Defense Aircraft Investments: Major Program Commitments Based on Optimistic Budget Projections (Testimony, 03/05/97, GAO/T-NSIAD-97-103)
GAO discussed the Department of Defense's (DOD) aircraft modernization
plans.
GAO noted that: (1) as the nation proceeds into the 21st century with
the prospect of a flat budget, GAO believes that action needs to be
taken to address DOD's problematic aircraft investment strategy; (2)
action needs to be taken now because, if major commitments are made to
procure the planned aircraft programs, such as the F/A-18E/F, F-22,
Joint Strike Fighter, and V-22, over the next several years, a
significant imbalance is likely to result between program funding
requirements and available funding; (3) such imbalances have
historically led to program stretchouts, higher unit costs, and delayed
deliveries to operational units; (4) also, this imbalance may be long
term in nature, restricting DOD's ability to respond to other funding
requirements; (5) DOD must reorient its aircraft investment strategy to
recognize the reality of the current security and budget environment;
(6) accordingly, instead of continuing to start aircraft procurement
programs that are based on optimistic assumptions about available funds,
DOD, in consultation with the Congress, should determine how much
procurement funding will realistically be available and structure its
investment strategy within those levels; (7) DOD must also provide more
concrete and lasting assurance that its procurement programs are
militarily justified in the current security environment and clearly
affordable through their planned periods of procurement; (8) the key to
ensuring the efficient production of systems is program stability; (9)
understated cost estimates and overly optimistic funding assumptions
result in too many programs chasing too few dollars; (10) GAO believes
that bringing realism to DOD's acquisition plans will require very
difficult decisions because programs will have to be terminated; and
(11) nevertheless, the likelihood of continuing fiscal constraints and
reduced national security threats should provide additional incentives
for real progress in changing the structure and dominant culture of
DOD's system aquisition processes.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: T-NSIAD-97-103
TITLE: Defense Aircraft Investments: Major Program Commitments
Based on Optimistic Budget Projections
DATE: 03/05/97
SUBJECT: Military procurement
Future budget projections
Fighter aircraft
Military budgets
Military cost control
Cost effectiveness analysis
Combat readiness
Military downsizing
Advanced weapons systems
Procurement appropriations
IDENTIFIER: F/A-18E/F Aircraft
F-22 Aircraft
KC-135 Aircraft
C-5A Aircraft
F-15E Aircraft
F-117 Aircraft
EA-6B Aircraft
S-3B Aircraft
Persian Gulf War
F-15 Aircraft
F/A-18C/D Aircraft
DOD Quadrennial Defense Review
JCS National Military Strategy
Joint Strike Fighter
V-22 Aircraft
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Cover
================================================================ COVER
Before the Subcommittees on Military Research and Development and
Military Procurement, Committee on National Security, House of
Representatives
For Release on Delivery
Expected at
2:00 p.m., EDT
Wednesday,
March 5, 1997
DEFENSE AIRCRAFT INVESTMENTS -
MAJOR PROGRAM COMMITMENTS BASED ON
OPTIMISTIC BUDGET PROJECTIONS
Statement of Louis Rodrigues, Director, Defense Acquisitions,
National Security and International Affairs Division
GAO/T-NSIAD-97-103
GAO/NSIAD-97-103T
(707134)
Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV
CBO - Congressional Budget Office
DOD - Department of Defense
============================================================ Chapter 0
Mr. Chairmen and Members of the Subcommittees:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of Defense's
(DOD) aircraft modernization plans. Our review of 15 aircraft
programs revealed that DOD plans to buy or significantly modify at
least 8,315 aircraft at a total procurement cost of $343 billion
(fiscal year 1997 dollars) through their planned completions in
fiscal year 2030.\1 Appendix I lists the 15 aircraft programs and
their estimated procurement costs.
I would like to start with a short overview of the current situation
and then provide more detail about (1) how much DOD has historically
spent on aircraft purchases, (2) the availability of funding for
aircraft purchases, and (3) how funding instabilities have led to
schedule stretchouts and billions in increased costs. I will also
discuss some of our recent reports where we question the need and
timing of some aircraft programs.
--------------------
\1 This statement discusses procurement costs, in constant 1997
dollars. It does not include research and development or operation
and maintenance costs.
OVERVIEW
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1
Last year, we testified before your Subcommittees that DOD's planned
investments in aircraft were not achievable within likely future
budgets and appear to be inconsistent with the current security
environment. DOD, however, maintained that its aircraft investment
strategy was realistic.
We have continued to evaluate DOD's aircraft procurement programs and
remain concerned that DOD cannot achieve its plans within likely
future budgets. Our recently completed and ongoing evaluations, and
those by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), continue to raise
questions about DOD's ability to execute its planned aircraft
investment strategy. For example, in all but 2 years between fiscal
year 2000 and 2015, the total funding required for the 15 programs we
evaluated exceeds the funding historically spent on aircraft
purchases, as a percentage of DOD's overall budget. For several of
those years, the funding required to achieve DOD's planned aircraft
acquisitions approaches the percentage of the budget reached during
the peak Cold War spending years of the early to mid-1980s.
In addition, we doubt DOD's ability to execute its aircraft
investment plans because (1) overall defense funding is not expected
to increase, (2) the amount of savings from infrastructure reductions
and acquisition reforms is uncertain, and (3) inflation indexes used
to develop aircraft budget estimates are understated.
DOD continues to (1) generate and support acquisitions of new weapon
systems that will not satisfy the most critical requirements at
minimal cost and (2) plan on the availability of more procurement
funds than can reasonably be expected to be available in future
defense budgets. In a recent review of weapon system production
rates, we found DOD's optimistic acquisition strategies are rarely
achieved because of DOD's decisions to fund new programs in low-rate
initial production and to reduce funding for programs in full-rate
production. Consequently, weapon systems are produced at less than
planned rates, causing schedules to be stretched out and increasing
costs by billions of dollars.
The absence of stability in the execution of DOD's acquisition plans
must be addressed. In fact, last week, the Under Secretary of
Defense (Acquisition and Technology) testified that the problem of
instability in defense acquisition programs and the attendant cost
growth and schedule slips caused by the instability are the most
important issues that need to be addressed in reforming DOD's
acquisition process.
We agree that bringing stability and realism to DOD's acquisition
plans is important and will not be easy. It will require fundamental
changes to a deeply entrenched acquisition culture. Difficult
decisions will need to be made about restructuring and terminating
some aircraft or other weapon programs.
In previous reports, we questioned the need for and timing of a
number of DOD's aircraft acquisitions.\2 For example, we recently
issued reports on the major issues related to U.S. combat air power,
the Navy's F/A-18E/F strike fighter, and the Air Force's F-22 air
superiority fighter. In the latter two reports, we recommended that
DOD consider options that would potentially reduce or postpone the
costs of planned aircraft acquisitions. These options would free
significant procurement funds.
Let me provide some details on DOD's aircraft investment strategy.
--------------------
\2 A list of GAO reports dealing with DOD aircraft programs is
contained in appendix II.
FUNDING NEEDED FOR AIRCRAFT
PROGRAMS EXCEEDS HISTORICAL
NORMS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2
DOD spending for aircraft purchases reached its highest point, both
in terms of dollars and as a percentage of overall defense spending,
during the early to mid-1980s--the peak Cold War spending era. Using
those peak years, DOD maintains that its aircraft acquisition plans
are within historical norms.
However, in light of the current budget environment, we believe it is
not realistic to use the peak years as the norm. Figure 1 shows, as
a percentage of the budget, a longer history for DOD aircraft
spending. It also shows DOD's plans to increase future aircraft
acquisition funding--sometimes approaching Cold War-era spending
levels.
Figure 1: Projected Funding
for DOD's Aircraft Purchases
Approaches Cold War Levels (as
a percentage of DOD's budget)
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Source: GAO analysis of DOD and CBO data.
Since 1973, funding for DOD's aircraft acquisitions has fluctuated
substantially. From fiscal year 1982 to 1986, DOD spent from 6.1 to
7.8 percent of its budget on aircraft purchases. In contrast, DOD
devoted $6.2 billion, or 2.4 percent of its fiscal year 1996 budget
to buy aircraft. On average, however, DOD has spent about 4.8
percent of its budget since 1973 buying aircraft.
To execute its aircraft investment strategy, DOD needs to
significantly increase spending on aircraft and sustain the increase
for several years. Figure 2 shows future spending plans for aircraft
acquisitions. For 14 of the next 20 years, DOD plans to spend more
than $12 billion\3 annually on aircraft. For 4 years during this
period, aircraft spending will exceed $15 billion, and for 2 of those
years it will exceed $17 billion.
Figure 2: DOD's Projected
Funding Requirements for
Aircraft Purchases
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Source: GAO analysis of DOD and CBO data.
Historically, acquisition programs almost always cost more than
originally projected. Figure 2 is a conservative projection of DOD's
aircraft funding requirements because no cost growth beyond current
estimates is considered. Research has shown that unanticipated cost
growth has averaged at least 20 percent over the life of weapon
programs.
In addition, the projected funding requirements in figure 2 may be
understated because they do not include any projected funding for
other aircraft programs that DOD has yet to approve for procurement.
For example, tentative plans exist to replace the KC-135, C-5A,
F-15E, F-117, EA-6B, S-3B, and other aircraft. Adding any of these
potential programs to DOD's aircraft investment strategy would
further complicate the funding problems.
--------------------
\3 Applying the historical average spending level for aircraft--4.8
percent--to DOD's current overall budget of $253 billion equates to
about $12 billion.
FUNDING FOR INCREASED
PROCUREMENT IS UNCERTAIN
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3
DOD expects to increase procurement spending to a level of
approximately $60 billion per year while keeping overall defense
spending at current levels, at least through fiscal year 2002.
Aircraft acquisitions are expected to be a prime beneficiary of the
procurement increases. Of the $40 billion cumulative increase
through fiscal year 2002, about $24 billion will be used for DOD's
aircraft investment strategy.
To achieve the increased procurement spending, DOD expects
substantial savings to be generated from infrastructure reductions
and acquisition reforms. Our work, however, indicates that the
extent to which such savings will be available to fund the increase
is unclear.
In 1996, we reported that DOD would accrue no significant net
infrastructure savings between fiscal year 1996 and 2001 because the
proportion of infrastructure costs in DOD budgets remain relatively
constant.\4 In addition, our ongoing evaluation of acquisition reform
savings on major weapon systems suggests that the amount of such
savings that will be available to increase procurement spending is
uncertain. While DOD has estimated as much as $29 billion (then year
dollars) in acquisition reform savings, our work shows that, for
various reasons, the costs of some of the programs claiming the
savings have increased, more than offsetting any acquisition reform
savings. Without the savings expected from infrastructure reductions
and acquisition reform, DOD will face difficult choices in funding
its modernization plans.
We recently raised an issue on the Air Force's F-22 air superiority
fighter that further complicates the situation.\5
That issue deals with the inflation indexes that DOD is using to
estimate program costs. In estimating the cost to produce the F-22,
for example, the Air Force used an inflation rate of
2.2 percent per year for all years after 1996. However, in agreeing
to restructure the F-22 program to address the recently acknowledged
$15-billion increase (then year dollars), the Air Force and its
contractors used an inflation rate of 3.2 percent per year.
Increasing the inflation rate by 1 percent added billions of dollars
to the F-22 program's estimated cost. We are concerned that the
higher inflation rates could have a significant budgetary impact for
other DOD acquisition programs. Similar increases on other major
weapon programs would add billions of dollars to the amounts we have
been discussing today and further jeopardize DOD's ability to fund
its modernization plans.
--------------------
\4 Defense Infrastructure: Budget Estimates for 1996-2001 Offer
Little Savings for Modernization (GAO/NSIAD-96-131, Apr. 4, 1996).
\5 F-22 Restructuring (GAO/NSIAD-97-100R, Feb. 28, 1997).
PROGRAM INSTABILITIES CAUSE
SCHEDULE STRETCHOUTS AND HIGHER
COSTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4
We recently reported that better use of limited DOD acquisition
funding could reduce costs.\6 We found that DOD has inappropriately
placed a high priority on buying large numbers of untested weapons
during low-rate initial production to ensure commitment to new
programs and thus has had to cut by more than half its planned
full-rate production for many weapons that have already been tested.
This wasteful practice adds unnecessary costs. For example, the
costs for 17 of 22 full-rate production systems we reviewed increased
by $10 billion beyond original estimates due to stretching out the
completion of the weapons' production. Actual production rates were,
on average, less than half of the originally planned rates and
systems were taking an average of 8 years longer to complete than
originally planned. For example, if the Army continues to buy the
Blackhawk helicopter at the current rate, full-rate production will
take almost 54 years to complete, about 43 years longer than
originally planned. Such stretchouts in production are costly. For
example, rather than producing 48 T-45 aircraft annually at a unit
cost of $8.7 million, the Navy is producing an average of 12 T-45s
annually at a unit cost of $18.2 million.
If DOD bought untested weapons at minimum rates during low-rate
initial production, more funds would be available to buy proven
weapons in full-rate production at more efficient rates and at lower
costs.
--------------------
\6 Weapons Acquisition: Better Use of Limited DOD Acquisition
Funding Would Reduce Costs (GAO/NSIAD-97-23, Feb. 13, 1997).
NEED AND TIMING OF SOME
AIRCRAFT PROGRAMS SHOULD BE
REASSESSED
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:5
Our previous reports have questioned the need for and timing of some
aircraft procurements. For example, we recently issued reports on
U.S. combat air power,\7 the Navy's F/A-18E/F strike fighter,\8 and
the Air Force's F-22 air superiority fighter.\9 In the latter two
reports, we recommended that DOD consider options that would
potentially reduce or postpone the cost of planned aircraft
acquisitions.
In the combat air power report, we point out that the United States
has significantly improved its combat air power capabilities in
recent years while reducing its total combat aircraft in the active
inventory by about 28 percent since the end of the Persian Gulf War.
It also points out that other air power assets, such as long-range
cruise missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, and theater air defense
forces, are increasingly supplementing aircraft and that today's
combat aircraft have more capabilities for (1) multimission roles,
(2) autonomous navigation, (3) night operations, (4) target
acquisition, (5) self-protection, and (6) the use of advanced
munitions. These capabilities are giving combatant commanders
greater flexibility in employing aviation assets and are potentially
reducing the required number of manned aircraft. Moreover, although
potential adversaries possess capabilities that threaten U.S. air
power missions, DOD considers the severity of these threats to be
limited. Our work showed that some aircraft modernization programs
would only marginally improve existing capabilities at a very high
cost. Other programs may no longer be needed in view of the changed
security environment. And for some programs, less costly
alternatives could be pursued to meet identified needs.
The F-22 program has a high degree of risk because the Air Force
plans to procure a significant number of aircraft before completing
initial operational testing and evaluation. Because neither the
threat nor the need to replace the current front-line air superiority
fighter, the F-15, was urgent, we recommended that the Air Force not
rush into high-production rates for the F-22 prior to completing
operational testing.
In the case of the F/A-18E/F, we concluded that the Navy's plans to
buy 1,000 aircraft were overstated and the eventual annual production
rate of 72 aircraft was overly optimistic. As a result, the
F/A-18E/F would be more expensive than the Navy reported. We also
determined that the E/F model did not provide significant performance
advantages over the less expensive C/D model of the aircraft. We
estimated the Navy could save about $17 billion by continuing to buy
C/D models in lieu of E/F models.
We understand that the milestone decision on F/A-18E/F low-rate
initial production is scheduled for March 28, 1997. We believe that
DOD should postpone the decision until it completes and fully
considers two very significant, congressionally mandated analyses.
First, as a result of our prior F/A-18E/F report, the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (P.L. 104-201)
directed the Secretary of Defense to conduct a comparison of the cost
and benefits of the F/A-18E/F and the F/A-18C/D aircraft, taking into
account the operational combat effectiveness of each aircraft. That
report is due to the Congress by March 30, 1997. The conference
report supporting the fiscal year 1997 defense appropriations
directed an identical study and report by April 15, 1997. Second,
the Quadrennial Defense Review is evaluating the gamut of defense
missions, forces, and programs. Because of the potential for
widespread and significant impact, we believe that DOD should defer
all but the most urgent procurement decisions until the review's
conclusions and recommendations are examined. This would be
consistent with the National Military Strategy, which cautions
against making major new investments unless there is a substantial
payoff.
--------------------
\7 Combat Air Power: Joint Mission Assessments Needed Before Making
Program and Budget Decisions (GAO/NSIAD-96-177, Sept. 20, 1996).
\8 Navy Aviation: F/A-18E/F Will Provide Marginal Operational
Improvement at High Cost (GAO/NSIAD-96-98, June 18, 1996).
\9 Tactical Aircraft: Concurrency in Development and Production of
F-22 Aircraft Should Be Reduced (GAO/NSIAD-95-59, Apr. 19, 1995).
WEAPON SYSTEM ACQUISITION
PROBLEMS PERSIST
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:6
As you know, in 1990, we began a special effort to review and report
on the federal program areas our work identified as high risk because
of vulnerabilities to waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement. This
effort has brought a much needed focus on problems that were costing
the government billions of dollars. As we recently reported in our
high-risk report on defense weapon systems acquisition, DOD has
produced many of the world's most capable weapon systems, but its
weapon system acquisition processes have often proved costly and
inefficient, if not wasteful.\10 Despite DOD's past and current
efforts to reform the acquisition system, wasteful practices still
add billions of dollars to defense acquisition costs. Pervasive
problems persist regarding (1) questionable requirements and
solutions that are not the most cost-effective available; (2)
unrealistic cost, schedule, and performance estimates; (3)
questionable program affordability; and (4) the use of high-risk
acquisition strategies.
--------------------
\10 Defense Weapon Systems Acquisition (GAO/HR-97-6, Feb. 1997).
CONCLUSION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:7
As the nation proceeds into the 21st century with the prospect of a
flat budget, we believe that action needs to be taken to address
DOD's problematic aircraft investment strategy. Action needs to be
taken now because, if major commitments are made to procure the
planned aircraft programs--such as the F/A-18E/F, F-22, Joint Strike
Fighter, and V-22--over the next several years, a significant
imbalance is likely to result between program funding requirements
and available funding. Such imbalances have historically led to
program stretchouts, higher unit costs, and delayed deliveries to
operational units. Also, this imbalance may be long term in nature,
restricting DOD's ability to respond to other funding requirements.
DOD must reorient its aircraft investment strategy to recognize the
reality of the current security and budget environment. Accordingly,
instead of continuing to start aircraft procurement programs that are
based on optimistic assumptions about available funds, DOD--in
consultation with the Congress--should determine how much procurement
funding will realistically be available and structure its investment
strategy within those levels. DOD must also provide more concrete
and lasting assurance that its procurement programs are militarily
justified in the current security environment and clearly affordable
through their planned periods of procurement. The key to ensuring
the efficient production of systems is program stability.
Understated cost estimates and overly optimistic funding assumptions
result in too many programs chasing too few dollars.
We believe that bringing realism to DOD's acquisition plans will
require very difficult decisions because programs will have to be
terminated. While all of us may agree that there are too many
programs chasing too few dollars, and could probably agree that we
need to bring stability and executability to those programs that are
pursued, it will be much more difficult to agree on which programs to
cut.
Nevertheless, the likelihood of continuing fiscal constraints and
reduced national security threats should provide additional
incentives for real progress in changing the structure and dominant
culture of DOD's system acquisition processes. We hope that today's
hearing may provide a stimulus for progress toward the goal we all
share--efficient and effective processes for identifying, developing,
and procuring needed defense weapon systems.
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:7.1
Mr. Chairmen, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be
happy to address any questions you or other members of the
Subcommittees may have.
DOD'S FISCAL YEAR 1997 AIRCRAFT
PROCUREMENT PLANS (AS OF DECEMBER
31, 1995)
=========================================================== Appendix I
(Dollars in billions (fiscal year 1997))
Estimated
procurement
Aircraft Mission/procurement type Quantity funding
------------------------ ------------------------ ------------- -------------
1. Joint Strike Fighter Strike fighter/new 2,978 $144.8
2. F/A-18E/F Multimission tactical/ 1,000 61.7
upgrade
3. F-22 Air superiority fighter/ 438 40.9
new
4. V-22 Vertical assault/new 523 29.9
5. Comanche Reconnaissance & attack 1,292 24.5
helicopter/new
6. C-17 Airlift and cargo/new 80 18.8
7. Longbow Apache Attack helicopter/ 734 5.7
modification
8. SH-60R Antisubmarine and 188 4.0
antisurface warfare
helicopter/upgrade
9. Joint Surveillance Surveillance and 11 3.1
Target Attack Radar targeting/new
System
10. Joint Primary Primary trainer/new 705 2.6
Aircraft Training
System
11. E-2C Hawkeye Combat information/new 29 2.2
12. T-45 Training System Strike pilot trainer/ 78 1.9
new
13. AV-8B Light attack/ 56 1.7
remanufacture
14. UH-60L Black Hawk Air assault/cavalry/ 172 1.5
medical evacuation
helicopter/
modification
15. E-3 AWACS Airborne warning and 31 0.4
control/modification
=======================================================================================
Total 8,315 $343.7
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: DOD's December 31, 1995, Selected Acquisition Reports,
except the Joint Strike Fighter data is based on CBO estimates, and
Comanche data is from the Comanche program office.
RELATED GAO PRODUCTS
========================================================== Appendix II
Combat Air Power: Joint Assessment of Air Superiority Can Be
Improved (GAO/NSIAD-97-77, Feb. 26, 1997).
B-2 Bomber: Status of Efforts to Acquire 21 Operational Aircraft
(GAO/NSIAD-97-11, Oct. 22, 1996).
Air Force Bombers: Options to Retire or Restructure the Force Would
Reduce Planned Spending (GAO/NSIAD-96-192, Sept. 30, 1996).
U.S. Combat Air Power: Aging Refueling Aircraft Are Costly to
Maintain and Operate (GAO/NSIAD-96-160, Aug. 8, 1996).
Combat Air Power: Assessment of Joint Close Support Requirements and
Capabilities Is Needed (GAO/NSIAD-96-45, June 28, 1996).
U.S. Combat Air Power: Reassessing Plans to Modernize Interdiction
Capabilities Could Save Billions (GAO/NSIAD-96-72, May 13, 1996).
Combat Air Power: Funding Priority for Suppression of Enemy Air
Defenses May Be Too Low (GAO/NSIAD-96-128, Apr. 10, 1996).
Navy Aviation: AV-8B Harrier Remanufacture Strategy Is Not the Most
Cost-Effective Option (GAO/NSIAD-96-49, Feb. 27, 1996).
Future Years Defense Program: 1996 Program Is Considerably Different
From the 1995 Program (GAO/NSIAD-95-213, Sept. 15, 1995).
Aircraft Requirements: Air Force and Navy Need to Establish
Realistic Criteria for Backup Aircraft (GAO/NSIAD-95-180, Sept. 29,
1995).
Longbow Apache Helicopter: System Procurement Issues Need to Be
Resolved (GAO/NSIAD-95-159, Aug. 24, 1995).
Comanche Helicopter: Testing Needs to Be Completed Prior to
Production Decisions (GAO/NSIAD-95-112, May 18, 1995).
Cruise Missiles: Proven Capability Should Affect Aircraft and Force
Structure Requirements (GAO/NSIAD-95-116, Apr. 20, 1995).
Army Aviation: Modernization Strategy Needs to Be Reassessed
(GAO/NSIAD-95-9, Nov. 21, 1994).
Future Years Defense Program: Optimistic Estimates Lead to Billions
in Overprogramming (GAO/NSIAD-94-210, July 29, 1994).
Continental Air Defense: A Dedicated Force Is No Longer Needed
(GAO/NSIAD-94-76, May 3, 1994).
Tactical Aircraft: F-15 Replacement Is Premature as Currently
Planned (GAO/NSIAD-94-118, Apr. 25, 1994).
*** End of document. ***
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