  The United States
believes that there are two primary factors in achieving a stable
military balance:  (1) the arms control provisions of the Dayton
Agreement and (2) the U.S.-led program to train and equip the Bosniak
and Bosnian Croat militaries as they integrate into a unified
Federation military. 

Arms Control
In 1997, the international community and political leaders of
Bosnia's three major ethnic groups continued to implement two of the
three arms verification and control agreements called for by annex
1B, articles II, IV, and V, of the Dayton Agreement, although they
did so only with strong international pressure and support.  The
negotiations for the article V regional arms control agreement had
not yet begun as of late April 1998. 
         ARTICLE II CONFIDENCE AND
         SECURITY-BUILDING
         MEASURES
         IN BOSNIA
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 2:4.0.1
The article II agreement was signed on January 26, 1996, by political
leaders of Bosnia's three major ethnic groups and called for measures
to enhance mutual confidence and reduce the risk of conflict.\14 To
assist in this process, OSCE established a regional arms control
monitoring mission in Sarajevo to oversee article II implementation. 
The political leaders of the three major ethnic groups have generally
fulfilled the objectives of the article II agreement, although they
required heavy OSCE pressure to do so.  Specifically, they (1)
declared their holdings of heavy weapons; (2) completed scheduled
inspections of those holdings under OSCE auspices; and (3) exchanged
information and military liaisons, established other communications
links, and participated in joint visits and seminars. 
While U.S.  and OSCE officials stated that they were generally
satisfied with the degree of compliance demonstrated by the parties
in 1997, they also said that military liaison missions were meeting
twice monthly only under OSCE pressure.  They also noted that the
parties were not using the defense ministry "hot lines" that had been
established.  Because of these problems, U.S.  and OSCE officials
believe that the parties cannot continue the article II process in
1998 without significant international involvement.  According to
these officials, OSCE will review the need for the continued presence
of its arms control mission in Bosnia in June 1998. 
--------------------
\14 Negotiations conducted under annex 1B, article II, of the Dayton
Agreement resulted in the "Agreement on Confidence- and Security-
Building Measures."
         ARTICLE IV SUBREGIONAL
         ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 2:4.0.2
The second agreement, the article IV subregional arms control
agreement of June 1996, was signed by political leaders of Bosnia's
three major ethnic groups as well as Croatia and the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia, to reduce arms and military forces to balanced and
stable levels.\15 These parties made substantial progress during 1997
in implementing the outstanding provisions of the article IV
agreement.  Specifically, the parties (1) completed an additional
round of scheduled inspections (beyond those completed in 1996) of
all five parties' declared heavy weapons holdings; (2) remained under
the voluntary manpower limits that they established in 1996; (3)
periodically updated their heavy weapons declarations; and (4) met
the October 31, 1997, deadline for reducing their declared surpluses
of heavy weapons.  Altogether, the five militaries destroyed or
disposed of nearly 6,600 surplus heavy weapons--about 40 percent of
their combined heavy weapons holdings--by that date.  Thus, at the
end of 1997, the parties were below the heavy weapons ceilings
established by the article IV agreement (see fig.  2.2).\16
   Figure 2.2:  Heavy Weapons
   Holdings and Ceilings Under
   Article IV
   (See figure in printed
   edition.)
Legend
FRY = Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
Note 1:  The article IV agreement defined five major categories of
heavy weapons to be declared and subject to limitations:  (1) battle
tanks, (2) armored combat vehicles, (3) combat aircraft, (4) attack
helicopters, and (5) artillery with a caliber of 75 millimeters and
above.  It required the parties to reduce a portion of their surplus
heavy weapons by set percentages--40 percent of surplus artillery,
combat aircraft, and attack helicopters, as well as 20 percent of
surplus tanks and armored combat vehicles--by December 31, 1996, and
to reduce 100 percent of their surplus heavy weapons by October 31,
1997. 
Note 2:  The Bosniak and Bosnian Croat militaries declared their
heavy weapons together as the Federation Army.  The Federation
imported about 116 tanks, 122 armored personnel carriers and other
combat vehicles, and 204 artillery pieces under the U.S.-led train
and equip program during 1996 and 1997.  Acquisition of the artillery
required the Federation to reduce its artillery holdings by 126
pieces during the first week of November 1997. 
Source:  OSCE data. 
Bosnian Serb political leaders, who had largely failed to comply with
the December 1996 interim reduction target, fully met the final
target date.\17 U.S.  officials attributed the greater compliance of
Bosnian Serbs to (1) SFOR's restrictions on the Bosnian Serb
military's movement and training as a means of forcing compliance,
(2) Bosnian Serb budget and manpower constraints that do not allow
them to maintain weapons, and (3) SFOR assistance in transporting
weapons to their reduction sites.  According to OSCE and State
officials, OSCE will remain substantially involved in the article IV
inspection processes and will use them to push the parties to report
more fully all heavy weapons holdings.\18 For example, according to a
State Department official, OSCE will ask the parties to classify
several hundred mortars currently excluded from article IV as subject
to its heavy weapons limits. 
--------------------
\15 Negotiations conducted under annex 1B, article IV, of the Dayton
Agreement resulted in the "Agreement on Sub-regional Arms Control,"
signed on June 16, 1996.  Bosnia's three major ethnic groups were
represented by the governments of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, the Republika Srpska and the Federation.  The parties
agreed to regularly participate in a consultative commission in
Vienna to monitor article IV implementation. 
\16 The parties disposed of 6,455 of these surplus heavy weapons by
cutting them up in accordance with the standards established by the
Conventional Force Reduction in Europe agreement.  OSCE reported that
the parties exported, converted into training units or nonmilitary
uses, or lost through accidents an additional 125 weapons. 
\17 As of the December 31, 1996, interim deadline, Bosnian Serb
political leaders had reduced only 45 heavy weapons and had
circumvented the article IV agreement by exempting about 1,250 heavy
weapons.  In December 1996, the Peace Implementation Council required
that no more than 5 percent of July 1996 heavy weapons holdings could
be exempt from the ceiling and threatened sanctions against the
Bosnian Serbs.  The Bosnian Serbs then declared they would reduce an
additional 1,100 heavy weapons by the final deadline date of October
31, 1997. 
\18 Some of the difference between SFOR and OSCE figures may be
caused by their different counting methodologies and definitions of
heavy weapons categories.  According to a NATO document and OSCE
officials, SFOR established a direct field-level liaison with OSCE
weapons experts to refine SFOR cantonment data and to reconcile
differences in their heavy weapons counts. 
         ARTICLE V REGIONAL ARMS
         CONTROL AGREEMENT
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 2:4.0.3
Negotiations had not yet begun on the third agreement called for by
annex 1B, article V, to establish a regional arms control balance in
and around the former Yugoslavia, by late April 1998.  The Dayton
Agreement placed no time limit on these negotiations, nor did it
define the geographic area subject to this agreement.  According to a
State Department official, OSCE did select a Special Representative
at its December 1997 meeting in Copenhagen.  The Special
Representative is expected to begin consultations in the spring of
1998 to set the scope and objectives for article V, under which
negotiations can later begin. 
      MILITARY TRAIN AND EQUIP
      PROGRAM
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:4.1
The U.S.-led international program to equip, train, and integrate the
Bosniak and Bosnian Croat militaries into a unified Federation
military\19 remains a key element of the U.S.  effort to establish a
stable military balance in the region and sustain a secure
environment in Bosnia.\20 The program made significant progress in
equipping, training, and establishing integrated structures for the
Federation Army in 1997, but the Bosniak and Bosnian Croat militaries
still maintain separate chains of command, the troops will require
years of additional training and sustainment support, and the force
is not projected to have a fully integrated defensive and deterrence
capability until beyond the year 2000. 
As of April 1998, the total pledges and contributions to the train
and equip program were about $389 million, including $109.1 million
from the United States, with a total of 14 countries pledging cash,
equipment, training, or other support.\21 For example, foreign donors
provided in full the $147 million in cash they pledged in 1996 plus
an additional $5 million contributed in 1998; the majority of the
donated or purchased military equipment has been delivered to the
Federation (see fig.  2.3); and Bosniak and Bosnian Croat soldiers
are or will be trained in Germany, Turkey, Egypt, Malaysia,
Bangladesh, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, while American,
Jordanian, and Indonesian trainers have instructed Bosniak and
Bosnian Croat soldiers in Bosnia.  In addition, the Bosniak military
has used donor funds to purchase multiple-launch rocket systems, and
532 trucks and trailers; moreover, it started producing artillery,
helmets, and small arms ammunition in state-owned factories.  See
appendix III for additional details on the status of the train and
equip program. 
   Figure 2.3:  Heavy Weapons
   Donated by the United States,
   United Arab Emirates, and Egypt
   (See figure in printed
   edition.)
   (See figure in printed
   edition.)
The U.S.  firm contracted by the Federation to train and integrate
the Bosniak and Bosnian Croat militaries--MPRI--largely met the
objectives of its first phase of its 2-year contract, which is valued
at about $80 million.\22 According to State Department and contractor
officials, phase I of the contract--which ended in September
1997--achieved the following: 
  -- The integrated Ministry of Defense, the Joint Military Command,
     the joint logistics and training commands the contractor helped
     establish and train are now at least partially staffed and
     beginning to function.  As of October 1997, the new joint
     logistics command was starting to distribute the small arms and
     some types of equipment donated by the United States. 
  -- The contractor has completed "train the trainer" courses in
     small unit tactics for 9 of the 15 Bosniak and Bosnian Croat
     brigades using U.S.-supplied light weapons. 
  -- The Federation Army School, which was established by the
     contractor in October 1996, trained about 1,900 Bosniak and
     Bosnian Croat officers and noncommissioned officers in its first
     year.  The school's leadership and technical training ranged
     from basic non-commissioned officer's classes up to brigade and
     battalion commander and staff courses. 
  -- The Federation Army combat simulation center near Hadzici opened
     in January 1997 and has provided brigade and battalion staff
     training for Bosniak and Bosnian Croat commanders and staff.  In
     keeping with the Federation Army's defensive strategy, the
     training emphasizes defensive warfare. 
The contract was extended for an additional year on September 6,
1997, according to State Department officials.  During this phase,
the contractor intends to help the Ministry of Defense and Joint
Military Command become fully operational, continue to provide
individual and unit training, and give instruction in the use of
U.S.-donated weapons.  The Federation Army School plans to provide
training for approximately 1,500 officers and noncommissioned
officers in its second year.  As of the beginning of May 1998, the
contractor had completed training 1,823 Federation Army personnel in
the operation and maintenance of the U.S.-provided tanks and armored
personnel carriers.  The new joint logistics command had also started
to distribute the small arms and equipment donated by the United
States, was planning to distribute weapons donated by four other
countries, and was maintaining control over the ammunition.\23
The Federation will need additional financial and material resources
to complete and sustain its new force structure, according to State
officials, because the $152 million in cash donations and $100
million in U.S.  drawdown authority is fully committed to existing
program requirements.  The Federation will also need assistance in
maintaining the heavy weapons donated by the United Arab Emirates,
Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey.  Further, according to contractor
personnel, Federation commanders and staff will require 2 or 3 years
before these staffs are fully trained in the tactical doctrine being
taught at the simulation center.  Maintenance personnel will need 3
or 4 years' additional training before they will be able to instruct
other personnel on the maintenance of the U.S.-provided heavy
weapons. 
As of May 1998, Bosnian Serb leaders had not agreed to participate in
the military train and equip program under conditions imposed by the
United States.  Specifically, according to State Department
officials, the Bosnian Serb political leaders and military would have
to (1) begin to work toward establishing common national defense
institutions for Bosnia; (2) end their deep and extensive military
relationship with Serbia; and (3) comply with all areas of the Dayton
Agreement, including arresting people indicted for war crimes,
guaranteeing freedom of movement, and following through on arms
control agreements.  A senior State Department official acknowledged
that Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks have not fully complied with the
agreement, but said that they have complied to a far greater degree
than have the Bosnian Serbs on such issues as surrendering indictees
to the war crimes tribunal, allowing freedom of movement, permitting
the return of refugees, and accepting other key elements of Dayton. 
--------------------
\19 Public Law 104-107, section 540, (February 12, 1996) authorized
the President to draw down $100 million in DOD military equipment and
services in support of the train and equip program. 
\20 State Department officials stated that the specific weaponry
provided under the program would contribute to a stable military
balance and would be within the limits of the subregional arms
control agreement negotiated under article IV of the Dayton
Agreement. 
\21 According to State Department officials, many donors did not
place a monetary value on in-kind assistance.  The program added one
donor in 1997, when Jordan provided training. 
\22 MPRI--formerly known as Military Professional Resources,
Incorporated--is a professional services company engaged in
military-related contracting in the U.S.  and international defense
markets.  The organization, headquartered in Alexandria, Virginia,
was incorporated in 1987 and is owned and operated by former military
officers and noncommissioned officers. 
\23 Contract and U.S.  officials noted that in September 1997, SFOR
barred the contractor from completing a combat training center
facility near Livno until the Federation agreed to (1) locate and
compensate displaced Serb property owners in the area and (2) provide
guarantees that roads through the area will remain open for civilian
transit.  According to a State Department official, the Federation
addressed these concerns in November 1997, and construction resumed. 
As of April 1998, the first unit rotation through the center was
scheduled for May or June 1998. 
PROGRESS IN DEVELOPING A UNIFIED,
DEMOCRATIC BOSNIA
============================================================ Chapter 3
A second principal objective of the Dayton Agreement was to establish
Bosnia as a unified, democratic country that would uphold the rule of
law and adhere to international standards of human rights.  Some
progress was made in 1997 and early 1998 in establishing the
institutions, laws, and practices of a unified, democratic Bosnia at
all levels; the human rights situation improved considerably; ethnic
intolerance eased slightly; and the international community's efforts
to promote democratic governance and practices showed early results. 
Despite the progress made, the country remained a long way from
achieving the overall objective:  Most multiethnic institutions at
all levels of government were largely not functioning or were
functioning only as a result of heavy international involvement, the
vast majority of Bosnian Serbs and Croats and their political leaders
still wanted to be separate from Bosnia, and the human rights
situation remained poor and ethnic intolerance strong.  Ethnic
intolerance and human rights remain particularly volatile, as
reflected in the increased number of these incidents in these areas
from January through April 1998. 
   MULTIETHNIC INSTITUTIONS
   AND LAWS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1
Under intense international pressure, some progress was made during
1997 and early 1998 in developing governmental institutions and the
legal framework for politically linking Bosnia's three ethnic groups
at the national, entity, and municipal levels, as well as in the area
of the Brcko supervisory regime.  However, the intransigence of
political leaders of Bosnia's three major ethnic groups--particularly
the hard-line SDS leadership in Pale--continued to block the
effective functioning of Bosnia's national institutions.  This
situation required the High Representative to use his authority to
break political impasses in the development of national symbols and
laws. 
Further, as of May 1998, the new, relatively moderate government in
Republika Srpska was still in the process of consolidating the
political, security, and financial institutions and resources that
would allow it to live up to its pledges of implementing the Dayton
Agreement; real power in the Federation remained in separate Bosniak-
and Croat-controlled structures; 133 of 136 municipal governments
elected in September 1997 had formed but only with strong
international involvement; and Brcko's multiethnic institutions were
established and functioning only because of the intense international
supervision and pressure. 
      NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS,
      SYMBOLS, AND LAWS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1.1
Since the September 1996 election of Bosnia's multiethnic, collective
Presidency and Parliamentary Assembly, elected Bosnian officials from
all three ethnic groups have begun to build a national government. 
Although all key national institutions were established by the summer
of 1997, they generally have not functioned as intended, in large
part because hard-line SDS political leaders within these
institutions impeded their effective operations.  In October 1997,
the High Representative noted that the internal crisis in Republika
Srpska and the regular absence of SDS members of these institutions
substantially hampered their work and constituted a major impediment
to implementing the Dayton Agreement.  By early December 1997, the
problems of the non-functioning national institutions led the High
Representative to request, and the Peace Implementation Council to
approve, an interpretation of his Dayton authority that allowed him
to regulate the functioning of national institutions and to impose
interim measures when the parties are unable to reach agreement. 
Table 3.1 shows a list of national institutions and their status as
of May 1998. 
                                    Table 3.1
                      Progress in Creating Bosnia's National
                           Institutions, as of May 1998
Institution     Function                        Status
--------------  ------------------------------  --------------------------------
Parliamentary   National legislation to         Met 10 times in 1997 and twice
Assembly        implement decisions of the      in 1998; adopted laws on
                Presidency, make revenue        passports and Council of
                decisions, approve national     Ministers on December 16, 1997,
                budget, and ratify treaties.    under intense international
                                                pressure.
Collective      Act as executive of national    Met 42 times between October
Presidency\a    government.                     1996 and May 30, 1998.
                                                Presidency members, particularly
                                                the Serb member, had repeated,
                                                intentional absences that
                                                constituted lasting incapacity
                                                to perform the duties of the
                                                Presidency.
Council of      Implement policies and          Met 57 times since initial
Ministers       decisions of national           January 1997 meeting. Small
                government.                     secretariat created on April 15,
                                                1997. Most ministries lack
                                                staff, funding, office space,
                                                and effective authority. Could
                                                not reach agreement on important
                                                legislation as a result of Serb
                                                member's obstinacy, nor on
                                                implementing the Council of
                                                Ministers law that would address
                                                these shortfalls.
Standing        Coordinate military and arms    Established on June 1, 1997. Met
Committee on    control matters at national     six times between September 15,
Military        level.\                         1997, and April 16, 1998, after
Matters\\b                                      agreements were reached on the
                                                procedures and composition of
                                                the committee.\ International
                                                official appointed coordinator
                                                to the committee's secretariat
                                                in March 1998.
Constitutional  Highest appellate court;        Convened May 23, 1997, and
Court\c\        resolves disputes over          established on
                constitution and between        August 11, 1997. Judges and
                entities.                       staff appointed. The court held
                                                five sessions but lacks budget
                                                for administrative structure.
Central Bank    Act as a simple currency board  Central bank law passed June 20,
                for first 6 years; issue        1997. Commenced operations on
                currency and conduct monetary   August 11, 1997; separate
                policy.                         currencies continue to be used
                                                in Bosnia's Serb, Croat, and
                                                Bosniak areas.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a The collective Presidency consists of three members:  one Bosniak
and one Croat, each directly elected from the territory of the
Federation; and one Serb directly elected from the territory of
Republika Srpska. 
\b Bosnia's Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks still maintain three separate
armed forces, a condition that must evolve into a unified armed
forces, according to a State Department official, if Bosnia is to
become a unified country.  As an interim measure under the Dayton
Agreement, the Standing Committee on Military Matters is to
coordinate the activities of the armed forces.  NATO plans to
implement its security cooperation activities with Bosnia's three
militaries through this committee. 
\c The other national judicial body established by the Dayton
Agreement, the Commission on Human Rights, is functioning with
international support.  The commission considers human rights
violations committed after the agreement went into effect.  It
consists of an Ombudsperson to investigate alleged violations and a
Human Rights Chamber to issue rulings on cases referred by the
Ombudsperson or submitted directly by other applicants.  OSCE
appointed the Ombudsperson for a 5-year term.  For the chamber, the
Council of Europe appointed eight international members and the
parties appointed six Bosnian members for 5-year terms.  At the end
of 5 years, Bosnia's national government is to assume responsibility
for the commission's operations.  As of January 1998, the chamber had
received 70 cases and had issued five decisions. 
Sources:  OHR and NATO documents; interviews with State Department
and NATO officials. 
Because these institutions have largely not functioned as intended,
during most of 1997 the political leaders of the three ethnic groups
reached agreement on few laws and symbols that would link them
politically.  In late 1997 and early 1998, the High Representative
responded to the political intransigence by ordering the
implementation of legislation after Bosnia authorities failed to pass
the required legislation on time (see
table 3.2).  As of May 19, 1998, the High Representative had not
exercised his authority that allows him to remove obstructionist,
elected officials from office at the national level.\1
                                    Table 3.2
                     Progress in Developing Bosnia's National
                         Laws and Symbols, as of May 1998
Law or symbol       Status
------------------  ------------------------------------------------------------
National flag       Failed to adopt design by December 31, 1997, deadline. OHR
                    declared the establishment of an independent and
                    representative flag design commission on January 12, 1998;
                    the commission proposed three alternatives for the flag on
                    January 26, 1998. The High Representative selected design on
                    February 4, 1998, after Parliament failed to meet deadline.
                    Flag flown at United Nations for first time on February 6,
                    1998, and at Winter Olympics in Japan.
Ambassadorships     Agreement on ambassadorships reached on August 7, 1997,
                    which called for the Bosniak member of the collective
                    Presidency to appoint 13 ambassadors, the Serb member to
                    appoint 11 ambassadors, and the Croat member to appoint 9
                    ambassadors. On January 13, 1998, the collective Presidency
                    reached agreement on 32 ambassadors; the remaining
                    ambassador (to the United States) was appointed by the Serb
                    member of the collective Presidency on February 2, 1998.
Common currency     The Presidency failed to adopt the design for the new
                    currency by the January 20, 1998, deadline. The High
                    Representative received and accepted the design from the
                    Central Bank Governor on January 20, 1998, and, with the
                    Governor, introduced the design of new currency, the
                    Convertible Marka, on January 21, 1998.
Citizenship law     After Parliament failed to meet the December 15, 1997,
                    deadline, the High Representative imposed an interim law
                    that took effect on January 1, 1998.\\a
Common passports    The High Representative designated the design in December
                    1997, which allows the use of Bosnian, Croatian, or Serbian
                    language on the passport. Parliament adopted law on travel
                    documents on December 16, 1997. The new passport is to be
                    issued in May 1998 and is to be recognized by all foreign
                    countries as of June 1, 1998.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a This was the first issue on which the High Representative used his
authority to arbitrate in cases where the parties are unable to reach
agreement. 
Source:  OHR documents. 
--------------------
\1 The High Representative used his authority to remove the Mayor of
Stolac in March 1998 and the Deputy Mayor of Drvar in April 1998. 
      NEW REPUBLIKA SRPSKA
      GOVERNMENT
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1.2
The election for the Republika Srpska National Assembly, or
parliament, on November 22 and 23, 1997, resulted in the SDS losing
control of the parliament and in the formation of a more moderate
entity-level government.  This government is headed by a Prime
Minister--Milorad Dodik--who publicly declared support for full
implementation of the Dayton Agreement.  As of May 1998, the new
government's control of the political, security, and financial
apparatus in Republika Srpska was not yet complete, and its plans and
pledges to support Dayton not yet implemented. 
In the November 1997 elections, the SDS lost its majority in the
parliament, dropping from 45 (of 83) seats to 24 seats and from 52
percent of the vote to 27 percent.  Even when in coalition with
another hard-line party, the Serb Radical Party, the SDS could no
longer control the assembly (see fig.  3.1).  President Plavsic's new
political party, the Serb People's Union (SNS), was the biggest
beneficiary of changes in the parliament, winning 15 seats and 16
percent of the vote.\2 Another Serb opposition party, the Socialist
Party of Republika Srpska (which has strong ties to President
Milosevic of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), won nine seats in
the parliament.  The Coalition for a Unified and Democratic
Bosnia--led by the ruling Bosniak Party of Democratic Action
(SDA)--won the same number of seats, 16, as in 1996, although its
total percentage of the vote declined from about 19 percent to about
17 percent.\3
   Figure 3.1:  Results of the
   Republika Srpska National
   Assembly Elections, 1996 and
   1997
   (See figure in printed
   edition.)
Legend
Serb opposition (1996) = A coalition of Socialists, Independent
Social Democrats, and other parties; Democratic Patriot Block; Serb
Party of Krajina; and Serb Patriotic Party
Serb opposition (1997) = Socialists, Independent Social Democrats,
and SNS
Federation-based parties (1996) = SDA, Party for Bosnia and
Herzegovina, and a coalition of other political parties
Federation-based parties (1997) = Coalition for a Unified and
Democratic Bosnia and Social Democratic Party. 
Source:  National Democratic Institute analyses. 
Although an SDS member was reelected as the parliament's President,
members of Serb opposition and Federation-based political parties in
the parliament elected the new, moderate Prime Minister by one vote
and gave him the mandate to form a new government on January 18,
1998.\4 This election took place despite hard-liners' attempts to
disrupt the proceedings by walking out of the session.  On January
31, 1998, at the third parliamentary session, the new Republika
Srpska government was sworn in, and the parliament voted to move the
seat of government from Pale to Banja Luka. 
After being elected Prime Minister, Dodik pledged a clean break with
the failed policies of the ultranationalists, promised to cooperate
with the international community, and expressed full support for the
peace plan, including the right of all refugees to return to their
prewar homes.  The international community, including SFOR, supported
the first meetings of the new parliament and transition to the new
government through political and military means.  For example,
following the election of the new government, SFOR increased patrols
and established observation posts in the vicinity of Republika Srpska
government offices in and around Pale. 
Dodik's election as Prime Minister is viewed by observers in Bosnia
as one of the most significant political developments in Bosnia since
the signing of the Dayton Agreement.  According to the International
Crisis Group, a nongovernmental organization operating in Bosnia,
before the war Dodik supported non-nationalist policies and reforms;
during the war he formed an opposition block of 12 members in the
Bosnia Serb parliament and supported all peace initiatives; and after
the 1996 national elections, he formed a "shadow government"
consisting of three Serbs, three Bosniaks, and two Croats.\5 Further,
in September 1997, after Dodik's party had won a plurality of seats
in the Laktasi municipal assembly and tied for the most seats in the
Srbac municipal assembly, he invited all former residents who were
expelled during the war to return.  In forming his new government,
the International Crisis Group reported, Dodik continued to break
Bosnian taboos.  For example, instead of looking to the exclusive
support of one ethnic group, he sought the political backing of all
ethnic groups.\6
USIA polling data show that as of mid-February 1998, Dodik had
substantial support from Bosnian Serbs, with 69 percent holding a
favorable opinion of him.  Further, according to OHR documents, Dodik
immediately moved to reestablish political and economic ties between
Republika Srspka and Sarajevo, as well as between Republika Srpska
and Croatia.  The new government received support from the Republika
Srpska Ministry of Defense and has been attempting to reunify the
entity's state media that had been split during the political crisis. 
As of May 1998, however, it was unclear whether the Prime Minister
would be able to fulfill his commitments to implement Dayton due to
his weak hold on Republika Srpska's political, security, and
financial institutions.  For example: 
  -- Some observers, including human rights groups, said that
     Dodik-appointed Ministers of Defense, Justice, and Interior had
     either expressed limited support for Dayton implementation or
     were closely associated with hard-line nationalists and
     individuals indicted by the war crimes tribunal; thus, these
     individuals may attempt to obstruct efforts to implement Dayton. 
  -- Dodik's government remained threatened by attempts of
     hard-liners to undermine the government.  For example, according
     to an OSCE report, the President of the Republika Srpska
     parliament, an SDS member, called a special parliamentary
     session to be held in Doboj on April 16; during the session, the
     hard-line SDS and Serb Radical parties intended to hold a vote
     of no-confidence.  The session was cancelled when a boycott by
     all other parties deprived the session of a quorum.  Several
     reports in late April and early May 1998, including a statement
     of the President's Special Representative for Dayton
     Implementation, stated that Milosevic, President of the Federal
     Republic of Yugoslavia, supported this and other hard-liner
     attempts to destabilize the government. 
  -- It was unclear whether the new government had gained control of
     all Republika Srpska police.  The new Minister of Interior had
     moved to depoliticize and reunify the police forces that were
     controlled by SDS leaders in Pale and by the government in Banja
     Luka; for example, he named new chiefs to eight of the nine
     public security centers in the entity.  However, there was no
     evidence that these moves had broken the chain of command
     extending from the SDS in Pale to police forces in eastern
     Republika Srpska. 
  -- Dodik was unable to take full control of Republika Srpska
     revenues, and revenues continued to flow to SDS leaders in Pale. 
     According to an international observer in Bosnia, it was unknown
     how much of the entity's total revenue was flowing to Dodik's
     government. 
In mid-February 1998, Dodik vowed to quit his position if
international assistance to his new government was not quickly
delivered, as he needed funds to pay police, teachers, and civil
servants.\7 On February 24, 1998, the High Representative delivered
the first tranche of international assistance to go toward budgetary
support for the new government--4 million deutsche marks from the
European Union.  USAID pledged $5 million for budgetary support for
the new Republika Srpska government, which will be distributed
through a grant to OHR.  These funds will pay back salaries for
government employees, except those of the Ministries of Justice,
Defense, and Interior. 
--------------------
\2 The SNS did not participate in the September 1997 municipal
elections because it was founded after the deadline for party
registration. 
\3 The political parties that made up the coalition ran separately in
the 1996 parliamentary election. 
\4 Dodik's party of Independent Social Democrats won only two seats
in the parliament. 
\5 Dodik chose not to stand as a candidate in the 1996 elections,
fearing that the antinationalist stance he adopted during the war
might harm the prospects of Republika Srpska's nascent opposition
coalitions. 
\6 The first candidate Plavsic proposed as Prime Minister, Mladen
Ivanic, refused to seek the support of non-Serb political parties
after he was rejected by hard-line Serb political parties. 
\7 According to a USAID official, USAID would not allow its
assistance funds to go through Republika Srpska ministries because
the probability of misuse was too high. 
      FEDERATION INSTITUTIONS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1.3
Some progress was made in 1997 toward the creation of institutions,
laws, and symbols of the joint Bosniak-Croat Federation\8 under
intense pressure from the United States and others; however, at the
end of the year the Federation was not yet a fully functioning
governmental entity, and the Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats still
maintained separate administrative structures. 
The Federation Parliament met more frequently during 1997.  It passed
laws on privatization on October 21, 1997, and after international
arbitration, on the resolution of territorial issues associated with
split and new municipalities on January 22, 1998.\9
The ministries, particularly the Defense Ministry, have begun to
acquire staff and facilities and have started to function; the higher
courts have been established and have begun to hear cases; and police
restructuring and integration have made some progress in integrating
Bosniak and Bosnian Croat police forces at the cantonal and municipal
levels.  In addition, according to international advisors to the
Federation, all 10 of the Federation's cantonal governments were
established by October 1997; 9 of 10 cantons had passed laws on
courts by late February 1998; and most of the cantons had started to
restructure their court systems. 
Despite this progress in developing Federation institutions, in April
1998 the High Representative reported that illegal structures of
government in the Federation had not been dissolved or integrated,
despite three formal announcements in 1996 that they had been
abolished.  According to international observers in Bosnia, real
governmental power and authority in the Federation continues to
reside in separate Bosniak and Bosnian Croat governmental structures. 
There, Bosnian Croat political leaders, and some hard-line Bosniak
political leaders, carry on their obstruction of the development of
Federation institutions.\10
The Bosnian Croats still maintain the administrative structures and
symbols of their separate para-state, known as Herceg-Bosna, and
continue to use Croatia's education policy and currency, the Kuna, as
they did during the war.  Bosniaks have also kept their separate
institutions, those of the former Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
including the Bosniak-controlled internal security service, whose
presence has impeded the development of an integrated Federation
Ministry of Interior.  Furthermore, cantonal governments in areas of
the Federation containing a sizable number of both Bosniaks and
Bosnian Croats--particularly the Neretva and Central Bosnia
cantons--have constantly resisted international pressure to pass laws
that would link the two groups and integrate their administrative,
police, and court systems.  This intransigence is due in large part
to hard-line Bosnian Croat leaders. 
--------------------
\8 The Federation between Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats was established
in March 1994. 
\9 According to an OHR report, crucial unresolved issues identified
by the Peace Implementation Council in December 1997 included (1) the
drawing of the borders of Usora Canton in central Bosnia and (2)
agreeing upon borders for a total of 49 municipalities in the
Federation that were situated on the interentity boundary line. 
These issues were resolved by the arbitration of the Senior Deputy
High Representative, who drew the boundary line for the Usora Canton,
enabling the draft law on split and new municipalities to pass
through the Federation parliament's House of Representatives. 
\10 In particular efforts to build viable Federation institutions
were undermined by violence in the Neretva city of Mostar in February
and September 1997. 
      MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1.4
On September 13 and 14, 1997, municipal elections held in Bosnia
resulted in the election of multiethnic municipal governments
throughout Bosnia, as a number of people, primarily Bosniaks, chose
to vote for municipal governments where they lived in 1991.  If fully
implemented, according to observers, the municipal election results
would be a positive step forward in the development of democratic
institutions in Bosnia and could help pave the way for creating
conditions that would allow people to return home across ethnic
lines.  However, the election results proved very difficult to
implement in many municipalities that had a different ethnic
composition before the war, including in Srebrenica. 
Recognizing the potential problems, an interagency working group led
by OSCE developed a municipal election implementation plan in May
1997 and a final operational plan in mid-October 1997.  The
implementation plan called for a final certification that confirms
which municipal councils had been duly formed by the end of 1997. 
According to an OSCE official, final certification means that the
"shell" of a municipal government has been formed.  The
implementation plan recognized that candidates who win office must be
able to travel to municipal council meetings and to move about their
municipality without fear of physical attack or intimidation.  It
called for local police to provide security for council members and
for IPTF and SFOR to supervise the development of the security plan. 
In addition, IPTF and SFOR, together with OSCE and other
organizations, were to monitor the plan's implementation through the
National Election Results Implementation Committee. 
         FORMATION OF MUNICIPAL
         GOVERNMENTS SLOWER THAN
         PROJECTED
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 3:1.4.1
In mid-October 1997, an OSCE official told us that OSCE expected that
up to 12 of the 136 municipalities\11 that held elections would have
problems achieving final certification by December 31, 1997,
primarily because they would involve installing multiethnic
assemblies and governments.  Two of the more difficult cases were
projected to be (1) Srbrenica, a city that had a prewar
Bosniak-majority population but was "ethnically cleansed" by Serbs in
1995; its prewar residents successfully elected a predominantly
Bosniak council and (2) Drvar, a town with a predominantly Serb
majority before and during much of the war but now populated in large
part by Bosnian Croats; Bosnian Serbs won the majority on the
municipal council of Drvar. 
The OSCE projection proved overly optimistic:  as of December 31,
1997, 126 of the 136 municipalities had not yet achieved final
certification.  An OSCE official told us that OSCE had underestimated
the difficulty of establishing municipal governments in many areas. 
However, according to a State Department official, the unexpected
parliamentary elections in Republika Srpska contributed to the early
difficulties, as OSCE resources were diverted to administering and
supervising the elections from September through December 1997. 
On December 10, 1997, in response to the slow pace of implementing
the municipal election results, the Peace Implementation Council gave
OSCE and OHR increased authority over the installation of municipal
governments.  Specifically, it gave the OSCE Head of Mission and High
Representative final and binding arbitration authority over
municipalities that had not fulfilled final certification
requirements before February 28, 1998.  According to the chairman of
the National Election Results Implementation Committee, the committee
was using this authority in early 1998 to convoke meetings of
noncompliant municipal councils and negotiate solutions that would
allow the formation of local governments. 
Even with this intense international involvement and effort, however,
as of February 6, 1998, only 79 of the 136 municipalities that held
elections had established their governments and received final
certification by OSCE.  As of that date, OSCE estimated that 31
municipalities would be subjected to final arbitration by OSCE and
OHR.  By March 5, 1998, the number of municipalities receiving final
certification had increased to 115, leaving 21 municipalities subject
to OSCE and OHR arbitration.  By early May 1998, 133 municipalities
had received final certification,\12 and 3 had received arbitration
awards that had not yet been implemented. 
--------------------
\11 This figure consists of 135 municipalities and the Mostar City
Council.  Eighteen municipalities did not hold elections. 
\12 Six of these municipalities had been subject to arbitration. 
         INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT
         IN FUNCTIONING OF NEW
         GOVERNMENTS
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 3:1.4.2
According to OSCE officials, final certification alone does not
ensure that municipal governments will continue to function in a
democratic manner.  Recognizing this, the election implementation
plan called for an interagency structure that would continue to
monitor and report on the functioning of municipal assemblies, thus
ensuring that elected candidates are able to carry out their duties
as envisioned by the Dayton Agreement.  In early February 1998, OSCE
officials told us that this envisioned function and structure had not
yet been fully defined, nor the level of the international
community's involvement in promoting the development of municipal
governments clearly articulated.  These officials said that the
involvement may go beyond monitoring and reporting to include
proactive development of local governments. 
For Srebrenica, the international community established an interim
executive board to replace the elected municipal council, after
repeated attempts at crafting a solution mutually acceptable to
Bosniak and Serb elected municipal councillors had failed and
subsequent arbitration awards were not honored.  On April 6, 1998,
OHR and OSCE issued a supplementary arbitration award that suspended
the work of Srebrenica's elected council and established the interim
executive board to be composed of two Bosniaks and two Serbs and
chaired by an international official.  On April 16, 1998, OHR
announced that a U.S.  citizen had been appointed as chair of the
board and that each of the four local members would choose their
deputies from the opposing ethnic group in the days to come.  In
consultation with the parties, the board will administer Srebrenica
municipality under the supervision of the High Representative and the
OSCE Head of Mission and will assume authority over all municipal
funds, material, and assets. 
In early 1998, the OSCE's election appeals subcommission issued
decisions that removed from office or otherwise penalized individuals
who had obstructed the functioning of municipal governments.  For
example, on April 17, 1998, the subcommission (1) ruled that two SDS
councillors and one Serb Radical Party councillor in Srebrenica had
obstructed the mediation process and the formation of the municipal
government, (2) removed these councillors from office, and (3) banned
them from occupying administrative posts in the municipality.  The
subcommission placed a similar ban on a Coalition party member, who
did not hold office, because he also had obstructed mediation
sessions.  On the same day, the subcommission decided to remove from
the Teslic assembly an SDS member who served as the assembly's
Vice-President, because this official had used inflammatory language
in an attempt to disrupt the implementation process and intimidate
Bosniak councillors.\13
--------------------
\13 The subcommission warned that the President of the Teslic
assembly, an SDS member, would also be removed if three SDS
councillors found to have been guilty of the same inappropriate
behavior did not read an apology prepared by the subcommission at the
next assembly meeting. 
      BRCKO INSTITUTIONS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1.5
The results of the municipal elections led to the establishment of a
multiethnic administration, judiciary, and police force in the
strategically important area of Brcko, largely due to the efforts of
the interim Brcko supervisory regime.  After the municipal elections,
the Brcko Supervisor issued three orders (plus amendments) that
specified requirements for the establishment of these multiethnic
institutions.  Based on the voters' registration list and election
results, the amendments to the Supervisory orders specified the
ethnic composition of the multiethnic administration, police, and
judiciary as 52.2 percent Serb, 39.1 percent Bosniak, and 8.7 percent
Croat. 
In October 1997, the Brcko Supervisor told us that he foresaw nothing
but troubles, turbulence, and obstruction from hard-line SDS leaders
in Pale in trying to implement Brcko's municipal election results. 
In early February 1998, OHR reported that obstruction by the Serb
parties slowed the process to a pace that only allowed minimum
compliance with orders and regulations, saying that the development
of Brcko's municipal government had been slow and had required a
considerable amount of mediation by OHR.  Table 3.3 describes the
progress made in establishing Brcko's institutions as of late April
1998. 
                                    Table 3.3
                          Status of Establishing Brcko's
                      Multiethnic Administration, Judiciary,
                        and Police, as of late April 1998
                Requirements in supervisory
Institution     orders                          Status
--------------  ------------------------------  --------------------------------
Multiethnic     Municipal assembly was to       Assembly executives and
administration  elect a multiethnic assembly    executive branch leaders were
\b              executive\a and executive       elected by the municipal
                branch leadership.              assembly on November 13, 1997,
                                                the day after the SDS-
                                                controlled local radio called
                                                for the arrest of elected
                                                municipal councillors as war
                                                criminals.
                                                Multiethnic executive board was
                The executive branch leaders    elected, and criteria for OSCE
                were to implement a             certification were achieved on
                multiethnic administration by   December 30, 1997.
                December 31, 1997, later
                changed to May 1, 1998.         Not implemented.
Multiethnic     President of Republika Srpska   When Republika Srpska President
judiciary\b     was to appoint seven key posts  failed to appoint court officers
                of a multiethnic Basic Court,   by the deadline, the Brcko
                Magistrate Court, and Public    Supervisor made six of seven
                Prosecutor's office. The Basic  appointments on December 5,
                Court administrative staff was  1997, and the seventh on
                also to be multiethnic.         December 31, 1997. The SDS
                                                refuted the legitimacy of the
                                                order on December 9. In total,
                                                the supervisor appointed 12
                                                Basic Court Judges and 3 judges
                                                of Magistrate Court by December
                                                31, 1997, in consultation with
                                                the Republika Srpska President
                                                and Prime Minister.
Multiethnic     The municipal assembly was to   The municipal assembly elected a
police force\b  elect a police chief and two    multiethnic police leadership on
                deputies from different ethnic  November 13, 1997.
                groups.
                                                Brcko's multiethnic police force
                Brcko's police force was to     began to function on December
                reflect the local ethnic        31, 1997.
                composition and start
                operations by December 31,
                1997.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a The executive consists of a President, Vice-President, and
Secretary. 
\b Based on the voters' registry and municipal election results, the
Brcko Supervisor established the ethnic composition of the
multiethnic administration, judiciary, and police as 52.2 percent
Serb, 39.1 percent Bosniak, and 8.7 percent Croat. 
Source:  OHR and U.N.  Civil Affairs. 
On March 15, 1998, the Brcko arbitration tribunal issued a second
decision on the status of the Brcko area.\14 This decision deferred
until early 1999\15 a final decision on whether the Brcko area should
be transferred to the Federation, remain within the territory of
Republika Srpska, or be declared a "special" or "neutral district."
In the decision, the tribunal recognized the systematic, blatant, and
at times violent attempts of the SDS leaders in Pale to thwart the
Dayton objective of returning Bosnia, particularly Brcko, to its
prewar multiethnicity, as well as the promise that Dodik's commitment
to a multiethnic Bosnia may change the level of Bosnian Serb
compliance in Brcko over the coming year.\16
The tribunal's decision called for the continuation of the Brcko
supervisory regime under the auspices of OHR because (1) Brcko's new
multiethnic institutions were "shallowly rooted"; (2) the SDS and its
leaders continued to have influence in the area, keeping tensions and
instability high by resisting the Supervisor's efforts to promote
Dayton compliance; and (3) Bosnia's national and entity-level
institutions had not yet become fully effective.  The decision also
gave the Brcko Supervisor new authority equivalent to the High
Representative's powers.  These included the power to remove from
office any official considered by the Supervisor to be inadequately
cooperative with his efforts to achieve compliance with the Dayton
Agreement, to strengthen democratic institutions in the area, and to
revitalize the local economy. 
--------------------
\14 Only the Presiding Arbitrator, an American, signed the decision. 
\15 The decision called for a final arbitration phase at the end of
1998. 
\16 The decision observed that the Federation's record of compliance
with Dayton was not perfect, noting evidence that Federation
authorities had acted to inhibit the return of former Serb residents
to Sarajevo and other communities in the Federation.  Many of these
Serbs are displaced persons living in the Brcko homes of Bosniaks and
Bosnian Croats who would like to return to Brcko. 
      ATTITUDES TOWARD A UNIFIED,
      MULTIETHNIC BOSNIA
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1.6
The problems in establishing multiethnic institutions can largely be
attributed to political leaders of Bosnia's three major ethnic groups
retaining their wartime goals, views that are still largely shared by
the ethnic groups they represent.  In February 1998, international
observers in Bosnia told us that most Bosnian Serb and Croat
political leaders still want to establish ethnically pure states
separate from Bosnia.  According to an international official in
Bosnia, the new Prime Minister of Republika Srpska--while more
moderate and more willing to work with the international community
than nationalist Bosnian Serb leaders--sees himself as the Prime
Minister of an autonomous entity and will be constrained in truly
unifying the country.  On the other hand, Bosniak political leaders
continue to profess support for a unified, multiethnic Bosnia,
although, according to some observers, with Bosniaks in control. 
According to polls conducted by USIA in January 1998, most Bosnian
Serbs and Croats still agree with their political leaders that a
unified Bosnia should not exist (see fig.  3.2).  However, Bosnian
Serb support for this goal has increased from 4 percent in late 1995
to 18 percent in early 1998.  Furthermore, 92 percent of Bosnian
Serbs and 74 percent of Bosnian Croats said that it would be best for
their respective areas to become independent or become part of Serbia
or Croatia, respectively.  In contrast, almost all Bosniaks have
continued to support a unified Bosnia, with 56 percent of them
believing a unified Bosnia is worth dying for.\17
   Figure 3.2:  Support for a
   Unified Bosnia, by Ethnic
   Group, December 1995 To January
   1998
   (See figure in printed
   edition.)
Note:  Bosnia's 1991 census data show that Muslims (Bosniaks)
comprised about 44 percent of the population; Serbs, 31 percent;
Croats, 17 percent; and "other groups," 8 percent.  USIA advises
against weighting the results of its polls to get a "total
population" average because its samples are designed to give an
accurate representation of the views of the predominant ethnic group
in their respective areas of dominance, not nationwide. 
Source:  USIA polling data. 
--------------------
\17 USIA data show results for "Bosnian Muslims," not Bosniaks.  For
the purposes of this report, we have used the terms synonymously. 
   HUMAN RIGHTS AND
   DEMOCRATIZATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2
In general, though significant problems remain, human rights and
other observer reports indicate improvements during the latter part
of 1997 in (1) freedom of association and political pluralism; (2)
freedom of movement across ethnic boundaries; and (3) freedom of the
media.  Further, police-related human rights abuses declined and
ethnic intolerance eased somewhat during 1997; however, according to
SFOR Assessment Cell data, incidents of police abuse and ethnic
conflict increased significantly in March 1998 and remained at high
levels during April.  SFOR data also showed that incidents of a
political nature had increased in late 1997 but had declined sharply
by March 1998. 
      FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND
      POLITICAL PLURALISM
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2.1
According to observer reports, the political environment leading up
to elections held in September and November 1997 was much more open
than the campaign period for the national elections held 1 year
earlier.  Nevertheless, the elections were still a long way from
meeting international standards as fully free and fair.\18
Much less fraud occurred during the municipal elections than during
the September 1996 elections, as OSCE reregistered Bosnia's voting
population under international supervision using strict rules for
where people could register to vote.\19 OSCE's election appeals
subcommission often took action against the three ruling political
parties after they violated electoral rules and regulations during
the registration process and campaign period, particularly against
the SDS and the Bosnian Croat ruling party, the Croatian Democratic
Union (HDZ).\20 OSCE also deployed an international supervisor to
every polling station during the election, a crucial advance over the
1996 elections.  One observer report characterized OSCE's
administration of the municipal elections as a considerable
achievement, despite their technical shortcomings, given the fact
that the elections were organized within the context of a conflict
resolution process.\21
Furthermore, the municipal and Republika Srpska national assembly
elections contributed to the development of a more pluralistic
political culture, particularly in Republika Srpska where opposition
political parties significantly increased their representation and
broke the hold of the SDS.  Opposition political parties also
improved their showing in Bosniak-controlled areas in the municipal
elections, but the SDA and the HDZ remained dominant in Bosniak and
Bosnian Croat-controlled areas, respectively. 
The elections also had negative aspects of people voting largely
along ethnic lines, a situation that observers expected given the
recent war and remaining fear and uncertainty of the people that the
war is not yet over.  And although media access and freedom of
association were better for political parties in 1997 as compared
with 1996, political parties generally did not campaign in areas of
the country controlled by another ethnic group.  Further, many
opposition parties did not have full access to the media.  Also,
according to an observer report, the broadcast of extreme propaganda
and hate campaigns by the SDS and HDZ during the lead-up to the
municipal elections had adverse consequences for the campaign
environment and did not in any way serve the electorate or enable it
to make informed choices. 
--------------------
\18 Bosnia's next set of elections are scheduled to take place on
September 12 and 13, 1998.  These will include elections for all
levels of government, with the exception of most municipalities. 
(Elections will be held in 10 new municipalities in the Federation.)
\19 Bosnia's municipal elections were originally scheduled to take
place in September 1996 but were postponed until September 1997
because of widespread fraud in registering Serb voters. 
\20 In one controversial case, the election appeals subcommission
made ineligible the entire SDS candidate list in Pale the day after
the municipal election because the SDS, through its Pale
headquarters, was maintaining Radovan Karadzic in a party position or
function, even though he is under indictment by the war crimes
tribunal.  The OSCE Head of Mission overrode this decision because he
feared for the safety of international electoral supervisors who were
still in Republika Srpska. 
\21 USAID democracy funds paid for contract personnel from the
International Foundation for Election Systems to staff OSCE's
election unit, including the Director General position, which
administered and implemented the September and November 1997
elections.  USAID also funded the foundation to provide specialized
technical assistance to directly support OSCE in the planning and
administration of the elections. 
      FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT ACROSS
      ETHNIC BOUNDARIES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2.2
According to human rights and other observers in Bosnia, freedom of
movement across ethnic boundaries slowly and incrementally improved
throughout Bosnia in the second half of 1997, although major
impediments discouraged people from traveling freely across ethnic
lines at the end of the year.  Signs of improvement included (1)
increased circulation of private vehicles across the interentity
boundary line, with the notable exception of the Prijedor (Republika
Srpska)-Sanski Most (Federation) corridor; (2) the institution of
several public bus lines by both UNHCR and private companies; (3)
approval and heightened interentity cooperation by authorities for
assessment and graveyard visits; (4) increased foot and vehicle
traffic across ethnic boundaries in the Brcko and Mostar areas; and
(5) new roadside markets located along the former front lines.  One
such market started operating in Mostar in July 1997 that serves both
Bosniaks and Bosnian Croat and a second started operating near
Zvornik in Republika Srpska that serves both Bosniaks and Bosian
Serbs. 
Human rights and other observers attributed the increased freedom of
movement to the success of IPTF's police checkpoint policy, which is
described later in this chapter.  The establishment of joint police
forces in some areas of the Federation was cited as a factor in
increasing freedom of movement, including in the Mostar area between
the predominantly Bosniak east and predominantly Croat west sides of
the city.  Further, according to an SFOR document, some of the
improvement late in the year was due to an improving political
situation in Republika Srpska. 
Despite these positive developments, people still feared to drive,
visit, or return to their homes across ethnic lines since those who
attempted such crossings often suffered incidents of harassment,
intimidation, and violence.  For example, people who attempted to
drive into an area controlled by another ethnic group were easily
identified by their license plates\22 as likely belonging to a
specific ethnic group and subject to police harassment through the
collection of illegal visa fees and taxes, particularly by Republika
Srpska police, as well as for roadside assaults, robberies, and
vehicle hijackings, primarily at night in Republika Srpska. 
Furthermore, at the end of 1997, local authorities in both entities
continued to refer to "lists of war crimes suspects" in an attempt to
discourage return of refugees and displaced persons, harass citizens,
and deter elected municipal councils of other ethnic groups from
taking office.  And people attempting to cross ethnic lines to visit
or return to their homes suffered numerous acts of intimidation and
violence, in some cases including murder.  These incidents are
discussed in more detail in
chapter 5 of this report. 
To promote increased freedom of movement across ethnic boundaries,
the Peace Implementation Council pressured Bosnia's political leaders
to develop a uniform license plate for all areas of the country by
the end of 1997.  Bosnia's Council of Ministers signed a memorandum
of understanding on the development of this license plate on January
28, 1998, and promotion of the plate occurred on February 2, 1998, in
Sarajevo and Banja Luka.  According to an OHR report, reaching an
agreed design for the uniform license plate proved less contentious
than resolving other national symbols, as the majority of the people
in both entities strongly favored a license plate that would not
reveal the driver's ethnic group. 
OHR and human rights observers believe that with the issuance of the
new plates, freedom of movement across ethnic lines in Bosnia will
increase dramatically as the plate's design guarantees anonymity.\23
On April 20, 1998, OHR extended the original deadlines for
implementing the new license plates due to technical reasons related
to registration documents.  By June 1, 1998, the new plate will be
compulsory for travel outside Bosnia; by August 31, 1998, it will be
illegal for residents to use any other plate for travel within
Bosnia.\24
--------------------
\22 Bosniak-, Bosnian Serb-, and Bosnian Croat-controlled areas of
Bosnia have separate license plates.  In February 1998, OHR called
this license plate system one of the biggest obstacles to freedom of
movement in Bosnia. 
\23 The plate consists only of numerals in combinations with the
eight letters of the Bosnian alphabet that are identical in both the
Cyrillic and Latin alphabets. 
\24 The original deadlines were April 21, 1998, for travel abroad and
June 30, 1998, for travel within Bosnia. 
      MEDIA
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2.3
In 1997, according to the State Department human rights report, the
right to freedom of speech and the press was partially respected in
the Federation and in western Republika Srpska, but less so in
eastern Republika Srpska.  Some progress was made in shutting down
offensive media outlets and in establishing more open and independent
media, particularly in Banja Luka and in Bosniak-controlled areas of
the Federation.  Party-controlled media--particularly Croatian State
Radio and Television--are the only electronic media available to the
vast majority of citizens in Bosnian Croat-controlled areas of the
Federation.  Party-controlled television is the only television
available to roughly half of Bosnia's population until the Open
Broadcast Network, an independent television network supported by the
international community, is fully functioning.  Radio is a freer
medium, with independent radio available to about 70 percent of the
population. 
         REPUBLIKA SRPSKA
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 3:2.3.1
Using the expanded interpretation of his authority granted by the
Peace Implementation Council Steering Board in May 1997,\25 the High
Representative took a series of escalatory actions starting in August
1997 to counter SRT-Pale violations (app.  I provides information on
these actions).  Most importantly, SFOR seized control of five
transmission towers of SRT-Pale in October 1997 in order to remove
its inflammatory messages (see fig.  3.3).\26 In early October, the
High Representative dismissed SRT-Pale's managing board, stating that
it could not broadcast using these towers until it agreed to be
restructured in accordance with western democratic standards.  In the
interim, only the SRT station in Banja Luka was authorized to
continue originating the SRT broadcasts.  After parts of the
microwave link were stolen from the Veliki Zep hub transmitter in
October 1997, OHR and SFOR reconnected the system by leasing a
satellite system.  The new Republika Srpska government recovered and
replaced the microwave links in early 1998.  SRT broadcasts now
originate from Banja Luka under international supervision. 
   Figure 3.3:  Location of SRT
   Television Transmitters
   (See figure in printed
   edition.)
Source:  Derived from OHR and NATO reports. 
Following President Plavsic's break with the SDS leaders in Pale,
SRT-Banja Luka began to broadcast its own programming, giving a
favorable slant to Plavsic's activities.  In comparison with
SRT-Pale's earlier broadcasts, however, SRT-Banja Luka broadcasts (1)
were generally more open to opposing views, (2) presented the Dayton
Agreement and the international community in a much more favorable
light, and (3) began to open a discussion of surrendering indictees
to the war crimes tribunal and promoting reconciliation among the
ethnic groups. 
On February 13, 1998, the new Republika Srpska government signed an
agreement with the High Representative in which it agreed to (1) the
restructuring of SRT into a public service television station that
operates in accordance with western democratic standards of public
service broadcasting and (2) the appointment of an international
administrator and provision of international technical and financial
assistance for the network.\27 On April 13, 1998, the SFOR Commander
and Prime Minister Dodik signed a memorandum of understanding that
could lead to SFOR transferring the control and security of the five
SRT towers to the government.  As mid-May 1998, SFOR still controlled
the towers. 
At the end of 1997, according to the State Department human rights
report, independent or opposition radio stations broadcast in
Republika Srpska, particularly in Banja Luka, but they tended to
skirt most significant political issues for fear of retaliation by
the SDS.  And the SDS still controlled television and radio in some
areas of Republika Srpska, including Brcko, using them to broadcast
vitriolic, anti-Dayton messages. 
--------------------
\25 The Steering Board gave the High Representative the authority to
curtail or suspend any media network or program whose output is in
persistent and blatant contravention of either the spirit or letter
of Dayton. 
\26 Among other things, just prior to and following the evening news,
SRT-Pale broadcast pictures of SFOR troops juxtaposed with footage of
Hitler and Nazi SS soldiers who occupied Yugoslavia during World War
II and referred to the peacekeepers as "SS-FOR."
\27 The agreement was signed by President Plavsic, Prime Minister
Dodik, and the Republika Srpska Minister of Information Vasic. 
SRT-Banja Luka had already agreed to fully restructure its operation
in accordance with the High Representative's democratic media
standards on November 3, 1997. 
         BOSNIAK-CONTROLLED AREAS
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 3:2.3.2
While generally considered the most open, along with SRT-Banja Luka,
the SDA-run, Federation state television station faithfully served
the interests of the Bosniak-ruling party, the SDA, giving
preferential coverage to SDA leaders and greatly limiting reports on
the political opposition.  While its broadcasts were often biased,
they were rarely inflammatory.  Radio broadcasting in
Bosniak-controlled areas of the Federation was diverse, and
opposition viewpoints were reflected in the news programs of
independent broadcasters. 
         CROAT-CONTROLLED AREAS
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 3:2.3.3
Media access in Bosnian Croat areas remained largely under the
control of the HDZ ruling party, and most Bosnian Croats relied on
the state-controlled media of Croatia for their information.  News
programs and editorials on the Croatian state television station
frequently criticized the Dayton Agreement, their weather maps showed
the Federation as part of Croatia, and coverage of Bosnian events
often left the impression that the scene pictured was actually in
Croatia.  Further, local radio stations in Croat-controlled areas
were usually highly nationalistic and did not tolerate opposition
viewpoints. 
      POLICE-RELATED HUMAN RIGHTS
      ABUSES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2.4
In January 1998, the State Department and the SFOR Assessment Cell
reported that police-related human rights violations had declined
during 1997, although police continued to commit abuses throughout
the country.  The most important advance in 1997 was the success of
the IPTF checkpoint policy in reducing the number of illegal police
checkpoints that had hampered freedom of movement, particularly along
the interentity boundary line.  Initiated with SFOR support on May
26, 1997, this policy addressed the "inordinate" number of
checkpoints by defining as illegal any fixed or mobile checkpoint
that (1) was manned by two or more police officers and (2) operated
for more than 30 minutes without a valid IPTF checkpoint permit. 
SFOR supported IPTF in enforcing this policy by confiscating weapons
and identity cards of noncompliant police, jointly patrolling with
IPTF certain sensitive areas, such as Brcko, and by cooperating in
removing 38 out of 151 identified illegal checkpoints (as of March
12, 1998). 
SFOR Assessment Cell data show that the number of incidents of police
abuse increased by 86 percent from January through March 1998 and
declined slightly in April 1998.  According to an assessment cell
report, this increase was mainly due to an IPTF "crackdown" on
illegal police checkpoints in the zone of separation around Sarajevo. 
This crackdown resulted in a large number of IPTF noncompliance
reports against police, primarily in the Federation. 
Despite this advance, according to observers in Bosnia, Bosnia's
political leaders continued to use police as tools for furthering
their political aims.  For example, according to the 1997 State
Department human rights report, Bosnian Serb police often employed
excessive force to prevent Bosniak former residents from returning
to, or staying in, Republika Srpska; Bosnian Serb police also
apparently took no action against the perpetrators of severe
incidents involving harassment.  Similar problems of abuse occurred
in Croat-majority areas.  According to the report, IPTF investigated
a number of cases of police abuse in Brcko and Banja Luka, as well as
in the Croat-controlled town of Drvar; the officers found responsible
were either dismissed from the force or fined. 
SDA-controlled local police in Velika Kladusa and Cazin continued a
pattern of severe police abuses, according to the State Department
human rights report, although the frequency of such acts had greatly
diminished since 1996 as a result of intense monitoring and
intervention by international human rights organizations.  Most of
the people abused by local police in these areas were associated with
Fikret Abdic, a businessman who led a breakaway Bosniak region during
the war.\28
Moreover, according to State's human rights report, Bosnia's police
and mobs that appeared organized by local authorities committed a few
extrajudicial killings; members of security forces abused and
mistreated citizens; and police continued to use arbitrary arrest and
detention, although to a lesser extent than in 1996.  In both
entities, police still exercised great latitude based on
Communist-era criminal procedure laws that permit the police to
detain persons up to 6 months without bringing formal charges against
them.  In the Federation, the laws were being revised with the aim of
eliminating this practice. 
--------------------
\28 According to an observer report, at the beginning of the war,
Abdic, who is from Bihac municipality, retained ties to and was able
to bargain with Croats and Serbs for the "safety" of the Bihac
pocket.  On September 27, 1993, Abdic proclaimed the establishment of
the "Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia," which had its capital in
Velika Kladusa.  Abdic was then labeled a traitor by the Bosniak
leadership in Sarajevo, and fighting broke out between Abdic
supporters (Autonomists) and Sarajevo supporters (Loyalists).  In
August 1994, the Bosniak army retook the region, and Abdic and his
supporters fled into Croatia.  These divisions in the area's Muslim
community continued after the war and led to politically-related
human rights abuses rather than ethnically related ones. 
      ETHNIC TENSIONS AND
      POLITICALLY MOTIVATED
      VIOLENCE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2.5
SFOR Assessment Cell data show that ethnic tensions--measured in
terms of ethnically-related incidents of hostile activity--had
decreased during the last third of 1997; these incidents, however,
increased by 200 percent from January through March 1998--with a
further 16 percent increase by the end of April--as people began to
cross ethnic lines to visit or return home.  While these occurrences
were fewer in January and February 1998 than the year before, they
appeared to be more organized than in the past, for example, the
burning of potential returnees' houses in Drvar.  For March and April
1998, the number of ethnic incidents was higher than the prior year
by 41 percent and 130 percent, respectively. 
USIA polls indicated that animosity among Bosnia's three ethnic
groups remained strong in 1997 but lessened slightly during the year. 
For example, Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats held slightly more favorable
opinions of Bosnian Serbs at the end of 1997 than at the beginning. 
Further, after a period of dramatically worsening relations during
1996, the percent of Bosniaks holding favorable opinions of Bosnian
Croats rose from 42 percent to 59 percent.  However, a large majority
of Bosnian Serbs and Croats still viewed other ethnic groups
unfavorably, and the majority of Bosniaks still held negative
opinions of Bosnian Serbs.  Appendix IV provides USIA polling data on
these issues from December 1995 through January 1998. 
In February 1997, the Archbishop of Sarajevo said that Bosnians held
negative views of each other because their political leaders
controlled and used the media to encourage animosity and discourage
reconciliation among the ethnic groups.  During the year, the
international community took concrete steps to shut down some media
outlets that inflamed ethnic animosity and took steps (described
later in this chapter) to develop a more open, tolerant media in
Bosnia. 
Further, according to international observers, the bitter memories
from the recent war contributed to the strong ethnic
animosities--people remember who killed their family members or
forced them from their homes.  USIA polls show that despite the
slight lessening of ethnic animosity during the year, Bosnian Serbs
and Croats would agree that the war has severely harmed ethnic
relations in Bosnia.  In January 1998, a large majority of Bosnian
Serbs (74 percent) and Bosnian Croats (73 percent) believed that the
war has done too much damage for people of the three ethnic groups to
live together peacefully again.  In contrast, only 5 percent of
Bosniaks believed that the war had irreparably damaged ethnic
relations--91 percent of them believed that Bosniaks, Serbs, and
Croats could again live together peacefully, an increase from 65
percent who believed this at the end of the war. 
While the SFOR Assessment Cell noted a decrease in ethnic incidents
during late 1997, it also noted an increase in "terrorist" incidents
in the Federation and Republika Srpska in December 1997 and January
1998.  The cell defines "terrorist incidents" as being distinct from
ethnic events in that the motive is political rather than ethnic
hatred.  Examples of these terrorist incidents include conflicts
associated with Bosniak/SDA resistance to the return of 600
Bosniaks--supporters of Fikret Abdic and his opposition party--to
Velika Kladusa; violent incidents involved with the interparty,
intra-ethnic struggles between SDS and SNS members in Bijeljina; a
series of explosions in Mostar; and incidents revolving around the
implementation and results of municipal elections.  The number of
politically-motivated terrorist incidents declined significantly over
February and March 1998, as the number of ethnic incidents and police
abuses increased sharply. 
   INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS TO
   PROMOTE DEMOCRACY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3
The democratization projects started during 1996 by many
international aid donors--including USIA, USAID, and OSCE--began to
show very early results in 1997.  These projects were designed to (1)
develop alternative and independent media outlets; (2) foster ethnic
tolerance and reconciliation within and across the two entities,
primarily through support for local political, social, cultural,
religious, and business organizations that would link Bosnia's ethnic
groups; and (3) develop the institutions and practices of a
democratic culture at all levels.\29 According to a State Department
document, the international community intended that these efforts
would constitute part of a long-term democratization effort to
counter the continued presence of separatists and unreconstructed,
authoritarian centralists in Bosnia. 
--------------------
\29 International efforts to develop democratic civilian police
forces and judicial systems are described in chapter 2. 
      ALTERNATIVE AND INDEPENDENT
      MEDIA
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3.1
According to OHR and State Department officials, efforts to enlarge
and improve access to independent media are at the heart of the
international democratization program.  As OHR and SFOR sought to
break SDS control of SRT broadcasts from Pale, international donors
were attempting to develop a more open, objective SRT-Banja Luka and
alternative and independent media outlets throughout Bosnia. 
         TELEVISION AND RADIO
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 3:3.1.1
Since late August 1997--when SRT-Banja Luka staff broke from Pale and
started alternative broadcasts--the United States has provided
equipment to SRT-Banja Luka to help it improve the quality and
quantity of its programming.  According to SRT-Banja Luka officials,
the station's signal could reach about 70 percent of Republika Srpska
territory in late October 1997. 
The Open Broadcast Network, created in 1996 by the international
community, expanded its broadcast range and programming in 1997 with
international assistance, though it still did not have Bosnian Croat
participation at the end of the year.\30 This four-station network\31
now broadcasts 6 hours daily and, if it were fully funded, would have
the ability to expand its coverage from about 50 percent of Bosnia's
territory to 80 percent using state-of-the-art broadcast technology
supplied by international donors. 
According to the State Department and other reports, the network has
been plagued by poor management at its Sarajevo hub and by problems
with affiliate relations and funding.  The network has not increased
its geographic coverage and remains short of operating funds because
many donors have failed to provide money they had pledged as of
mid-April 1998.  Thus, according to USIA polls, as of January 1998,
only 50 percent of Bosniaks, 26 percent of Bosnian Serbs, and 21
percent of Bosnian Croats were able to receive the network's
broadcasts, although the vast majority of those who had access
regularly watched the network's programs.  Further, lack of a
government licensing agreement hindered the network's ability to
attract advertising and its plans to become a self-sustaining
enterprise. 
During 1997, USAID funded Internews, a California-based
nongovernmental organization, to provide on-site technical assistance
and training to independent radio and television operations in the
Federation and Republika Srpska.  USAID's Office of Transition
Initiatives helped create and develop 34 Bosnia-based television (7)
and radio stations (27), which, according to USAID, reach about 70
percent of Bosnia's population. 
--------------------