Defense Acquisitions: Antiarmor Weapons Master Plan Does Not Identify Potential Excesses or Support Planned Procurements (Letter Report, 05/08/2000, GAO/NSIAD-00-67)
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of
Defense's (DOD) Antiarmor Master plan, focusing on whether it provided
the data and analyses necessary to: (1) identify excess antiarmor
weapons currently in the inventory or under development; and (2) support
current acquisition plans.
GAO noted that: (1) DOD's Antiarmor Master Plan did not identify any
excess antiarmor weapons or provide the data and analyses needed to
identify such excesses; (2) instead of identifying the types and
quantities of antiarmor weapons needed to meet requirements under
current planning scenarios, the plan only described the types of
antiarmor weapons in the inventory and under development and identified
the number and types of armored systems possessed by nine countries it
considered potentially hostile to the United States; (3) the total
capabilities and quantities of the armored systems possessed by these
countries substantially exceeds those in the current two-regional
conflict threat scenario; (4) the plan acknowledged that the tank threat
from the countries identified in that scenario is low, but the plan did
not identify potential excesses in antiarmor weapons resulting from
major reductions in the armor threat since 1990; (5) further, the
modeling practices the services used to identify individual antiarmor
weapons quantity requirements routinely generated excessive
requirements; (6) specifically, GAO found that: (a) the Air Force added
more targets to the model than it is responsible for; (b) the services
added large quantities of weapons to their models to allow for
uncertainties; (c) the services projected the use of sophisticated and
expensive antiarmor guided weapons against unarmored targets; and (d)
the Marine Corps and the Army did not always accept their model's
results and used manual calculations to support higher antiarmor weapon
requirements; (7) the plan provided little data and analyses to support
the services' plans to spend about $17.9 billion on 15 antiarmor weapon
acquisition programs; (8) in support of acquiring the new systems, the
plan described various types of improvements and technological advances
in the designs of armored systems and noted the potential proliferation
of armored systems with these advanced designs; (9) the plan also
described the capabilities of individual antiarmor weapons that were
being acquired by the services and noted that the new weapons would
provide improved lethality and effectiveness; (10) however, the plan
also indicated that the existing antiarmor weapon inventory is more than
adequate to defeat the threat as defined in the Secretary of Defense's
planning guidance; and (11) further, the plan did not assess the effects
of combined joint service capabilities and changes in war-fighting
strategies on the requirements for these weapons.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: NSIAD-00-67
TITLE: Defense Acquisitions: Antiarmor Weapons Master Plan Does
Not Identify Potential Excesses or Support Planned
Procurements
DATE: 05/08/2000
SUBJECT: Defense procurement
Weapons systems
Defense capabilities
Weapons research and development
Procurement planning
Defense contingency planning
IDENTIFIER: DOD Antiarmor Munitions Master Plan
Joint Standoff Weapon
Sensor Fuzed Weapon
M1A1 Tank
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GAO/NSIAD-00-67
Appendix I: Antiarmor Requirements Modeling Practices
16
Appendix II: Quantity and Cost of Antiarmor Systems Under Development and
Procurement
20
Appendix III: Projected Antiarmor Weapon Production Funding,
Fiscal Year 2000 to Completion
21
Appendix IV: Comments From the Department of Defense
22
Appendix V: GAO Staff Acknowledgments
24
Table 1: Army Direct Fire Antiarmor Weapons Used Against
Targets, as a Percentage of Combat Requirement 17
Table 2: Air Force and Navy/Marine Corps Air Antiarmor
Weapon Usage Against Target Types 18
Table 3: Comparison of Marine Corps Ground Model Results
and Manual Calculations 19
Figure 1: Comparison of Technology Levels of Main Battle Tanks
of the Countries in the Two-Regional Conflict Threat
Scenario 8
Figure 2: Percentage of Mobile Armored Targets Allocated to the
Army and the Air Force, 1997-98 12
BAT/ATACMS Brilliant Antiarmor Submunition/Army Tactical Missile
System
DOD Department of Defense
JSOW Joint Stand-Off Weapon
MLRS Multiple Launch Rocket System
MPIM Multipurpose Individual Munition
RADAM Remote Area Denial Artillery Munition
SADARM Sense and Destroy Armor Munition
SFW Sensor Fuzed Weapon
WAM Wide Area Munition
National Security and
International Affairs Division
B-282444
May 5, 2000
The Honorable Jerry Lewis
Chairman, Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
Dear Mr. Chairman:
In its report on the Fiscal Year 1999 Defense Appropriations Bill, the House
Committee on Appropriations expressed concern that the military services are
continuing to develop and procure an increasing number of tank-killing
weapons at a time when potential adversaries have smaller armored forces.
The Committee also questioned whether current antiarmor acquisition plans
are appropriate and directed the Secretary of Defense to develop an
Antiarmor Munitions Master Plan. According to the report, the plan should
identify the projected armored threat and the projected quantity of all
antiarmor weapons, whether fielded or in development, with the purpose of
identifying and eliminating excess antiarmor capability. The Department of
Defense (DOD) was directed to submit the plan with its fiscal year 2000
budget submission.
Before the Master Plan was issued, we reported that DOD's inventory of
antiarmor weapons had remained at 1990 Cold War levels (in terms of overall
quantities and types), while the number of armored targets under current
planning scenarios had dropped to less than 20 percent of the number
considered in 1990.1 Previously, guidance issued by the Secretary of Defense
establishing the most demanding level of threat U.S. forces must be prepared
to counter and setting forth the war-fighting strategy had been based on a
large-scale Soviet/Warsaw Pact threat involving thousands of armored
vehicles; but the guidance is now based on a much smaller armored threat
from two regional conflicts occurring simultaneously.2 Since 1990, DOD has
invested billions of dollars to further increase its antiarmor weapon
capabilities. According to the President's fiscal year 2000 budget
submission, DOD expects to spend about $17.9 billion developing and
producing additional antiarmor weapons from fiscal year 2000 until all the
programs are completed.
The plan3 was sent to Congress on August 25, 1999, several months after the
fiscal year 2000 budget submission. At your request, we reviewed DOD's
Antiarmor Munitions Master Plan to determine whether it provided the data
and analyses necessary to (1) identify excess antiarmor weapons currently in
the inventory or under development and (2) support current acquisition
plans.
DOD's Antiarmor Munitions Master Plan did not identify any excess antiarmor
weapons or provide the data and analyses needed to identify such excesses.
Instead of identifying the types and quantities of antiarmor weapons needed
to meet requirements under current planning scenarios, the plan only
described the types of antiarmor weapons in the inventory and under
development and identified the number and types of armored systems possessed
by nine countries it considered potentially hostile to the United States.
The total capabilities and quantities of the armored systems possessed by
these countries substantially exceeds those in the current two-regional
conflict threat scenario. The plan acknowledged that the tank threat from
the countries identified in that scenario is low, but the plan did not
identify potential excesses in antiarmor weapons resulting from major
reductions in the armor threat since 1990. Further, the modeling practices
the services used to identify individual antiarmor weapons quantity
requirements routinely generated excessive requirements. Specifically, we
found that (1) the Air Force added more targets to the model than it is
responsible for, (2) the services added large quantities of weapons to their
models to allow for uncertainties, (3) the services projected the use of
sophisticated and expensive antiarmor guided weapons against unarmored
targets, and (4) the Marine Corps and the Army did not always accept their
model's results and used manual calculations to support higher antiarmor
weapon requirements.
The plan provided little data and analyses to support the services' plans to
spend about $17.9 billion on 15 antiarmor weapon acquisition programs. In
support of acquiring the new systems, the plan described various types of
improvements and technological advances in the designs of armored systems
and noted the potential proliferation of armored systems with these advanced
designs. The plan also described the capabilities of individual antiarmor
weapons that were being acquired by the services and noted that the new
weapons would provide improved lethality and effectiveness. However, the
plan also indicated that the existing antiarmor weapon inventory is more
than adequate to defeat the threat as defined in the Secretary of Defense's
planning guidance. Further, the plan did not assess the effects of combined
joint service capabilities and changes in war-fighting strategies on the
requirements for these weapons. For example, under the 1990 Cold War threat
scenario, the Army was expected to play the dominant role in halting a
massive Soviet/Warsaw Pact armored invasion, but under current war-fighting
plans, the Air Force is to have the largest (and still growing) share of
armored targets. Nevertheless, the Army's planned procurement costs for
antiarmor weapons from fiscal year 2000 to completion account for about 80
percent ($14 billion) of DOD's total procurement budget for antiarmor
weapons. An assessment of the joint antiarmor capabilities of the services
and changes in war-fighting requirements could identify opportunities to
significantly reduce requirements for certain antiarmor weapons currently
being acquired.
We are issuing a matter for congressional consideration either (1) to
restrict funding for antiarmor weapons until the Secretary of Defense
provides Congress with the antiarmor weapon analysis directed in the
conference report on the fiscal year 2000 appropriations bill or (2) to
establish an annual funding cap on the procurement of antiarmor weapons and
require that DOD establish priorities among the multitude of antiarmor
weapons now available or being developed.
DOD currently has a large inventory of 40 different types of antiarmor
weapons capable of destroying tanks, armored combat vehicles, and artillery.
These weapons include various types of ground- and air-fired guided
missiles, tank rounds, rockets, and mines. DOD is currently funding the
production of 15 new antiarmor weapon systems.4
DOD issued its first Antiarmor Master Plan in 1985 and updated it annually
until 1990. The 1990 Antiarmor Master Plan still reflected the Cold War
threat and focused on the antiarmor weapons that would be needed to prevail
in a Central European conflict. The plan was not updated until 1999. In the
October 1999 conference report on the fiscal year 2000 Defense appropriation
bill,5 the congressional conferees noted that the 1999 Master Plan lacked
the analyses needed to support the services' claimed antiarmor weapons
requirements. In their report, the conferees directed the Secretary of
Defense to provide another antiarmor weapon analysis with the fiscal year
2001 budget request. Although the budget has been submitted, the Secretary
has not yet provided the analysis as directed.
Excess Weapons
The 1999 Antiarmor Munitions Master Plan did not identify any excess
antiarmor weapons or provide the data and analyses needed to identify any
such excesses. Key to identifying any excess antiarmor weapons is an
assessment of the types and quantities of antiarmor weapons needed to defeat
the threat outlined in the planning scenarios.6 Although such data is
available, the plan only described various types of antiarmor weapons in the
inventory or under development and identified the number and types of
armored systems possessed by nine countries it considered potentially
hostile to the United States--including some countries of the former Soviet
Union. The total capabilities and quantities of the armored systems
possessed by these countries substantially exceeded those in current threat
scenarios. According to DOD officials, no attempt was made to determine
whether the weapon systems presented in the Master Plan were justified on
the basis of the threat depicted in the Secretary of Defense's planning
guidance.
Threat
The plan did not assess the impact of reductions in the threat scenarios on
antiarmor weapons requirements. As we previously reported, the number of
potential enemy armored targets outlined in the planning guidance has
decreased considerably since 1990.7 During the Cold War, the services
considered the greatest threat to be a massive land attack spearheaded by
thousands of armored vehicles in Central Europe. Today's conditions,
however, are significantly different, and military planners consider smaller
regional conflicts as the basis for developing war-fighting plans and
requirements. According to the Defense Intelligence Agency's latest biannual
out-year threat report, issued in 1997, the number of armored targets that
the United States is likely to face is less than 20 percent, the number
considered in 1990.8
Iraq and North Korea are currently the most likely opponents the United
States would face in a regional conflict scenario. The armored systems
possessed by these two counties were included in the Master Plan but
accounted for a small percentage of the total number it identified.9 In
addition, the plan concluded that the armored systems that would be used by
the two countries under the two-conflict scenario are low technology
threats. Our review of the Secretary of Defense's planning guidance shows
that the two countries are unlikely to acquire significant improvements in
their armored capabilities in the foreseeable future. Intelligence officials
believe the likelihood that either country will obtain such technologies in
significant quantities is extremely low. Figure 1 shows a comparison of tank
technology levels of the two countries in 1999 and projected in 2004. It
shows that high technology tanks are expected to increase from 1 percent of
the total in 1997 to 9 percent in 2004, with low technology tanks still
accounting for 64 percent of the total in 2004.
Figure 1: Comparison of Technology Levels of Main Battle Tanks of the
Countries in the Two-Regional Conflict Threat Scenario
Source: DOD's Antiarmor Munitions Master Plan.
According to intelligence officials, the proliferation of high technology
systems is not materializing as quickly as originally estimated, and the two
countries are economically disadvantaged. Further, an arms embargo and
sanctions by the United Nations limit one country from procuring additional
weapons.
Overstated
Each of the military services determines the type and quantities of
antiarmor weapons it needs on the basis of target allocations provided by
the commanders in chief. On the basis of the number and types of armored
targets they are assigned, the services determine the types and quantities
of antiarmor weapons they need to (1) defeat the assigned targets, (2) equip
forces not assigned to the two-theater conflict, (3) ensure that forces
assigned to the conflict have a ready supply of weapons left over after the
conflict ends, and (4) conduct training. The services use war-fighting
simulation models that determine the number of weapon systems needed to
defeat the threat. Each service is responsible for designing its own threat
models and determining its underlying assumptions.
Our review of how the services determine their antiarmor weapon requirements
found several modeling practices that routinely generated excessive
requirements. Specifically, we found the following:
· The Air Force added more targets to the model than were assigned. For
example, it increased the number of allocated targets by 13 to
21 percent--depending on the type of target--for additional flexibility.
· The services added large quantities of weapons to their models to allow
for uncertainties. For example, according to Army data, an average of only 3
percent of its direct fire antiarmor weapons would be used against assigned
targets, with the remaining 97 percent required to compensate for
uncertainty factors such as missing targets and shooting at wrong targets.
· The services projected the use of sophisticated and expensive antiarmor
guided weapons against unarmored targets. For example, two of the Air
Force's newer and more advanced antiarmor weapons (the Joint Stand-Off
Weapon BLU-108 variant and the Sensor Fuzed Weapon) are expected to be used
against unarmored targets over 60 percent of the time.
· In some cases, the Marine Corps and the Army did not accept their models'
results and used manual calculations to support higher requirements. For
example, the Marine Corps increased its requirements for the Predator
short-range assault weapon by
289 percent over the model's calculation.
The services' antiarmor weapon requirements' modeling practices are
discussed in more detail in appendix I.
The Antiarmor Munitions Master Plan did not provide the data and analyses
necessary to support DOD's current acquisition plans. The military services
currently have 15 different types of antiarmor weapons under development or
in production. According to the President's fiscal year 2000 budget
submission,10 DOD plans to spend a total of over $24 billion procuring these
weapon systems, of which $17.9 billion will be used from fiscal year 2000
through program completion. Of the $17.9 billion, $8.3 billion will be spent
in fiscal years 2000-05 and $9.5 billion in fiscal year 2006 and beyond.
Appendix II shows planned costs and procurement quantities of each weapon
system based on the fiscal year 2000 budget request. Appendix III shows
funding by fiscal year from 2000 through 2005 and to completion.
As support for acquiring the new systems, the plan described various types
of improvements and technological advances in armored system designs and
noted the potential proliferation of armored systems with these advanced
designs. The plan also described the capabilities of individual antiarmor
weapons being acquired by the services and noted that the new weapons would
provide improved lethality and effectiveness. The plan indicated that the
existing inventory of antiarmor weapons is more than adequate to defeat the
threat as defined in the scenario. The plan stated that "by preparing for a
North Atlantic Treaty Organization/Warsaw Pact conflict involving massive
Soviet armed forces, the United States would certainly be prepared for
conventional regional conflicts." Further, the plan did not assess the
effects that combined joint service antiarmor capabilities and changes in
war-fighting strategies could have on requirements for new systems.
Service Capabilities
The plan did not assess the impact of joint service antiarmor capabilities
on acquisition requirements. Such an assessment could identify unnecessary
overlap and duplication among the services' antiarmor capabilities. Instead,
the plan simply incorporated the services' antiarmor inventory data and
procurement plans without assessing them on a joint basis. While each
antiarmor weapon acquisition program described in the plan has gone through
the requirement determination and acquisition approval process in each
service and in DOD, we previously reported that these processes have not
been effective in preventing overlap and duplication in weapon capabilities
and requirements.11
In our prior work, we found that the services conduct extensive analyses to
justify major acquisitions but that these analyses can be narrowly focused
and do not fully consider alternatives. For example, when the Navy carried
out its analyses to justify the development of an antiarmor variant of the
Joint Standoff Weapon, it did not fully consider available alternatives such
as the Air Force's Sensor Fuzed Weapon with Wind Corrected Munitions
Dispenser, which uses the same submunition, carries more submunitions, and
is cheaper than the proposed variant. However, the Joint Standoff Weapon was
chosen as the more cost-effective weapon. A subsequent Air Force analysis
showed that the Sensor Fuzed Weapon would be more cost-effective and
potentially more suitable.
DOD has a structure and process to review requirements from a joint
perspective, but they are not effective. Operational requirements for new
weapons are reviewed by all the services, the Defense Acquisition Board, and
the Joint Requirements Oversight Council to help define and validate system
requirements, examine trade-offs, and explore alternatives. In 1998,
however, we reported that officials in both the Office of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense view their roles as
members of these organizations in determining weapon requirements as only
advisory.12 We concluded that DOD's lack of an effective process to assess
joint mission capabilities and requirements adequately makes the Department
unable to determine the need for and priority of planned antiarmor
investments.
In addition to not assessing joint service capabilities, the plan did not
take into account allied forces and their contribution to antiarmor
capability. DOD expects its allies to be responsible for 29 percent of the
anticipated threat in the two-conflict scenario.
War-fighting Plans
Under the1990 Cold War threat scenario, the Army was expected to play the
dominant role in halting a massive Soviet/Warsaw Pact armored invasion.
However, current war-fighting plans, based on the threat, call for the Air
Force to have the largest (and still growing) share of armored targets.
Nevertheless, the Army's planned procurement costs for antiarmor weapons
from fiscal year 2000 to completion account for about 80 percent ($14
billion) of DOD's total procurement budget for antiarmor weapons.
Depending on how they plan to conduct the war, the commanders in chief
allocate the number of targets contained in the planning scenarios among
individual services. According to these plans, the Air Force has the highest
percentage of total mobile armored targets, and its share of these targets
has increased from 20 to 29 percent. The Navy's share has increased from 6
to 9 percent; the Marine Corps' target share has remained constant at about
12 percent. The Army's share has remained the same at about 21 percent. The
U.S. allies' share has decreased from 40 to 29 percent. Figure 2 shows the
percentage of all mobile armored targets in two hypothetical major conflicts
for the Army and the Air Force in 1997 and 1998.
Figure 2: Percentage of Mobile Armored Targets Allocated to the Army and the
Air Force, 1997-98
Source: DOD's Phased Threat Distribution.
The antiarmor weapon quantity requirements described in the Antiarmor
Munitions Master Plan also do not reflect changes in the Army's war-fighting
strategy. After submitting the Master Plan, the Army Chief of Staff
announced plans to develop a lighter and more mobile force in response to
concerns about the difficulties and limitations of transporting and
supporting the large and heavy M1A1 tank and other armored systems. To
respond more quickly to contingencies, and to become more mobile and more
rapidly deployable, the Army has begun transitioning to a lighter, smaller,
more fuel-efficient and reliable force. Although the transition will take a
number of years, it will significantly impact the Army's antiarmor weapon
requirements. However, the Master Plan shows substantial investments in
heavy armored capabilities such as the improved
120-millimeter tank rounds.
In its October 1999 conference report on the fiscal year 2000 defense
appropriation bill, the conferees stated that the 1999 Master Plan did not
show any evidence of future prospects for reducing the number of antiarmor
programs and little evidence of rigorous critique of claimed requirements.13
The congressional conferees directed the Secretary of Defense to provide,
with his fiscal year 2001 budget request, an evaluation of (1) the joint
effectiveness of existing antiarmor weapons in addressing the threat
described in defense planning guidance and (2) the ability of planned
antiarmor weapons to fill the shortfalls in capabilities described in threat
scenarios. DOD has submitted its fiscal year 2001 budget, but the Secretary
has not yet provided the analysis directed by the conference report.
The Antiarmor Munitions Master Plan did not provide the data and analyses
needed to identify any excesses in antiarmor weapons or to support current
antiarmor weapon acquisition plans. Specifically, the plan did not address
the joint effectiveness of existing antiarmor weapons in addressing the
threat described in the Secretary of Defense's guidance or the way planned
antiarmor weapons are expected to fill any shortfalls in capabilities
described in threat scenarios. Although the congressional conferees directed
the Secretary to provide such data and analyses with the submission of the
fiscal year 2001 defense budget request, the Secretary has not yet done so.
As a result, congressional decisionmakers have limited ability to assess the
services' plans to spend about $17.9 billion to develop and produce
antiarmor weapons from fiscal year 2000 to program completion.
Should Congress not receive the data and analyses directed by the conference
report on the fiscal year 2000 Defense appropriation bill, it should
consider restricting fiscal year 2001 funding for antiarmor weapons until
such information is provided. Alternatively, Congress may wish to impose an
annual funding cap on the procurement of antiarmor weapons to permit some
modernization but requiring DOD to establish priorities and choose among the
multitude of antiarmor options now available or being developed.
In commenting on a draft of our report, DOD stated that we had identified
several areas where the munitions requirement process could be improved and
noted that a working group had been tasked to review the existing process
and recommend changes. DOD also offered several explanations of why
additional antiarmor weapons beyond those needed to kill expected targets
may be justified. They stated that the requirements process also permits the
services to base their requirements on the amount of munitions needed to
fully arm a given force structure. Further, they stated that, while the
services plan to fight in fully joint operations, each service equips and
trains its forces to ensure that it retains strategic and tactical
flexibility. Finally, DOD stated that its update of the Antiarmor Munitions
Master Plan would address these issues more fully. If DOD's working group
addresses the problems that we identified with the requirements process, we
believe that will be a step in the right direction.
Nevertheless, DOD was directed to identify and eliminate excess antiarmor
capability. However, the August 1999 Plan was found to be inadequate to
support the services' claimed antiarmor requirements. Subsequently, DOD was
directed to submit additional data and analyses of its antiarmor weapons and
capabilities with its fiscal year 2001 budget. However, it did not do so.
Accordingly, we continue to believe that Congress should consider
restricting DOD's funding for antiarmor weapons until such information is
provided.
DOD's comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix IV.
To determine whether DOD's Antiarmor Munitions Master Plan provided the data
and analyses necessary to identify excess antiarmor weapon capability, we
evaluated the plan's results and discussed the plan with representatives
from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition and
Technology, Washington, D.C.; the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation,
Washington, D.C.; and the Institute for Defense Analysis, Alexandria,
Virginia. We compared the plan's threat with the Secretary of Defense's
guidance, the out-year threat report, and the phased threat distribution. We
discussed the information with representatives from the Defense Intelligence
Agency, Bolling Air Force Base, Maryland, and the U.S. Army Deputy Chief of
Staff for Intelligence, Crystal City, Virginia. We also analyzed DOD's
process for developing the requirement quantities depicted in the Master
Plan. We analyzed the services' munitions requirement models that generated
the different quantities of antiarmor weapons needed to defeat the current
threat as defined in the Defense Intelligence Agency's out-year threat
report. We discussed the requirement data and our analyses with
representatives from the Center for Army Analysis, Fort Belvoir, Virginia;
the Air Force Director for Operational Requirements, Arlington, Virginia;
the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations Assessment Division, Washington, D.C.;
and the Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Virginia.
To determine whether the Master Plan provided the necessary data and
analyses necessary to support DOD's current acquisition plans, we compared
the weapon systems contained in the plan with DOD's current acquisition
plans. We reviewed the fiscal year 2000 budget submission, the commanders in
chief's target allocations, changes in war-fighting strategies, and our
prior reports.
We conducted our review from May 1999 through January 2000 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
We are sending copies of this report to the Honorable William S. Cohen,
Secretary of Defense; the Honorable Louis Caldera, Secretary of the Army;
the Honorable F. Whitten Peters, Acting Secretary of the Air Force; the
Honorable Richard Danzig, Secretary of the Navy; General James L. Jones,
Commandant of the Marine Corps; Jacob J. Lew, Director, Office of Management
and Budget; and other interested congressional committees and parties. We
will also make copies available to others upon request.
Please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or William Graveline at (256) 650-1400
if you or your staff have any questions concerning this report. Major
contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Sincerely yours,
James F. Wiggins
Associate Director
Defense Acquisitions Issues
Antiarmor Requirements Modeling Practices
The services are responsible for destroying the number of targets assigned
to them by the commanders in chief. The services use war-fighting simulation
models to determine the number of weapon systems needed to defeat the
threat. Our review of these models found several practices that routinely
generate excess requirements.
The commanders in chief's target allocations include an optional flexibility
factor to either increase or decrease the service's share of allotted
targets. The Air Force used this factor to increase the number of allocated
armored targets in its model by 13 to 21 percent (the percentage varied
according to the target type). The Navy and the Army did not use this factor
in their models, and the Marine Corps said it was unable to determine
whether the factor had been included because only the results of the model
are available, not the input data. Representatives of the commanders in
chief stated that they believe using the flexibility factor results in
overstated requirements and that a flexibility factor is not needed because
their office goes through a very rigorous process in developing initial
target allocations. They recommended that the flexibility factor be
eliminated in the next target allocation. A new target allocation process is
being developed, but it is unknown at this time whether the flexibility
factor will be included.
All the services incorporated large uncertainty factors into their models,
increasing the numbers of needed combat weapons well beyond those needed to
destroy allocated targets. Uncertainty factors include logistical delays or
losses, poor weather, and wrong targets. According to Army data, an average
of only 3 percent of its combat requirement would be used to destroy
assigned targets; additional weapons needed to compensate for uncertainty
factors account for the remaining 97 percent. Table 1 shows the percentage
of Army direct fire antiarmor weapons used against allocated targets. For
example, only 1.1 percent of the Army's Javelin system combat requirement is
used for weapons needed to destroy assigned targets.
Table 1: Army Direct Fire Antiarmor Weapons Used Against Targets, as a
Percentage of Combat Requirement
Weapon Weapons fired against targets as a percentage of
combat requirement
Javelin 1.1
Copperhead 2.1
M919 25-mm gun round 2.8
TOW Missile 3.6
120-mm tank rounds 6.6
2.75-in. Hydra rockets 8.2
Hellfire 11.1
Longbow 14.5
In the Air Force, weapons expected to be used against assigned targets
accounted for an average of 60 percent of the combat usage requirement. The
remaining 40 percent is attributed to uncertainties. The Marine Corps was
unable to provide us with percentage figures. The Navy uses three classified
uncertainty factors similar to those of the other services. Some of these
factors, such as poor weather, are already taken into account by the
commanders in chief. When they develop initial target allocations, the
commanders in chief allocate more targets than the number available in the
theaters to compensate for some of these uncertainties.
The Navy/Marine Corps Air, and the Air Force also use a significant portion
of some expensive antiarmor weapons against unarmored targets. This practice
also increases requirements. In its models, for example, the Navy/Marine
Corps Air uses about 80 percent of its TOW and Hellfire missiles against
unarmored and lower-value targets such as trucks. It could instead use its
less expensive saboted light armor penetrator, high explosive antiarmor
munition, or other weapons and save the more expensive and more capable
weapons for more heavily armored targets. Similarly, two of the Air Force's
newer and more advanced antiarmor weapons (the Joint Stand-Off Weapon
BLU-108 variant and the Sensor Fuzed Weapon) are expected to be used against
unarmored targets over
60 percent of the time. All four weapons were designed and justified
primarily as tank-killing weapons. Table 2 shows the percentage of combat
requirements for Air Force and Navy/Marine Corps Air antiarmor weapons to be
used against armored and other targets.
Table 2: Air Force and Navy/Marine Corps Air Antiarmor Weapon Usage Against
Target Types
Percent used Percent used Percent used Percent used
Weapon against against armored against against other
tanks combat vehicles artillery targets
Air Force
CBU-87 <1 <1 0 99
CBU-103 3 7 3 87
Sensor Fused
Weapon 21 6 10 62
JSOW
(BLU-108) 12 13 13 61
Maverick G 0 0 74 25
Maverick K 41 19 27 14
Maverick H 65 4 30 1
Maverick D 100 0 0 0
Navy/Marine Corps Air
IR Maverick 16 4 <1 79
Hellfire 10 6 4 80
Laser
Maverick 15 4 <1 81
TOW 10 6 4 80
Rockeye 36 23 16 25
JSOW
(BLU-108) 71 23 6 <1
The Army and the Navy/Marine Corps Air also allowed their models to destroy
more targets than allocated, again increasing weapon usage. According to the
most recent analyses available, the Army and the Navy/Marine Corps Air
destroyed 17 percent and 21 percent more tanks, respectively, than they were
assigned, inflating their weapon requirements.
Finally, in some cases, the Marine Corps Ground and the Army did not accept
the number of weapon systems recommended by their models for combat usage.
In their latest requirements report, they instead favored using a higher
estimate obtained by a manual calculation. They told us that the numbers
provided by the models had been too low and that manual calculations had
been necessary. The Marine Corps Ground compared the results of the model
with a manual calculation of the number of munitions each weapon can hold
and selected the higher number. Table 3 shows the increases in some Marine
Corps Ground weapon requirements because of these higher manual
calculations.
Table 3: Comparison of Marine Corps Ground Model Results and Manual
Calculations
Combat
usage Combat usage Combat usage in Percent above
Weapon based on based on manual latest
model calculations requirement modeled
results report requirement
Predator 1,139 4,523 4,428 289
M829 tank round 6,030 13,050 13,050 116
TOW 2A/B missile 5,172 10,837 10,836 109
Javelin 1,264 2,214 2,214 75
Saboted Light
Armor Penetrator 647,010 541,680 758,989 17
ammunition
25-mm gun round 169,232 124,335 170,288 0.6
Dual Purpose
Improved
Conventional 48,879 23,882 48,879 0
Munition
Copperhead 1,335 99 1,335 0
High Explosive
Antiarmor rocket 10,216 4,640 10,216 0
The Army disregarded its modeled results when calculating one of its
antiarmor weapon requirements. According to Army officials, the Army did not
use the model's results if weapon usage results were so low that other
formulas based on usage could not be calculated. This was the case, they
said, for the Javelin antiarmor weapon. According to the Army's May 1999
requirement update, only 180 Javelins were expected to be fired at targets
in the model. This low usage was insufficient to calculate the remaining
portion of the combat requirement using the model formula. Consequently, the
Army used a manual calculation to finalize the combat requirement. Using the
manual calculation, the number of Javelins needed for combat was determined
at 16,848.
Quantity and Cost of Antiarmor Systems Under Development and Procurement
(then-year dollars in millions)
Quantity Cost Cost, fiscal
Weapon Service to be Total through year 2000 to
procured cost fiscal completion
year 1999
Brilliant Antiarmor
Submunition/Army
Tactical Missile Army 19,554 $4,284 $149 $4,135
System (BAT/ATACMS)
M26 Multiple Launch
Rocket System Army 12,378 3,485 109 3,376
(MLRS)
Joint Stand-Off
Weapon (JSOW) Navy/ Air 5,955 2,369 22 2,347
BLU-108 Force
Javelin Army/Marine 26,956 3,324 1,494 1,830
Corps
Sense and Destroy 1,792
Armor Munition Army 50,000 2,057 266
(SADARM)
Wide Area Munition
(WAM) Army 33,991 1,708 49 1,658
Longbow Hellfire Army 12,905 2,092 1,005 1,087
Sensor Fuzed Weapon
(SFW) Air Force 4,237 1,434 925 509
Predator Marine 18,190 492 0 492
Corps
Tank round
M829A2/E3 Army 242,000 1,694 1,438 256
Remote Area Denial
Artillery Munition Army 428,000 194 0 194
(RADAM)
M919 25-mm gun
round Army 1,791,000 242 188 54
Multipurpose
Individual Munition Army 3,521 147 0 147
(MPIM)
Volcano Army 184,000 412 412 0
M830A1 tank round Army 76,000 533 533 0
Total $24,467 $6,590 $17,877
Projected Antiarmor Weapon Production Funding, Fiscal Year 2000 to
Completion
(then-year
dollars in
millions)
Weapon 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 to
completion
BAT/ATACMS $226 $228 $264 $374 $340 $372 $2,331
M26 MLRS Rocket 3 10 41 63 66 98 3,095
JSOW BLU 108 111 246 233 227 231 241 1,058
Javelin 400 437 413 406 41 52 81
SADARM 55 64 77 93 155 84 1,264
WAM 10 23 56 57 57 57 1,398
Longbow Hellfire 308 300 236 195 26 22 0
SFW 61 102 88 87 86 85 0
Predator 0 27 27 28 54 55 301
Tank round
M829A2/M829E3 0 0 41 72 72 71 0
RADAM 48 48 49 49 0 0 0
M919 25-mm gun
round 30 24 0 0 0 0 0
MPIM 0 2 24 23 48 50 0
Volcano 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
M830A1 tank
round 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total $1,252 $1,511 $1,549 $1,674 $1,176 $1,187 $9,528
Comments From the Department of Defense
GAO Staff Acknowledgments
Beverly Breen, Laura Durland, William Gillies, Bobby Hall, and Roy Karadbil
made key contributions to this report.
(707414)
Table 1: Army Direct Fire Antiarmor Weapons Used Against
Targets, as a Percentage of Combat Requirement 17
Table 2: Air Force and Navy/Marine Corps Air Antiarmor
Weapon Usage Against Target Types 18
Table 3: Comparison of Marine Corps Ground Model Results
and Manual Calculations 19
Figure 1: Comparison of Technology Levels of Main Battle Tanks
of the Countries in the Two-Regional Conflict Threat
Scenario 8
Figure 2: Percentage of Mobile Armored Targets Allocated to the
Army and the Air Force, 1997-98 12
1. Defense Acquisitions: Reduced Threat Not Reflected in Antiarmor Weapon
Acquisitions (GAO/NSIAD-99-105 , July 22, 1999).
2. The Defense Intelligence Agency identifies the number and types of enemy
armored targets in each scenario that each service needs to destroy. The
commanders in chief allocate responsibility for the targets among the
military services. On the basis of these allocations, the services determine
their antiarmor weapon requirements.
3. The plan was classified as secret.
4. The Antiarmor Master Plan shows 19 systems under procurement. One of
them, however, is for a modification, and three others are for practice
rounds. Procurements of combat weapons thus total 15.
5. H.R. Conference Report 106-371, page 214 (1999).
6. According to DOD Instruction 3000.4, the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy shall develop policy guidance on munition requirements in the Defense
planning guidance.
7. Defense Acquisitions (GAO/NSIAD-99-105 , July 22, 1999).
8. The next report is scheduled to be released later this year.
9. Russia and the Ukraine, both of the former Soviet Union, account for over
half of the systems identified in the plan.
10. DOD classifies the costs of the systems contained in the Antiarmor
Munitions Master Plan. We used unclassified fiscal year 2000 budget
submission documentation to determine costs.
11. High-Risk Series: An Update (GAO/HR-99-1 , Jan. 1999) and Weapons
Acquisitions: Guided Weapon Plans Need to Be Reassessed (GAO/NSIAD-99-32 ,
Dec. 9, 1998).
12. Weapons Acquisitions: Guided Weapon Plans Need to Be Reassessed
(GAO/NSIAD-99-32 , Dec. 9, 1998).
13. H.R. Conference Report 106-371, page 214 (1999).
*** End of document. ***
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