Combat Air Power: Joint Assessment of Air Superiority Can Be Improved (Chapter Report, 02/26/97, GAO/NSIAD-97-77)
GAO evaluated the air superiority mission to: (1) identify the overlap
among the military services' planned capabilities; and (2) determine
whether the joint warfighting assessment process relating to air
superiority was useful to assist in making program and budget decisions
about these capabilities.
GAO found that: (1) the services have overlapping capabilities for
achieving each of the five component missions of air superiority; (2)
overlaps exist primarily in the systems to defeat enemy aircraft and
ballistic missile systems; (3) while some degree of overlapping
capabilities may be necessary and/or unavoidable, the Department of
Defense (DOD) has not determined how best to reduce overlaps in the
post-Cold War era without unnecessary effects on force capabilities; (4)
the process used by DOD's air superiority joint warfighting capabilities
assessment team to make its assessment provided a useful, though
limited, result and used a meaningful method of displaying the results;
(5) the team identified several functions for which joint capabilities
were determined to be inadequate,and DOD classified the descriptions of
the inadequate capabilities; (6) although the assessment pointed out
several inadequacies in existing forces, it did not adequately address
several major issues regarding the overlap of capabilities, priorities
of future acquisitions of air superiority weapon systems, or alternative
means of meeting the highest priority requirements; (7) further, it did
not assign ratings of warfighting capability over a long enough period
of time to be useful for establishing acquisition and budget priorities;
(8) the assessment did not examine certain key issues related to the
modernization of forces for the air superiority mission; (9) for
example, the assessment was limited to the 6-year period, fiscal year
(FY) 1996 to FY 2001, and many of the weapon systems being planned were
not included in the assessment because they are in development and were
not scheduled to be available in the active force until after FY 2001;
(10) further, the results of the assessment indicate that the
acquisition of major aircraft systems like the F-22 may not be justified
because acquisition of new aircraft is not clearly related to the
functions rated inadequate by the joint assessment team; and (11) other
critical issues that were not evaluated during the assessment include
the need for and affordability of the acquisition of three new tactical
fighters, appropriate timing for replacing F-15s with F-22s, the need to
replace each F-15 with an F-22, the operational utility of the F/A-18E/F
compared with the F/A-18C/D, and the appropriate size and makeup of the
forces to be acquired for theater ballistic missile defense.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: NSIAD-97-77
TITLE: Combat Air Power: Joint Assessment of Air Superiority Can
Be Improved
DATE: 02/26/97
SUBJECT: Air warfare
Fighter aircraft
Advanced weapons systems
Defense capabilities
Tactical air forces
Military procurement
Air defense systems
IDENTIFIER: F/A-18 Aircraft
F/A-18E/F Aircraft
F-15 Aircraft
F-22 Aircraft
Joint Strike Fighter
F-14 Aircraft
AV-8B Aircraft
Patriot Missile Advanced Capability-Three Upgrade
SDI Theater High Altitude Area Defense System
Medium Extended Air Defense System
Improved Hawk Missile
Navy Area Defense Program
THAADS
JCS National Military Strategy
Sparrow Missile
Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile
AMRAAM
Sidewinder Missile
DOD Space-Based Laser Program
DOD Joint Advanced Strike Aircraft Technology Program
F-16 Aircraft
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Cover
================================================================ COVER
Report to Congressional Committees
February 1997
COMBAT AIR POWER - JOINT
ASSESSMENT OF AIR SUPERIORITY CAN
BE IMPROVED
GAO/NSIAD-97-77
Combat Air Power
(707047/707224)
Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV
CINC - commander in chief
DIA - Defense Intelligence Agency
DOD - Department of Defense
GAO - General Accounting Office
JROC - Joint Requirements Oversight Council
JSF - Joint Strike Fighter
JWCA - Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment
Letter
=============================================================== LETTER
B-260442
February 26, 1997
Congressional Committees
The Department of Defense (DOD) plans to spend over $43 billion from
fiscal year 1996 to fiscal year 2001 to acquire weapon systems to
equip and modernize forces for the air superiority missions. DOD
will face difficult decisions as it attempts to cover the high cost
of these and other defense acquisitions while the nation is moving
toward a balanced budget.
This is an unclassified version of a classified report we recently
issued to you. It evaluates the air superiority missions to identify
the overlap among the military services' planned capabilities and to
determine whether the joint warfighting assessment process relating
to air superiority was useful to assist in making program and budget
decisions about these programs. This evaluation is one of six
individual air power evaluations that we have conducted over the past
2 years.
We believe the concerns identified in this report--namely that the
joint warfighting assessment needs to cover a longer period, include
cost-effectiveness analyses of alternative means to achieve U.S.
objectives, identify unnecessary overlap and duplication, and address
major issues such as the need to acquire three new tactical fighters
(F/A-18E/F, F-22, and Joint Strike Fighter)--should be addressed as
part of DOD's efforts to improve its analytical support for overall
decision-making. We are addressing this report to you because of
your oversight responsibility for defense issues and budgets and your
interest in this important subject.
Please contact me at (202) 512-4841 if you or your staff have any
questions concerning this report. Major contributors to this report
are listed in appendix IV.
Louis J. Rodrigues
Director, Defense Acquisitions Issues
List of Congressional Committees
The Honorable Strom Thurmond
Chairman
The Honorable Carl Levin
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
The Honorable Ted Stevens
Chairman
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
The Honorable Floyd Spence
Chairman
The Honorable Ronald V. Dellums
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on National Security
House of Representatives
The Honorable C.W. Bill Young
Chairman
The Honorable John P. Murtha
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on National Security
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
============================================================ Chapter 0
PURPOSE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1
One of the primary objectives that U.S. combat air power is expected
to achieve is air superiority. Achieving air superiority permits
operations in the air and on land and sea without prohibitive
interference from an enemy's air forces, cruise missiles, and theater
ballistic missiles. The Persian Gulf War clearly demonstrated the
superior U.S. and coalition forces' capability to quickly achieve
air superiority by paralyzing Iraqi air defenses and dominating the
air-to-air battle.
The Department of Defense (DOD) plans to spend over $43 billion from
fiscal year 1996 to fiscal year 2001 to acquire weapon systems to
equip and modernize forces for the air superiority mission. Because
of the large investment planned during the next several years and
pursuant to its basic legislative authority, GAO evaluated the air
superiority mission to (1) identify the overlap among the military
services' planned capabilities and (2) determine whether the joint
warfighting assessment process relating to air superiority was useful
to assist in making program and budget decisions about these
capabilities.\1 This is an unclassified version of an earlier
classified report on this subject.
--------------------
\1 Similar evaluations were conducted on interdiction, close support,
air refueling, suppression of enemy air defenses, and surveillance
and reconnaissance missions. A culminating report entitled Combat
Air Power: Joint Mission Assessments Needed Before Making Program
and Budget Decisions (GAO/NSIAD-96-177, Sept. 20, 1996) built on and
synthesized the findings of these six evaluations.
BACKGROUND
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2
Congress has recognized that each service's military missions and the
capabilities of the services to accomplish those missions overlap one
another, at least to some degree. To achieve a stronger joint
orientation in DOD, Congress enacted the Goldwater-Nichols Department
of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. This act gave the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the commanders in chief (CINC) of the
combatant commands stronger roles in DOD matters, including the
acquisition process. In this role, the Chairman is expected to
advise the Secretary of Defense on the priority of requirements
identified by the CINCs and the extent to which service program
recommendations and budget proposals conform with these priorities.
The Chairman is also expected to submit to the Secretary alternative
program recommendations and budget proposals to achieve conformance
with CINC priorities. Subsequent legislation has given the Chairman
additional responsibilities to examine ways DOD can eliminate or
reduce duplicative capabilities and to assess military requirements
for defense acquisition programs from a joint warfighting military
perspective.
To assist the Chairman, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff established in 1994 the joint warfighting capability assessment
process. The Vice Chairman looked to the process to produce the
information the Chairman needs to meet his program review and
assessment responsibilities and to resolve cross-service requirements
issues, eliminate duplicate programs, and pursue opportunities for
enhancing the interoperability of weapon systems.
Air superiority, the subject of this report, is the degree of
dominance one force possesses over another in the air, governing the
extent to which air, ground, and sea forces can achieve campaign
objectives. DOD analytically divided the achievement of air
superiority into two offensive and three defensive missions. Figure
1 shows that alignment of missions.
Figure 1: The Missions of Air
Superiority
(See figure in printed
edition.)
For fiscal years 1996-2001, DOD plans to apply most of its
acquisition funding for air superiority systems to aircraft to defeat
enemy fighters and aircraft and to defensive systems to defeat enemy
theater ballistic missiles.
The air superiority joint warfighting assessment team evaluated the
services' joint capabilities by evaluating nine functions that must
be accomplished to successfully achieve the objectives of each
mission. DOD has termed this an "end-to-end" assessment. Overall,
the team concluded that the capabilities to achieve the five air
superiority missions were marginal, or acceptable with some risk,
through 2001. A formal assessment report was not done. Although a
team spokesman said the team made recommendations to the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff for preparation of the Chairman's program
assessment, he would not share the recommendations with us.
RESULTS IN BRIEF
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3
The services have overlapping capabilities for achieving each of the
five component missions of air superiority. For example, every
service has weapon systems that perform some portion of each of the
five missions except for the conduct of offensive operations to
defeat enemy fighters in enemy territory, for which the Army has no
capability. Overlaps exist primarily in the systems to defeat enemy
aircraft and ballistic missile systems. While some degree of
overlapping capabilities may be necessary and/or unavoidable, DOD has
not determined how best to reduce overlaps in the post-Cold War era
without unnecessary effects on force capabilities.
The process used by DOD's air superiority joint warfighting
capabilities assessment team to make its assessment provided a
useful, though limited, result and used a meaningful method of
displaying the results. An unclassified summary of the ratings
assigned to 45 capabilities
(9 functional elements, such as detecting targets and engaging
targets, for each of the 5 missions) is shown in figure 2.
Figure 2: Summary of Ratings
Assigned to Air Superiority
Capabilities
(See figure in printed
edition.)
The team identified several functions for which joint capabilities
were determined to be inadequate. DOD classified the descriptions of
the inadequate capabilities.
Although the assessment pointed out several inadequacies in existing
forces, it did not adequately address several major issues regarding
the overlap of capabilities, priorities of future acquisitions of air
superiority weapon systems, or alternative means of meeting the
highest priority requirements. Further, it did not assign ratings of
warfighting capability over a long enough period of time to be useful
for establishing acquisition and budget priorities.
The assessment did not examine certain key issues related to the
modernization of forces for the air superiority mission. For
example, the assessment was limited to the 6-year period, fiscal year
1996 to fiscal
year 2001, and many of the weapon systems being planned were not
included in the assessment because they are in development and were
not scheduled to be available in the active force until after fiscal
year 2001. Further, the results of the assessment indicate that the
acquisition of major aircraft systems like the F-22 may not be
justified because acquisition of new aircraft is not clearly related
to the functions rated inadequate by the joint assessment team.
Other critical issues that were not evaluated during the assessment
include the need for and affordability of the acquisition of three
new tactical fighters (F/A-18E/F, F-22, and Joint Strike Fighter),
appropriate timing for replacing F-15s with F-22s, the need to
replace each F-15 with an F-22, the operational utility of the
F/A-18E/F compared with the F/A-18C/D, and the appropriate size and
makeup of the forces to be acquired for theater ballistic missile
defense.
PRINCIPAL FINDINGS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4
SERVICES HAVE OVERLAPPING
CAPABILITIES TO PERFORM AIR
SUPERIORITY MISSIONS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.1
Overlapping capability among the services exists in each of the five
air superiority missions. Aircraft used for air superiority were
generally developed by one of the services for use within that
service except for the recent initiative to acquire a Joint Strike
Fighter for use by the Air Force, the Navy, and the Marine Corps.
Systems in inventory in 1996 with capability to defeat enemy aircraft
include the Navy F-14, the Air Force F-15 and F-16, the Marine Corps
F-18 and AV-8B, and several Army surface-to-air missile systems.
Most of the aircraft in the inventory have a primary mission other
than air superiority but have a significant air superiority
capability. The Air Force is developing the F-22 and it is expected
to be in service in 2004, the Navy is beginning procurement of the
F/A-18E/F in fiscal year 1997, and the Air Force, the Navy, and the
Marine Corps have begun development of the Joint Strike Fighter.
Several systems are commonly used among the services. They consist
primarily of missiles that are developed in joint program offices
under DOD direction. For the most part, however, aircraft have been
acquired that are used only by a single service. The only current
exception is the F/A-18 used by both the Navy and the Marine Corps.
Each service is developing its own equipment to defend against
theater ballistic missiles, and as a result, there is an overlap of
capabilities planned. Nine systems currently in development could
cost an estimated $71 billion if all are produced. Overlapping
systems include the Patriot Advanced Capability Level 3, the Medium
Extended Air Defense System, the Improved Hawk, the Theater High
Altitude Air Defense System, and the Navy Area System, all of which
are intended to intercept enemy theater ballistic missile systems in
the terminal phase of their flight to their target. Even though
there is substantial overlap of capabilities among air superiority
systems, the joint warfighting capabilities assessment did not
evaluate the degree of overlap and duplication among these systems or
the other existing or planned systems that perform the air
superiority missions.
THE JOINT WARFIGHTING
CAPABILITIES ASSESSMENT DID
NOT ADEQUATELY ADDRESS SOME
KEY ISSUES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.2
The joint warfighting capabilities assessment process has the
potential to provide decisionmakers better insight into the
capabilities of the entire U.S. military force to perform particular
missions. GAO recognizes that it will take some time for this
process to mature. The methodology used in the air superiority
assessment had significant limitations and did not address key issues
confronting the air superiority missions. Further, the assessment
offers little information to achieve one of its objectives, which was
to assist in making program and budget decisions. One limitation is
the relatively short period of time, 6 years, covered by the
assessments. Most major weapon acquisition programs last over 10
years, and intelligence estimates of the projected threat may cover
as much as
15 years. Thus, this assessment may not include the impact of
significant changes in the U.S. weapon capabilities or significant
changes in the projected threat expected to come about after the
6-year period.
Other limitations are that the assessments do not identify the extent
of overlap among air superiority systems, nor do they evaluate the
cost-effectiveness of alternative weapon mixes. Further, the
assessments did not address several other key issues. For example, a
major issue confronting DOD and Congress is the need to pursue and
the affordability of, as currently planned, three new tactical
aircraft programs that will cost an estimated $355.7 billion. It is
crucial to address this issue through an aggregate assessment of the
quantity of U.S. aircraft with air superiority capabilities compared
to potential adversaries. For example, the United States has over
2,000 frontline fighters (F-14s, F-15s, F-16s, and F-18s), but
potential adversaries have few. An aggregate assessment of
capabilities is absent from the joint warfighting capabilities
assessment. This report identifies additional key issues involving
the air superiority missions that must be addressed.
RECOMMENDATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:5
GAO is not making new recommendations in this report. In its overall
report on combat air power, GAO recommended that the Secretary of
Defense, along with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
develop an assessment process that yields more comprehensive
information in key mission areas. In making this recommendation, GAO
includes the offensive and defensive aspects of the air superiority
mission and the results of this review of the assessments conducted
by the joint warfighting capability assessment team. GAO said the
recommended process could be achieved by broadening the joint
warfighting capability assessments or developing an alternative
mechanism. DOD partially concurred with the recommendation, agreeing
that analytical support for overall decision-making can be improved,
but disagreeing that the Secretary is currently receiving inadequate
advice from a joint perspective.
In DOD's assessments of air superiority mission areas, GAO believes
the concerns identified in this report--namely that the assessments
need to cover a longer period, include cost-effectiveness analyses of
alternative means to achieve U.S. objectives, identify unnecessary
overlap and duplication, and address major issues set forth in
chapter 3--should be addressed as part of DOD's efforts to implement
GAO's prior recommendation.
AGENCY COMMENTS AND GAO'S
EVALUATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:6
In commenting on a draft of the classified version of this report,
DOD agreed that overlap exists among the air superiority missions but
stated that the overlap among the Army's theater ballistic missile
defense systems is by design. DOD further agreed that analytical
support for overall decision-making can be improved. GAO believes
many of DOD's other comments were not clearly related to the central
message in this report.
DOD stated that it disagreed with assertions that it believes are
included in the report and in a prior report, Combat Air Power:
Joint Mission Assessments Needed Before Making Program and Budget
Decisions, (GAO/NSIAD-96-177, Sept. 20, 1996). DOD said that GAO
implies that the threat does not warrant investment, and that air
power is not important. Neither report makes such assertions. The
intent of this report is to show overlap in air superiority
capabilities and to raise specific issues that future joint
assessments of the air superiority mission could address to improve
the analytical support for decisionmakers.
DOD also believes that this report leaves a misleading impression
that the DOD processes used to develop modernization plans are
inadequate. This report identifies equipment overlap among the air
superiority missions and ways to make the joint warfighting
capabilities assessment of the air superiority missions more useful
to decisionmakers. This report is not intended to be a comprehensive
evaluation of DOD processes for developing modernization plans, but
suggests that the air superiority joint warfighting capabilities
assessment can be improved to better support the DOD processes used
to develop modernization plans.
DOD further takes the opportunity in its comments to point out an
apparent change in DOD mission descriptions by stating that it wants
not only air superiority but also air dominance, and that its
modernization program is designed to maintain air dominance.
However, DOD did not provide a clear description of the differences
between air superiority and air dominance or the additional
capabilities it believes are justified because of this undefined
change of mission objectives.
DOD's comments and GAO's detailed evaluation of the comments are in
appendix III.
INTRODUCTION
============================================================ Chapter 1
Sweeping changes in the global threat environment, sizable reductions
in resources devoted to defense, technological advancements in combat
systems, and other factors have significantly affected the Department
of Defense's (DOD) combat air power. Ensuring that the most
cost-effective mix of combat air power capabilities is identified,
developed, and fielded to conduct effective, joint military
operations in such an environment is a major challenge that will
confront DOD and Congress for years to come.
This report, which focuses on air superiority, is one of a series
that examines the overall air power of the United States. The other
reports in the series concentrate on interdiction, close support,
defeat of enemy surface-to-air defenses, surveillance and
reconnaissance, and air refueling. A culminating report, which
builds on and synthesizes the findings of these six evaluations, was
issued on September 20, 1996.\1
--------------------
\1 Combat Air Power: Joint Mission Assessments Needed Before Making
Program and Budget Decisions (GAO/NSIAD-96-177, Sept. 20, 1996).
CONGRESSIONAL MANDATE TO ASSESS
DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS FROM A
JOINT WARFIGHTING PERSPECTIVE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1
Traditionally, the individual services have been the dominant players
in the acquisition process based on their broad responsibilities to
organize, train, and equip their forces under title 10 of the U.S.
Code. However, to achieve a stronger joint orientation in DOD,
Congress enacted the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986. This act gave the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and the commanders in chief (CINC)\2 of the combatant
commands stronger roles in DOD matters, including the acquisition
process. As principal military adviser to the Secretary of Defense,
the Chairman is now expected to advise the Secretary on the priority
of requirements identified by the CINCs and the extent to which
service program recommendations and budget proposals conform with
these priorities. The Chairman is also expected to submit to the
Secretary alternative program recommendations and budget proposals to
achieve greater conformance with CINC priorities. The National
Defense Authorization Acts for Fiscal Years 1993 and 1996 have given
the Chairman additional responsibilities to examine ways DOD can
eliminate or reduce duplicate capabilities and to assess military
requirements for defense acquisition programs from a joint
warfighting perspective.
According to the 1995 National Military Strategy, major modernization
programs involving significant investments are to be undertaken only
when there is "clearly a substantial payoff." To evaluate the merits
of the services' weapon investment proposals, programs, and budgets,
various entities within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, such
as the Director of the Program Analysis and Evaluation, provide the
Secretary independent analyses. The Joint Requirements Oversight
Council (JROC) assists the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in
carrying out his responsibilities. This assistance includes
identifying and assessing the priority of the joint military
requirements (including existing systems and equipment), ensuring
that the assignment of program priorities reflects projected resource
levels, and considering alternatives to any acquisition program
identified to meet military needs.
--------------------
\2 CINCs of: (1) Atlantic Command, (2) Central Command, (3) European
Command, (4) Forces Command, (5) Pacific Command, (6) Southern
Command, (7) Space Command, (8) Special Operations Command, (9)
Strategic Command, and (10) Transportation Command. CINCs are
responsible for military operations in their geographic region or
functional area.
JOINT WARFIGHTING CAPABILITY
ASSESSMENT PROCESS ESTABLISHED
TO IMPROVE JOINT PERSPECTIVE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:2
To assist the JROC in advising the Chairman and the Secretary on
joint warfighting capabilities, the joint warfighting capabilities
assessment (JWCA) process was initiated in April 1994. Under this
process,
10 assessment teams have been established in selected mission areas,
1 of which is air superiority. The intent of JWCA is to continuously
assess available information on the services' respective joint
capabilities to identify opportunities to improve warfighting
effectiveness. A Joint Staff official who participated in conducting
JWCA for the air superiority mission told us that the purpose of this
assessment was not to identify overlap and unnecessary duplication
among the services.
In expanding the JROC process, including the establishment of the
JWCA teams, it was envisioned that the JROC would be more than simply
another military committee on which members participate strictly as
representatives of their services. Recommendations coming from the
JROC would not simply reflect the sum of each service's requirements.
Rather, the JROC, with the support of the JWCA process, would produce
joint information the Chairman needs to meet his program review and
assessment responsibilities and to resolve cross-service requirements
issues, eliminate duplicative programs, and pursue opportunities to
enhance the interoperability of weapon systems.
OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND
METHODOLOGY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:3
Because of the large planned investment during the next several years
and pursuant to our basic legislative responsibility, we evaluated
the air superiority mission (1) to identify the overlap among the
military services' planned capabilities and (2) to determine whether
the joint warfighting assessment process was useful to assist in
making program and budget decisions about these capabilities.
We visited or obtained information from the following organizations:
Air Force Organizations
-- Headquarters, Air Force Materiel Command, Wright-Patterson Air
Force Base, Ohio.
-- Headquarters, Air Force Air Combat Command, Langley Air Force
Base, Virginia.
-- Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
(Acquisition), Washington, D.C.
-- Air Force Roles and Missions Office, Washington, D.C.
-- National Air Intelligence Center, Wright-Patterson Air Force
Base, Ohio.
-- Airborne Laser Program Office, Albuquerque, New Mexico.
-- F-15 System Program Office, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base,
Ohio.
-- F-16 System Program Office, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base,
Ohio.
-- F-22 System Program Office, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base,
Ohio.
Navy Organizations
-- Department of the Navy, Washington, D.C.
-- Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, D.C.
-- Office of Naval Intelligence, Washington, D.C.
-- F/A-18 Program Office, Washington, D.C.
-- F-14 Program Office, Washington, D.C.
-- Marine Corps Systems Command, Quantico, Virginia.
Army Organizations
-- Office of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and
Plans, Washington, D.C.
-- Army Space and Strategic Command, Huntsville, Alabama.
-- Medium Extended Air Defense System Project Office, Huntsville,
Alabama.
-- Theater High Altitude Air Defense Project Office, Huntsville,
Alabama.
-- Patriot Project Office, Huntsville, Alabama.
-- Army Research Development and Engineering Center, Redstone
Arsenal, Alabama.
-- Forward Area Air Defense Project Office, Redstone Arsenal,
Alabama.
-- Weapon Systems Management Directorate, Redstone Arsenal,
Alabama.
-- Army Air Defense Artillery School, Fort Bliss, Texas.
-- Patriot Advanced Capability 3 Project Office, Huntsville,
Alabama.
Other DOD Organizations
-- Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C.
-- Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, Washington, D.C.
-- Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C.
-- U.S. Central Command, Tampa, Florida.
-- U.S. Pacific Command, Honolulu, Hawaii.
-- Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C.
-- Airborne Interceptor Program Office, Los Angeles, California.
-- Missile and Space Intelligence Center, Redstone Arsenal,
Alabama.
Non-DOD Organizations
-- Central Intelligence Agency, Langley Virginia.
To identify the overlap among the military services' planned
capabilities, we identified the roles and missions each service is
responsible for performing and listed the existing and planned
equipment that could be used for air superiority missions. We
reviewed DOD directives, military doctrine, and previous roles and
mission reports prepared by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces. We
asked weapon system program offices and/or operating commands, such
as Air Combat Command, to identify the specific air superiority
missions the equipment is capable of performing or is being designed
to perform so we could identify the equipment that performs the same
missions, that which is service unique, and that which is used by
more than one service. We discussed the capabilities of existing and
planned equipment with officials at the U.S. Central Command, the
U.S. Pacific Command, the Joint Staff, and the services. From
threat reports prepared by the Defense Intelligence Agency and the
Central Intelligence Agency we compared U.S. capabilities to the
capabilities of two major regional conflict countries--North Korea
and Iraq. Our analyses covered three timeframes--fiscal years 1995,
2001, and 2010. We used DOD's future years defense program database
to obtain cost data for fiscal years 1996-2001. For cost data beyond
this period, we used selected acquisition reports or estimates
prepared by program offices.
To determine whether the JWCA process was useful for making program
and budget decisions, we reviewed the methodology and the results of
the air superiority JWCA. Further, we reviewed applicable laws and
DOD instructions involving the roles and responsibilities of the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for conducting and reporting on
joint assessments. We also discussed the usefulness and the
strengths and weaknesses of the JWCA with officials at the U.S.
Central Command, the U.S. Pacific Command, and the services.
We also relied on reports published by the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, Joint Staff, National Air Intelligence Center, Defense
Science Board, Congressional Budget Office, Ballistic Missile Defense
Organization, Air Force Roles and Missions Office, Commonwealth
Institute, RAND Corporation, Congressional Research Service, and our
prior reports (a list of our related products is provided at the end
of this report).
We performed our review from October 1994 through September 1996 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
THE SERVICES HAVE OVERLAPPING
CAPABILITIES TO PERFORM AIR
SUPERIORITY MISSIONS
============================================================ Chapter 2
Achieving air superiority is a high priority during any conflict.
But independent efforts by the services, without an adequate joint
orientation, has led to overlap among service capabilities that could
be excessive. Each military service plays a role in achieving air
superiority and has capabilities in four of the five missions.
However, each service has acquired mostly unique equipment to perform
these missions, although Congress advocates jointness among the
services. DOD plans include over $43 billion from fiscal year 1996
to fiscal year 2001 for the acquisition of systems dedicated to the
air superiority missions. Most of the planned funding is for the
acquisition of aircraft to defeat enemy aircraft, and defensive
systems to defeat enemy theater ballistic missiles.
AIR SUPERIORITY INCLUDES FIVE
MISSIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1
Air Force doctrine states that the attainment of air superiority is
normally one of the first and most important U.S. military goals in
a conflict. Without the attainment of air superiority, achieving
success in a military campaign is more difficult. Air superiority is
the degree of dominance one force possesses over another in the air,
governing the extent to which air, ground, and sea forces can achieve
campaign objectives.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in its assessment of U.S. air superiority
capability, divided it into five distinct missions. Two missions
involved offensive air superiority operations to defeat enemy fighter
aircraft and surface-to-air defenses within enemy territory, and
three involved defensive air superiority to protect friendly
territory against enemy aircraft, cruise missiles, and theater
ballistic missiles (see fig. 1).
FUNDING PLANNED FOR AIR
SUPERIORITY MISSIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2
Substantial funding is planned from fiscal year 1996 to fiscal year
2001 to acquire weapon systems that are dedicated or closely related
to achievement of air superiority missions. DOD plans include over
$43 billion for acquisition of dedicated systems, with about 47
percent of the funding intended to modernize U.S. capabilities to
defeat enemy fighters (offensive operations) and aircraft (defensive
operations) and about 44 percent intended to modernize capabilities
to defeat enemy theater ballistic missiles.
Table 2.1 shows the amounts included in the fiscal years 1996-2001
defense plan for acquisition of systems for each air superiority
mission, as of June 1995. Additional detail of the funding for each
mission is included in table II.1.
Table 2.1
Approximate DOD Future Years Defense
Program Acquisition Funding for the
Missions of Air Superiority, as of June
1995
(Then-year dollars in millions)
Missile Amount Percent
-------------------------------------- -------------- --------------
Offensive operations
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Defeat enemy fighters $20,475.8 47.5
Defeat enemy surface-to-air missiles 807.2 01.9
Defensive operations
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Defeat enemy aircraft \a
Defeat enemy cruise missiles 3,001.9 7.0
Defeat enemy theater ballistic 18,861.4 43.7
missiles
======================================================================
Total $43,146.3 100.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a The funding to defeat enemy fighters and aircraft in offensive and
defensive operations is not separable; all is included under
offensive operations.
In addition to acquisition of weapon systems primarily dedicated to
achieving air superiority, there are other systems, primarily
aircraft, that have a primary mission other than air superiority but
that have a significant capability to contribute to air superiority
missions. This category includes the Air Force F-15E and F-16, Navy
F/A-18, Marine AV-8B, and the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF).
Acquisition of F/A-18 fighters is expected to consume the greatest
amount of resources in fiscal
years 1996-2001, about $21 billion. Table II.2 includes further
information on these systems.
OVERLAP AMONG SERVICES'
PERFORMANCE OF THE AIR
SUPERIORITY MISSIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3
While some degree of overlapping capabilities may be necessary and/or
unavoidable, many of the systems that the services have or plan to
acquire to accomplish the five air superiority missions will have
overlapping capabilities. Many of these overlapping capabilities
have evolved over the years. Table 2.2 shows that each service has
capabilities in each air superiority mission, except the Army does
not have a capability to accomplish offensive operations against
enemy fighters.
Table 2.2
Services' Capability to Perform Air
Superiority Missions
Air Marine
Air superiority missions Army Navy Force Corps
-------------------------------------- ------ ------ ------ ------
Offensive operations
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Defeat enemy fighters X X X
Defeat enemy surface-to-air defenses X X X X
Defensive operations
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Defeat enemy aircraft X X X X
Defeat enemy cruise missiles X X X X
Defeat enemy theater ballistic X X X X
missiles
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: "X" indicates that the service has or is acquiring
capabilities to perform an air superiority mission.
Appendix I shows the missions and the current and future equipment
planned by each service to perform the five missions to achieve air
superiority. Our display in appendix I of the current and future
planned equipment shows that most equipment in the inventory has been
procured by a service for operational forces within that service.
Rarely have the same systems been used by more than one service,
except for certain missiles and munitions. For example, the Air
Force, the Navy, and the Marines have their own aircraft platforms
capable of defeating enemy fighters and aircraft. The Navy operates
F-14s and F/A-18s, the Air Force operates F-15s and F-16s, and the
Marine Corps operates F/A-18s and AV-8Bs. The Air Force is
developing the F-22 fighter and expects it to be in service in 2004,
and the JSF is expected to be in service in 2010. The largest
percentage of acquisition funding included in the DOD'S plans for air
superiority (47 percent) is for defeating enemy fighters and
aircraft. About 44 percent of the funding is for acquisition of
theater ballistic missile defenses.
AIR SUPERIORITY FIGHTERS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3.1
Although air superiority missions have many components, and many
types of equipment are involved, the acquisition of U.S. fighter
aircraft with the capability to defeat enemy fighters and other
aircraft is expected to consume about 47 percent of the resources
planned for air superiority missions. The Air Force, the Navy, and
the Marines all have capabilities to defeat enemy fighters and other
aircraft as a part of offensive and defensive air superiority
missions using aircraft equipped with air-to-air missiles and guns.
Although the missiles used are generally common for the air
superiority missions regardless of the service (AIM-7 Sparrow,
Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile, AIM-9 Sidewinder), the
aircraft in use and being acquired are generally unique to each
service. Table 2.3 shows the fighter aircraft systems in service or
being acquired that have a capability to defeat enemy fighters and
other aircraft. Some fighters have air superiority designated as
their primary mission, while others have a significant capability to
accomplish air superiority missions, but their primary missions are
interdiction or are related to the attack of ground targets.
Table 2.3
Fighter Aircraft in Service or Being
Acquired That Have Capability to
Accomplish Air Superiority Missions
Against Enemy Fighters and Other
Aircraft
Aircraft Air superiority
Service system primary mission?
------------------------------------ -------------- ----------------
Navy F-14 Yes
Navy F/A-18 No
Air Force F-15 C/D Yes
Air Force F-16 No
Air Force F-15E No
Air Force F-22 Yes
Marines AV-8B No
Marines F/A-18 No
Joint JSF No
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Successful acquisition of systems that are commonly used among the
services has been accomplished in air-to-air missiles and several
air-to-ground munitions programs. However, despite Congress' push
for more efficient use of resources by emphasizing jointness among
the services, few joint initiatives, particularly in the acquisition
of aircraft, have been undertaken by DOD. Initiatives to acquire
aircraft for joint service use in the past have often failed. For
example, the Air Force was to develop and acquire the advanced
tactical fighter (F-22), and the Navy was to develop and acquire an
advanced tactical aircraft (A-12). These aircraft were both planned
for use by both the Air Force and the Navy. Ultimately, the
Secretary of Defense terminated the troubled A-12 program, and the
Navy withdrew its support for the advanced tactical fighter program
reportedly because of affordability problems.
In a more recent attempt to reduce overlap in future aircraft
systems, DOD initiated the Joint Advanced Strike Technology program
in 1993. This program focuses on affordability and on developing
common components such as engines, aviation electronics, ground
support, training, and munitions for use in three similar, but
different JSF variants--one for the Air Force, the Navy, and the
Marine Corps. Operational capability for this "family" of JSF
aircraft is tentatively scheduled for 2010.
THEATER BALLISTIC MISSILE
DEFENSE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3.2
The Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps each are
developing some capabilities to defend against theater ballistic
missiles by defeating them at one of three intercept areas--boost
phase, midcourse phase, or terminal phase. DOD plans to fund nine
systems from fiscal
year 1996 through fiscal year 2001 to defeat enemy theater ballistic
missiles. Table 2.4 lists the nine theater missile defense systems
that were included in the DOD plans for fiscal years 1996-2001. The
estimated cost to acquire these nine systems is $71 billion. Five of
those planned systems--three Army, one Navy, and one Marine
Corps--are designed to defeat theater ballistic missiles during the
terminal phase of an enemy missile's trajectories.
Table 2.4
Theater Ballistic Missile Defense
Systems
Service System Intercept point
------------------------------ ------------------ ------------------
Army Patriot Advanced Terminal
Capability Level 3
Army Theater High Terminal and
Altitude Air midcourse
Defense System
Army Medium Extended Terminal
Air Defense System
Marine Corps Improved Hawk Terminal
Navy Navy Area System Terminal
Navy Navy Theater Wide Midcourse
System
Air Force Airborne Laser Boost
Air Force and Navy Airborne Boost and
Interceptor midcourse
DOD Space-Based Laser Boost
----------------------------------------------------------------------
AIR SUPERIORITY JOINT WARFIGHTING
ASSESSMENT DID NOT ADEQUATELY
ADDRESS SOME KEY ISSUES
============================================================ Chapter 3
JWCA teams began assessing the U.S. joint warfighting capabilities
in 1994, and in early 1995 rated the overall capability to conduct
air superiority missions as marginal, or acceptable with some risk,
through fiscal year 2001. This assessment process is an evolving
one. Although the assessment was useful for displaying and rating
the current joint force capability, it cannot be used to justify the
spending planned by DOD for fighter aircraft planned for deployment
beyond fiscal year 2001.
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is expected to advise the
Secretary of Defense on the priority of requirements identified by
the CINCs and the extent to which service program recommendations and
budget proposals conform to these priorities. Further, the Chairman
is expected to submit to the Secretary, alternative program
recommendations and budget proposals. Although the assessment was
useful in pointing out several inadequacies in forces that exist at
this time, it did not adequately address several major issues
regarding overlap of capabilities, priorities of future acquisitions
of air superiority weapon systems, or alternative means of meeting
the highest priority requirements. Further, it did not assign
ratings of warfighting capability over a long enough period of time
to be useful for establishing acquisition and budget priorities.
To assess the joint capability, the JWCA team evaluated the
capabilities of the services to perform air superiority missions.
The assessment was based on the services' ability to accomplish nine
functions that are determinants of the overall ability to accomplish
the missions. For example, to defeat enemy fighters, the JWCA
evaluated the effectiveness of the capabilities to integrate command,
control, communications, computers, and intelligence; deploy assets
to the theater; plan missions, detect, identify, track, engage, and
kill targets; and assess damage.
A formal report of the assessment was not made. Although a spokesman
for the JWCA team told us that recommendations were made to the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for preparation of the
Chairman's program assessment, they would not share their
recommendations with us.
JOINT STAFF RATED OVERALL AIR
SUPERIORITY CAPABILITY AS
ACCEPTABLE WITH SOME RISK
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1
In February 1995, the JWCA rated overall air superiority capabilities
as acceptable with some risk through 2001. Aspects of several
functional elements, however, were rated inadequate.
In 1994, the JWCA, under the direction of the Vice Chairman, began
making assessments to evaluate the joint warfighting capabilities of
U.S. military forces to perform designated missions. To conduct its
assessment of air superiority, the JWCA divided the five air
superiority missions into nine functional elements. Based on a
combination of military judgment and existing analyses, they rated
the capability to effectively accomplish each functional element
through fiscal year 2001. One of three possible ratings was assigned
to each element as follows:
-- inadequate (high risk),
-- marginal (acceptable with some risk), or
-- adequate (low risk).
The marginal rating was determined to be an acceptable level to
achieve in a realistic, fiscally constrained environment.
The Joint Staff briefed each CINC to obtain concurrence with the
ratings and eventually achieved a consensus among the Commanders and
the Joint Staff. The assessment provides an overview of the
capabilities of the joint forces to accomplish the nine functions as
they affect each of the five air superiority missions. The
assessment permits a rapid identification of the immediate problem
areas.
SEVERAL ELEMENTS RATED
INADEQUATE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1.1
Although the overall assessments for the air superiority missions
were that the capabilities were acceptable with some risk through
fiscal year 2001, several elements were rated inadequate. DOD
officials told us that all the services are working to rectify one of
the long-standing deficiencies.
The process used by the team to make its assessment provided a
useful, though limited, result and used a meaningful method of
displaying the results. The details of the assessment were
classified by DOD. However, the results of the assessment do not
justify the acquisition of major aircraft systems like the F-22
because correction of the functions rated inadequate would not
necessarily be impacted by acquisition of new aircraft.
THE 1995 AIR SUPERIORITY JOINT
WARFIGHTING ASSESSMENT HAS
LIMITATIONS AND DID NOT ADDRESS
MAJOR ISSUES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2
Without broad, comprehensive assessments, the decisionmakers cannot
be sure that they have sufficient information to make the difficult
tradeoff decisions that may be required. At a minimum, we believe
that such assessments should, for the air superiority mission (1)
assess the relative merits of retiring assets, reducing procurement
quantities, or canceling acquisition programs where excesses exist or
where substantial payoff is not clear and (2) determine the most
cost-effective means to satisfy deficiencies. Conducting such
assessments could help determine what priority should be given to
competing programs, whether programmed investments should continue to
be funded, and whether new investments should be made.
The use of a joint perspective to assess U.S. warfighting capability
has the potential to provide decisionmakers better insight into the
capability of the entire U.S. military force to perform particular
missions than by assessing an individual service's capability to
perform a particular mission. However, there were limitations in the
assessments of the air superiority mission and some major issues were
not addressed.
ASSESSMENT LIMITATIONS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2.1
DOD limited its assessment to the planned capability contained in the
future years defense program that covers fiscal years 1996-2001.
Also, this assessment did not evaluate the overlap of capability in
each mission and offered no alternative means of achieving the
capabilities contained in the program.
For the warfighter who is concerned about the U.S. capability to
fight a war in the near future, a 6-year period may be sufficient.
However, to improve the usefulness of these assessments to assist
program and budget decisions, comprehensive capability ratings over a
longer period are necessary. Intelligence estimates of the projected
threat may cover as much as a 15-year period. Many major weapon
systems included in the fiscal years 1996-2001 defense plan will not
be in the active inventory until long after fiscal year 2001 and, in
some cases, are intended to respond to threats that may not exist
until after fiscal year 2001. Thus, the air superiority joint
warfighting assessment through fiscal year 2001 may not include the
impact of significant changes in U.S. weapon capabilities or
significant changes in the projected threat expected to come about
after the 6 years covered in the defense program.
Another limitation was that the assessments do not examine the
cost-effectiveness of alternative mixes of weapon systems to achieve
the objectives of the air superiority mission. For example, the JWCA
assessed current plans to upgrade theater missile defenses and to
upgrade fighter aircraft; yet, they did not identify other possible
mixes or combinations of weapons to achieve the objectives.
MAJOR ISSUES NOT ADDRESSED
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2.2
As the nation attempts to achieve a balanced budget, our evaluations
of U.S. air power missions and acquisition plans\1
showed that some programs would only marginally improve existing
capabilities at a very high cost. The timing of others may be
questionable in view of the changed security environment. For some
programs, less costly alternatives could be pursued to meet
identified needs.
An air superiority program that appears to be proceeding at an
unnecessarily fast pace is the Air Force F-22 fighter program. The
Air Force is proceeding with its plan to have a high degree of
concurrency in the development and production of the F-22 aircraft.
It plans to begin to acquire F-22 fighters in fiscal year 1999 and to
rapidly accelerate the pace of production to 48 aircraft a year.\2
The Air Force plans to begin initial operations with F-22s in
November 2004. Our analyses showed that the existing U.S. frontline
fighter, the F-15, compared favorably to the projected frontline
aircraft of potential adversaries used in the assessments through
fiscal year 2010. DOD told us that there are several current or soon
to be fielded foreign fighters that are at parity with the F-15.
Although we recognize several foreign fighter aircraft are in
development that are projected to be roughly comparable with the
F-15C when those foreign aircraft are ultimately developed and
fielded, it is uncertain how quickly the aircraft will be produced.
It is also unlikely that large quantities will be available and
affordable by countries that the United States considers to be
potential adversaries. Additionally, there are risks associated with
the concurrent development and production planned for the F-22, risks
that DOD and we have disagreed about, but which need to be an
important consideration in a decision to move into production of a
high technology system such as the F-22.
We previously recommended that, at a minimum, the Joint Staff should
assess the impact on joint warfighting capability of delaying the
F-22's initial operations to 2010 and adjusting acquisition plans to
slow the acceleration of the production pace and reduce the degree of
concurrency.
Another shortcoming in the assessment was that it did not consider
whether the F-15 could be replaced by the JSF instead of the F-22
because the JSF, with some capabilities similar to the F-22s, is also
supposed to have low-observable characteristics and the capability to
launch missiles against enemy aircraft. The JSF average unit
procurement cost is expected to be lower\3 than an F-22 and is
scheduled to become operational in 2010, compared to 2004 for the
F-22.
The assessment also did not deal with the issue of whether there is
the need to replace F-15s with F-22s on a one-for-one basis. The Air
Force plans to replace four wings of F-15s with about four wings of
F-22s (438). Yet, an Air Force analysis indicates that the F-22
would be 12 times more effective than the F-15C in defeating the same
threat.
The assessment, moreover, did not address the issue of whether there
was a more viable alternative to the Navy's F/A-18E/F fighter
program. Our recent report\4 on the F/A-18E/F program has shown that
deficiencies in the current F/A-18C/D range, carrier recovery
payload, survivability, and system growth the Navy cited in
justifying the F/A-18E/F program either do not exist, can be
corrected with minimal changes to the F/A-18C/D, or will only be
marginally improved in the F/A-18E/F model. The assessment did not
discuss the benefits and drawbacks of canceling the F/A-18E/F and
continuing with the less costly F/A-18C/D until the JSF becomes
operational.
A major issue confronting DOD and Congress is the need to pursue
three new tactical aircraft programs that will cost an estimated
$355.7 billion in fiscal year 1997 dollars, according to the
Congressional Budget Office. However, the assessment did not provide
an aggregate assessment of the quantity of U.S. aircraft with air
superiority capabilities compared to potential adversaries. Even
with the drawdown of the U.S. fighter inventory over the past few
years, its current and future inventory numbers about 2,600 frontline
fighters (F-14s, F-15s, F-16s, and F-18s).
The size and the makeup of the U.S. theater ballistic missile
defense is another major issue confronting DOD and Congress; yet the
JWCA did not address this issue. Pursuing all nine systems could
cost an estimated $71 billion, which is probably understated
considering that most of these systems are technologically risky and
remain unproven. For example, none of the nine tests conducted on a
Navy and on an Army system were a complete success. However, the
JWCA did not address the issue of what was the most cost-effective
mix of theater ballistic missiles required to meet mission
requirements.
--------------------
\1 Combat Air Power: Joint Mission Assessment Needed Before Making
Program and Budget Decisions (GAO/NSIAD-96-177, Sept. 20, 1996).
\2 Tactical Aircraft: Concurrency in Development and Production of
F-22 Aircraft Should Be Reduced (GAO/NSIAD-95-59, Apr. 19, 1995).
\3 CBO Testimony on Modernizing Tactical Aircraft (June 27, 1996).
\4 Naval Aviation: F/A-18E/F Will Provide Marginal Operational
Improvement at High Cost (GAO/NSIAD-96-98, June 18, 1996).
CONCLUSIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3
It is important that U.S. forces be properly equipped to
successfully achieve air superiority and that the effectiveness of
this equipment be continually modernized. At a time when the country
is striving to achieve a balanced budget, the JWCA on air superiority
is not ensuring that resources are being applied in an efficient,
economical, and effective manner. Moreover, the assessments did not
address the key issues involving joint operations and requirements
facing the air superiority missions nor do they attempt to identify
opportunities to reduce duplications and overlaps in capabilities
without unacceptable effects on force capabilities.
We are not making any new recommendations in this report. In our
overall report on combat air power, we recommended that the Secretary
of Defense, along with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
develop an assessment process that yields more comprehensive
information in key mission areas. In making this recommendation, we
included the offensive and defensive aspects of the air superiority
mission and the results of this review of the assessments conducted
by the JWCA team. We said the recommended process could be achieved
by broadening the JWCAs or developing an alternative mechanism. DOD
partially concurred with the recommendation, agreeing that analytical
support for overall decision-making can be improved, but disagreeing
that the Secretary is currently receiving inadequate advice.
We believe the concerns identified in this report about DOD's
assessments of air superiority mission areas should be addressed as
part of DOD's efforts to implement our prior recommendation.
Specifically, we believe the assessments need to
-- cover a longer period to permit better analysis of projected
capabilities of both the U.S. and potential adversaries;
-- include cost-effectiveness analyses of alternative means to
achieve U.S. objectives;
-- identify unnecessary overlap and duplication;
-- include comparisons and analyses of U.S. capabilities to
conduct air superiority missions to capabilities of adversaries;
and
-- address major issues including (1) the need to proceed with
three new tactical fighters, (2) the need to proceed with a
highly concurrent schedule and rapid production pace increase
for the F-22 program, (3) the need to replace each F-15 with an
F-22, (4) the potential for replacing F-15s with the JSF rather
than F-22s, (5) the need for procuring the F/A-18E/F rather than
modifying F/A-18C/Ds, (6) the most cost-effective mix of theater
ballistic missile defenses required to meet mission
requirements, and (7) U.S. capabilities to defend against
certain cruise missile threats.
SERVICES' IDENTIFICATION OF
CAPABILITIES FOR ACHIEVING AIR
SUPERIORITY
=========================================================== Appendix I
Table I.1
Platforms Contributing to Air
Superiority
Mission Joint Air Force Army Navy Marine Corps
---------------------------- ---------------------------- --------------------- ---------------------- -------------------- --------------------
Current Future Current Future Current Future Current Future Current Future
---------------------------- ------------- ------------- --------- ---------- ---------- ---------- --------- --------- --------- ---------
Offensive counter air
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Defeat enemy fighters JSF AWACS F-22 F-14 F/A-18 E/ F/A-18 C/ F/A-18E/
F D F
F-15 A-D F/A-18 A- AV-8B
D
F-15E E-2C
F-16
Airfield attack only F-117
F-111
B-1
B-2
B-52
Offensive counter air
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Defeat enemy surface-to-air JSF F-16 Multiple F-14 F/A-18 E/ F/A-18 C/ F/A-18E/
defense (HTS) Launch F D F
Rocket
System
F-4G F/A-18 A-
D
EF-111 EA-6B
F-111
F-117
B-1
B-2
B-52
Defensive counter air
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Defeat enemy fighters JSF F-15 A-D F-22 Hawk F-14 F/A-18 E/ F/A-18 C/ F/A-18E/
(Guard F D F
only)
F-15 E Airborne F/A-18 A- Various AV-8B
laser D Ships
F-16 Various Hawk
ships mobility
F-111 E-2C
(partial)
AWACS
Defensive counter air
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Defeat enemy cruise missiles JSF F-15 A-D F-22 Hawk Medium F-14 F/A-18 E/ F/A-18 C/ F/A-18E/
(Guard Extended F D F
only) Air
Defense
System
F-15 E Airborne Patriot F/A-18 A- Various Hawk
Laser D ships mobility
F-16 Various
ships
F-111 E-2C
Ground attack only B-52
B-1
Defensive counter air
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Defeat enemy theater missile Space-based Airborne Patriot Theater F-14D F-14 D Hawk with
defenses laser\a laser High (with Theater
Altitude intecepto Missile
Air r Defense
Defense missile) Upgrade
Boost phase Medium Aegis Medium
intercept Extended ships Extended
Air Air
Defense Defense
System System
Patriot Area
Advanced system
Capability
-Level 3
Theater-
wide
system
Ground attack only JSF F-15 A-D F/A-18A- F/A-18E/ F/A-18C/ F/A-18E/
D F D F
F-15E
F-16
B-52
B-1
F-111
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes:
1. The platforms and munitions listed in the "Current" columns
represent what the services use today.
2. The platforms and munitions listed in the "Future" columns
represent what the services plan to buy or upgrade in the future and
include new systems or major capability improvements of existing
system.
3. JSF - Joint Strike Fighter.
4. AWACS - Airborne Warning and Control System.
\a This is a DOD-managed system that can potentially be used by all
the services.
Table 1.2
Missiles and Munitions Contributing to
Air Superiority
Mission Joint Air Force Army Navy Marine Corps
---------------------------- ---------------------------- --------------------- --------------------- --------------------- --------------------
Current Future Current Future Current Future Current Future Current Future
---------------------------- ------------- ------------- ---------- --------- --------- ---------- ---------- --------- --------- ---------
Offensive counter air
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Defeat enemy fighters Sparrow AIM-9X Phoenix
Sidewinder Advanced
Medium Range
Air-to-Air
Missile--
Improvement
Advanced
Medium Range
Air-to-Air
Missile
Airfield attack Maverick Joint Direct Air-to- GPS Aided Standoff
Attack Ground Munition Land
Munition Munition Wind Attack
130, 142 Corrected Missile
Munition (extended
range)
Guided Bomb Joint Cluster Walleye
Unit 24 Standoff Bomb Unit
Weapon 5
Mark 84 Cluster Rockeye
Bomb Unit
87
Convention Laser
al Air Guided
Launched Bomb 83
Cruise
Missile
Guided Mark 83
Bomb Unit
10,15, 27,
28
Mark 82 Tomahawk
Offensive counter air
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Defeat enemy surface-to-air High Speed Joint Direct Cluster GPS Aided Army Army Guided
defenses Anti- Attack Bomb Unit Munition Tactical Tactical Bomb Unit
Radiation Munition 58,87, 97 Missile Missile 24
Missile System System
Improvemen
ts
Maverick Joint Guided Wind Walleye
Standoff Bomb Unit Corrected
Weapon 10, 12,15, Munition
24, 27
Mark 82, 84 Convention Rockeye
al Air
Launched
Cruise
Missile
Sensor Laser
Fused Guided
Weapon Bomb 83
Mark 83
Tomahawk
Defensive counter air
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Defeat enemy fighters Sparrow AIM-9X Patriot Medium Close-In Close-In Hawk Hawk with
Advanced Extended Weapon Weapon mobility Theater
Capabilit Air System System Missile
y 2 Hawk Defense Blocks Defense
(National System 1A, 1B, Upgrade
Guard 1C
only)
Sidewinder Advanced Bradley Rolling Rolling Stinger Stinger
Medium Range Stinger Airframe Airframe
Air-to-Air Missile-- Missile-
Missile-- Block 0 -Block 1
Improvement
Advanced Avenger NATO Sea Evolved
Medium Range Stinger Sparrow Sea
Air-to-Air Sparrow
Missile
Stinger Standard Standard
Missile 2 Missile 2
Block IIIA Blocks
IIIB, IV
Phoenix
Defensive counter air:
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Defeat enemy cruise missiles Sparrow AIM-9X Patriot Medium Close-In Close-In Hawk Hawk with
Advanced Extended Weapon Weapon mobility Theater
Capabilit Air System System Missile
y 2 Defense Blocks Defense
System 1A, 1B, Upgrade
1C
Sidewinder Advanced Hawk Bradley Rolling Rolling
Medium Range (National Stinger Airframe Airframe
Air-to-Air Guard Missile-- Missile-
Missile-- only) Block 0 -Block 1
Improvement
Advanced Avenger NATO Sea Evolved
Medium Range Stinger Sparrow Sea
Air-to-Air Sparrow
Missile
Stinger Standard Standard
Missile 2 Missile 2
Block IIIA Blocks
IIIB, IV
Phoenix
Defensive counter air
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Defeat enemy theater Patriot Standard Hawk with
ballistic missiles Advanced Missile Theater
Capability 2, Block Missile
3 IVA, Defense
Block Upgrade
Theater
Missile
Defense
Medium
Extended
Air
Defense
System
Theater
High
Altitude
Air
Defense
Ground attack only Joint Maverick
Standoff
Weapon
Rockeye
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes:
1. The missiles and munitions listed in the "Current" column
represent what the services use today.
2. The missiles and munitions listed in the "Future" columns
represent what the services will buy or upgrade in the future and
include new systems or major capability improvements of existing
systems.
3. NATO -- North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
4. GPS -- Global Positioning System.
FUNDING FOR MISSIONS OF AIR
SUPERIORITY
========================================================== Appendix II
Table II.1
Approximate DOD Future Year Defense
Program Acquisition Funding for the
Missions of Air Superiority, as of June
1995
(Then-year dollars in thousands)
Fiscal years
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mis
sio
ns 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Total
--- --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- =========
Conduct offensive operations:
Defeat enemy fighters
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
F- $92,902 $141,572 $240,911 $302,728 $284,147 $262,121 $1,324,38
15 1
F- 2,138,718 2,048,435 2,346,248 2,214,665 3,014,556 3,933,995 15,696,61
22 7
F- 103,537 206,866 225,499 245,931 193,996 121,697 1,097,526
14
Adv 266,768 261,160 259,845 243,397 252,639 286,668 1,570,477
an
ce
d
Me
di
um
Ra
ng
e
Ai
r-
to
-
Ai
r
Mi
ss
il
e
Tac 73,673 110,275 142,661 181,498 138,691 139,984 786,782
ti
ca
l
Ai
r-
to
-
Ai
r
Mi
ss
il
es
Defeat enemy surface-
to-air missiles
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hig 3,348 4,226 2,586 2,027 0 0 12,187
h
Sp
ee
d
An
ti
-
Ra
di
at
io
n
Mi
ss
il
e
F- 615 136 0 0 0 0 751
4G
Wi
ld
We
as
el
EA- 0 59,422 81,304 143,756 152,454 208,738 645,674
6B
Com 18,914 23,918 29,340 18,781 19,399 19,983 130,335
pa
ss
Ca
ll
Man 7,408 2,147 2,150 2,130 2,207 2,166 18,208
ned
De
st
ru
ct
iv
e
Su
pp
re
ss
io
n
Conduct defensive operations:
Defeat enemy aircraft\a
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Defeat enemy cruise missiles
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Air 356,008 342,620 126,151 117,731 122,318 125,746 1,190,574
bo
rn
e
Wa
rn
in
g
an
d
Co
nt
ro
l
Sy
st
em
E- 216,673 303,278 312,945 320,872 324,665 332,921 1,811,354
2C
Ha
wk
ey
e
Defeat enemy theater
ballistic missiles
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The 589,927 740,888 867,941 1,269,833 928,486 862,193 5,259,268
at
er
Hi
gh
Al
ti
tu
de
Ar
ea
De
fe
ns
e
Sy
st
em
Air 19,954 19,954 0 0 0 0 39,908
bo
rn
e
La
se
r\
b
Nav 254,370 402,161 440,717 499,689 560,328 494,517 2,651,782
y
Ar
ea
Sy
st
em
Nav 0,442 3 3,400 0 0 0 0 6 3,842
y
Th
ea
te
r-
wi
de
Sy
st
em
3
Med 0,442 3 3,400 0 0 0 0 6 3,842
ium
Ex
te
ne
d
Ai
r
3
De
fe
ns
e
Sy
st
em
\c
Air 49,061 44,300 66,300 72,300 0 0 231,961
bo
rn
e
In
te
rc
ep
to
r
Pat 690,100 616,670 582,800 453,300 516,700 299,900 3,159,470
ri
ot
Ad
va
nc
ed
Ca
pa
bi
li
ty
Le
ve
l
3
Mar 30,794 32,883 25,380 596 614 8,260 98,527
ine
Co
rp
s'
Ha
wk
Spa 72,832 28,372 28,894 28,593 28,304 27,732 214,727
ce-
Ba
se
d
La
se
r
Oth 917,668 920,333 1,163,026 1,022,263 1,448,013 1,606,729 7,078,032
er
================================================================================
Tot $5,964,15 $6,376,41 $6,944,69 $7,140,09 $7,987,51 $8,733,35 $43,146,2
al 4 6 8 0 7 0 25
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes:
1. Acquisition funding includes research, development, test, and
evaluation and procurement of aircraft and missiles as of June 1995.
\a The funding to defeat enemy fighters and aircraft in offensive and
defensive operations are not separable and are essentially all
included under the offensive operations.
\b According to an Air Force official, the Air Force has programmed
$693,200,000 in additional funds for Airborne Laser between fiscal
years 1997 and 2001.
\c According to a Medium Extended Air Defense System project office
cost official, the Army has requested $533 million additional funds
for the program for fiscal years 1997-2001.
Table II.2
Approximate DOD Future Year Defense
Program Funding for Weapon Systems With
Some Capability, Not Primary
Responsibility, for the Missions of Air
Superiority
(Then-year dollars in thousands)
Fiscal years
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Missions 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Total
---------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- ========
Conduct Offensive Operations:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Defeat
enemy
fighters
F-15E $293,559 $280,705 $236,986 $232,245 $262,026 $289,974 $1,595,4
95
F-16 561,455 456,162 499,594 521,707 565,321 563,848 3,168,08
7
F-111 597 0 0 0 0 0 597
F/A-18 1,886,68 2,938,02 3,561,88 4,196,79 4,245,14 4,206,66 21,035,1
5 8 4 2 1 8 98
AV-8B 208,890 406,260 379,072 418,489 408,367 411,050 2,232,12
8
JSF 331,156 480,061 680,611 841,965 664,507 938,805 3,937,10
5
Defeat 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
enemy
surface-
to-air
defenses
Conduct Defensive Operations:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Defeat \a \a \a \a \a \a \a
enemy
aircraft
Defeat 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
enemy
cruise
missiles
Defeat 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
enemy
theater
ballistic
missiles
================================================================================
Total $3,282,3 $4,561,2 $5,358,1 $6,211,1 $6,145,3 $6,410,3 $31,968,
42 16 47 98 62 45 610
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note:
1. Acquisition funding includes research, development, test, and
evaluation and procurement of aircraft as of June 1995.
\a The funding to defeat enemy fighters and aircraft in offensive and
defensive operations are not separable and are essentially all
included under the offensive operations.
(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix III
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
========================================================== Appendix II
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
The following are our comments on the Department of Defense's (DOD)
letter dated October 22, 1996.
GAO COMMENTS
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:1
1. This report does not suggest, imply, or infer that air power is
not important or that the threat does not warrant investment. The
purpose of this report is to identify overlap of the military
services' capabilities to achieve air superiority and evaluate the
utility of the joint warfighting assessment process.
2. The capabilities of the specific threat aircraft mentioned by DOD
were considered in the joint warfighting capability assessment (JWCA)
for 1996-2001. The JWCA concluded that U.S. capability to defeat
enemy aircraft through fiscal year 2001 was marginal (acceptable with
some degree of risk). The JWCA considered not only the aerodynamic
and propulsion qualities of individual threat aircraft mentioned by
DOD in its comments, but also the closely related functions of
command, control, communications, mission planning, target detection,
tracking, engagement, and destruction.
3. Our review evaluated U.S. capability to achieve air superiority,
which was 1 of 10 missions assessed by the Joint Staff in its JWCAs.
The Joint Staff did not identify air dominance as one of its
missions; however, redefining the objective as air dominance could
have significant implications for future programming of forces.
4. This report specifically deals with the air superiority JWCA, not
the entire process to develop modernization plans and scrutinize
programs. We do believe JWCA can be substantially improved, as can
the analytical support, and DOD partially concurred with that
evaluation in response to the companion report Combat Air Power:
Joint Mission Assessments Needed Before Making Program and Budget
Decisions (GAO/NSIAD-96-177, Sept. 20, 1996). Although we disagree
that further criticism of the DOD decision processes is intended in
this report, there are many facets of DOD's assessment process that
we believe can and should be improved. We have and will continue to
provide appropriate reports to DOD for comment.
5. DOD did not comment on the specific issues we raised about the
JWCA.
6. The intent of this report is to show overlap in air superiority
capabilities and raise specific issues that the air superiority JWCA
could address to improve the analytical support for decisionmakers.
In this report, we have not intended to make a case for overturning
the decisions made by DOD. However, because of concerns we have
raised in other reports about tactical aircraft systems (listed on
the last page of this report), we believe those concerns should be
addressed by JWCA from the point of view of joint warfighting
capabilities.
7. The report clearly notes that these aircrafts' primary missions
are air-to-ground. However, their significant air-to-air
capabilities cannot be ignored and are available to the wartime
commander.
8. Our prior report demonstrated the high degree of concurrency that
exists with the F-22 program. The ramp up of production from 4, to
12, 24, and 36 aircraft a year under the low-rate production phase,
and planned initiation of long lead parts procurement for 48 a year
essentially represents a plan to achieve full-rate production before
initial operational test and evaluation is completed.
9. We do not make threat projections. The threat information came
directly from DOD intelligence agencies.
10. We believe this issue is appropriate for an expanded JWCA on air
superiority. We believe DOD's air superiority JWCA should analyze
the need to replace F-15s with F-22s on a one-for-one basis.
11. We believe that the Joint Staff's air superiority JWCA should
analyze this as a possible option in the context of joint force
capabilities.
12. The report was clarified to identify the specific aircraft that
make up the 2,600 frontline fighters. None of them are A-10s.
13. This comment has been added to the body of the report.
14. We recognize that the E/F will provide some improvements over
the C/D; however, we believe the C/D's current capabilities are
adequate to accomplish its assigned mission. Based on the marginal
nature of the improvements and the E/F's projected cost, we believe
an analysis between these two models should be included in the JWCA.
MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
========================================================== Appendix IV
NATIONAL SECURITY AND
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix IV:1
Robert D. Murphy, Assistant Director
David B. Best, Evaluator
CHICAGO FIELD OFFICE
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix IV:2
Richard L. Strittmatter, Evaluator-in-Charge
Edward R. Browning, Evaluator
Don M. Springman, Evaluator
ATLANTA FIELD OFFICE
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix IV:3
Barbara Haynes, Site Senior
John Randall, Evaluator
NORFOLK FIELD OFFICE
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix IV:4
Brenda Waterfield, Site Senior
Henry Arzadon, Evaluator
RELATED GAO PRODUCTS
============================================================ Chapter 1
Combat Air Power: Assessment of Joint Close Support Requirements and
Capabilities Is Needed (GAO/NSIAD-96-45, June 28, 1996).
U.S. Combat Air Power: Reassessing Plans to Modernize Interdiction
Capabilities Could Save Billions (GAO/NSIAD-96-72, May 13, 1996).
Tactical Aircraft: F-15 Replacement Is Premature as Currently
Planned (GAO/NSIAD-94-118, Mar. 25, 1994).
*** End of document. ***
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