Bottom-Up Review: Analysis of Key DOD Assumptions
(Chapter Report, 01/31/95, GAO/NSIAD-95-56)
In its bottom-up review of the nation's defense needs, the Defense
Department (DOD) concluded that it is prudent to maintain the capability
to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major regional wars, and it
determined the forces, capability improvements, and funding necessary to
do so. Because the bottom-up review is the basis for the Pentagon's
planning, programming, and budgeting for the foreseeable future, GAO
examined key DOD assumptions underlying the two-conflict strategy. GAO
raises questions about the redeployment of forces from other operations
to major regional conflicts, availability of strategic mobility assets
and Army support forces, deployability of Army National Guard enhanced
brigades, and planned enhancements to strategic lift and firepower. In
addition, military commanders believe that DOD's concept for responding
to two nearly simultaneous conflicts may not be the best approach. For
example, their estimates of key characteristics of how two nearly
simultaneous wars might arise and how forces should be deployed differ
significantly from DOD's estimates, including the timing between the two
conflicts and the timing of force deployments.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: NSIAD-95-56
TITLE: Bottom-Up Review: Analysis of Key DOD Assumptions
DATE: 01/31/95
SUBJECT: Strategic planning
Defense capabilities
Defense contingency planning
Defense budgets
Military operations
Combat readiness
Mobilization
Mission budgeting
Strategic forces
Emergency preparedness
IDENTIFIER: DOD Future Years Defense Program
DOD Bottom-Up Review
F-15E Aircraft
F-4G Aircraft
F-117 Aircraft
EF-111 Aircraft
B-2 Aircraft
Ready Reserve Force
Ready Reserve Fleet
C-17 Aircraft
Persian Gulf War
Bradley Fighting Vehicle
Army Bold Shift Initiative
F-14 Aircraft
Tri-Service Standoff Attack Missile
DOD Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
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Cover
================================================================ COVER
Report to Congressional Committees
January 1995
BOTTOM-UP REVIEW - ANALYSIS OF KEY
DOD ASSUMPTIONS
GAO/NSIAD-95-56
Bottom-Up Review
Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV
DOD - Department of Defense
GAO - General Accounting Office
Letter
=============================================================== LETTER
B-259314
January 31, 1995
The Honorable Strom Thurmond
Chairman
The Honorable Sam Nunn
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
The Honorable Pete V. Domenici
Chairman, Committee on the Budget
United States Senate
The Honorable Floyd D. Spence
Chairman
The Honorable Ronald V. Dellums
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on National Security
House of Representatives
The Honorable John R. Kasich
Chairman, Committee on the Budget
House of Representatives
This report discusses the Department of Defense's (DOD) bottom-up
review and examines assumptions about key aspects of the two-conflict
strategy to determine whether they reasonably support DOD's
conclusions that the projected force, with capability enhancements,
can execute the strategy. The information in this report should be
useful to your Committees in their deliberations on the future size
and composition of DOD forces and capabilities. The report contains
a recommendation to the Secretary of Defense concerning the
congressionally mandated report on the bottom-up review that must be
completed by May 1995.
We are sending copies of this report to other interested
congressional committees; the Secretaries of Defense, the Army, the
Navy, and the Air Force; the Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps; and the
Director, Office of Management and Budget. Copies will also be made
available to others on request.
If you or your staffs have any questions on this report, please call
me on (202) 512-3504. Major contributors to this report are listed
in appendix II.
Richard Davis
Director, National Security
Analysis
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
============================================================ Chapter 0
PURPOSE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1
In its bottom-up review of the nation's defense needs, the Department
of Defense (DOD), among other things, judged that it is prudent to
maintain the capability to fight and win two nearly simultaneous
major regional conflicts, and determined the forces, capability
improvements, and funding necessary to do so. DOD used the results
of the bottom-up review to develop its fiscal year 1995 budget and
Future Years Defense Program. Because the bottom-up review is the
basis for DOD's planning, programming, and budgeting for the
foreseeable future, GAO examined DOD's assumptions about key aspects
of the two-conflict strategy to determine whether they reasonably
support DOD's conclusion that the projected force, with capability
improvements, can execute the strategy. GAO did not review the
rationale for DOD's decision to select the two-conflict strategy.
BACKGROUND
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2
In October 1993, DOD reported on its bottom-up review--an assessment
of U.S. defense needs in the post-Cold War security environment. In
particular, the review outlined an overall defense strategy for the
new era, specific dangers to U.S. interests and strategies for
dealing with each danger, and force structure requirements. Chief
among the dangers was the threat of large-scale aggression by major
regional powers. DOD evaluated various strategy and force options
for countering regional aggression. It also considered requirements
for conducting (1) peace enforcement or intervention operations in
smaller-scale conflicts or crises, (2) overseas presence, and (3)
deterrence of attacks with weapons of mass destruction.
DOD selected the two-conflict strategy option and determined the
force structure capable of executing the strategy and meeting
requirements for overseas presence and smaller-scale operations, as
shown in table 1. According to its Report on the Bottom-Up Review,
DOD also estimated the cost of the bottom-up review program and
matched it against the President's objective for reducing the defense
budget by $104 billion. DOD estimated that the program would achieve
$91 billion in total savings during fiscal years 1995 to 1999 and
that additional savings would be identified during DOD's normal
program and budget review.
Table 1
DOD's Bottom-Up Review Force Structure
Force Requirement
----------------------------- -----------------------------
Army 10 active divisions
15 Army National Guard
enhanced
readiness (combat) brigades\a
Navy 11 active aircraft carriers
1 reserve/training aircraft
carrier
45-55 attack submarines
346 ships
Marine Corps 3 Marine expeditionary
forces
174,000 active personnel
42,000 reserve personnel
Air Force 13 active fighter wings
7 reserve fighter wings
Up to 184 bombers (B-52H, B-
1, B-2)
Strategic nuclear forces 18 ballistic missile
submarines
Up to 94 B-52H bombers\b
20 B-2 bombers\b
500 Minuteman III
intercontinental ballistic
missiles (single warhead)
------------------------------------------------------------
\a These enhanced brigades will be existing Guard combat brigades
with improved readiness.
\b These bombers are included in the 184 bombers listed under the Air
Force.
DOD also determined it would need to make specific enhancements to
force capabilities, such as improving strategic mobility--airlift,
sealift, and prepositioning--and the lethality of U.S. firepower.
DOD estimated that the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps forces
would be in place by 1999, strategic nuclear forces would be in place
by 2003, and most enhancements would be done by 2000.
The Secretary of Defense's defense planning guidance for fiscal years
1995-99 and 1996-2001, issued in September 1993 and May 1994,
respectively, implemented the bottom-up review's findings. The 1994
guidance included an illustrative planning scenario covering two
nearly simultaneous regional conflicts for DOD to use in developing
program and budget requirements. In general, this scenario described
force levels, deployment schedules, and other aspects of a situation
involving two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts.
Because of concerns about the results of the bottom-up review, the
Congress, in the Fiscal Year 1995 National Defense Authorization Act,
requires the Secretary of Defense to reexamine the bottom-up review's
assumptions and conclusions regarding force and budgetary
requirements and report on the review to the President and the
Congress in May 1995. DOD must describe the force structure required
to execute its two-conflict strategy in light of other ongoing or
potential operations and may also address possible adjustments to the
two-conflict strategy.
RESULTS IN BRIEF
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3
DOD has not fully analyzed key bottom-up review assumptions about the
availability of forces, supporting capabilities, and enhancements
that it concluded were necessary for executing the two-conflict
strategy. Furthermore, some of DOD's assumptions are questionable.
DOD assumed the following:
Forces would be redeployed from other operations, such as
peacekeeping, to regional conflicts, and forces would be
redeployed between regional conflicts. However, critical
support and combat forces needed in the early stages of a
regional conflict may not be able to quickly redeploy from peace
operations because (1) certain Army support forces would be
needed to facilitate the redeployment of other forces and (2)
logistics and maintenance support needed for specialized Air
Force aircraft would have to wait for available airlift.
Certain specialized units or unique assets would be shifted from
one conflict to another. However, two war-fighting commands, in
an on-going study of the two-conflict strategy, have raised
questions about shifting assets between conflicts.
Sufficient strategic lift assets, prepositioned equipment, and
support forces would be available. However, the Army lacks
sufficient numbers of certain types of support units to meet
current requirements for a single conflict.
Army National Guard enhanced combat brigades could be deployed
within 90 days of being called to active duty to supplement
active combat units. However, National Guard combat brigades
are currently experiencing difficulty meeting peacetime training
requirements critical to ensuring their ability to deploy
quickly in wartime.
A series of enhancements, such as improvements to strategic
mobility and U.S. firepower, are critical to implementing the
two-conflict strategy and would be available by about 2000.
However, some enhancements, such as additional airlift aircraft,
may not be available as planned.
In addition, war-fighting command officials believe that DOD's
concept for responding to two nearly simultaneous conflicts--included
in DOD guidance for developing program and budget requirements--may
not be the best approach. For example, their estimates of key
characteristics of how two nearly simultaneous conflicts might evolve
and how forces should be deployed differ significantly from DOD's
estimates, including the timing between the two conflicts and the
timing of force deployments. In February 1994, the commands
initiated a study to examine options for deploying forces and
supporting capabilities they believe could maximize the use of U.S.
capabilities. Command officials emphasized that, in initiating the
study, they are not suggesting that the United States cannot
accomplish the two-conflict strategy. Their analysis is addressing
many of the variables that DOD made assumptions about during the
bottom-up review and could therefore provide useful insights to the
validity of DOD's assumptions.
In the Report on the Bottom-Up Review, DOD stated that much more work
needs to be done. DOD has since begun to examine the redeployment of
forces from other operations, shifting of assets between conflicts,
availability of strategic mobility and support forces, and use of
enhanced brigades. In general, these analyses will not be complete
until sometime in 1995. Until DOD fully analyzes its bottom-up
review assumptions and considers the war-fighting commands' options,
it will not have a firm basis for determining the forces, supporting
capabilities, and funding needed for the two-conflict strategy or if
the strategy should be changed.
PRINCIPAL FINDINGS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4
DOD HAS NOT FULLY ANALYZED
KEY BOTTOM-UP REVIEW
ASSUMPTIONS, AND SOME ARE
QUESTIONABLE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.1
DOD has not fully analyzed key bottom-up review assumptions about the
availability of forces, supporting capabilities, and enhancements
that it concluded were necessary to execute the strategy to fight and
win two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts. GAO questions
some of DOD's assumptions.
Since the bottom-up review, DOD and two war-fighting commands began
analyzing key aspects of the two-conflict strategy that are related
to DOD's bottom-up review assumptions (see table 2).
Table 2
Status of DOD's Analyses of Key Aspects
of the Two-Conflict Strategy
Aspect of the two- Related DOD bottom-up Status of DOD analyses (as
conflict strategy review assumption of Jan. 1995)
------------------------- ------------------------- --------------------------
Redeployment Forces involved in other In June 1994, the Army
of forces from other operations, such as began a study of the
operations peacekeeping, would be feasibility of redeploying
redeployed to a regional forces from peace
conflict. operations to regional
conflicts. It expects to
complete this analysis in
early to mid-1995.
Shifting assets from one Certain specialized units In 1994, the Air Force,
conflict to another or unique assets would be Air Mobility Command, and
shifted from the first two war-fighting commands
regional conflict to the initiated studies of the
second conflict. two-conflict strategy,
including examining
shifting assets between
conflicts. The first two
studies were completed in
August and May 1994,
respectively, and follow-
on efforts are planned.
These efforts and the
commands' study will not
be completed until
sometime in 1995.
Availability of Sufficient airlift, In October 1993, DOD
strategic sealift, and initiated a detailed
mobility prepositioning would be analysis of mobility
available for deploying requirements for the two-
forces to two regions. conflict strategy. DOD
expects to identify
overall requirements by
February 1995 but will not
identify the specific
numbers and types of
airlift aircraft until
November 1995.
Availability of support Sufficient support forces In July 1994, the Army
forces would be available for began analyzing support
combat operations in two requirements for the two-
conflicts. conflict strategy. It
expects to complete this
analysis in mid-1995.
Deployability of reserve Army National Guard In November 1993, the Army
forces enhanced combat brigades began to study the concept
could be deployed within of enhanced brigades,
90 days of being called including equipment and
to active duty and would training needs. The Army
supplement active combat expects to complete the
units. equipment study in
February 1995 and the
training study in mid-
1995. Use of the brigades
is being considered as
part of the two war-
fighting commands' study.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
As table 2 shows, DOD assumed that forces committed to other
operations such as peacekeeping would be redeployed to a major
regional conflict. However, some of the same Army support forces and
specialized Air Force combat aircraft used in peace operations, such
as the F-4G and F-15E, are needed in the early stages of a conflict,
and it may be difficult to disengage and redeploy these forces
quickly. Support forces, such as transportation units that move
personnel and cargo through ports, could not immediately redeploy
because they would be needed to assist in redeploying other forces
from the peace operation. While specialized Air Force aircraft and
their aircrews could easily redeploy, the supplies, equipment, and
personnel needed to support the aircraft would have to wait for
available airlift. Finally, forces might need to upgrade their
training, equipment, and supplies before redeploying. The Army is
currently analyzing the feasibility of redeploying forces from peace
operations to a major regional conflict and does not expect to
complete this analysis until early to mid-1995.
DOD further assumed that certain assets, such as B-2 bombers and
F-117 stealth fighters, would be shifted between conflicts. The
bottom-up review, however, did not analyze the specific types and
numbers required to be shifted, redeployment timing, or logistical
requirements. In 1994, the Air Force and its Air Mobility Command,
using the 1994 defense planning guidance scenario covering two nearly
simultaneous regional conflicts, completed preliminary studies of
specific aspects of the two-conflict strategy that they began after
the bottom-up review. Preliminary results of these analyses
identified the number of assets that would possibly shift from one
conflict to another and requirements for refueling support. The Air
Force is continuing to analyze the requirements for the two-conflict
strategy, including the shifting of assets. In February 1994, two
war-fighting commands began studying options for executing the
two-conflict strategy, using a different concept for deploying forces
and supporting capabilities from that reflected in the defense
guidance scenario. Among other things, this study will examine
requirements for shifting assets between conflicts. The commands do
not expect to complete this study until sometime in 1995.
DOD relied heavily on its 1991 mobility requirements study in
assessing mobility requirements during the bottom-up review. This
study analyzed mobility requirements for various scenarios involving
single regional conflicts and a scenario involving two concurrent
conflicts. Based on the requirements for the single conflict
scenario deemed to be most demanding, the study recommended the
acquisition of additional C-17 aircraft and sealift ships and the
prepositioning of Army equipment on ships. It stated that this
recommendation did not provide sufficient capability to handle a
second conflict. The bottom-up review endorsed the study's
recommendation and called for additional prepositioning of equipment
on land. However, after completing the bottom-up review, DOD
initiated a detailed analysis to validate the bottom-up review's
conclusions about mobility requirements for the two-conflict
strategy. This study, according to DOD, was required because of
significant changes resulting from the bottom-up review and delays in
DOD's mobility program. DOD expects to identify overall mobility
requirements by February 1995 but will not identify the specific
numbers and types of airlift aircraft until November 1995.
In addition, DOD assumed that it would have sufficient support forces
for two conflicts and did not consider the numbers and types of
support units needed. For example, in modeling force options, DOD
used notional Army support forces. The Army plans to complete an
analysis of specific support requirements in mid-1995. Current
indications are that it would be difficult for the Army to support
two conflicts. A 1992 Army analysis shows that the Army cannot
support its current active force of 12 divisions. Although the
bottom-up review active force of 10 divisions is smaller, the Army's
total number of personnel is also smaller, leaving fewer people to
fill support units. Army officials therefore anticipate that its
analysis of support requirements for the bottom-up review force will
also reveal shortfalls. Analysis of two U.S. plans for responding
to regional conflicts shows that the Army has insufficient numbers of
certain units, such as transportation and quartermaster companies, to
meet the requirements of one plan for responding to a regional
conflict and the combined requirements of both plans. However, using
existing support resources in Army National Guard units may be an
option for augmenting the Army's support capability.
Finally, DOD assumed that 15 Army National Guard enhanced brigades
would be trained, organized, and equipped to deploy within 90 days of
being called to active duty to augment active combat units. However,
during the bottom-up review, it did not determine the brigades'
specific roles during wartime, required enhancements, and ability to
deploy quickly or when the brigades would actually be needed. As of
January 1995, the Army was still developing training and equipment
requirements, and the two war-fighting commands were studying how and
when the brigades would be needed in wartime. GAO concluded on the
basis of 1992 and 1993 training data for seven existing Guard combat
brigades that none have met premobilization training and readiness
goals critical to ensuring timely deployment in wartime.
DOD's bottom-up review emphasized the importance of several
enhancements; however, some may not be available by 2000, as
projected. For example, to improve strategic mobility, DOD assumed
that by fiscal year 1999, 80 of 120 planned C-17 aircraft would be
available and additional equipment would be prepositioned in the
Persian Gulf area to accelerate the arrival of ground forces.
Because of cost and technical problems, however, in December 1993,
the Secretary of Defense limited the procurement of C-17s to 40 and
deferred a decision to buy more C-17s until November 1995. In
addition, according to DOD officials, while DOD had prepositioned
equipment on ships and nearly completed prepositioning the first of
two planned brigade sets on land in the Persian Gulf, it had obtained
only a small portion of the funds required to preposition the second
brigade set.
To improve the lethality of U.S. firepower by about the year 2000,
DOD planned, among other things, to continue developing antiarmor
precision-guided munitions, such as the tri-service standoff attack
missile, and to add limited air-to-ground capability to the Navy's
F-14 aircraft, referred to as the Block I upgrade. Because of
significant developmental difficulties and growth in expected unit
cost, DOD has canceled the tri-service standoff attack missile
program. The Congress has also denied funding for the Block I
upgrade. GAO has reported extensively on problems with the
tri-service standoff attack missile and has raised questions about
the justification for the Block I upgrade.
WAR-FIGHTING COMMANDS
QUESTION DOD'S CONCEPT FOR
RESPONDING TO TWO NEARLY
SIMULTANEOUS CONFLICTS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.2
Officials from two war-fighting commands believe that DOD's concept
of how a situation involving two nearly simultaneous conflicts would
evolve and how the United States would respond--outlined in a May
1994 defense planning guidance illustrative planning scenario that is
being used to develop program and budget requirements--may not
reflect the best approach. Their estimates of the characteristics of
two nearly simultaneous conflicts differ significantly from DOD's
estimates, such as the amount of warning time and amount of time
separating the two conflicts. The commands also have a different
concept of how U.S. forces and supporting capabilities should be
allocated and deployed, including the (1) mix of combat forces needed
in each conflict, (2) timing of force deployments, and (3) allocation
of strategic mobility assets.
The commands are not suggesting the strategy cannot be accomplished
but that DOD's concept may not reflect the best approach. They
therefore believe that options other than those depicted in DOD's
scenario may maximize the use of U.S. combat and support
capabilities and may reduce the risks involved in simultaneously
engaging in combat operations in two regions. In February 1994, the
commands initiated a study to examine options for responding to two
nearly simultaneous conflicts with the bottom-up review force based
on a scenario that differs from the defense planning guidance
scenario. This study will address many of the same aspects of the
strategy that DOD made assumptions about during the bottom-up review
and is currently analyzing, including shifting assets from one
conflict to another, sufficiency of strategic mobility and support
forces, and the use of enhanced brigades. (Specific details of the
commands' concerns about the scenario and their deployment concept
are classified.) As of January 1995, the commands had reached
preliminary conclusions and did not expect to complete the study
until sometime later in 1995.
RECOMMENDATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:5
GAO recommends that in the congressionally mandated examination of
the bottom-up review, the Secretary of Defense thoroughly examine the
assumptions related to the (1) redeployment of forces from other
operations to major regional conflicts, availability of strategic
mobility assets and Army support forces, deployability of Army
National Guard enhanced brigades, and planned enhancements to
strategic lift and firepower and (2) consider the options being
examined by the war-fighting commands.
AGENCY COMMENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:6
DOD provided comments on a draft of this report, which are included
in appendix I. Although DOD concurred with GAO's recommendations and
partially concurred with the report, it disagreed with GAO's overall
conclusion that it did not adequately analyze assumptions used in
conducting the bottom-up review. DOD said that its leadership
recognized practical limitations on the scope of analysis that could
be conducted in the time available and fully considered these
limitations in making decisions about the defense program. DOD
further stated that, in raising questions about the bottom-up
review's assumptions, GAO did not recognize the difference between
conceptual force planning and war-fighting commands' operational
planning for using specific forces to undertake specific operations.
GAO recognizes that the bottom-up review was a broad force planning
effort that did not develop actual war plans for using specific
forces. It did, however, make the judgment that the United States
would maintain the capability to fight and win two nearly
simultaneous major regional conflicts and decided the size and
composition of the force capable of meeting this strategy. In making
these decisions, DOD made critical assumptions about factors that are
key to the successful execution of the two-conflict strategy without
performing sufficient analyses to test the validity of its
assumptions. In fact, DOD and the war-fighting commands, through
studies initiated after the bottom-up review, are now examining DOD's
assumptions.
DOD also disagreed with GAO's specific findings that (1) it did not
assess requirements for shifting assets between regional conflicts,
(2) it did not fully assess mobility requirements, and (3) the Army
would be challenged in supporting two major regional conflicts.
DOD's specific comments on these findings and our evaluation are
discussed in chapter 2.
INTRODUCTION
============================================================ Chapter 1
In light of the significant changes in the international security
environment resulting from the dissolution of the Soviet Union and
declining resources available for defense needs, the Department of
Defense (DOD) has been reexamining U.S. defense strategy, force
levels, and budgetary requirements for the post-Cold War era. In
1990, the President presented a defense plan reflecting a shift in
U.S. strategy from preparing for a global war in Europe against the
Soviet Union to preparing for major regional conflicts against
uncertain adversaries. This plan proposed a significantly reduced
force structure, or base force, but retained sufficient forces to
counter a possible reemergence of the Soviet threat.
Following the change in administrations in 1993, the new Secretary of
Defense reassessed U.S. defense requirements in an effort referred
to as DOD's bottom-up review. This review, completed in October
1993, examined the nation's defense strategy, force structure,
modernization, infrastructure, foundations, and resources needed for
the post-Cold War era. As a result of the bottom-up review, DOD
continued to focus U.S. strategy on regional threats; however, it
de-emphasized the possibility of a reemerging Soviet threat and
reduced U.S. forces to levels smaller than the base force.
According to DOD officials, the Secretary of Defense called for the
bottom-up review to be completed in time to be considered in
developing DOD's fiscal year 1995 budget and Future Years Defense
Program. Therefore, the review was completed in about 7 months. In
the Report on the Bottom-Up Review, DOD stated that much more work
had to be done.
THE BOTTOM-UP REVIEW OUTLINED A
DEFENSE STRATEGY AND NEW
DANGERS IN THE POST-COLD WAR
ERA
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1
According to DOD's bottom-up review, the United States must pursue an
overall defense strategy characterized by continued political,
economic, and military engagement internationally. This strategy of
engagement advocates (1) preventing the emergence of threats to U.S.
interests by promoting democracy, economic growth, free markets,
human dignity, and the peaceful resolution of conflict and (2)
pursuing international partnerships for freedom, prosperity, and
peace.
The bottom-up review outlined the new dangers facing U.S. interests
in the post-Cold War era and a specific strategy for dealing with
each one. These dangers included (1) the proliferation of nuclear
weapons and other weapons of mass destruction; (2) regional dangers,
posed primarily by the threat of large-scale aggression by major
regional powers with opposing interests; (3) dangers to democracy and
reform in the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and elsewhere; and
(4) economic dangers to national security.
In the Report on the Bottom-Up Review, the Secretary of Defense cited
regional aggression as chief among the new dangers. To deal with
regional aggression and other regional dangers, DOD's strategy is to
(1) defeat aggressors in major regional conflicts; (2) maintain a
presence overseas--the need for U.S. forces to conduct normal
peacetime operations in critical regions--to deter conflicts and
provide regional stability; and (3) conduct smaller-scale
intervention operations, such as peacekeeping, humanitarian
assistance, and disaster relief.
DOD JUDGED THAT THE UNITED
STATES MUST BE CAPABLE OF
WINNING TWO NEARLY
SIMULTANEOUS REGIONAL
CONFLICTS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1.1
To deal with the threat of regional aggression, DOD judged that it is
prudent for the United States to maintain sufficient military power
to be able to fight and win two major regional conflicts that occur
nearly simultaneously.\1 The bottom-up review determined the specific
forces, capabilities, and improvements in capabilities for executing
the two-conflict strategy. In reaching its conclusions, DOD examined
various strategy and force options for major regional conflicts, as
shown in table 1.1.
Table 1.1
The Bottom-Up Review's Strategy and
Force Options for Responding to Major
Regional Conflicts
Win two nearly
simultaneous
Win one Win two nearly conflicts plus
Military Win one conflict with simultaneous conduct smaller
service conflict hold in second conflicts operation
-------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- ----------------
Army 8 active 10 active 10 active 12 active
divisions divisions divisions divisions
6 reserve 6 reserve 15 reserve 8 reserve
division division enhanced- enhanced
equivalents equivalents readiness equivalents
brigades
Navy 8 carrier 10 carrier 11 carrier 12 carrier
battle groups battle groups battle groups battle groups
1 reserve
carrier
Marine Corps 5 active 5 active 5 active 5 active
brigades brigades brigades brigades
1 reserve 1 reserve 1 reserve 1 reserve
division division division division
Air Force 10 active 13 active 13 active 14 active
fighter wings fighter wings fighter wings fighter wings
6 reserve 7 reserve 7 reserve 10 reserve
fighter wings fighter wings fighter wings fighter wings
Force
enhancements
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: DOD's Report on the Bottom-Up Review.
For assessment purposes, DOD focused on two specific scenarios
involving regional aggression. In evaluating the strategy and force
options, DOD also considered requirements for conducting (1) peace
enforcement or intervention operations in smaller-scale conflicts or
crises, (2) overseas presence, and (3) deterrence of attacks with
weapons of mass destruction.
DOD, for various reasons, chose the strategy of fighting and winning
two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts and related forces
with enhancements--the third option shown in table 1.1. For example,
DOD believed that this option would possibly deter a second regional
aggressor from attacking its neighbors while the United States was
responding to another regional conflict. In addition, fielding
forces sufficient to win two wars nearly simultaneously would provide
a hedge against the possibility that a future adversary might one day
confront the United States with a larger-than-expected threat.
Finally, DOD believed that this strategy option, forces, and
enhancements were affordable within expected budget constraints.
According to its Report on the Bottom-Up Review, DOD also estimated
the cost of the bottom-up review program and matched it against the
President's objective for reducing the defense budget. DOD estimated
that the program would achieve $91 billion in total savings and that
additional savings would be identified during DOD's normal program
and budget review. DOD estimated that the projected force would be
available by fiscal year 1999. DOD used the results of the bottom-up
review to develop its fiscal year 1995 budget and Future Years
Defense Program.
--------------------
\1 For planning purposes, DOD defined "nearly simultaneous" to be a
certain number of days between the time that enemy forces mobilize in
each conflict. The number of days is classified.
DOD MADE SEVERAL KEY
ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT ITS CHOSEN
FORCE OPTION
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1.2
In concluding that the forces selected for the third option could
implement its strategy, DOD made several key assumptions about the
forces' deployability and capabilities, including that
forces involved in other operations, such as peacekeeping, would be
redeployed to a regional conflict;
certain specialized units or unique assets would be shifted from
one conflict to another;
sufficient strategic lift assets and support forces would be
available;
Army National Guard enhanced combat brigades could be deployed
within 90 days of being called to active duty to supplement
active combat units; and
a series of enhancements, such as improvements to strategic
mobility and U.S. fire power, were critical to implementing the
two-conflict strategy and would be available by about 2000.
The specific enhancements included improving (1) strategic mobility,
through more prepositioning and enhancements to airlift and sealift;
(2) the strike capabilities of aircraft carriers; (3) the lethality
of Army firepower; and (4) the ability of long-range bombers to
deliver conventional precision-guided munitions. Completing these
enhancements, according to DOD, would both reduce overall ground
force requirements and increase the responsiveness and effectiveness
of its power projection forces.
In most cases, the projected enhancements involved ongoing programs
to upgrade existing capabilities. For example, the bottom-up review
cited the need for additional airlift and sealift assets to improve
strategic mobility. DOD had previously identified this need in its
1991 mobility requirements study and had already programmed funds to
procure some of the specific assets.
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE'S
PLANNING GUIDANCE IMPLEMENTED
DOD'S BOTTOM-UP REVIEW
CONCLUSIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:2
According to the Secretary of Defense, the bottom-up review was a
comprehensive reassessment that set the framework for defense
planning for the next 5 years and beyond. In September 1993 and May
1994, the Secretary issued his defense planning guidance for fiscal
years 1995 to 1999 and fiscal years 1996 to 2001, respectively. This
guidance formally directed the military services and defense agencies
to implement the bottom-up review's conclusions.
The May 1994 guidance included an illustrative planning scenario
reflecting DOD's concept of how the United States would respond to
two major regional conflicts that occur nearly simultaneously. Among
other things, the scenario detailed the amount of time between the
outbreak of hostilities in both conflicts, number and types of forces
deployed to each conflict, timing of deployments, and projected time
for completing various combat phases. DOD directed military planners
to use this scenario, along with other guidelines in the September
and May guidance, in developing program and budget requirements for
DOD's selected strategy and forces.
THE CONGRESS IS REQUIRING DOD
TO REEXAMINE THE BOTTOM-UP
REVIEW
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:3
In considering DOD's portion of the President's budget for fiscal
year 1995, Members of the Congress raised questions about the
bottom-up review, including the accuracy of its assumptions and
affordability of its projected force. As a result, in the Fiscal
Year 1995 National Defense Authorization Act, the Congress is
requiring the Secretary of Defense to review the assumptions and
conclusions of the President's budget, the bottom-up review, and the
Future Years Defense Program. The Secretary is required to submit a
report on the results of its review to the President and the Congress
in May 1995. Among other things, this report must describe the force
structure required to execute DOD's two-conflict strategy in light of
other ongoing or potential operations and may also address possible
adjustments to the strategy.
OBJECTIVE, SCOPE, AND
METHODOLOGY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:4
We examined DOD's bottom-up review assumptions about key aspects of
the two-conflict strategy to determine whether they reasonably
supported DOD's conclusion that the projected force, with
enhancements, can execute the strategy. In conducting our
assessment, we did not examine DOD's rationale for selecting the
two-conflict strategy, the capabilities of potential regional
aggressors, and the extent to which allied support could reduce the
need for U.S. forces.
To determine DOD's assumptions and conclusions about executing the
two-conflict strategy, we interviewed knowledgeable officials
involved in the bottom-up review at the offices of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Resources, and Requirements; the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs; the Joint Chiefs
of Staff; and the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps
headquarters.
We also reviewed relevant documentation, including the final report
on the bottom-up review and the Secretary of Defense's planning
guidance, and received briefings on regional dangers from DOD
officials. We did not examine DOD's rationale for selecting the
two-conflict strategy; rather, we focused on examining DOD's
assumptions on key aspects of the strategy. DOD denied us access to
specific information on the inputs and results of its analysis of
force options. However, we obtained considerable information on
DOD's analysis through interviewing knowledgeable officials and
reviewing available documentation.
To analyze whether DOD's assumptions reasonably supported DOD's
conclusion that the projected force, with enhancements, can execute
the two-conflict strategy, we interviewed officials at the
headquarters of the four military services, the U.S. Army Forces
Command, the U.S. Transportation Command, the Air Combat Command,
the Army National Guard Bureau, and the U.S. Army Reserve Command.
We also reviewed relevant documentation on (1) the use of U.S.
forces engaged in peacekeeping operations, (2) Army support
capability, (3) training of Army National Guard enhanced combat
brigades, and (4) DOD plans for improving strategic mobility and the
lethality of U.S. firepower.
We interviewed officials at two war-fighting commands to obtain their
views on DOD's assumptions in the bottom-up review, the feasibility
of conducting the two-conflict strategy, and the defense planning
guidance implementing the bottom-up review's findings.
We conducted our review from October 1993 to October 1994 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
DOD DID NOT FULLY ANALYZE KEY
BOTTOM-UP REVIEW ASSUMPTIONS
============================================================ Chapter 2
Under the bottom-up review's two-conflict strategy, military
planners, for the first time, are required to plan to deploy forces
to respond to two nearly simultaneous regional conflicts. However,
in doing the review, DOD did not fully analyze its assumptions
regarding key aspects of the strategy, such as the ability of forces
to redeploy from other operations to regional conflicts or between
conflicts, availability of strategic lift and support forces, and
deployability of Army National Guard combat brigades.
Furthermore, we question some of DOD's assumptions. For example,
certain support forces needed in the early stages of a regional
conflict could not immediately redeploy from peace operations because
they would be needed to assist in redeploying other forces. The Army
currently lacks sufficient numbers of certain support forces for a
single conflict, and National Guard combat brigades are experiencing
difficulty meeting peacetime training requirements that are critical
to ensuring timely deployment in wartime. Finally, some enhancements
may not be available as planned.
THE TWO-CONFLICT STRATEGY
CHANGED THE BASIS OF MILITARY
PLANNING FOR RESPONDING TO
REGIONAL CONFLICTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1
The bottom-up review's strategy of maintaining the capability to
fight and win nearly simultaneous conflicts changed the basis for
U.S. military planning. Specifically, the base force was required
to be capable of conducting a decisive offense in response to one
conflict and still be capable of mounting a credible defense against
an aggressor in another region before the first crisis ended. As a
result, war-fighting commanders prepared operational plans for
regional conflicts with the assumption that no other conflict was
ongoing or would occur after their conflict began. They therefore
assumed that combat and support forces, strategic mobility assets,
and other capabilities required to execute their plan would be
available.
The bottom-up review's strategy envisions that U.S. forces could be
engaged in offensive operations in two conflicts nearly
simultaneously. This strategy requires DOD to meet the requirements
of two war-fighting commanders at the same time. DOD officials
stated that extensive analysis, beyond that conducted during the
bottom-up review, is required to consider the implications of
responding to two nearly simultaneous conflicts. Since the bottom-up
review, DOD has begun additional analyses.
FORCES INVOLVED IN OTHER
OPERATIONS MAY NOT BE
IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE FOR A
REGIONAL CONFLICT
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2
According to the bottom-up review, if a major regional conflict
occurs, DOD will deploy a substantial portion of its forces stationed
in the United States and draw on forces assigned to overseas presence
missions. If DOD believes it is prudent to do so, it will keep
forces engaged in smaller-scale operations, such as peacekeeping,
while responding to a single conflict. If a second conflict breaks
out, DOD would need to deploy another block of forces, requiring a
further reallocation of overseas presence forces, any forces still
engaged in smaller-scale operations, and most of the remaining
U.S.-based forces.
In determining force requirements for the two-conflict strategy, DOD
assumed that forces already engaged in other operations could
redeploy to a regional conflict. However, DOD did not analyze the
feasibility of or requirements for such a redeployment during the
bottom-up review. For example, DOD did not consider (1) requirements
for readiness upgrades for forces before redeployment, (2)
requirements for diverting airlift and sealift assets to pick up
personnel and equipment from the operation, and (3) the impact on the
war-fighting commander involved in a regional conflict if combat and
support forces engaged in other operations were not immediately
available.
DOD did not begin to analyze its assumption on redeploying forces
from operations other than war until after completing the bottom-up
review. In June 1994, the Army initiated a study of the impact of
peace operations on Army requirements, including the implications of
redeploying combat and support forces from such operations to
regional conflicts. The Army does not expect to complete this
analysis until early to mid-1995.
Our work on the impact of peace operations on U.S. forces suggests
that it would be difficult for certain support and combat forces to
disengage and quickly redeploy to a major regional conflict. For
example, certain Army support forces and specialized Air Force combat
aircraft, such as the F-4G and F-15E, deployed to peace operations
are the same forces needed in the early stages of a regional
conflict. However, some support forces, such as transportation units
that move personnel and cargo through ports, could not immediately
redeploy because they would be needed to assist in redeploying other
forces. Furthermore, while Air Force aircraft and aircrews could
easily fly from the peace operation to a regional conflict, the
maintenance and logistics support needed to keep the aircraft
flying--supplies, equipment, and personnel--would have to wait for
available airlift. Obtaining sufficient airlift to redeploy forces
from a peace operation would be challenging because already limited
airlift assets committed to deploying forces to the regional conflict
would have to be diverted to pick up these forces.
Finally, forces may need to upgrade their training, equipment, and
supplies before redeploying. For example, according to Air Force
officials, peace operations tend to degrade the overall combat
readiness of Air Force flight crews. Similarly, naval aviators also
find that they lose proficiency in some combat skills through
prolonged participation in peace operations. We are reporting
separately on the impact of peace operations on U.S. forces.
THE BOTTOM-UP REVIEW DID NOT
ASSESS REQUIREMENTS FOR
SHIFTING ASSETS BETWEEN
REGIONAL CONFLICTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3
According to the bottom-up review, certain specialized units or
unique assets would be dual-tasked--shifted from the first regional
conflict to the second conflict. In prior years, the Air Force had
enough fighter and bomber aircraft to meet the war-fighting
requirements of two regional conflicts. DOD believes that it may not
have certain assets, such as B-2 bombers, F-117 stealth fighters, and
EF-111 aircraft, in sufficient quantities to support two conflicts,
and it therefore may need to shift aircraft from one conflict to
another.
Although DOD assumed that dual-tasking would occur, it did not
analyze how assets would be shifted from one conflict to another.
For example, in determining force requirements, DOD did not determine
what specific types and numbers of assets would be required to be
dual-tasked and when they could be redeployed, or whether sufficient
logistical support, such as airlift, refueling aircraft, air crews,
or spare parts kits, would be available for the redeployment.
DOD officials explained that because a model for two nearly
simultaneous conflicts does not exist, the modeling to determine
force requirements during the bottom-up review did not simulate the
shifting of assets from one conflict to another. Rather, DOD
identified the specific number of assets required for each conflict
and assumed that dual-tasking would compensate for any shortfalls.
After the bottom-up review, the Air Force and its Air Mobility
Command began analyzing the implications and requirements for
dual-tasking based on assumptions contained in the Secretary of
Defense's May 1994 defense planning guidance. Among other things,
these analyses--completed in August and May 1994,
respectively--identified the specific assets that would be
dual-tasked, the timing of redeployment, and refueling aircraft
needed to support the redeployment from one conflict to another.
The Air Force is continuing to analyze the requirements for
dual-tasking, including the availability of aircrews and spare parts
kits. Furthermore, in November 1994, at the direction of the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, DOD began a war game analysis
of several variables of the two-conflict strategy, including
requirements for dual-tasking. This analysis is expected to be
completed sometime in 1995.
As discussed in chapter 3, war-fighting commands are analyzing the
two-conflict strategy using a different scenario and deployment
concept from those outlined in the defense planning guidance. They,
too, are examining dual-tasking, including how many and what type of
assets would need to shift and at what point in the conflict such a
shift could reasonably occur. Until this analysis is completed,
currently projected for sometime in 1995, and its results are
reconciled with ongoing Air Force and DOD studies, the specific
requirements for dual-tasking will not be known.
THE BOTTOM-UP REVIEW DID NOT
FULLY ASSESS MOBILITY
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
TWO-CONFLICT STRATEGY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:4
According to the bottom-up review, the illustrative planning
scenarios that DOD used in determining force and strategy options for
regional conflicts assumed that a well-armed regional power would
initiate aggression thousands of miles from the United States. On
short notice, U.S. forces from other areas would be rapidly deployed
to the area and enter the battle as quickly as possible. Because DOD
assumed that most of these forces would not be in the region when
hostilities begin, it emphasized that sufficient strategic
mobility--airlift, sealift, and prepositioning of equipment at
forward locations--would be needed to successfully execute the
two-conflict strategy.
The bottom-up review called for specific enhancements to DOD's
existing strategic mobility capability--most of which DOD had
identified in its 1991 mobility requirements study. This
congressionally required study determined future requirements for
airlift, sealift, and prepositioning and recommended a program to
improve DOD's mobility capability. In conducting the study, DOD
analyzed various scenarios involving single regional conflicts and a
scenario involving two concurrent conflicts. Based on the
requirements for the single conflict scenario deemed to be most
demanding, the study recommended
increasing sealift capacity for prepositioned equipment and rapid
deployment of heavy Army divisions\1 and other U.S. forces by
(1) acquiring--through new construction and
conversion--additional capacity equal to 20 large, medium-speed,
roll-on/roll-off ships; (2) leasing two container ships; (3)
expanding the Ready Reserve Force from 96 to 142 ships (an
increase of 46 ships); and (4) increasing the overall readiness
of the Ready Reserve Force;\2
increasing U.S. capability to respond within the first few weeks
of a regional conflict by prepositioning Army combat, support,
and port-opening equipment aboard nine of the newly constructed
or converted large, medium-speed ships (by fiscal year 1997);\3
improving airlift by continuing the C-17 aircraft program,
acquiring up to 120 aircraft; and
improving the capability of the U.S. transportation system to move
combat and support units from their peacetime locations to ports
of embarkation by, among other things, purchasing 233 additional
heavy-lift rail cars and developing an ammunition loading
facility on the U.S. west coast.
According to the mobility study, the recommended program reflected a
moderate-risk and affordable mobility force for a single regional
conflict that would enable DOD to move 4-2/3 Army divisions in 6
weeks. It also concluded that its recommended program was not
sufficient to handle a second concurrent major regional conflict.
During the bottom-up review, DOD relied heavily on the results of the
mobility study when considering mobility requirements for the
two-conflict strategy. The bottom-up review endorsed the mobility
study's recommendations, and called for increasing the amount of
equipment prepositioned on land in the Persian Gulf area. At the
time of the bottom-up review, DOD had a battalion-sized set of
equipment ashore in the Persian Gulf and planned to increase this
prepositioning to two brigade sets. DOD believed that the
prepositioning was necessary because the bottom-up review envisioned
that forces would need to deploy more quickly than provided for in
the 1991 study.
After completing the bottom-up review, DOD initiated a detailed
analysis of mobility requirements for the two-conflict strategy to
validate its recommendations in the 1991 mobility study and the
bottom-up review. According to DOD, this study was required because
of significant changes resulting from the bottom-up review and delays
in DOD's mobility program. For example, the bottom-up review and
related defense planning guidance presented a new military strategy,
changed the overall force structure, and called for enhancements in
war-fighting capability. Furthermore, as discussed later, DOD
experienced delays in acquiring C-17 aircraft.
By February 1995, DOD expects to complete its study, identifying any
changes in mobility requirements and necessary adjustments to its
mobility program. DOD will then identify the appropriate mix of
specific airlift aircraft--C-17 and alternatives to the C-17. DOD
plans to complete this mix analysis by November 1995. Until the two
studies are complete, DOD will not know the overall mobility
requirements and related costs for its two-conflict strategy.
--------------------
\1 The Army has heavy and light forces. Heavy forces include armor,
mechanized infantry, and cavalry units, and light forces include
nonmechanized infantry, airborne, and air assault units.
\2 DOD now plans to acquire 19, rather than 20, large, medium-speed
ships, and to expand the Ready Reserve Force by 21, rather than 46,
ships.
\3 DOD has since determined that 8, rather than 9, ships were needed
for this prepositioning. These
8 ships will replace 7 of the 12 ships the Army is currently using
for prepositioning and add additional capacity.
THE ARMY WOULD BE CHALLENGED IN
SUPPORTING TWO MAJOR REGIONAL
CONFLICTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:5
During the bottom-up review, DOD assumed that sufficient support
units would be available to support combat operations in two nearly
simultaneous major regional conflicts.\4 However, the Army currently
does not have the units needed to support its overall combat force.
Furthermore, analysis of current U.S. plans for responding to
regional conflicts indicates that the Army lacks sufficient units for
a particular conflict and would have even more difficulty supporting
two conflicts.
--------------------
\4 Support units include detachments, companies, and teams that
maintain equipment, transport and distribute supplies, provide
personal services, and otherwise sustain combat operations.
THE BOTTOM-UP REVIEW ASSUMED
THAT SUFFICIENT SUPPORT
FORCES WOULD BE AVAILABLE
FOR TWO CONFLICTS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:5.1
The bottom-up review did not analyze the specific types and
quantities of Army support units needed to execute the two-conflict
strategy. In modeling force and strategy options, DOD used notional
numbers to simulate the support forces that would typically deploy to
support an Army division. It assumed that the Army would deploy with
all of the specific support units needed to support its combat
forces. According to DOD officials, they did not thoroughly analyze
support requirements because of the short time frame to complete the
bottom-up review.
In September 1994, the Army began analyzing support requirements for
its two-conflict combat force of 10 active divisions and 15 Army
National Guard enhanced brigades--existing Guard combat brigades with
improved readiness. This analysis was part of its biennial process
for determining support needs. The process, referred to as the Total
Army Analysis, identifies the numbers and types of units needed to
support a given combat force in a designated scenario and the
personnel and equipment needed to fill these units. The Army then
assesses other priorities, such as combat requirements, risks
involved if support requirements are not fully met, and decides on
how many support units to fill, given available funding. The Army
planned to complete by mid-1995 its Total Army Analysis of support
requirements for the two-conflict strategy based on the bottom-up
review force.
ARMY DOES NOT HAVE
SUFFICIENT FORCES TO SUPPORT
ITS CURRENT COMBAT FORCE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:5.2
Although the bottom-up review assumed that the Army would have
sufficient support forces, the Army cannot support its current active
force of 12 divisions, and Army officials anticipate that shortfalls
will also exist for the two-conflict combat force. In an earlier
Total Army Analysis of support requirements for the 12-division
force, the Army was unable to fill 838 support units, including
engineer, medical, quartermaster, and transportation units. Although
these 838 units, as a whole, represent a small portion of the Army's
total support units, they reflect key capabilities that the Army has
determined are required to support combat operations.
While the number of active divisions in the two-conflict force is
smaller than the current force, the total number of personnel
allotted to the Army under the bottom-up review is also smaller,
leaving fewer people to fill support units. Army officials involved
in the ongoing Total Army Analysis therefore believe the analysis
will reveal that the Army cannot fully fill all support units needed
for the two-conflict strategy and force.
THE ARMY WOULD HAVE
DIFFICULTY PROVIDING ALL
REQUIRED SUPPORT EVEN FOR A
SINGLE CONFLICT
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:5.3
In the past, the Army has had difficulty generating sufficient
support units for deployed combat forces, and it currently does not
have certain types of units called for in plans for a single regional
conflict. In 1992, we reported that in trying to support a combat
force of about eight divisions during the Persian Gulf War, the Army
deployed virtually all of some types of support units and exhausted
some units.\5 For example, the Army deployed virtually all
prisoner-handling, postal, and medium truck units and all graves
registration, pipeline and terminal operation, heavy truck, and water
supply units.
Because of favorable conditions, such as a long lead time for
deployment, extensive host nation support from Saudi Arabia, a ground
offensive of short duration, and the lack of a second conflict
requiring a U.S. response, the Army was able to mitigate most of the
adverse impact of its support shortfalls during the Gulf War. The
bottom-up review strategy and force present a greater challenge
because the Army may need to generate support forces for at least 10
active divisions deployed nearly simultaneously, with little warning
time, to two major conflicts.
Analysis of current U.S. plans for two particular regional conflicts
indicates that the Army would face the same types of difficulties it
encountered during the Gulf War. Our examination of the requirements
for 17 types of support units\6 contained in the plans showed that
the Army (1) lacks a total of 238 units to meet the requirements of a
single conflict and (2) has tasked 654 units to support combat
operations in both conflicts. Table 2.1 shows the number of units,
by type, that the Army lacks for a single conflict and that are
assigned to both plans.
Table 2.1
Army Units in Short Supply for a Single
Regional Conflict and Tasked to Deploy
to Two Conflicts
Number of
Shortfall of same units
units for a tasked to
single deploy to
regional two
Type of unit conflict conflicts
-------------------------------- ------------ ------------
Aviation 4 40
Chemical 3 32
Engineer 33 94
Medical 84 96
Ordnance 9 32
Quartermaster 20 94
Signal 6 25
Adjutant General 1 20
Chaplain 3 0
Finance 0 9
Military police 40 45
Military law 0 1
Psychological operations 0 1
Military intelligence 2 4
Maintenance 4 22
Headquarters\a 0 4
Transportation 29 135
============================================================
Total 238 654
------------------------------------------------------------
\a These units consist of personnel that would be assigned to augment
command organizations in wartime.
As shown in table 2.1, the largest shortfalls in units required for a
single conflict occurred in five types--medical (84 units), engineer
(33 units), quartermaster (20 units), military police (40 units), and
transportation
(29 units), totaling 206 units. For two plans--each covering a
different conflict--the shortfall would increase to 338 units. Table
2.2 shows a breakdown of this shortfall.
Table 2.2
Shortfall of Medical, Engineer,
Quartermaster, Military Police, and
Transportation Units for Two Major
Regional Conflicts
Shortfall of
units for two
Type of unit conflicts
-------------------------------------------- --------------
Medical 96
Engineer 59
Quartermaster 59
Military police 52
Transportation 72
============================================================
Total 338
------------------------------------------------------------
We are reporting separately on the Army's ability to provide support
forces for the two-conflict strategy, including options for
alleviating possible shortfalls. The bottom-up review called for 15
Army National Guard enhanced brigades to execute the two-conflict
strategy and about 22 other National Guard brigades--now organized as
8 divisions--for other purposes, including providing the basis for
rotational forces in extended crises and fulfilling domestic
missions. We believe that these divisions include support units,
personnel, and equipment that the Army may be able to draw upon to
augment its support capability.
--------------------
\5 Operation Desert Storm: Army Had Difficulty Providing Adequate
Active and Reserve Support Forces (GAO/NSIAD-92-67, Mar. 10, 1992).
\6 These types represent the types of units that the Army was unable
to fill during its 1992 Total Army Analysis process.
DOD HAS NOT FULLY DEFINED THE
CONCEPT OF ENHANCED RESERVE
BRIGADES, AND QUESTIONS REMAIN
ABOUT THEIR DEPLOYABILITY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:6
The Army's portion of the forces for the two-conflict strategy
consists of 10 active divisions and 15 Army National Guard enhanced
brigades. The bottom-up review stated that the enhanced brigades
were needed to execute the two-conflict strategy and assigned them
the broad mission of reinforcing active divisions in regional
conflicts. For example, DOD envisioned that these brigades would
deploy to one or both conflicts if operations did not go as planned
or would replace overseas presence forces redeployed to a regional
conflict.
The bottom-up review further stated that, in the future, Guard combat
brigades would be organized and filled so that they could be
mobilized, trained, and deployed more quickly. It committed the Army
to focus on readiness initiatives directed toward the enhanced
brigades and established a specific goal to have these brigades ready
to begin deployment within 90 days of being called to active duty.
In April 1994, the Army Chief of Staff approved the 15 Guard brigades
selected--8 heavy brigades and 7 light brigades--as the enhanced
brigades.
THE BOTTOM-UP REVIEW DID NOT
FULLY DEFINE THE CONCEPT OF
AN ENHANCED BRIGADE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:6.1
Although DOD assumed that the enhanced brigades would deploy quickly
to reinforce active divisions in a regional conflict, it did not
analyze the specific wartime requirements for these brigades. DOD
officials stated that in analyzing force options for responding to
regional conflicts, they used active notional Army brigades and did
not test the impact on the war fight of deploying reserve enhanced
brigades. Furthermore, DOD did not determine basic factors such as
the (1) specific wartime missions of the enhanced brigades and the
timing for deploying the brigades, (2) ability of National Guard
combat brigades to deploy quickly and fulfill combat missions given
readiness problems experienced during the Gulf War, and (3) specific
capability enhancements needed to improve the brigades' readiness.
Because fundamental questions remained about the brigades, the Army
formed a task force in November 1993 to do an in-depth study of
alternatives for organizing, tasking, training, and equipping the
brigades. In April 1994, the Army Chief of Staff confirmed, based on
the task force's findings, the bottom-up review's assertion that the
enhanced brigades would reinforce active forces. However, the
brigades' specific missions, such as whether the brigades would
conduct combat maneuvers, provide security, or perform other tasks,
are still undefined. As discussed in chapter 3, war-fighting
commands are just beginning to analyze how and when the enhanced
brigades might be used in a regional conflict.
The Army Chief of Staff also determined that the brigades would
maintain personnel and equipment at the highest readiness level
during peacetime and be ready to deploy at this level no later
than 90 days after being called up;
train with specific divisions or corps in peacetime, but maintain
the flexibility to operate with any division or corps in
wartime;
focus their training on mission-essential tasks involving movement
(maneuvering) to contact with the enemy, attacks on enemy
positions, and defense against enemy attacks;
be of standard Army design for heavy and light brigades and armored
cavalry regiments; and
be equipped and modernized in a manner compatible with active
divisions.
The U.S. Army Forces Command was tasked to develop and test a
training strategy to ensure that the enhanced brigades meet the
90-day deployment goal. This strategy will include any necessary
adjustments to the Army's current training program for Guard combat
brigades. Army headquarters elements were tasked to identify the
requirements and costs associated with equipping the brigades. As of
January 1995, the Army expected to complete the equipment study in
February 1995 and the training strategy in mid-1995. Once the
training strategy is completed, the Army envisions that by 1999 it
will be tested on only 3 of the 15 brigades. Based on the test
results, the Army will decide whether to apply the training strategy
to the remaining brigades.
ABILITY OF ENHANCED BRIGADES
TO MEET 90-DAY DEPLOYMENT
GOAL IS UNCERTAIN
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:6.2
The bottom-up review's goal to have enhanced brigades ready to deploy
within 90 days of being called to active duty is based on Army
estimates that the brigades will need 90 days of post-mobilization
training to achieve proficiency in more complex skills at higher
echelons, such as companies and battalions. However, these estimates
assumed that the brigades will have achieved proficiency in basic
skills at the individual soldier, crew, and platoon level during
peacetime training.
During the Persian Gulf War, three Guard combat brigades were
activated, but the Army did not deploy any of these brigades.
Instead, they remained in training status until the war was over. As
we reported in November 1992,\7 and testified in March 1994,\8 the
brigades experienced problems in achieving proficiency in basic
skills at the time of mobilization. For example,
many Guard soldiers were not completely trained to do their jobs,
many tank and Bradley Fighting Vehicle crews were not proficient in
gunnery skills, and
many commissioned and noncommissioned officers had not completed
required leadership courses.
As a result, Guard brigades were trained to achieve proficiency in
many basic skills, rather than more complex skills, after
mobilization. Because the Army believed the brigades were not ready
to deploy, it substituted active brigades. Contributing to the
brigades' training problems was the fact that reserve forces
generally train only about 39 days each year, and a considerable
portion of this time can be taken up by administrative matters or in
traveling long distances to reach training ranges.
Because of the Gulf War experience, the Army significantly changed
its strategy for training Guard combat brigades, including
implementing an initiative called Bold Shift. This project,
initiated in September 1991, was designed to focus brigade training
during peacetime at the basic--individual, crew, and platoon--level.
Prior to this initiative, peacetime training encompassed both basic
and complex skills.
Our ongoing work on the Bold Shift program suggests that Guard combat
brigades are still continuing to experience problems in achieving
proficiency in basic skills. For example, as we stated in our March
1994 testimony, 1992 training data for seven existing Guard combat
brigades showed that none had reached pre-mobilization training and
readiness goals. Our analysis of 1993 training data confirmed that
this trend is continuing. We are reporting separately on the
specific training problems and progress of Guard combat brigades
under Bold Shift.
--------------------
\7 Army Training: Replacement Brigades Were More Proficient Than
Guard Roundout Brigades (GAO/NSIAD-93-4, Nov. 4, 1992).
\8 Military Training: Lessons Learned and Their Implications for the
Future (GAO/T-NSIAD-94-128, Mar. 10, 1994).
SOME BOTTOM-UP REVIEW
ENHANCEMENTS MAY NOT BE
COMPLETED WHEN PLANNED OR AT
ALL
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:7
As discussed in chapter 1, the bottom-up review described several
specific enhancements to U.S. capabilities as key to the projected
force's ability to fight and win two nearly simultaneous conflicts,
including improving strategic mobility and the lethality of U.S.
firepower. According to DOD, these improvements would compensate for
the loss in capability resulting from reductions in forces required
in the bottom-up review. Although DOD estimated that most
enhancements would be done by about 2000, some may not come on line
as planned or at all.
AVAILABILITY OF CERTAIN
STRATEGIC MOBILITY
IMPROVEMENTS AND
PREPOSITIONED EQUIPMENT IS
UNCERTAIN
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:7.1
To improve strategic mobility, DOD's plans included procuring C-17
airlift aircraft, increasing the number of sealift ships available,
improving the responsiveness of the Ready Reserve Force, and
prepositioning additional equipment on land. At the time of the
bottom-up review, DOD assumed that by 1999, 80 of 120 C-17s and 21
additional Ready Reserve Force roll-on/roll-off ships would be
available as planned. By the same time, DOD expected to preposition
equipment on ships and increase the amount of equipment prepositioned
on land in the Persian Gulf area from a battalion-sized set to two
brigade sets, located in two different locations. War-fighting
command officials stated that prepositioning this equipment is
critical to executing the two-conflict strategy. As of January 1995,
DOD, as we reported in November 1994,\9 had made progress in
improving the responsiveness of the Ready Reserve Fleet. It had also
prepositioned a brigade set of equipment on ships and nearly
completed prepositioning a brigade set of equipment on land in the
Persian Gulf area.
DOD has encountered some problems or funding uncertainties in
acquiring additional airlift and sealift and prepositioning the
second brigade set on land. Specifically, DOD's assumption that 80
C-17 aircraft would be available by fiscal year 1999 was overly
optimistic. Since its inception, the C-17 program has been plagued
with cost, schedule, and performance problems. We testified in April
1994 that total costs continued to grow, delivery schedules had
slipped, and aircraft had been delivered with unfinished work or
known deficiencies.\10 In December 1993, the Secretary of Defense
decided to limit the program to 40 aircraft unless the contractor
significantly improved management and productivity. Furthermore, as
discussed previously, the Secretary also decided to study
alternatives for a mixed airlift force of C-17s and
nondevelopmental--commercial or military--aircraft. DOD expects to
complete the study in November 1995 and at that time will decide
whether to procure additional C-17s. As of October 1994, the
contractor had delivered 15 C-17 aircraft and planned to deliver the
remaining 25 aircraft by September 1998.
As of October 1994, the Department of Transportation had acquired 14
of the 21 Ready Reserve Force ships planned to be available for DOD's
mobility program by fiscal year 1999. It planned to acquire the
remaining seven ships with funds remaining from fiscal year 1994 and
requested for fiscal year 1995. However, during fiscal year 1995
deliberations, the Congress rescinded $158 million in fiscal year
1994 funds programmed for the seven ships, but provided $43 million
in fiscal year 1995 funds. DOD believes that this funding will be
sufficient to procure two ships and plans to program funds for the
remaining five ships in its budgets for 1996 to 1998.
DOD's plans to preposition the second of two brigade sets of
equipment ashore in the Persian Gulf are also uncertain. As of
January 1995, the U.S. Central Command had identified a location for
the second set of equipment and reached necessary agreements with the
host country. However, according to DOD officials, the Army had
obtained funding only for the site survey and the project's design.
The Army plans to request funding in its fiscal year 1996 budget
submission for the remainder of the project over a 3-year period
covering fiscal years 1996-98.
--------------------
\9 Ready Reserve Force: Ship Readiness Has Improved, but Other
Concerns Remain (GAO/NSIAD-95-24, Nov. 8, 1994).
\10 Military Airlift: The C-17 Proposed Settlement and Program
Update (GAO/T-NSIAD-94-172,
Apr. 28, 1994).
CERTAIN IMPROVEMENTS TO U.S.
FIREPOWER HAVE NOT BEEN
FUNDED AS EXPECTED
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:7.2
The bottom-up review called for various improvements to the lethality
of U.S. firepower, including development of precision-guided
munitions and the addition of air-to-ground attack capability to the
Navy's F-14 aircraft (referred to as the Block I upgrade). At the
time of our review, these improvements were part of DOD's ongoing
programs and therefore reflected capabilities that were already
planned. DOD assumed that sufficient quantities of precision
munitions for the two-conflict strategy would be available by about
the year 2000 and the Block I upgrade would be completed by the year
2003.
The bottom-up review emphasized that precision-guided munitions
already in the U.S. inventory, as well as new types of munitions
still under development, are needed to ensure that U.S. forces can
operate successfully in future major regional conflicts and other
operations. It noted that they hold the promise of dramatically
improving the ability of U.S. forces to destroy enemy armored
vehicles and halt invading ground forces, as well as destroy fixed
targets at longer ranges, thus reducing exposure to enemy air
defenses. Specific antiarmor precision munitions cited included the
Tri-Service Standoff Attack Missile.
The Tri-Service Standoff Attack Missile will not come on line as
planned. Because of significant developmental difficulties and
growth in the expected unit cost, DOD canceled the Tri-Service
Standoff Attack Missile program. We reported extensively on cost,
schedule, and performance problems with the Tri-Service Standoff
Attack Missile.\11 Furthermore, we concluded that the Navy did not
adequately justify the need for the Block I upgrade.\12 During
deliberations on DOD's fiscal year 1995 appropriation, the Congress
canceled funding for the F-14 Block I upgrade because of questions
about its affordability.
--------------------
\11 Missile Development: TSSAM Production Should Not Be Started as
Planned (GAO/NSIAD-94-52, Oct. 8, 1993) and four classified reports
issued in 1989, 1991, 1992, and 1993.
\12 Naval Aviation: F-14 Upgrades Are Not Adequately Justified
(GAO/NSIAD 95-12, Oct. 19, 1994).
CONCLUSIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:8
The strategy of fighting and winning two nearly simultaneous
conflicts will require a significant change in military planning for
the deployment and use of U.S. forces. However, in the bottom-up
review, DOD determined the strategy, forces, capability enhancements,
and estimated costs for accomplishing the strategy without
sufficiently analyzing key assumptions to ensure their validity.
Until DOD fully analyzes basic factors, such as whether forces
engaged in other operations that are needed in the early stages of a
regional conflict can quickly redeploy, sufficient mobility and
support forces exist, reserve brigades can deploy when needed or
improvements in capabilities will be available, it will not have a
firm basis for determining the forces, supporting capabilities, and
funding needed for the two-conflict strategy or if the strategy
should be changed.
AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
EVALUATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:9
DOD disagreed with our overall conclusion that DOD did not adequately
analyze the assumptions used in the bottom-up review. DOD said that
DOD's leadership recognized practical limitations on the scope of
analysis that could be done in the time available and fully
considered these limitations in making decisions about key aspects of
the long-term defense program.
DOD further stated that, in raising questions about the bottom-up
review's assumptions, we did not recognize the difference between
broad conceptual force planning and detailed operational planning.
DOD said that it did not develop actual war plans, but rather
identified broad, but comprehensive, requirements that U.S. forces
should be able to meet to carry out crucial elements of DOD's defense
strategy. DOD also stated that to ensure adequate force planning, it
recognized the need to continually refine and update its assessments.
DOD noted that, to date, follow-on analyses have upheld the basic
tenets and findings of the bottom-up review. We were unable to
confirm DOD's statement regarding the results of the follow-on
analyses because DOD will not make these results available until the
studies are completed.
We recognize that DOD was faced with time limitations in doing the
bottom-up review, and was therefore restricted in the extent of
analyses that could be done. We also agree that the bottom-up review
was a broad force planning and programming effort rather than a
war-planning effort. In fact, in chapters 1 and 3, we clearly
distinguish between the bottom-up review and detailed future
operational planning.
However, in the bottom-up review, DOD made a specific judgment that
the United States would maintain the capability to fight and win two
nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts and decided the specific
size and composition of the force capable of meeting this strategy.
In making these decisions, DOD made critical assumptions about
factors that are key to the successful execution of the two-conflict
strategy without performing sufficient analyses to test the validity
of its assumptions. In fact, DOD and the war-fighting commands are
now exploring basic questions about DOD's assumptions, such as
whether forces involved in smaller-scale operations can actually be
available when needed to deploy to a regional conflict, whether the
same combat forces would be needed at the same time in both regional
conflicts and whether the Army has sufficient support for nearly
simultaneous combat operations in two conflicts.
DOD also disagreed with our specific findings that (1) it did not
assess requirements for shifting assets between regional conflicts,
(2) it did not fully assess mobility requirements, and (3) the Army
would be challenged in supporting two major regional conflicts.
First, DOD stated that it has ample experience in rapidly deploying
forces, particularly combat and support aircraft, from one theater to
another. DOD said that in its bottom-up review analysis, it made
judgments about its future ability to shift assets based on that
experience.
We agree that DOD has ample experience in redeploying forces from one
theater to another. We note, however, that DOD's experience has not
included redeployments from one major regional conflict to another,
as envisioned in the bottom-up review and defense planning guidance
scenario. Furthermore, as discussed in chapter 3, the war-fighting
commands' study has raised questions about shifting assets between
conflicts. For these reasons, we continue to believe that the
bottom-up review did not adequately assess requirements for shifting
assets between conflicts.
Second, DOD stated that in assessing mobility requirements during the
bottom-up review, it relied heavily on its 1991 mobility requirements
study. DOD believes that it understands the vast majority of its
basic lift requirements and capabilities for responding to two nearly
simultaneous conflicts. We agree that the 1991 study provided a
useful baseline; however, the bottom-up review resulted in
significant changes in mobility assumptions. DOD did not begin to
analyze these changes until after the bottom-up review. Furthermore,
the 1991 study concluded that its recommended mobility program was
not sufficient for two concurrent conflicts. Until DOD's
reassessment of mobility requirements is complete, we continue to
believe that DOD will not know the extent of strategic airlift,
sealift, and prepositioning needed to support two major regional
conflicts.
Finally, DOD stated that the Army demonstrated, as recently as
Operation Desert Storm in 1991, that it can fully support large-scale
combat operations in a single major regional conflict. DOD also
believes that it is premature to draw conclusions regarding Army
support shortfalls until the Army completes its ongoing analysis of
support requirements for the two-conflict strategy. We recognize
that the Army was able to support combat operations during Operation
Desert Storm; however, as discussed in chapter 2, the Army did
encounter difficulties. Also, the operation was conducted under
several favorable circumstances; for example, there was no second
conflict at the same time. Furthermore, we did not conclude that the
Army could not support two major regional conflicts. Rather, we
showed that DOD did not analyze the validity of its assumption that
sufficient support forces would be available and that various factors
suggest that the Army would be challenged in meeting this
requirement. We agree that the Army's ongoing analysis will identify
specific requirements and shortfalls.
Additional annotated evaluations of DOD's comments are presented in
appendix I.
WAR-FIGHTING COMMANDS QUESTION
DOD'S CONCEPT FOR RESPONDING TO
TWO NEARLY SIMULTANEOUS CONFLICTS
============================================================ Chapter 3
War-fighting command officials believe that DOD's concept for
responding to two nearly simultaneous major regional
conflicts--detailed in defense planning guidance that is being used
to develop program and budget requirements--may not be the best
approach. Their estimates of key characteristics of a situation
involving two nearly simultaneous conflicts and the deployment of
forces differ significantly from DOD's estimates, including the
amount of warning time for both conflicts and time between the onset
of each conflict, mix of combat forces needed to respond to each
conflict, and timing of force deployments. As a result, the commands
are examining options they believe may maximize the use of U.S.
capabilities. Command officials emphasized that they are not
suggesting the United States cannot accomplish the two-conflict
strategy. Their study is analyzing many of the variables that DOD
made assumptions about during the bottom-up review, such as shifting
assets between conflicts and the sufficiency of strategic lift.
THE MAY 1994 DEFENSE PLANNING
GUIDANCE OUTLINES DOD'S CONCEPT
FOR RESPONDING TO TWO NEARLY
SIMULTANEOUS CONFLICTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1
In May 1994, the Secretary of Defense issued his defense planning
guidance for the 5-year planning period 1996 to 2001. This guidance
provided several illustrative planning scenarios depicting the
challenges U.S. forces might face during the planning period and
generic force packages representing the types of military capability
needed to address these challenges. The specific scenarios covered
single regional conflicts, two nearly simultaneous conflicts, and
various smaller-scale operations. They included a detailed summary
of the situation, enemy objectives and forces, U.S. objectives and
forces, projected warning times of enemy attack, a schedule for the
deployment of U.S. forces to the conflict area, and assumptions
governing the circumstances depicted in the scenario.
According to the defense guidance, the illustrative scenarios, among
other things, (1) provide a "technical yardstick" to help focus,
develop, and evaluate defense forces and programs in further detail
and (2) enable service components to formulate detailed programs that
provide levels of readiness, sustainability, support, and mobility
appropriate to the bottom-up review's two-conflict strategy. For
example, DOD is using the defense planning guidance scenario for two
nearly simultaneous conflicts as a basis for its study of mobility
requirements, and the Air Force and its Air Mobility Command used the
scenario in examining requirements for dual-tasking assets and
refueling aircraft (see chap. 2). The Joint Chiefs of Staff will
use the defense planning guidance and scenario in apportioning
specific forces, strategic lift, prepositioning, and other assets to
war-fighting commanders for accomplishing assigned missions,
including responding to regional conflicts.
In general, the defense planning guidance scenario for nearly
simultaneous conflicts depicted a situation in which a second
conflict breaks out while the United States is engaged in and
preoccupied with a major regional conflict a considerable distance
away. The scenario envisioned that U.S. combat and supporting
capabilities, including strategic mobility, would first be focused on
responding to the first conflict until indications of a second
conflict were recognized. It made several key assumptions, including
the anticipated warning time, number of days separating the two
conflicts, forces sufficient to respond to each conflict, additional
forces available to the war-fighting commanders if adverse conditions
developed, and the timing of various combat phases. Specific details
about the scenario and assumptions are classified.
WAR-FIGHTING COMMANDS QUESTION
SEVERAL ASPECTS OF THE DEFENSE
PLANNING GUIDANCE SCENARIO
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2
Two war-fighting commands with responsibility for responding to major
regional conflicts question whether the defense planning guidance
scenario being used to develop program and budgetary requirements for
the two-conflict strategy reflects the best approach. Specifically,
they believe that the guidance may not best reflect how two nearly
simultaneous conflicts would evolve and how the United States should
respond. Their overall concern is that the scenario focuses on
responding to the first conflict and then the second conflict and
does not sufficiently recognize the value of taking significant
action to deter the second conflict when the first conflict occurs.
The specific details of the commands' concerns are classified.
The commands are also concerned about specific aspects of the
scenario and its assumptions, including the following:
The warning time for both conflicts and the separation time between
the two conflicts are likely to be shorter than DOD envisions.
DOD's concept for deploying forces may not provide the mix of
combat and supporting capability that the two commands believe
is necessary to successfully respond to two nearly simultaneous
conflicts.
The scenario does not recognize that both commands have operational
requirements for some of the same air, ground, and naval forces
and prepositioned equipment that if deployed to the first
conflict may not be available when needed for the second
conflict.
The apportionment of strategic airlift and sealift assets is
inadequate and should be based on a different concept for
deploying forces.
Both commands will likely require many of the same support forces;
however, the scenario only addresses combat forces.
A higher level of mobilization of reserve forces than called for in
the scenario will likely be required.
Because of these concerns, the two commands, in February 1994,
initiated a joint study to assess the feasibility of responding to
two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts with the bottom-up
review force. They are using a scenario and deployment concept that
differs from the defense planning guidance scenario. Command
officials emphasized that, by initiating the study, they are not
suggesting that the United States cannot accomplish the two-conflict
strategy. Rather, they are examining options that they believe (1)
lessen the possibility that U.S. forces will be required to engage
in two major regional conflicts at the same time and (2) put U.S.
forces in a better position to be successful in both conflicts if
deterrence fails. This study will examine various aspects of the
two-conflict strategy, including the number and type of assets
required to shift between conflicts and at what point such a shift
could reasonably occur.
As of January 1995, the commands had reached preliminary conclusions
and did not expect to complete the study until sometime later in
1995. However, according to command officials, the study thus far
has validated many of their concerns about the defense planning
guidance scenario and raised questions about DOD's bottom-up review
assumptions, including the availability of strategic airlift and
support forces, shifting assets between conflicts, and how and when
enhanced brigades would be needed. Based on their preliminary study
results, the commands hope to influence DOD and Joint Staff thinking
in apportioning forces and preparing future defense planning guidance
for developing program and budgetary requirements.
Command officials emphasized that their study will not address
detailed operational planning for executing the two-conflict strategy
or determine specific operational requirements. This process will
occur after the Joint Staff formally apportions forces and missions
in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan--expected to be issued in
early 1995. Command officials expect the plan to task them to
develop plans and deployment schedules for a single regional conflict
scenario in their respective areas, assuming no other conflicts are
occurring, and for two nearly simultaneous conflicts, assuming that
their command is involved in the second of the two conflicts. In the
past, commands have been tasked only to prepare a concept summary on
how they would respond if they were in the second conflict.
Based on the tasking, the commands will develop operational plans
followed by detailed deployment schedules for their respective
regional conflicts. As part of this process, the commands will
determine their specific requirements for executing the plans and
schedules, such as combat forces, mobility, sustainability, and
munitions. The commands estimate that it would take about 18 months,
from the time the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan is issued, to
complete the plans and deployment schedules.
DOD officials agreed that the commands' concept of executing the
two-conflict strategy differs from the defense planning guidance and
that the commands' study could generate a different baseline for
determining defense requirements, budgets, and plans. They stated
that reconciling the differences when the study becomes available may
be necessary, but until then, the defense planning guidance remains
the basis of DOD planning for the two-conflict strategy.
CONCLUSIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3
In developing the defense planning guidance scenario that military
planners will use to develop program and budget requirements for the
two-conflict strategy, DOD used a specific concept for deploying
forces and supporting capabilities. Key war-fighting commands
believe that the scenario may not reflect the most effective
deployment and use of U.S. capabilities and are analyzing
alternatives. Their analysis is addressing many of DOD's key
bottom-up review assumptions regarding key aspects of the
two-conflict strategy and could provide useful insights for
determining the validity of these assumptions.
RECOMMENDATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:4
We recommend that in the congressionally mandated examination of the
bottom-up review, the Secretary of Defense thoroughly examine the
assumptions related to the (1) redeployment of forces from other
operations to major regional conflicts, availability of strategic
mobility assets and Army support forces, deployability of Army
National Guard enhanced brigades, and planned enhancements to
strategic mobility and U.S. firepower and (2) consider the options
being examined by the war-fighting commands.
AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
EVALUATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:5
DOD agreed with our recommendations and noted that it is conducting
detailed studies to address many of the issues raised. DOD stated
that it will reflect the results of these studies in its response to
the congressionally mandated report on the bottom-up review. As
discussed in chapter 2, DOD stated that in raising questions about
the bottom-up review's assumptions, we did not recognize the
difference between broad conceptual force planning and operational
planning for using specific forces to undertake specific operations.
We note that DOD's comments imply that the war-fighting commands'
study is similar to detailed operational planning. As discussed in
chapter 3, the commands are examining options for executing the
strategy on a macro scale rather than developing specific detailed
plans and requirements.
(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix I
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
============================================================ Chapter 3
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
The following are GAO's comments on the Department of Defense's (DOD)
letter dated January 17, 1995.
GAO COMMENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:6
1. As discussed in chapter 2, our work showed the bottom-up review
did not analyze in detail the feasibility or requirements of
redeploying forces engaged in smaller-scale operations to a major
regional conflict. As discussed in chapters 2 and 3, the
war-fighting commands, as part of their joint study, are reviewing
force requirements for different stages of both regional conflicts,
and the Army is studying the impact of redeploying forces from peace
operations. DOD agrees that it did not analyze the problem of
redeploying assets in detail, and we believe that the ongoing studies
will provide a better understanding of the feasibility and
requirements for redeploying forces, including when specific forces
and support capabilities might be needed in either conflict.
2. We agree that redeploying forces from one operation to another
may not necessarily increase lift requirements. However, until DOD
examines the lift requirements for such redeployments, we believe
that the specific impact is unknown.
3. Until the Army completes its study on the impact of redeploying
forces from smaller-scale operations, the specific support shortfalls
will not be known. Until DOD knows the shortfalls, it cannot
identify the most appropriate options for addressing them.
4. We agree that the 1991 mobility requirements study addressed two
concurrent regional conflicts and was a useful source of analysis
during the bottom-up review. We note, however, that the 1991 study
concluded its recommended mobility program was not sufficient to meet
the mobility requirements for two concurrent conflicts. Furthermore,
the bottom-up review resulted in significant changes affecting
mobility requirements, such as a new military strategy, a different
force structure, and enhancements in war-fighting capability. In
fact, because of these changes, DOD initiated a study to update the
1991 study to validate its conclusions in the bottom-up review about
strategic mobility.
5. The changes in end strength have decreased the Army's flexibility
to provide more support units in areas of need. The 13,000 person
decrement represents a net decrease in end strength for the active
component and the U.S. Army Reserve--those components that provide
most of the Army's support units--and an increase in the Army
National Guard's end strength. Within its increased end strength,
the Guard is retaining more combat positions than it retained under
the base force. Because of the decreases in end strength in the
active and U.S. Army reserve components and the fact that the
increased Guard end strength is being used to retain combat
positions, the Army has less flexibility for providing more support
units within its end strength.
6. Our work showed indications that the Army would be challenged in
supporting two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts. We
agree that the extent of actual shortages will not be determined
until the Army completes its ongoing Total Army Analysis. Until DOD
knows the shortfalls, it cannot identify the most appropriate options
for addressing them.
7. We agree that the bottom-up review defined some parameters of the
enhanced brigades. Although the bottom-up review stated that these
brigades were needed to accomplish the two-conflict strategy, our
work showed that DOD did not determine basic factors about the
brigades, such as their wartime missions, deployability, or required
enhancements. Although DOD states that the brigades will be fielded
in significant numbers by the end of the decade, the Army currently
envisions that by 1999 the training strategy being developed will be
tested on only 3 of 15 brigades.
8. We modified the text to reflect improvements in the Ready Reserve
Force. Chapter 2 already notes that DOD has prepositioned a brigade
set on ships and nearly completed prepositioning a brigade set on
land. Availability of sufficient lift, including 80 of 120 C-17
aircraft by 1999, was a key bottom-up review assumption. Since its
inception, the C-17 program has encountered cost, technical, and
schedule problems that DOD was aware of at the time of the bottom-up
review. In fact, because of these problems, the Secretary of Defense
was contemplating limiting procurement of the aircraft and in
December 1993 decided to do so. For these reasons, we believe that
DOD's assumption was overly optimistic. In its comments, DOD states
that delivery of the full complement of airlift aircraft may very
well be late.
9. We modified the text to reflect DOD's comment.
10. While DOD states that most other enhancement programs remain on
track, DOD officials agreed, in discussing their comments, that
schedules have been delayed in some of these programs such that they
will not come on line until sometime after 2000. (The specific dates
are classified.)
11. We modified the text to reflect DOD's comment regarding the two
phrases.
12. We do not suggest that the bottom-up review rules out taking
actions to deter a second conflict. In chapter 3, we are merely
relaying the views of the war-fighting commanders that the defense
planning guidance scenario does not sufficiently recognize the value
of taking significant deterrent action. (The specific basis for
their views is classified.) We agree that the bottom-up review
recognized that some assets would be needed in both conflicts, as
reflected in our discussion on dual-tasking in chapter 2 of the
report. Furthermore, in chapters 1 and 3, we specifically
distinguish between the bottom-up review and the defense planning
guidance implementing the bottom-up review. We therefore do not
agree that the report implies that the bottom-up review proffered
specific guidance to the commands.
MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
========================================================== Appendix II
NATIONAL SECURITY AND
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:1
Steven Sternlieb, Assistant Director
Sharon Pickup, Evaluator-in-Charge
William Wood, Senior Evaluator
Barbara Gannon, Senior Evaluator
Samuel Hinojosa, Senior Evaluator
Nancy Ragsdale, Communications Analyst
NORFOLK REGIONAL OFFICE
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:2
Richard Payne, Senior Evaluator
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