Military Readiness: Data and Trends for January 1990 to March 1995 (Briefing Report, 03/04/96, GAO/NSIAD-96-111BR)
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined the military readiness
data in the Department of Defense's (DOD) Status of Resources and
Training System (SORTS) focusing on the: (1) overall readiness of
military units from January 1, 1990 to March 31, 1995; (2) readiness
trends and problems of select units from each service; and (3) changes
in reported readiness of selected units.
GAO found that: (1) military units' combat readiness remained generally
stable from January 1, 1990 to March 31, 1995; (2) 80 percent of 94
reviewed units' readiness levels met service goals; (3) most units'
readiness problems were caused by personnel and equipment shortages and
inadequate training for military personnel; (4) Navy ships maintained
their readiness levels when periods of planned maintenance and training
were excluded from SORTS data; (5) Navy aviation squadrons' reductions
were a result of personnel shortages from increases in the number of
authorized aircraft and shortages in pilot training funding; (6) Marine
Corps readiness for ground combat units remained at desired levels, but
support and aviation units experienced fluctuations after supplying
detachments to deploying ships and expeditionary units; (7) the Army's
readiness levels were influenced by the number of contingency operations
it was involved in; and (8) the Air Force maintained its desired level
of readiness, but contingency and counterdrug operations have strained
the number of spare parts, engines, and crews available.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: NSIAD-96-111BR
TITLE: Military Readiness: Data and Trends for January 1990 to
March 1995
DATE: 03/04/96
SUBJECT: Combat readiness
Military training
Military personnel
Strategic planning
Military operations
Military forces
Military materiel
Defense contingency planning
Defense capabilities
IDENTIFIER: JCS Status of Resources and Training System
Airborne Warning and Control System
AWACS
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Cover
================================================================ COVER
Briefing Report to the Chairman, Committee on National Security,
House of Representatives
March 1996
MILITARY READINESS - DATA AND
TRENDS FOR JANUARY 1990 TO MARCH
1995
GAO/NSIAD-96-111BR
Military Readiness
(703130)
Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV
AWACS - Airborne Warning and Control System
DOD - Department of Defense
SORTS - Status of Resources and Training System
Letter
=============================================================== LETTER
B-271209
March 4, 1996
The Honorable Floyd Spence
Chairman, Committee on National Security
House of Representatives
Dear Mr. Chairman:
As you requested, this report is an unclassified version of our
earlier classified report on military readiness. We analyzed
military readiness data contained in the Department of Defense's
(DOD) Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS) to determine if
the data showed significant changes in readiness since 1990--a year
of peak readiness. This report provides readiness information for
the four military services. Specifically, it (1) summarizes the
reported overall readiness status of all military units from January
1, 1990, to March 31, 1995; (2) assesses readiness trends of selected
units from each service for the same period, and, where applicable,
discusses reported readiness problems experienced throughout a
service and by the selected units; and (3) explains significant
changes in reported readiness of the selected units.
On August 31, 1995, we briefed the Subcommittee on Military
Readiness, House Committee on National Security, staff on the results
of our work. This report summarizes the information we presented in
that briefing.
BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1
SORTS is DOD's automated reporting system that identifies the current
level of selected resources and training status of a unit--that is,
its ability to undertake its wartime mission. Units report their
overall readiness status as well as the status of four resource areas
(personnel, equipment and supplies on hand, equipment condition, and
training).\1 Overall readiness status is generally reported at a
level consistent with the lowest rated resource level, but commanders
are allowed to subjectively upgrade or downgrade the overall rating.
SORTS is an internal management tool used by the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs, services, and combatant commands. It provides the
Chairman with the necessary unit information to achieve an adequate
and feasible military response to crisis situations and participate
in the joint planning and execution process.
In viewing SORTS information, it should be noted that there are
significant differences in the way each service manages readiness.
For example, the Air Force's goal is to maintain all units at the C-2
level or better. In contrast, the Army uses a tiered resourcing
system that maintains contingency units at the C-1 or C-2 level but
allows later-deploying units to fall to the C-2 or C-3 level. The
Navy and the Marine Corps manage readiness so that deployed units are
C-1 or C-2. Units deployed or preparing for deployment have higher
resource allocation priority than nondeployed units. Therefore,
reported readiness fluctuates with deployment and maintenance cycles.
--------------------
\1 Readiness status of a unit is reported by assigning "C" levels
that are defined as follows: C-1--Unit can undertake the full
wartime mission for which it is organized or designed. C-2--Unit can
undertake the bulk of its wartime mission. C-3--Unit can undertake
major portions of its wartime mission. C-4--Unit requires additional
resources and/or training to undertake its wartime mission, but if
the situation dictates, it may be required to undertake portions of
the mission with resources on hand. C-5--Unit is undergoing a
service-directed resource change and is not prepared to undertake its
wartime mission.
RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2
DOD-wide, the percentage of military units with the ability to
undertake all or major portions of assigned missions remained
generally stable from January 1, 1990, to March 31, 1995.
Of the 94 units we reviewed, readiness remained at levels consistent
with service goals in 75 (80 percent) of the units. However,
readiness declined below the goals in 19 (20 percent) of the units.
In five of these units, the readiness reductions were for fairly
short periods of time due to the units' participation in contingency
operations. In the remaining units, readiness reductions were caused
primarily by personnel shortages, equipment shortages, and difficulty
in obtaining training for personnel in certain military occupations.
In the Navy units we analyzed, ships maintained the desired readiness
levels when periods of planned maintenance and training were
excluded. However, the readiness of Navy aviation squadrons declined
in the training area--a problem we found was Navy-wide. The
reduction was caused by personnel shortages related to the Navy's
decision to increase the number of aircraft authorized in some
squadrons and a shortage of funds to pay for the flying hours needed
to keep pilots qualified. As a result, from April 1994 through March
1995, the number of naval aviation units reporting the desired
readiness levels declined by 27 percent. Although the funding
problem was alleviated at the beginning of fiscal year 1995, the Navy
has been unable to raise the readiness to previous levels.
In the Marine Corps units we analyzed, the readiness for ground
combat units remained at desired levels throughout the period,
whereas the readiness of support and aviation units fluctuated or
remained stable at a lower level. This happened because these units
continuously provided detachments to deploying ships and Marine
Expeditionary Units. Although a constant drain of personnel and
equipment depressed the reported readiness of parent units, Marine
Corps officials said that this practice reflected normal operations
and that they considered the readiness of these units to be adequate,
albeit at a level lower than desired. Officials attributed this
situation to Marine Corps-wide problems in training personnel for
certain occupational specialties. Since the Corps does not have its
own training capability for skilled specialties, it must rely on the
other military services to provide it. Officials expect it will take
about
2 years to resolve this problem.
Readiness for most active Army infantry, armor, and artillery units
we analyzed remained high for contingency units and generally stable
for later deploying units. There were, however, significant changes
or fluctuations in the readiness of five active Army units due to
contingency operations. These units were used to support operations
such as Somalia, thereby decreasing their availability to the parent
units or inhibiting the deployed units' ability to train its
personnel. Also, Army National Guard combat units experienced
readiness reductions. Officials attributed the reductions to
comprehensive readiness reporting criteria that provide a more
accurate portrayal of personnel availability and to the difficulty of
getting guardsmen trained in occupational skills. National Guard
units also overstated their readiness by understating the number of
training days required to achieve a C-1 status. Lastly, some
commanders subjectively upgraded their units' overall status.
Officials told us they could not determine in retrospect whether the
upgrades were justified.
Readiness for Air Force units we analyzed generally remained at
desired levels. However, there was some reduction or fluctuation in
the readiness of airlift and Airborne Warning and Control System
(AWACS) units. Air Force officials said this condition occurred
because aircraft have been continuously committed to the operations
in Saudi Arabia, Somalia, and Bosnia. Officials said heavy usage of
airlift aircraft have strained the supply of spare parts and engines.
The constant use of AWACS aircraft for contingency and counterdrug
operations affected the Air Force's ability to train crews and
maintain required skills. We also noted that commanders sometimes
reported overall readiness levels higher than the measured resource
areas. Air Force officials said they consider this SORTS feature to
be a strength of the system. They believe that a commander is in the
best position to accurately assess the readiness of a unit on the
basis of a wide range of information available to make this judgment.
SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3
DOD has over 10,000 units that report readiness status under SORTS.
We analyzed the overall readiness reported for all units since
January 1, 1990. In addition, we performed a detailed analysis of
all readiness data reported for a cross-section of units\2 in each
service. To ensure that we obtained adequate coverage, we asked
service officials to help us select specific units that would
represent the various types of units within the service. The units
selected are not a statistical sample, and the results of our
analyses cannot be projected to the entire service. The units
included in our review are shown in appendix II.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff established the requirements for specific
data that each service must report. In addition, the Army, the Navy,
and the Air Force identified a number of service-unique indicators
that their units are required to report. We selected indicators from
this universe that we believe are most relevant to identifying
readiness trends. In general, these indicators comprised the overall
C-rating for the unit, the C-rating for each of the four measured
resource areas, and data elements that are used to determine the
C-rating in each measured area. (See app. II.)
For the selected units, we graphed the data elements and identified
trends. Where we noted changes in historical trends or in units that
dropped below C-2 for extended periods, we compared the readiness
data with operational scheduling and maintenance data and discussed
these conditions with readiness officers from the respective
services. Briefing sections I-IV of this report contain summary data
for each service.
With the exception that we did not assess the reliability of SORTS
data provided by the services, our review followed generally accepted
government auditing standards and was conducted from November 1994
through July 1995.
In written comments on a draft of our report, DOD agreed with the
information presented. (See app. I.) We are sending copies of this
report to the Chairmen, Senate and House Committees on
Appropriations; the Chairman, Senate Committee on Armed Services; and
the Secretaries of Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force.
Copies will also be made available to others upon request.
The major contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV. If
you or your staff have questions about this report, please call me on
(202) 512-5140.
Sincerely yours,
Mark E. Gebicke
Director, Military Operations
and Capabilities Issues
Briefing Section I
--------------------
\2 For our analyses, we selected the following reporting
organizations: Navy ships, submarines, and aircraft squadrons;
Marine Corps and Army battalions, support groups, and squadrons; and
Air Force wings and squadrons.
NAVY READINESS TRENDS: JANUARY
1990-MARCH 1995
============================================================== Letter
(See figure in printed
edition.)
The percentage of units that reported an overall readiness status of
C-1 to C-3 was stable. The readiness reported for 15 of the 16 ships
included in our analysis fluctuated cyclically between when they were
deployed and not deployed or undergoing maintenance. Five of eight
aviation units showed a similar readiness trend. In the remaining
units, we identified significant reductions in readiness levels.
Only one Navy ship experienced a reduction in readiness, as compared
to several aviation units. In explaining the reduced readiness in
aviation units, Navy officials said that during the past year, the
training readiness of aviation squadrons Navy-wide declined
significantly.
Officials attributed the reduction to two major factors. First,
contingency operations caused a shortage of flying hour funding in
late 1994, which significantly reduced training readiness. We did
not verify the funding shortage. Second, personnel shortages were
caused by force structure changes that increased the number of
authorized aircraft in some squadrons. In August 1994, the number of
squadrons that reported C-1 or C-2 in training declined by 15 percent
from only 3 months earlier. The funding shortage was alleviated at
the beginning of fiscal year 1995, but training readiness has not yet
reached previous levels.
Briefing Section II MARINE CORPS
READINESS TRENDS: JANUARY
1990-MARCH 1995
============================================================== Letter
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Although the percentage of units that reported C-1 to C-3 for overall
readiness was stable, the percentage that reported C-1 or C-2
declined. Readiness in the seven Marine Corps ground combat units we
reviewed was stable at desired levels. Likewise, readiness in 7 of
the 13 aviation and support units remained stable at desired levels.
However, we noted significant fluctuations or changes in the reported
readiness of five aviation, maintenance, and support units and one
instance in which a squadron's training rating dropped due to
insufficient flying hours late in fiscal year 1994.
Marine Corps officials contended that these changes generally reflect
normal variations due to the way the Corps organizes and deploys its
forces. For example, many Marine Corps aviation and support units
are not deployed as a single entity that reports readiness. Instead,
the units provide detachments, comprised of mission-ready personnel
and equipment, to a deploying Marine Expeditionary Unit. This
necessarily degrades the readiness status of the parent unit, which
then begins to build toward its next commitment. This continuous
cycle of deploying the best-trained personnel and mission-ready
equipment may cause changes in the reported status of the unit or
cause it to remain at a low level over time.
Officials said that although readiness for many of the units was
stable, it was not at the desired level. They said that there are
Corps-wide problems in providing sufficient personnel trained in many
of the low-density, highly skilled military occupational specialties.
Officials attributed this largely to the planned force-structure
reduction designed to reduce the Corps to 159,000 personnel.
Although this level was subsequently changed to 174,000, the Corps
meanwhile had lost many of its skilled personnel and forfeited future
training opportunities. Since the Corps does not have its own
facilities to train personnel for these skills, it relies on the
other services to provide training. Officials expect it will take
about 2 years to correct this deficiency.
Briefing Section III ARMY
READINESS TRENDS: JANUARY
1990-MARCH 1995
============================================================== Letter
(See figure in printed
edition.)
The percentage of units that reported C-1 to C-3 for overall
readiness was stable. We noted significant changes or fluctuations
in reported readiness for active Army units due to contingency
operations and equipment maintenance problems, a general reduction in
readiness reported by National Guard units and, in some cases,
commanders' subjective upgrades of overall readiness ratings.
Five of the units included in our analysis were used to respond to
contingency situations, which affected readiness for fairly short
periods of time. Officials said that such use of units may affect
readiness in two ways. First, if only part of the reporting unit is
deployed, certain resources available to the unit are depleted,
thereby degrading readiness in such areas as personnel and equipment
on hand. Second, if a unit is engaged in one role, such as
peacekeeping or security operations, it may be unable to train
personnel in the full range of military skills or to maintain its
equipment in mission-ready condition.
We noted a reduction in readiness for National Guard combat units,
which Army officials attributed to more stringent reporting
requirements and the difficulty of getting personnel trained in the
needed occupational skills. Moreover, our analyses disclosed that
two of the four National Guard combat units we analyzed appear to
have understated the number of training days required to achieve C-1
status.
In several instances, Army unit commanders subjectively upgraded
their units' overall status. Army officials told us there was no way
of determining in retrospect whether the upgrades were justified.
They said many commanders view the SORTS reports as "report cards" on
their performance and will therefore make every effort to present the
unit in the best light. Officials also explained that a commander's
subjective assessment to upgrade or downgrade readiness is a
standard, deliberate part of the process that provides a more
complete assessment of a unit's readiness.
Briefing Section IV AIR FORCE
READINESS TRENDS: JANUARY
1990-MARCH 1995
============================================================== Letter
(See figure in printed
edition.)
The percentage of units that reported C-1 to C-3 for overall
readiness was stable. Readiness remained generally stable in most of
the units we reviewed. Guard and reserve units were the most stable.
In three of the units, there was some reduction or fluctuation in
reported readiness, primarily among airlift and specialty aircraft
units. Air Force officials generally attributed the changes to
continuous use of the aircraft for contingency operations and the
resulting strain on the supply of spare parts and engines. We also
noted that Air Force commanders sometimes upgraded their units'
overall readiness status above the level indicated by the four
measured resource areas.
Included in our sample were four Air Force Reserve and four Air
National Guard units--two fighter squadrons and two airlift squadrons
from each. Reported readiness in these units remained at high levels
throughout the period. Air Force officials attributed this condition
to the Air Force policy of viewing reserve components as an integral
part of the total force. They said that the reserve units had equal
access to the supply system in obtaining spare parts, were usually
staffed with experienced pilots and maintenance personnel, and were
generally not used as heavily as active component units.
Continuously using the aircraft to support Desert Storm, Somalia, and
Bosnia operations, along with counterdrug operations, affected the
reported readiness of Air Force units during this period.
Particularly affected were the airlift units required to transport
personnel, equipment, and supplies. For example, in fiscal year
1991, the C-141 fleet flew 58 percent over the planned flying hour
program, and the C-5 fleet flew over by 175 percent. Heavy use of
the C-141 and C-5 aircraft created a greater demand for spare parts
and engines and accelerated the rate at which the aircraft required
major repairs. Units with specialty aircraft, such as the E-3B
Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), were also affected.
These aircraft are an integral part of air operations and are in
constant demand by the commanders in chief.
Finally, Air Force commanders sometimes upgraded the overall
readiness status of their units. In some units we analyzed,
commanders subjectively upgraded the overall readiness reported for
extended periods of time
(5 consecutive months or longer). Air Force officials said that they
do not consider upgrades to be a problem. In fact, they consider the
capability to do this to be a strength of the Status of Resources and
Training System (SORTS) rather than a weakness. They believe that a
commander is in the best position to accurately assess the readiness
of a unit, on the basis of a wide range of information available to
make this judgment. Commanders have the prerogative to upgrade or
downgrade their unit's overall readiness status.
(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix I
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
============================================================== Letter
UNITS INCLUDED IN OUR READINESS
ASSESSMENT
========================================================== Appendix II
Major command Unit name Major equipment Home station
------------------ ------------------ ------------------ --------------------
Air Force
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Air Combat Command
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
96th Wing 28th Bomb Squadron B-1B aircraft Dyess Air Force
Base, Tex.
4th Wing 744th Air KC-10A aircraft Seymour Johnson Air
Refueling Squadron Force Base, N.C.
1st Fighter Wing 71st Air Rescue HC-130P aircraft Patrick Air Force
Squadron Base, Fla.
27th Fighter F-15C/D aircraft Langley Air Force
Squadron Base, Va.
2nd Bomb Wing 20th Bomb Squadron B-52H aircraft Barksdale Air Force
Base, La.
355th Wing 354th Fighter OA-10A aircraft Davis-Monthan Air
Squadron Force Base, Ariz.
23rd Wing 41st Airlift C-130E aircraft Pope Air Force Base,
Squadron N.C.
U.S. Air Forces, Europe
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
52nd Fighter Wing 23rd Fighter F-16C aircraft Spangdahlem Air
Squadron Base, Germany
Pacific Air Forces
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
18th Wing 961st Airborne E-3B aircraft Kadena Air Force
Warning and Base, Japan
Control Squadron
3rd Wing 90th Fighter F-15E aircraft Elmendorf Air Force
Squadron Base, Alaska
Air Mobility Command
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
60th Airlift Wing C-5B aircraft Travis Air Force
Base, Calif.
437th Airlift Wing C-141B aircraft Charleston Air Force
Base, S.C.
22nd Air Refueling KC-135A aircraft McConnell Air Force
Wing Base, Kans.
Air Force Special Operations Command
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
353rd Special 1st Special MC-130E aircraft Kadena Air Base,
Operations Group Operations Japan
Squadron
Air National Guard
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
135th Airlift 104th Fighter A-10A aircraft Martin Air National
Group Squadron Guard Station, Md.
172nd Airlift 183rd Airlift C-141B aircraft Jackson Air National
Group Squadron Guard Station, Miss.
136th Airlift Wing 181st Airlift C-130H aircraft Dallas Naval Air
Squadron Station, Tex.
149th Fighter 182nd Fighter F-16A/B aircraft Kelly Air Force
Group Squadron Base, Tex.
Air Force Reserve
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
914th Airlift 328th Airlift C-130H aircraft Niagra Falls, N.Y.
Group Squadron
459th Airlift Wing C-141B aircraft Andrews Air Force
Base, Md.
442nd Fighter Wing 303rd Fighter OA-10A aircraft Whiteman Air Force
Squadron Base, Mo.
301st Fighter Wing 457th Fighter F-16A aircraft Ft. Worth Naval Air
Squadron Station, Tex.
Army
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3rd Infantry 2nd Battalion, 1st AH64A; OH58C Katerbach, Germany
Division Aviation Regiment helicopters
(mechanized)
1st Battalion, 6th Bradley fighting Vilseck, Germany
Infantry Regiment vehicles
3rd Battalion, 1st 155mm self- Bamberg, Germany
Field Artillery propelled
Regiment howitzers
2nd Battalion, M1A2 main battle Schweinft, Germany
64th Armor tanks
Regiment
82nd Combat Combat engineer Bamberg, Germany
Engineering vehicles;
Battalion personnel carriers
703rd Combat Recovery vehicles; Kitzingen, Germany
Support Battalion medical equipment
4th Infantry 1st Battalion, 4th AH64 attack Fort Carson, Colo.
Division Aviation Regiment helicopters
(mechanized)
1st Battalion, 155mm self- Pocatello, Idaho
148th Field propelled
Artillery Regiment howitzers
2nd Battalion, M1A1 main battle Fort Carson, Colo.
77th Armor tanks
Regiment
1st Battalion, 8th Armored personnel Fort Carson, Colo.
Infantry Regiment carriers
4th Combat Support Personnel carriers Fort Carson, Colo.
Battalion
299th Engineering Personnel carriers Fort Carson, Colo.
Battalion
24th Infantry 1st Battalion, AH64 attack Hunter Army
Division 24th Aviation helicopters Airfield, Ga.
(mechanized) Regiment
4th Battalion, 155mm self- Fort Benning, Ga.
41st Field propelled
Artillery Regiment howitzers
1st Battalion, M1A1 main battle Fort Stewart, Ga.
64th Armor tanks
Regiment
2nd Battalion, Bradley fighting Fort Benning, Ga.
18th Infantry vehicles; Dragon
Regiment anti-tank missiles
24th Combat Recovery vehicles; Fort Stewart, Ga.
Support Battalion personnel carriers
317th Engineering Combat engineer Fort Benning, Ga.
Battalion vehicles;
personnel carriers
1st Battalion, M1A1 main battle Mullins, S.C.
263rd Armor tanks
Regiment
1st Battalion, M1A1 main battle Calhoun, Ga.
108th Armor tanks
Regiment
148th Combat 5,000-gallon Forsyth, Ga.
Support Battalion trailers; 10,000-
gallon collapsible
tanks
648th Engineering Tank launch Statesboro, Ga.
Battalion recovery vehicles;
combat engineer
vehicles
10th Infantry 3rd Battalion, Infantry equipment Fort Drum, N.Y.
Division (light) 14th Infantry
Regiment
3rd Battalion, TOW anti-tank Utica, N.Y.
108th Infantry missiles
Regiment
2nd Battalion, OH58A helicopters Fort Drum, N.Y.
25th Aviation
Regiment
2nd Battalion, 7th 105mm towed Fort Drum, N.Y.
Field Artillery howitzers
Regiment
10th Combat Medical equipment Fort Drum, N.Y.
Support Battalion
41st Engineering Track and wheeled Fort Drum, N.Y.
Battalion engineering
vehicles
Marine Corps
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1st Marine Air Marine Wing Mobile airfield Okinawa, Japan
Wing Support Squadron equipment
172
2nd Marine Air Attack Squadron AV8B aircraft Cherry Point Marine
Wing 231 Corps Air Station,
N.C.
Electronic EA6B aircraft Cherry Point Marine
Countermeasures Corps Air Station,
Squadron 1 N.C.
Light Attack UH1N; AH1W New River Marine
Helicopter helicopters Corps Air Station,
Squadron 269 N.C.
Fighter/Attack F/A18D aircraft Beaufort Marine
(all weather) Corps Air Station,
Squadron 533 S.C.
3rd Marine Air Marine Air Control Radios; vans El Toro Marine Corps
Wing Group 38 Air Station, Calif.
Fighter/Attack F/A18D aircraft Miramar Naval Air
(all weather) Station, Calif.
Squadron 121
Attack Squadron AV8B aircraft Yuma Marine Corps
214 Air Station, Ariz.
1st Division 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry equipment Twenty Nine Palms,
Marine Regiment Calif.
1st Light Armor Light armor Camp Pendleton,
Reconnaissance vehicles Calif.
Battalion
2nd Division 3rd Battalion, 2nd Infantry equipment Camp Lejeune, N.C.
Marine Regiment
1st Battalion, 6th Infantry equipment Camp Lejeune, N.C.
Marine Regiment
2nd Light Armor Light armor Camp Lejeune, N.C.
Reconnaissance vehicles
Battalion
2nd Surveillance, 2nd Radio Radios Camp Lejeune, N.C.
Reconnaissance, Battalion
and Intelligence
Group
3rd Division 2nd Battalion, 3rd Infantry equipment Kaneohe Bay Marine
Marine Regiment Corps Air Station,
Hawaii
U.S. Marine Corps 1st Battalion, Infantry equipment Detroit, Mich.
Reserves 24th Marine
Regiment
4th Combat Engineer equipment Baltimore, Md.
Engineering
Battalion
1st Force Service 1st Maintenance Repair equipment Camp Pendleton,
Support Group Battalion Calif.
2nd Force Service 8th Engineering Engineer equipment Camp Lejeune, N.C.
Support Group Support Battalion
3rd Force Service 3rd Support Logistics support Okinawa, Japan
Support Group Battalion equipment
Navy
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Atlantic Fleet USS Puget Sound Destroyer tender Norfolk, Va.
USS Simon Lake Submarine tender La Maddalena, Italy
USS Monterey Guided-missile Mayport, Fla.
cruiser
USS Eisenhower Nuclear aircraft Norfolk, Va.
carrier
USS Connolly Destroyer Norfolk, Va.
USS Nassau Amphibious assault Norfolk, Va.
ship
USS Gladiator Mine counter- Ingleside, Tex.
measures ship
USS Nebraska Ballistic missile Kings Bay, Ga.
submarine
USS Saturn Combat stores ship Norfolk, Va.
Helicopter Support CH53E helicopters Norfolk Naval Air
Squadron 4 Station, Va.
Electronic Warfare EA6B aircraft Oceana Naval Air
Squadron 120 Station, Va.
Fighter Squadron F14 aircraft Oceana Naval Air
102 Station, Va.
Anti-Submarine S3 aircraft Cecil Field Naval
Squadron 32 Air Station, Fla.
USS America Conventional Norfolk, Va.
aircraft carrier
Pacific Fleet USS Willamette Fleet oiler Pearl Harbor, Hawaii
USS Sacramento Combat support Bremerton, Wash.
ship
USS Callaghan Guided-missile San Diego, Calif.
destroyer
USS Ingraham Guided-missile Everett, Wash.
frigate
Anti-Submarine SH60F; HH60H North Island Naval
Helicopter helicopters Air Station, Calif.
Squadron 14
USS New Orleans Amphibious assault San Diego, Calif.
ship
USS Honolulu Fast-attack Pearl Harbor, Hawaii
submarine
Attack Squadron A6 aircraft Whidbey Island Naval
196 Air Station, Wash.
Fighter/Attack F/A18 aircraft Lemoore Naval Air
Squadron 94 Station, Calif.
Tactical Support C130; T39; C2 Guam, U.S. territory
Squadron 50 aircraft
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
READINESS INDICATORS INCLUDED IN
OUR ANALYSIS
========================================================= Appendix III
AIR FORCE
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:1
AIR FORCE SORTS DATA
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:1.1
Overall C-rating
Personnel C-rating
Equipment and supplies on-hand C-rating
Major equipment condition C-rating
Training C-rating
AIR FORCE-UNIQUE INDICATORS
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:1.2
Percentage of authorized personnel available
Percentage of critical authorized personnel available
Percentage of authorized crews formed, mission-ready, and available
Percentage of authorized combat-essential equipment and supplies on
hand
Percentage of authorized support equipment and supplies on hand
Percentage of possessed combat-essential equipment that was
mission-ready and available within unit's response time
Percentage of possessed support equipment mission-ready and
available within unit's response time
GAO CALCULATIONS USING AIR
FORCE SORTS DATA
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:1.3
Percentage of total authorized personnel assigned
Percentage of total authorized critical personnel assigned
Percentage of total authorized crews formed, mission-ready, and
available
Percentage of total authorized crews formed from assigned
individual personnel
Percentage of authorized combat-essential equipment assigned
Percentage of authorized combat-essential equipment on hand
Percentage of authorized combat-essential equipment mission-ready
and available
Percentage of assigned combat-essential equipment mission-ready and
available
Percentage of possessed combat-essential equipment mission-ready
and available
ARMY
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:2
ARMY SORTS DATA
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:2.1
Overall C-rating
Personnel C-rating
Equipment and supplies on-hand C-rating
Major equipment condition C-rating
Training C-rating
Assigned personnel ratings
Percentage of total authorized personnel assigned
Available personnel rating
Percentage of total authorized personnel available
Percentage of total senior grade authorized personnel available
Military occupational specialty-qualified personnel ratings
Percentage of total authorized personnel qualified in military
occupational specialty
Senior grade personnel ratings
Percentage of personnel turnover
Pacing items fill rating
Condition rating for all on-hand equipment items
Percentage of all on-hand equipment that is mission-capable
Condition rating for all on-hand pacing items
Percentage of on-hand pacing equipment items that are
mission-capable
Training days required to achieve C-1
GAO CALCULATIONS USING ARMY
SORTS DATA
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:2.2
Percentage of equipment and supplies on hand
MARINE CORPS AND NAVY
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:3
Overall C-rating
Personnel C-rating
Equipment and supplies on hand C-rating
Major equipment condition C-rating
Training C-rating
GAO-calculated percentage of total authorized crews mission ready
(Marine Corps only)
MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
========================================================== Appendix IV
NATIONAL SECURITY AND
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
Sharon A. Cekala
Charles Bonanno
Waverly Sykes
Jai Eun Lee
James Ungvarsky
NORFOLK REGIONAL OFFICE
Ray S. Carroll, Jr.
James Lewis
James Mahaffey
Lester L. Ward
*** End of document. ***
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