U.S. Combat Air Power: Reassessing Plans to Modernize Interdiction Capabilities Could Save Billions (Chapter Report, 05/13/96, GAO/NSIAD-96-72)

GAO evaluated the military services' current aggregate interdiction
assets for striking enemy targets and the contribution of planned
modernization programs to total interdiction capabilities, focusing on
the reasonableness of the planned enhancements.
GAO found that: (1) although the services have determined that they have
enough capability to carry out the national military strategy of being
able to engage and win in two nearly simultaneous major regional
conflicts, the services plan to spend over $213 billion to modify and
purchase weapons; (2) the services' independently developed
modernization plans do not consider the other services' capabilities,
sometimes resulting in interdiction redundancies; (3) some weapons
modernization proposals may not be sound investments because they may
add expensive new capabilities that may be redundant or unnecessary; and
(4) until the Department of Defense assesses interdiction capabilities
in the aggregate, there can be little assurance that the appropriate,
most cost-effective mix of weapons systems is being identified,
developed, and fielded for interdiction missions.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: NSIAD-96-72
TITLE: U.S. Combat Air Power: Reassessing Plans to Modernize
Interdiction Capabilities Could Save Billions
DATE: 05/13/96
SUBJECT: Defense cost control
Military systems analysis
Defense capabilities
Combat readiness
Air defense systems
Military procurement
Weapons systems
Defense contingency planning
Cost effectiveness analysis
Air warfare
IDENTIFIER: B-1B Aircraft
Army Tactical Missile System
F-14 Aircraft
F/A-18C/D Aircraft
F/A-18E/F Aircraft
A-6 Aircraft
Apache Helicopter
Comanche Helicopter
Longbow Apache Helicopter
Tomahawk Cruise Missile
F-111 Aircraft
F-22 Aircraft
AV-8B Aircraft
DOD Future Years Defense Program
DOD Bottom-Up Review
AH-64 Helicopter
Joint Direct Attack Weapon
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Cover
================================================================ COVER
Report to Congressional Committees
May 1996
U.S. COMBAT AIR POWER -
REASSESSING PLANS TO MODERNIZE
INTERDICTION CAPABILITIES COULD
SAVE BILLIONS
GAO/NSIAD-96-72
U.S. Combat Air Power
(701039)
Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV
ATACMS - Army tactical missile system
BAT - brilliant anti-armor
CBMR - Capabilities Based Munitions Requirements
CEM - Combined Effects Munition
CINC - Commander in Chief
DOD - Department of Defense
FYDP - Future Years Defense Program
JSF - Joint Strike Fighter
JDAM - Joint Direct Attack Munition
JROC - Joint Requirements Oversight Council
JSOW - Joint Standoff Weapon
MLRS - Multiple-Launch Rocket System
MRC - major regional conflict
SFW - Sensor Fuzed Weapon
TLAM - Tomahawk Land Attack Missile
WCMD - Wind Corrected Munitions Dispenser
Letter
=============================================================== LETTER
B-260147
May 13, 1996
Congressional Committees
The military services plan to spend more than $200 billion on
aircraft and other interdiction weapons over the next 15 to 20 years
to add to their already extensive capabilities to interdict an enemy.
The current national military strategy asserts that modernizing U.S.
forces is vital to preserving the combat edge they now have, but it
also challenges the Department of Defense (DOD) to make investments
only "where there is clearly a substantial payoff."
To determine the reasonableness of planned enhancements, we evaluated
the military's current aggregate interdiction assets for striking
enemy targets and the contribution of planned modernization programs
to total interdiction capabilities. This report contains a
recommendation to the Secretary of Defense that would enhance DOD's
requirements processes.
This review was part of our broader effort to assess how DOD can
better adapt its combat air power to meet future needs. We are
addressing this report to you because of your responsibility for the
issues discussed and your interest in the subject.
Richard Davis
Director, National Security
Analysis
List of Congressional Committees
The Honorable Strom Thurmond
Chairman
The Honorable Sam Nunn
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
The Honorable Ted Stevens
Chairman
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
The Honorable Floyd Spence
Chairman
The Honorable Ronald V. Dellums
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on National Security
House of Representatives
The Honorable C.W. Bill Young
Chairman
The Honorable John P. Murtha
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on National Security
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
============================================================ Chapter 0
PURPOSE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1
In recent years, the U.S. military's interdiction and other combat
mission priorities have changed. During the Cold War, the enemy was
more clearly identified and defense forces were geared to fight that
enemy. The threat has changed dramatically, from a single global
threat to smaller, less easily defined regional threats, and the size
and structure of defense forces are changing as well. The military
is challenged to ensure that its funding is directed to the most
critical priorities as the forces are reduced and reshaped to meet
future national security needs. Yet the services plan to spend more
than $200 billion on aircraft and other weapons over the next 15 to
20 years, adding to their already extensive capabilities to interdict
an enemy. To determine the reasonableness of these planned
enhancements, GAO evaluated (1) the military's current and future
aggregate interdiction assets for striking enemy targets and (2) the
effect of the services' planned modernization programs on total
interdiction capabilities and alternatives to those programs. This
review was part of GAO's broader effort to assess how the Department
of Defense (DOD) can better adapt its combat air power to meet future
needs.
BACKGROUND
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2
During the Cold War era, the armed forces of the United States were
trained, organized, and equipped to counter the global Soviet threat.
Extensive modernization of the forces during the 1980s provided the
nation with immense military power. With the collapse of the Soviet
Union, a single enemy no longer poses an immediate threat to U.S.
survival. Instead, America faces a broad range of less serious
challenges such as regional strife, insurgencies, and civil wars.
DOD now requires that its smaller force be able to fight and win two
nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts (MRC)--one in the east,
another in the west. Part of the national strategy for fighting and
winning our nation's wars is to have weapons that can
interdict--divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy--enemy targets before
they can be used against U.S. forces, thus better controlling the
battlefield and minimizing U.S. and allied casualties. During two
MRCs, U.S. forces may confront more than 100,000 targets. They
include artillery, tanks, personnel carriers, bridges, and fuel
storage sites.
The Air Force, the Navy, and the Marines primarily use their combat
aircraft to strike these ground targets. The Navy also uses
sea-launched missiles, and the Army can use Apache helicopters and
ground-launched missiles. In addition, all the services use
precision-guided munitions. While these weapons can be used for
interdiction, almost all of the combat aircraft and helicopters can
be used in other roles such as close fire support. DOD's national
military strategy, considers modernization, where there is
"substantial payoff," to be vital to preserving the U.S. forces'
current combat edge and ensuring future readiness. The Defense
Planning Guidance for fiscal years 1997-2001 also highlights DOD's
commitment to an affordable long-term modernization program. The
DOD-sponsored Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces
(the Commission) issued a report in May 1995 on current and future
capabilities, including those used for interdiction.\1
In weighing the merits of the services' weapon modernization
proposals--including those for interdiction, various entities within
the Office of the Secretary of Defense provide independent analyses
as needed to the Secretary. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council
(JROC) examines military requirements from a joint perspective in
advising the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary
on these modernization proposals. To support the JROC, a Joint
Warfighting Capabilities Assessment process was set up in 1994 to
examine joint warfighting requirements from a mission area
perspective.
--------------------
\1 Directions for Defense, Report of the Commission on Roles and
Missions of the Armed Forces, (Washington, DC: GPO, May 1995), which
is referred to in this report as Directions for Defense.
RESULTS IN BRIEF
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3
The services have aggregate forces capable of hitting interdiction
targets in numerous overlapping, often redundant, ways during two
MRCs. They have designated at least 10 ways to hit nearly 65 percent
of the total expected ground targets, and some targets could be hit
by 25 or more combinations of aircraft, missiles, bombs, or
precision-guided munitions. Yet the services' modernization plans
would increase to over 85 percent the number of targets that could be
hit 10 or more ways.
Given the services' ample interdiction capabilities and continuing
questions over future defense spending, some planned modernization
programs may not be sound investments. Each service has proposed
upgrades or new weapons that may offer little additional interdiction
capability. For example, the Air Force's planned upgrade to the B-1B
bomber and the Navy's F/A-18E/F procurement add more redundancy at a
high cost. The effect of other planned modernization·the Army's
purchase of more Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS), Comanche
helicopters and its upgrade to the Apache helicopter as well as the
services' purchases of more precision-guided munitions·on
interdiction capability is unclear. DOD does not assess interdiction
modernization proposals in terms of the adequacy of aggregate
capability. Without such an assessment, DOD has little assurance
that its interdiction capabilities are properly sized to meet mission
needs, or whether more cost-effective alternatives exist.
PRINCIPAL FINDINGS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4
SERVICES HAVE ABUNDANT
INTERDICTION CAPABILITIES,
YET PLAN TO ADD MORE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.1
GAO's and others' analyses showed that the services have more than
enough capability to hit identified ground targets for the two MRCs.
Combat air power has been and is expected to remain a primary
interdiction force, as it was during the Persian Gulf War. The
forces available today, however, significantly exceed those used
during the Gulf War, and other weapons that could also contribute to
the mission·the Navy's Tomahawk Land Attack Missile, the Army's
Apache and Comanche helicopters and ATACMS, and all the services'
precision-guided munitions, for example·are increasingly available.
Additionally, the services' responsibilities for hitting targets
overlap and exceed 100 percent. For example, to interdict 80 percent
of one target type, a Commander in Chief (CINC) allocated a
percentage of the targets to each service so that in total, the
allocation exceeded the total number of targets by 140 percent.
Further, the services have multiple ways to hit the same target. For
example, 1 target type can currently be hit with 21 combinations
featuring 6 different aircraft,
1 type of missile launcher, and 10 types of munitions. Moreover, the
number of options in this example is not unusual·some targets can be
hit by at least 25 combinations.
Despite the numerous interdiction capabilities, the services plan to
spend over $213 billion to modify some of their weapons and buy
others. This cost does not include over $72 billion for the F-22 or
the cost of the Joint Strike Fighter aircraft, which will affect the
budget to 2010 and later. Six of the programs will cost an estimated
$188 billion over the next 15 to
20 years: the Air Force's modification of the B-1B for conventional
use, the Navy's purchase of 1,000 F/A-18E/F aircraft, the Army's
upgrade of about 750 Apache helicopters and purchase of about 1,300
Comanche helicopters and 2,800 ATACMS, and all the services' purchase
of
260,000 precision-guided munitions. Implementing all of the
services' planned modernization programs could pose problems for DOD.
According to GAO's analysis of DOD's Future Years Defense Program,
these modernization initiatives will cost at least $45 billion during
fiscal years 1995-2001.
ASSESSMENT OF TOTAL
CAPABILITIES OFFERS
OPPORTUNITY TO SEEK
ALTERNATIVES TO
MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.2
The environment in which the services develop modernization plans
does not encourage them to take into account the aggregate
capabilities available in the other services. Rather, each service
maintains its own view about how it can ensure that its interdiction
targets are hit. For example, GAO reported in 1993 that the Navy had
not justified the need for the F/A-18E/F aircraft based on threat and
had not explored options other than Navy fixed-wing aircraft.\2
Recognizing the need for oversight in developing requirements, JROC
was established to assess service modernization initiatives.
However, to date the Council has not focused on the possibility of
making trade-offs among major weapons. Moreover, the Joint
Warfighting Capabilities Assessment process is too new to evaluate
its contributions to the debate over modernization proposals.
Additionally, the Commission on Roles and Missions recommended that
DOD do a cost-effectiveness study to determine the appropriate
combination and quantities of attack capabilities in its current
inventory as well as those under development by all the services.
The study is expected to be completed by mid-1996.
During this review of DOD's interdiction capabilities, GAO assessed
the relative contribution of all the services' weapons. This
analysis served as a basis for determining whether planned
modernizations will provide substantial payoff and for developing
options for DOD to consider when assessing investments in some of
these modernization programs.
--------------------
\2 Naval Aviation: Consider All Alternatives Before Proceeding With
the F/A-18E/F (GAO/NSIAD-93-144, Aug. 1993), which is referred to in
this report as Naval Aviation: Consider All Alternatives.
B-1B
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 0:4.2.1
Rather than modify and sustain the B-1B force, the Air Force could
retire its B-1Bs as soon as possible, based on the presumption that
their targets could be hit by other available interdiction weapons.
It could then use the resulting savings·nearly $4 billion in
modernization costs and nearly $1 billion in annual operating
costs·for other initiatives.
Several factors make the continued need for B-1Bs questionable. DOD
considers its current capability sufficient to successfully meet its
requirement to interdict enemy targets identified in two MRCs. Also,
GAO and the Air Force estimate that the modified B-1B would strike a
very small percentage of the Air Force's designated enemy targets,
and Unified Command officials stated they would use far fewer B-1Bs
than are cited as necessary by DOD. In addition, other Air Force and
Navy aircraft can launch the same munitions as the modified B-1B as
well as others. Finally, although their impact is not yet known, new
or improved weapons such as helicopters, ATACMS, and other
precision-guided munitions could be used to strike interdiction
targets as well.
F/A-18E/F
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 0:4.2.2
The Navy could reconsider its F/A-18E/F aircraft procurement plans
and instead consider procuring more F/A-18C/Ds. These aircraft could
be used for interdiction until the next generation strike fighter
achieves operational capability. The Navy proposes spending almost
$90 billion for 1,000 F/A-18E/Fs to replace the A-6, F/A-18C/D, and
the F-14 as they are retired. We believe that this plan appears to
contradict the national military strategy, which cautions against
making major new investments unless there is "substantial payoff."
Based on recent assessments, the operational capabilities of the E/F
model may only be marginally improved over the F/A-18C/D model, yet
would cost substantially more. The C/D model, which proved its
capabilities in the Gulf War, is still in production and is being
improved at a cost of $1.5 billion.
ATACMS AND ARMY ATTACK
HELICOPTERS
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 0:4.2.3
The Army investments in ATACMS and improved Army helicopters could
affect the future force structure. However, the value of these
weapons for interdiction is unknown because the services have not
determined how they fit into the mission. While these weapons add
redundancy to aggregate interdiction capabilities, they also add new
capability that could reduce the need for some aircraft. An
examination of their value as part of the military's total
interdiction capabilities could aid in deciding how much money to
invest in each.
The Army plans to spend about $63 billion to purchase ATACMS and
Comanche helicopters and to modify its Apache helicopters. With
these modernizations, the Army could independently interdict ground
targets, and when added to the aggregate capability, these weapons
could minimize the risk associated with some of the options to Air
Force and Navy modernization programs discussed previously. The
Army, for example, has suggested that the ATACMS may be useful in
hitting 27 to 40 percent of the interdiction target types, depending
on the enemy. However, the services have not resolved how the ATACMS
should be coordinated with other services' assets to interdict such
targets. Furthermore, the Army plans to limit the use of the Apache
and the Comanche helicopters to supporting its ground maneuver
operations. Although Army officials said they will be used for
maneuver warfare, they were used in interdiction roles during the
Gulf War. Until these doctrinal and operational control issues are
resolved, the potential utility and interdiction contribution of
these weapons are unknown.
PRECISION-GUIDED
MUNITIONS
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 0:4.2.4
The services plan to spend over $40 billion to develop and buy
precision-guided munitions with improved accuracy, some with the
capability to be launched hundreds of miles from interdiction
targets, thereby reducing the risk to aircrews and aircraft. For
example, GAO's analysis shows that by 2002 the Air Force and the Navy
will require about 28 percent fewer flights to successfully hit their
targets because of these munitions' enhanced accuracy. However,
future force structure plans do not indicate that the services expect
to reduce the force below that cited in DOD's bottom-up review
because of the greater use of precision-guided munitions. Should
these munitions prove as effective as anticipated, it may be possible
to reduce some force structure without reducing overall capability
or, as the services suggested, to minimize the risks to pilots and
aircraft.
RECOMMENDATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:5
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense routinely review service
modernization proposals based on how they will enhance the current
aggregate ability of the U.S. military to perform the interdiction
mission. Such a process should prioritize funding for those
capabilities that contribute most to meeting joint operational
requirements and assist in determining the appropriate mix and
quantities of interdiction capabilities. Moreover, proposals that
add redundancy·such as the B-1B and Apache modifications and the
purchase of F/A-18E/Fs, ATACMS, attack helicopters, and
precision-guided missiles·should be examined in the context of the
additional interdiction capability they offer. This analysis could
serve as the basis for deciding funding priorities, the sufficiency
of investment, and the future force structure. GAO recognizes that
some weapon systems are multimission and that this recommended
assessment should consider the potential contribution to those other
missions.
AGENCY COMMENTS AND GAO'S
EVALUATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:6
In written comments (see app. III) on a draft of this report, DOD
agreed with GAO's recommendation that the Secretary of Defense
routinely review service modernization proposals based on how they
would enhance the current aggregate capability of the U.S. military
to perform the interdiction mission. DOD noted that changes were
needed to its requirements determination process in order to assess
the need for modernization proposals in terms of the threat, the
adequacy of current aggregate capabilities to conduct interdiction,
and the contribution that the modernization proposal would make to
aggregate interdiction capabilities.
DOD did not believe that it should initiate another process to review
service modernization proposals. It said that these reviews were
best implemented by making changes to their existing process. GAO
agrees with this approach. GAO's intent was not to institute a new
process, but rather to incorporate the necessary analysis required to
assess the aggregate capabilities of the services to perform
interdiction before deciding on the need for force modernization.
DOD disagreed that the services planned to add more interdiction
capability at high cost, despite the fact that they had ample forces
to meet current and future interdiction needs. However, DOD
acknowledged that its deep attack/weapons mix study is being done to
identify cost-saving reductions to current plans. This study was
recommended by the Commission on Roles and Missions because of its
concern that DOD may have greater quantities of strike aircraft and
other deep attack weapons than it needs. GAO also points to the
recent Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Program Assessment, in which he
states that tactical aircraft procurement plans call for greater than
expected resources. To reduce the strain on resources, the Chairman
recommends that the services identify programs that could be slowed
or terminated.
DOD partially concurred with other issues discussed in the report.
Its comments were considered in finalizing this report.
INTRODUCTION
============================================================ Chapter 1
During a war, the U.S. national leadership expects the military
forces to conduct large-scale, sustained combat operations with the
goal of winning quickly with as few casualties as possible.
Interdiction missions are part of the strategy for achieving this
goal. These missions are part of the effort aimed at denying the
enemy sanctuary and freedom of action. Targets may include such
things as tanks, bridges, and factories that when destroyed make
opponents easier to attack and defeat. Combat aircraft have
predominately been used to fulfill interdiction missions because they
generally offer the versatility and capability to strike at the enemy
when and where needed.
In recent years, U.S. military services' interdiction and other
combat mission priorities have changed. During the Cold War, the
enemy was more clearly identified, and defense forces were geared to
fight that enemy. The threat has changed dramatically, from a single
global threat to smaller, less defined regional threats, and the size
and structure of defense forces are changing as well. As the
services draw down their forces, the Department of Defense (DOD) is
grappling with questions about how to maintain technological
superiority over potential adversaries within expected budgets.
THE NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1
During the Cold War, the national military strategy was to contain
communism through nuclear and conventional deterrence. DOD
emphasized aspects of military power most useful for that purpose,
including standby nuclear forces that combined bombers and land- and
sea-based missile systems, forward-deployed forces in Europe and
Northeast Asia, and reinforcements ready to deploy from the United
States.
With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union,
the United States faces no immediate threat to its survival.
Therefore, the national military strategy is being altered to meet
new, lessened threats. For example, the President, Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretary of Defense identified the
involvement in two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts (MRC)
as the most demanding threat·one in the east, another in the west.
In addition to preparing to counter these threats, DOD will more
likely be distracted by less easily defined and smaller
contingencies. The modernization of U.S. forces is considered vital
to preserving the combat edge they now enjoy and to ensuring future
readiness. The strategy cautions against making major modernization
investments unless there is "substantial payoff."
DOD's Defense Planning Guidance for fiscal years 1997-2001 states its
commitment to developing an affordable, long-term modernization and
recapitalization program. This program is to (1) inject new
technologies to modernize existing platforms and upgrade mission
capabilities, (2) introduce modernized replacements for existing
systems that substantially upgrade capabilities and lower operation
and support costs, and (3) field new systems for which there is no
like item in the inventory. DOD asserted that introducing these
capabilities should better leverage joint warfighting capabilities
and, in some instances, allow consideration for making compensating
reductions elsewhere in the force.
In November 1993, Congress established the Commission on Roles and
Missions of the Armed Forces\1 to study the way the services allocate
roles and missions, to consider alternatives, and to recommend
changes to the process to better meet future needs. The Commission
comprised civilian and retired military officials appointed by the
Secretary of Defense in consultation with Members of Congress. In
Directions for Defense (May 24, 1995), the Commission reported that
while each service develops valuable capabilities, considering these
capabilities jointly is key to effective future unified operations.
--------------------
\1 The Commission was authorized in the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994
(P.L. 103-160, Nov. 30, 1993).
THE FOUR PHASES OF U.S. COMBAT
OPERATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:2
As part of the national military strategy and as reported in the
Secretary of Defense's January 1994 Annual Report to the President
and the Congress, the military services have planned for four phases
of operations: halting the invasion, building up U.S. combat power
while reducing the enemy's, defeating the enemy, and providing
post-war stability. Interdiction may play a role in the first three
phases. The significance of the role may vary according to the
circumstances.
During phase 1, the services seek to quickly minimize the territory
and strategic facilities the invader can capture and ensure that the
threatened ally can continue its crucial role in the collective
effort to defeat the aggressor. High priority missions for U.S.
forces during this phase include direct attacks on advancing enemy
forces; air defense and ballistic missile defense to protect rear
areas; attacks on selected high-value strategic assets, such as
centralized command and control sites; interdiction of lines of
communication critical to the enemy's offensive; and suppression of
enemy air defenses.
Once the enemy attack has been stopped, phase 2 begins, and U.S. and
allied efforts focus on continuing to build up combat forces and
logistics support in theater, reducing the enemy's capacity to fight
and ensuring that the enemy does not regain the initiative.
During phase 3, U.S. and allied forces may mount a large-scale,
air-land counteroffensive to defeat the enemy by attacking its
centers of gravity, retaking territory it occupies, destroying its
war-making capabilities, and successfully achieving other operational
or strategic objectives. In many cases, U.S. forces would also
threaten or carry out amphibious assault landings in the enemy's rear
areas.
Following a U.S.-coalition victory, military forces remain in theater
to ensure that the conditions that resulted in conflict do not recur.
These forces may also help repatriate prisoners, occupy and
administer some or all of the enemy's territory, assist in
reestablishing friendly governments in liberated areas, or ensure
compliance with the provisions of a cease-fire agreement or peace
accord.
THE SERVICES' INTERDICTION
MISSION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:3
Under DOD Directive 5100.1, the Air Force is primarily responsible
for air interdiction missions, but the Army, the Navy, and the
Marines are expected to interdict enemy forces as a collateral
mission. While the services do not limit interdiction to any
particular area on the battlefield, they generally strike at targets
beyond the close fire support area to avoid hurting friendly forces.
In line with the changes proposed by the Commission on Roles and
Missions, the services are working out how to better conduct joint
operations. Joint commanders can use interdiction to divert,
disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy's surface military potential
before it can effectively be used against friendly forces. Military
guidance on joint interdiction operations is still evolving, however.
Joint Publication 3-0, entitled Doctrine for Joint Operations and
issued in 1995, states that the services should fight together and
cites examples of joint interdiction missions. The Air Force and the
Army have draft joint doctrine publications that provide more details
on how joint interdiction operations would work. Joint Publication
3-03, Doctrine for Joint Interdiction Operations, drafted by the Air
Force, describes how the services should coordinate the use of their
forces during the joint missions. The Army's draft of Joint
Publication 3-09, Doctrine for Joint Fire Support, describes how the
services might better synchronize the use of firepower in all
missions to ensure success. According to an official in the Office
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, these publications may be approved in
the fall of 1996.
INTERDICTION TARGETS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:3.1
During two major regional conflicts, U.S. military forces expect to
encounter over 100,000 mobile or fixed targets. Mobile targets
include tanks, personnel carriers, artillery, trucks, and missile
launchers. Fixed targets include bridges, highways, railyards, fuel
storage sites, and power production sites. Striking at various
targets becomes more critical at different times during a war,
depending on how the targets support the enemy or threaten friendly
forces. For example, during phase 1 of a war, halting the enemy's
movement may make it critical for the services to interdict mobile
targets such as tanks and artillery.
INTERDICTION WEAPONS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:3.2
The services' weapons for interdicting targets include aircraft,
missiles, and helicopters. Each service traditionally has
individually determined the capabilities it needs to fulfill its
missions. The Air Force, the Navy, and the Marines expect to use
large portions of their combat aircraft for interdiction missions.
These aircraft can also be used for other roles, such as close air
support or air superiority. During the Gulf War, however, most of
the combat sorties by U.S. attack aircraft were flown for
interdiction missions (see table 1.1).
Table 1.1
Flights for Interdiction During the Gulf
War
Use
Service Type (percent)
-------------------------------------- -- ------------ ------------
Air Force F-15E 92
F-16 84
F-111 70
F-117A 100
A-10 79
B-1B \a
B-2 \a
B-52 95
Navy/Marine Corps A-6 49
AV-8B 52
F-14A/D \b
F/A-18 42
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a The B-1B and B-2 were not used in the Gulf War.
\b The F-14's contribution to interdiction was not specified.
In addition to fixed-wing aircraft, weapons such as the Navy's
Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM), the Army's Tactical Missile
System (ATACMS) and attack helicopters, and the services'
precision-guided munitions can also be used to interdict targets.
OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND
METHODOLOGY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:4
To illustrate the need to compare the services' plans for improving
their interdiction capabilities, we evaluated (1) the services'
current and future aggregate interdiction assets for striking
identified enemy targets and (2) the effect of the services' planned
modernization programs on total interdiction capabilities and
alternatives to those programs. This report is one of a series of
reports assessing how DOD might better adapt its combat air power to
meet future needs. Other reports in this series address close fire
support, air superiority, suppression of enemy air defense,
surveillance and reconnaissance, and aerial refueling.
To assess the services' aggregate interdiction capabilities, we
identified how the services plan to hit expected targets now and in
the future. We relied on threat assessments by the Defense
Intelligence Agency and the military services to identify the number
and type of targets. We also reviewed doctrine of the Office of
Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Air Force Doctrine Center, the Navy
Doctrine Command, and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command to
identify how the services have been authorized to perform
interdiction missions.
Officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and from the
Air Force, the Army, the Marine, and the Navy headquarters provided
information on current interdiction capabilities and modernization
plans. Additional views on capability and operational perspectives
were provided by the Air Force's Air Combat Command, the Army's
Training and Doctrine Command, the Navy's Commander in Chief (CINC)
Atlantic Fleet, and the Marine Forces Atlantic.
We also obtained data on how each service plans to hit interdiction
targets identified for two MRCs now and in the 2002 time frame. Air
Force headquarters officials provided an extract from the database it
uses to determine wartime conventional munition requirements. This
data linked targets to the likely munitions and the aircraft to be
used against them. The Air Force's analyses ensure it has sufficient
capability to interdict the targets it is apportioned by the Unified
CINCs. Navy headquarters officials provided a similar database for
the targets that the Navy and the Marine Corps are assigned to hit
with their fixed-wing aircraft. In addition, information on the
targets that might be hit by the TLAM was also provided by the Office
of the Chief of Naval Operations. In compiling their data, the Air
Force and the Navy assumed the availability of all munitions in the
inventory and suppression of enemy air defense aircraft. The U.S.
Army Field Artillery and the U.S. Army Aviation Warfighting Center
also provided information on the targets that the ATACMS and Apache
and Comanche helicopters might hit.
We compiled the services' data to determine aggregate capabilities to
interdict ground targets (see app. I for the aircraft and missile
launch system combinations). We analyzed this data in several ways
to identify redundant capabilities in the services. We then assessed
whether various service modernization proposals would add new
capability or more redundancy to the ways the services have to hit
the targets.
The database we developed had the following limitations:
-- The data represents a snapshot of capability at points in time.
Changes in threat, force structure, budget, or national military
strategy could significantly alter its validity.
-- We did not validate the Air Force's and the Navy's models
linking targets to munitions and aircraft.
-- We added Navy TLAM and Army ATACMS data to show the targets they
might hit, even though the services had not used the weapons in
their model for determining their sufficiency to interdict
designated targets.
-- We could not evaluate the full impact of some modernization
proposals because they will not be completely implemented by
2002, the last year of the services' data.
We discussed the modernization proposals and some alternatives with
officials at the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the services'
headquarters, and the U.S. Atlantic Command, Central Command,
European Command, and Pacific Command. We also interviewed officials
at the Air Combat Command; the U.S. Air Forces and Army Europe; and
the U.S. Pacific Air Forces, Army, and Navy. We also reviewed
documents they provided relevant to our analysis.
In our analysis of current capabilities and future force options, we
considered information from our prior reports, the Commission on
Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, RAND, the Institute for
Defense Analysis, the Center for Strategic and International Studies,
the Congressional Research Service, and the Congressional Budget
Office.
We conducted this review from April 1994 to November 1995 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
SERVICES NOW HAVE ENOUGH
INTERDICTION CAPABILITIES AND PLAN
TO ADD MORE
============================================================ Chapter 2
When viewed in the aggregate, the services' weapons constitute a
major force capable of interdicting targets in numerous overlapping,
and often redundant ways during two MRCs. The services have
concluded, and we concur, that they have enough capability to carry
out the national military strategy. Furthermore, the Congressional
Research Service reported concern about and the Commission on Roles
and Missions concluded that the United States may have more than
enough interdiction capabilities. Nevertheless, the services are
proposing to add to their interdiction capabilities by modernizing
some weapons and buying more of others between 1995 and 2010.
THE SERVICES ARE CONFIDENT THEY
HAVE SUFFICIENT FORCES TO HIT
EXPECTED TARGETS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1
Combat air power has been and is expected to remain the primary
interdiction force, as it was during the Gulf War. However, other
weapons are increasingly available for interdiction missions·the
TLAMs and ATACMS and potentially the Army's Apache helicopters. As
shown in table 2.1, the interdiction forces available in 1995
significantly exceed the combat air power and missiles used during
the Gulf War.
Table 2.1
DOD's 1995 and Gulf War Interdiction
Platform and Missile Types
Used in
Platform/missile Available Gulf
Service type\a in 1995 War\a,b
-------------------- -- -------------------- ------------ --------
Air Force
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Fixed-wing aircraft F-15E 138 48
F-16 765 215
F-111 54 66
F-117 36 42
A-10 144 146
B-1B 60 0
B-2 7 \c
B-52 74 66
Navy/Marine Corps
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Fixed-wing aircraft A-6E 119 116
AV-8B 185 84
F-14A/D 268 109
F/A-18A/C/D 799 167
A-7E 0 24
Missile TLAM 2,100 298
Army
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Helicopter Apache (AH-64A) 758 245
Missile ATACMS 1,197 32
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Gulf War Air Power Survey, Volume V: A Statistical Compendium and
Chronology (U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.:1993).
\b Additional U.S. weapons were available.
\c Not in inventory.
DOD and the services assert that current interdiction forces are
sufficient to successfully execute the national military strategy,
that is, to fight in concert with regional allies and decisively win
two nearly simultaneous MRCs. They base this assertion on target and
other information that served as the basis for several analyses
testing the sufficiency of the U.S. forces proposed in DOD's
bottom-up review and to support future requirements. According to
the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff's recent "Nimble
Dancer" extensive war games included an air campaign exercise that
tested the ability of the 1997 and 2001-05 forces to win two
conflicts based on hitting the designated targets. The results of
these tests, according to the Secretary of Defense, validated the
ability of these forces to meet the challenge.
OUR ANALYSES CONFIRM THAT
SERVICES HAVE ABUNDANT, AND
SOMETIMES REDUNDANT, CAPABILITY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2
Our analyses of the services' data show that they have more than
enough capability to hit the identified ground targets for the east
and west MRCs. In fact, we found that in the aggregate, the
services' responsibilities for hitting targets overlap considerably,
and the services have many ways to hit the same target.
In doing our analyses, we assessed information from a variety of
sources, including the Air Force and the Navy data used in their
Capabilities Based Munitions Requirements (CBMR) development process.
Following DOD's CBMR process, the Air Force and the Navy assessed the
munitions needed to defeat the threat from 1995 through 2002. Using
Defense Intelligence Agency target data, they matched the
interdiction targets to be hit to the services' 29 munition and 14
combat aircraft types. The Unified CINCs associated with the east
and west regional conflicts determined the percentage of targets each
service would be expected to hit. The sum of munitions required to
adequately destroy each region's targets became part of the basis for
the services' total munitions requirements.\1
The Air Force and the Navy databases linking targets to munitions and
combat aircraft were of particular value because they allowed us to
assess the adequacy of the expected combat air forces to meet mission
needs based on the Unified CINCs' apportionment of targets to the
services. Our databases confirmed that the Air Force, the Navy, and
the Marines have sufficient munitions and aircraft in 1995 and 2002
to interdict the targets. By adding target information on the Navy's
TLAM and the Army's ATACMS to the combat air forces' target data, we
identified the services' aggregate interdiction capabilities
available for each MRC. This approach also enabled us to identify
redundancies in interdiction capabilities. These redundancies were
expressed two ways: as overlapping service responsibility for the
same targets, and as multiple ways to hit the same target.
--------------------
\1 The results of these assessments were reported in the Air Force's
Nonnuclear Consumables Annual Analysis and the Navy's annual report
Nonnuclear Ordnance Requirements.
SERVICES' COVERAGE OF
TARGETS OVERLAPS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2.1
The Unified CINCs apportion more than 100 percent of the targets to
the services. For example, one CINC assigned the Army 5 to 10
percent, the Navy 20 to 30 percent, the Marines 15 to 25 percent, and
the Air Force 65 to 75 percent of one target type·a total apportioned
range of 105 to 140 percent coverage·even though the CINC's objective
was to destroy only 80 percent of the target quantity. This
over-apportionment creates a margin of safety and allows flexibility
to ensure targets will be hit even if some expected capabilities are
not available. However, it also establishes the expectation that the
services would acquire and maintain sufficient forces to provide this
level of target coverage and thus would be maintaining a significant
amount of redundancy. Figure 2.1 shows the apportionment of targets
for one MRC (providing specific target names would require the figure
to be classified).
Figure 2.1: Redundant Targets
Apportioned in One Major
Regional Conflict
(See figure in printed
edition.)
SERVICES HAVE NUMEROUS WAYS
TO HIT THE SAME TARGETS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2.2
Redundancy can also be expressed in the number of ways the services
have to hit targets. As an example, table 2.2 shows the number of
aircraft or other means of delivery and the munition combinations the
services designated to interdict one type of target (the specific
name of the target is classified).
Table 2.2
Current Ways to Hit One Type of Target
F- F/A-
Munition A-6 A-10 F-16 14A/B F-14D 18A/C MLRS\a
-------------------- ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ -------- --------
AGM-65D Maverick X
AGM-65G Maverick X X
IIR Maverick X X
Laser Maverick X X
Walleye X X
MK-83 X X X
MK-84 X X X X X
MK-82 X
MK-82R X X
ATACMS X
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Multiple-launch rocket system.
All 21 combinations involving 6 different aircraft types and a
missile launcher shown in table 2.2 might not be used, but the
services assume that these combinations will be available. Moreover,
the number of options represented is not unusual. The services
currently have 10 or more ways designated to hit nearly 65 percent of
the Defense Intelligence Agency-identified ground targets. By adding
the additional ways envisioned in 2002 to those ways designated in
1995 that would continue to be available, 86 percent of the targets
can be hit 10 or more ways. As shown in figure 2.2, some targets can
be hit more than 25 different ways.
Figure 2.2: Multiple Ways to
Interdict Designated Targets
(See figure in printed
edition.)
SERVICES PLAN TO ADD MORE
INTERDICTION CAPABILITY AT HIGH
COST
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3
Despite the fact that the services have ample forces to meet current
and future interdiction missions, they plan to add even more
capability by modernizing some platforms, missiles, and munitions and
buying more of others over the next 15 to 20 years, at a cost
exceeding $213 billion. The services expect these improved weapons
to interdict targets with more accuracy and lethality and to increase
aircraft and pilot survivability. Each service has proposed the
following:
-- The Air Force plans to (1) upgrade its B-1B bomber for
conventional use, (2) buy and develop more conventional
precision-guided munitions, and (3) retire the F-111 aircraft
(due to an Office of the Secretary of Defense decision) and buy
the new F-22 and Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) aircraft to replace
other aircraft.
-- The Navy plans to replace and/or retire its A-6, F/A-18A/C/D,
and F-14 aircraft with the new F/A-18E/F and the JSF aircraft
and to continue to buy and develop more of the improved TLAMs
and precision-guided munitions. The Marines plan to replace the
AV-8B and F/A-18C/D aircraft with a short takeoff and vertical
landing version of the JSF aircraft.
-- The Army plans to buy 2,800 improved ATACMS, upgrade its Apache
helicopters, and buy nearly 1,300 new Comanche helicopters.
-- All services plan to buy more precision-guided munitions.
In total, these plans will affect the current mix of aircraft and
missile types in 2001 and 2010 (see table 2.3).
Table 2.3
DOD's 1995, 2001, and 2010 Interdiction
Capabilities
Service 1995 2001 2010
---------------------------- ------------ ------------ ------------
Air Force
Fixed-wing aircraft F-15E F-15E F-15E
F-16 F-16 F-16
F-111
F-117 F-117 F-117
A-10 A-10 A-10
B-1B B-1B B-1B
B-52 B-52 B-52
B-2 B-2 B-2
F-22
JSF
Navy/Marine Corps
Fixed-wing aircraft A-6E
AV-8B AV-8B AV-8B
F-14A/D F-14A/D F-14A/D
F/A-18A/C/D F/A-18A/C/D F/A-18A/C/D
F/A-18E/F F/A-18E/F
JSF
Missile TLAM TLAM TLAM
Army
Helicopter Apache (AH- Apache (AH- Apache (AH-
64A) 64A) 64A)
Apache Apache
Longbow Longbow
Comanche
Missile ATACMS ATACMS ATACMS
(Block I) (Block (Block
I,Ia,II) Ia,II,IIa)
Precision-guided munition 14 20 20
types
----------------------------------------------------------------------
OTHERS CONCLUDE THAT THE
SERVICES HAVE MORE THAN ENOUGH
INTERDICTION CAPABILITY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:4
According to the Congressional Research Service and the Commission on
Roles and Missions, the services have more interdiction capabilities
than may be needed now and in the future. They based their
conclusion on their assessment of the current forces and their view
that the services' requirements development processes tend to yield
competing, sometimes redundant, service-specific solutions.
The Congressional Research Service reported in 1993 and again in 1995
that critics complained about the overlap in the services' airpower
and the excessive costs incurred to provide that capability. It also
expressed the belief that duplicative capabilities should be
eliminated but may remain because the services are reluctant to rely
on each other.\2
The Commission was more pointed in its conclusions. It reported in
May 1995 that DOD may have greater quantities of strike aircraft and
other deep attack weapons than it needs and noted that the total
capability is increasing. The Commission attributed the increase to
the addition of conventional bombers, growing inventories of improved
precision-guided munitions, and plans to buy stealth aircraft.
Because of these concerns, the Commission recommended the prompt
initiation of a DOD-wide cost-effectiveness study focused on finding
the appropriate combination and quantities of deep attack
capabilities currently fielded and under development by all services.
This effort, entitled "The Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study," is now
under way at the direction of the Secretary of Defense.
--------------------
\2 Four U.S. "Air Forces:" Overlap and Alternatives (Congressional
Research Service, 93-823 F, Allan W. Howey, Sept. 10, 1993) and
Military Roles and Missions: A Framework for Review (Congressional
Research Service, 95-517 S, John M. Collins, May 1, 1995).
AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
EVALUATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:5
DOD agreed that the services appear to have an abundant interdiction
capability but said that these capabilities must be viewed in terms
of flexibility, multimission capability, and availability. We agree
that these are considerations in assessing the sufficiency of assets
in relation to expected requirements. However, independent analyses
and DOD's own statements suggest that it also believes that aggregate
capabilities could be excess to requirements. For example, the most
recent program assessment by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
staff concluded that procurement plans included more than tactical
aircraft resources could pay for and therefore recommended that the
services identify programs that could be slowed or terminated. Taken
together, we believe that the conclusions of both external experts
and statements by DOD suggest that there may be cost-saving
alternatives to planned modernization programs.
DOD also noted that we had overstated available interdiction assets
by adding together all the possible weapons that a single aircraft
might employ. We acknowledge that a single aircraft can deliver only
the munitions it carries on a single sortie. However, the services
would not expect to attack all targets at the same time. Given the
likelihood of multiple sorties by many aircraft, we do not believe
that our analysis overstates the services' capabilities.
Finally, DOD said that today's interdiction forces exceed those used
during the Persian Gulf War because that war represented a single
major regional contingency, whereas current assets are geared for two
such contingencies. We do not agree with this line of reasoning in
that the interdiction assets available at the time of the Gulf War
were those planned to counter the former Soviet Union in a possible
global war--a much more demanding scenario than the current two MRC
strategy.
AN ASSESSMENT OF AGGREGATE
INTERDICTION CAPABILITIES YIELDS
ALTERNATIVES TO PROPOSED
MODERNIZATION
============================================================ Chapter 3
Given questions about future defense spending levels, the diminished
threat to U.S. security, and the services' statements that they have
ample interdiction capability, some modernization proposals may not
be sound investments. Some of these investments offer limited or
unknown additional capability to the current abundant interdiction
assets. For example, the Air Force's planned upgrade to the B-1B
bomber and the Navy's F/A-18E/F procurement appear to add more
redundancy at a high cost. Also, it is uncertain what value the
Army's ATACMS and Apache Longbow and Comanche helicopters and the
services' thousands of precision-guided munitions will add to
interdiction capabilities.
The Commission on Roles and Missions concluded, and our analysis
confirms, that the appropriate combination and quantities of
capabilities should be assessed because the services plan to add more
redundancy to that which already exists. We have included options in
this chapter based on our analysis of the services' total
capabilities to hit targets designated by the CINCs. While the
options presented here are not the only ones possible, they
illustrate the kind of trade-offs DOD should find useful when
evaluating whether the investments called for in current and future
service modernization plans provide substantial payoff.
Consideration of the services' capabilities in the aggregate, with an
understanding of how the weapons will be used and how that use will
affect other services' forces, could yield more cost-effective
alternatives to the services' current proposals.
REQUIREMENTS PROCESS ENCOURAGES
SERVICES TO PROPOSE
MODERNIZATION INDIVIDUALLY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1
Modernization plans such as those currently proposed evolve from each
service as its solution to a perceived need. Because each service
proposes improvements to its capabilities separately, the services do
not necessarily recognize that, together, their improvements result
in substantial, sometimes redundant, military capabilities. The
services' modernization plans are developed through a requirements
generation process that also encourages each service to maintain its
own view of how its own capabilities should be enhanced to ensure
interdiction targets are hit. As noted by the Commission in its 1995
report, "each Service is fully engaged in trying to deliver to the
CINCs what the Service views as the best possible set of its specific
capabilities·without taking into account the similar capabilities
provided by the other Services." The Commission report states that,
on one hand, this is desirable because "competition among the
Services produces innovation in weapon systems, forces, doctrine, and
concepts of operations that yield the dramatically superior military
capabilities we need." However, this decision process does not ensure
that the services consider the capabilities available in the total
force. For example, in a 1993 report, we asserted that the need for
the F/A-18E/F had not been adequately justified based on threat or as
a cost-effective solution to a recognized military need.
Furthermore, the Navy had not explored options other than Navy
fixed-wing aircraft.\1 While analyses of capability based on threat
or cost-effectiveness are advantageous, a DOD examination of the
contribution of a new capability in the context of the total force
could yield a different investment decision. Because DOD and the
services do not routinely assess the services' capabilities in the
aggregate, there is no assurance that modernization proposals will
yield substantial payoffs.
This acquisition environment has existed for some time. In a 1992
report,\2 we noted the similarity of major acquisition issues
addressed in work over the preceding 15 years. The report noted that
acquisition programs begin as individual service solutions to mission
needs. The organizations responsible for developing requirements for
new weapons generally represent individual branches within the
services that analyze their own mission area deficiencies and
recommend solutions in terms of their own type of assets. Therefore,
while the general threat may be legitimate and individual program
analyses objective, the processes for developing weapon system
requirements tend to narrow consideration of alternatives and favor
the promotion of particular weapons that may be the services'
preferred solution, not the best solution to a valid need. These
service organizations' institutionalized advocacy of the weapons
under their purview helps perpetuate the funneling of successor
weapons into the acquisition process.
In leading up to its recommendation that DOD conduct a
cost-effectiveness study of the appropriate combination and
quantities of deep attack capabilities by all services, the
Commission indicated the environment described above still exists.
Also, the Commission pointed out that no one in DOD has specific
responsibility for making this decision.
The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) was established, led
by the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to oversee the
services' requirements generation processes. JROC assessed 10 joint
warfighting areas, such as "strike" and "air superiority," to
determine whether the effectiveness of existing and planned
capabilities can be enhanced. These joint warfighting capability
assessments became the basis for the Chairman's program and budget
recommendations to the Secretary of Defense. Most of the Chairman's
1995 guidance concerned the financial implications of the services'
current plans, but the assessments did not explore ways to reduce
costs by suggesting specific trade-offs among major modernization
proposals.
--------------------
\1 Naval Aviation: Consider All Alternatives (GAO/NSIAD-93-144, Aug.
1993).
\2 Weapons Acquisition: A Rare Opportunity for Lasting Change
(GAO/NSIAD-93-15, Dec. 1992).
SERVICES' PROPOSED
MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS HAVE
BUDGET IMPLICATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2
With a high level of uncertainty surrounding future defense spending,
the services' proposed modernization of interdiction capabilities·at
a projected cost of more than $213 billion over the next 15 to
20 years·could pose a significant problem. According to our analysis
of DOD's Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) data, the services'
modernization programs will cost at least $45 billion in fiscal years
1995-2001. Moreover, the services' planned $213 billion plus
modernization costs do not include the $72 billion that the F-22 is
estimated to cost or the eventual cost of the JSF aircraft. These
costs will affect DOD's budgets out to 2010 and later.
THE SERVICES FACE A LESS
SERIOUS THREAT
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3
The Commission and others conclude that today's threat is
considerably different from the Soviet threat that previously
dominated U.S. military force planning, preparation, and funding. A
single enemy no longer poses an immediate, nuclear threat to U.S.
survival, and no one is expected to achieve military capabilities
challenging those of the United States during the next 20 years.
Overt attacks on the United States and its strategic interests are
unlikely because few nations will have the resources to succeed in
such attacks. Instead, America faces a broad range of less serious
but more likely challenges such as regional strife, insurgencies,
civil wars, and operations other than war. While the proliferation
of weapons and technology is expected to allow some nations to buy
state-of-the-art systems or upgrade those they have, the extent of
their investment will be limited by budget constraints. In addition,
an investment in a few improved systems does not equate to an
integrated, modernized force.
SOME PLANNED MODERNIZATIONS MAY
NOT BE SOUND INVESTMENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:4
By comparing the expected contribution of weapons resulting from the
services' modernization plans to current total U.S. military
interdiction capability, we assessed the significance of their impact
on the forces' ability to hit targets associated with two MRCs. Our
analysis indicated that some proposals may not be sound investments.
For example, the Air Force's B-1B upgrade and the Navy's F/A-18E/F
procurement may add more redundancy at a high cost. Others, like the
Army's ATACMS, the Apache Longbow and Comanche initiatives and the
services' precision-guided munitions proposals, may add expensive new
capabilities without a clear understanding of the extent they are
needed or their potential impact on other services' forces.
We determined how the services' plan to hit interdiction targets for
the two MRCs based on Air Force and Navy CBMR data, possible TLAM and
ATACMS targets, and CINC target allocations. After aggregating this
data, we assessed the interdiction contribution of various weapons.
We identified which targets each weapon was designated to hit in 1995
and 2002, how these designations changed between those points in
time, and other possible ways to hit those same targets. This
allowed us to focus on the interdiction contribution of those weapons
if they are modified or added to the services' capabilities. Our
analysis caused us to question whether some investments yielded a
substantial payoff, and to develop options for some modernization
proposals. We recognize that some systems have multimission
capabilities and that in making decisions impacting them, the
potential contribution to those other missions should be considered.
AIR FORCE COULD SAVE
BILLIONS BY RETIRING THE
B-1B
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:4.1
In light of the ample capability to hit the few targets assigned the
B-1B, retiring the aircraft could save almost $4 billion in
modernization costs and nearly $1 billion annually in operating costs
that could be used for other initiatives. Retirement of the aircraft
would increase U.S. forces' dependency on other capabilities and
therefore the risk that some targets might not be hit as quickly as
desired. However, it is reasonable to expect that the targets could
be hit by other U.S. military assets, including missiles such as
ATACMS and TLAM.
Should the risk associated with retiring the B-1B be unacceptable,
another option is to use the nearly $4 billion to buy up to 80 more
F-15Es. Considered the Air Force's premier air-to-ground fighter,
the F-15E launches a wide variety of munitions, adds flexibility to
air operations, and would still save operating funds.
B-1B MODIFICATION TO
IMPROVE CONVENTIONAL
CAPABILITY
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 3:4.1.1
The Air Force plans to spend nearly $4 billion to increase the
conventional capability and sustainability of the B-1B to make it the
backbone of its conventional bomber force. Currently, the B-1B's
ability to conduct conventional missions is limited because it can
carry only the 500-pound unguided, general-purpose bomb. The Air
Force therefore plans to (1) upgrade the avionics to enable the B-1B
to drop cluster bomb units and mines, (2) improve the electronic
countermeasures system to ensure that the B-1B is not vulnerable to
sophisticated enemy air defenses, and (3) add a global positioning
system and other modifications to integrate the use of
precision-guided munitions with its other systems.
By 2002, the improved B-1B will be expected to deliver several
precision-guided munitions: the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM)
and the Wind Corrected Munitions Dispenser (WCMD), with either the
Combined Effects Munition (CEM) or the Sensor Fuzed Weapon (SFW).
Eventually, the B-1B will also deliver the Joint Standoff Weapon
(JSOW). Many other aircraft are also expected to launch these and
other more potent weapons.
The nearly $4 billion modernization also includes $400 million for
the B-1B's sustainment modifications. Changes include engine
upgrades to correct safety and high maintenance problems,
enhancements to simulator systems used by flight crews and
maintenance personnel for initial qualification and continuation
training, and improvements to the antenna.
B-1B PLAYS A MINOR ROLE
IN INTERDICTION
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 3:4.1.2
According to Air Force modeling, even after the proposed
modifications, the B-1B's contribution to interdiction is expected to
be minor when compared to the services' total interdiction
capability. The specific percentage of targets to be destroyed by
the B-1B is classified. However, figure 3.1 shows the B-1B's
expected contribution in 2002 compared to other Air Force aircraft in
terms of target types it is designated to hit.
Figure 3.1: Target Types to Be
Hit by Each Type of Air Force
Aircraft
(See figure in printed
edition.)
UNIFIED CINCS WOULD USE
FEWER B-1BS THAN
BOTTOM-UP REVIEW REQUIRED
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 3:4.1.3
According to the Air Force, the B-1B's greatest contribution would be
to halt enemy aggression during the early days of a conflict. While
officials in the Unified Commands agreed that bombers would be
valuable, they also said they expect to use far fewer than the 100
bombers the bottom-up review cited might be necessary for a MRC.
Furthermore, the Air Force's analysis of its bomber force in the
years 2001-05 shows that the B-1B does not make a unique contribution
because other bombers or fighters hit the same types of targets it
hits in the first 7 days of a conflict. As shown in table 3.1, the
target the B-1B would most frequently strike in 2001 can be hit 20
other ways.
Table 3.1
Multiple Ways to Hit B-1B's Most
Frequent Target During the First 7 Days
of a Conflict
B- B- F- F-
Munition 1B B-2 52 15E 16 MLRS
---------------------------------- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----
GBU-12 X X
GBU-15 X
GBU-24 X X
MK-82 X X X
MK-82R X
MK-82R/B-1B X
MK-84 X X
MK-84R X
M-117 X
JDAM/MK-84 X X X X X
AGM-65G X
AGM-130/BLU-109 X
ATACMS-Block I X
ATACMS-Block IA X
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Air Force modeling shows that, as the conflict continues, the B-1B's
relative contribution to the war becomes even smaller. Moreover,
service data shows that as in the first 7 days, the B-1B's targets
are not unique, and in 2002 the services are expected to hit the same
18 target types numerous (one over 35) other ways (see fig. 3.2).
Figure 3.2: Other Ways to Hit
B-1B Targets Throughout a
Conflict
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Eight of the target types designated for the B-1B in 2002 were
different from those assigned in 1995. These new B-1B targets are
already designated to be hit in 1995 by 4 to 21 other combinations.
The two B-1B target types hit the fewest other ways in 2001 are
currently designated to be attacked at least four other ways. With
the exception of one aircraft, all missiles, aircraft, and munitions
comprising these four ways are still expected to be available in
2002, but they are not the preferred way designated for hitting these
targets.
In direct response to a draft of this report, DOD said that our cost
for the B-1B upgrade appeared to include operations and maintenance
items other than the specific cost required for the upgrade.
However, the $4 billion cited is the expected total program cost for
modernizing the B-1B. In addition to funds for the Conventional
Munition Upgrade Program, it includes the amounts for modifications
to enhance the B-1B's sustainability and to upgrade equipment in the
squadrons. If the B-1B were retired, more of the associated costs
would be avoided.
THE NAVY COULD SAVE BILLIONS
BY REDUCING ITS PURCHASE OF
F/A-18E/F AIRCRAFT
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:4.2
As an option for saving funds and at the same time retaining
interdiction capabilities, the Navy could reconsider its F/A-18E/F
aircraft procurement plans and instead consider procuring more
F/A-18C/Ds to meet its needs. The Navy is still purchasing the C/D
model, and ongoing and planned modifications costing about $1.5
billion will improve the aircraft's survivability and ability to
acquire and accurately strike targets. Changes in the F/A-18
procurement plans could save billions of dollars.
THE NAVY PLANS TO REPLACE
EXISTING AIRCRAFT AT A COST
OF NEARLY $90 BILLION
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:4.3
The Navy plans to buy 1,000 F/A-18E/F fighter aircraft at a total
estimated cost of nearly $90 billion. The Navy will buy the first
E/Fs in fiscal year 1997 and expects to own almost 700 by 2010. The
E/F was designed to replace the A-6, F/A-18C/D, and F-14 aircraft as
they reach the end of their service lives and are retired. Compared
to the C/D, the E/F was projected to perform the same mission but to
be more survivable, carry more weapons, and have greater range.
However, more recent assessments show that F/A-18E/F capabilities
will be marginally improved over the F/A-18C/D model.
THE E/F'S CONTRIBUTION TO
INTERDICTION DOES NOT APPEAR
SUBSTANTIALLY GREATER THAN
THAT OF THE C/D
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:4.4
Our analysis of the Navy's target database shows the F/A-18C/D's
interdiction role is virtually identical to that of the F/A-18E/F.
Both aircraft are expected to hit the same targets with the same type
weapons. The C/D can carry all the Navy's current strike weapons and
is expected to carry precision-guided munitions such as the JDAM and
the JSOW. While the E/F's range advantage could allow it to more
effectively employ the additional weapons it can carry, a
Congressional Budget Office memorandum reported the Secretary of the
Navy as stating that about 85 percent of the service's targets are
within 200 miles of shore and are therefore within the C/D's range.
According to the Gulf War air power survey commissioned by the Air
Force, the F/A-18C/D proved its combat capabilities and effectiveness
during Operation Desert Storm when it dropped more than 17,500 tons
of ordnance on a variety of ground targets. It was the only aircraft
that during a single mission acquired, identified, and in air-to-air
combat destroyed two enemy aircraft and then delivered munitions to a
ground target. Further, the E/F's contribution to the interdicting
ground targets is not expected to be unique relative to the services'
total capabilities. For example, table 3.2 shows the expected
interdiction contribution of the E/F in 2002 against one of its
targets and the 20 other ways also expected to be available to hit
that target.
Table 3.2
Multiple Ways to Hit One Type of F/A-
18E/F Target
B- A- F- F- F-14 F- F/A18 A/ F/A18 E/
Munitions B-2 52 10 15E 16 A/B 14D C F MLRS
---------- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ------ ---- -------- -------- ----
WCMD/CEM X X X X
WCMD/SFW X X X
AGM-65D X
AGM-65A/B X
CBU-87 X
CBU-97 X X
ROCKEYE X
(FMU-
140)
MK-83 X
MK-84 X X
JSOW X X X
(BLU-
108)
JSOW/CEB X
ATACMS X
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The difference in the unit cost of the two models is substantial.
The Navy plans to buy 1,000 F/A-18E/F fighter aircraft for the Navy
and the Marine Corps at an estimated total program cost of nearly $90
billion. Based on total program costs, each F/A-18E/F would cost
about $89 million under a 1,000-aircraft buy while the current unit
procurement cost of the F/A-18C/D is about $51 million based on
procurement of 12 aircraft.\3 However, if the Marine Corps does not
buy F/A-18E/Fs, the Navy could reduce the E/F procurement quantity.
The C/D model, which proved its capabilities in the Gulf War, is
still in production and is being improved at a cost of $1.5 billion.
In its comments on our draft report, DOD said that we should use the
expected flyaway costs rather than total program costs in comparing
the costs of the two aircraft. Although we acknowledge that DOD
often uses flyaway costs in this manner, we believe that it is
appropriate to use the total program costs for the F/A-18E/F since
the focus of our comparison is on future budgetary impacts.\4
In contrast to the C/D model that the Navy has procured for a number
of years, most of the research and development costs and the
investment in operations and support for the E/F model have not yet
been incurred.
--------------------
\3 These cost figures are adjusted for estimated inflation for the
years of the procurement. Cost comparisons vary widely based on
assumptions about the quantities procured, annual production rates,
and the specific costs included.
\4 A forthcoming GAO report on the F/A-18E/F program will provide a
more detailed analysis of the relative flyaway costs of these two
aircraft.
ARMY WEAPONS AND ALL
SERVICES' PRECISION-GUIDED
MUNITIONS HOLD POTENTIAL FOR
USE IN INTERDICTION
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:4.5
When considered in concert with other interdiction capabilities, the
ATACMS and Army helicopters as well as the services' planned
precision-guided munitions could affect the future force structure.
However, the potential value of these weapons is unknown because the
services have not resolved how they fit into joint interdiction
operations. At a minimum, these weapons appear to introduce more
redundancy into the services' aggregate interdiction capabilities,
but they could also add new capability that would reduce the need for
some aircraft. Even if the force structure cannot be reduced, a
further examination of their value to interdiction in light of the
total capability could help in deciding how much money to invest in
each.
The Army and the Air Force have not yet resolved doctrinal
differences about the use of Army weapons for interdiction. The
ATACMS, as well as Army helicopters, could provide significant,
sometimes unique, capabilities to interdiction missions. However,
how the Army should use these weapons, unilaterally or in support of
joint interdiction operations, must be resolved before the
contribution of these weapons can be calculated. Decisions about the
joint use of Army interdiction weapons could also better define the
amount of these capabilities the Army actually needs to buy.
Planned purchases of precision-guided munitions could allow for other
force options in the future. DOD's bottom-up review cited the use of
precision-guided munitions as a means of minimizing risk as the force
size is reduced.\5 However, the extent to which current procurement
plans meet or exceed this expectation is not clear. Since
precision-guided munitions are expected to be more accurate, aircraft
would be required to fly fewer sorties, fewer aircraft may be needed,
and survivability is expected to increase. Should these attributes
be realized, weighing their potential contribution instead of
modernizing or purchasing some aircraft could save money.
--------------------
\5 Bottom-Up Review: Analysis of Key DOD Assumptions
(GAO/NSIAD-95-56, Jan. 1995).
ATACMS AND HELICOPTER
MODERNIZATION TO GIVE THE
ARMY DEEP ATTACK
CAPABILITIES
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 3:4.5.1
While acknowledging that the Air Force's air power dominates
interdiction missions, the Army plans to increase and improve its
deep battle capabilities at a cost of about $63 billion. The Army's
modernization programs are intended to give ground commanders the
ability to rapidly detect, select, and destroy targets in support of
ground maneuvers through the depth of the battlefield. Planned
expenditures include
-- $4.6 billion for 2,800 ATACMS, including over 20,000 brilliant
anti-armor\6 (BAT) and BAT pre-planned product improvement
submunitions;
-- $8.4 billion for improvements to its 758 Apache helicopters; and
-- more than $50 billion for the development and acquisition of
1,292 Comanche helicopters.
ATACMS is a family of munitions that will be phased in through 2008;
all will be fired from the MLRS M270 launcher. The Block I munition
has an antipersonnel, antimaterial warhead with a range exceeding
150 kilometers. The Block Ia munition, scheduled for delivery in
fiscal year 1998, will carry a smaller warhead but attack the same
targets as the
Block I munition, with increased accuracy over 300 kilometers away.
The
Block II munition, with a range of 140 kilometers, will be fielded in
fiscal year 2001. It will carry 13 BAT submunitions effective
against moving or stationary hard targets plus mobile
surface-to-surface missile launchers. Last, the Block IIa munition,
scheduled to be delivered in fiscal year 2004, will deliver improved
BAT submunitions to ranges greater than
280 kilometers. It will be used against the same targets as Block II
at greater ranges.
In addition to the ATACMS, the Army plans to upgrade its 758 AH-64A
(Apache) helicopters to the AH-64D (Apache Longbow) model during
fiscal years 1997 through 2013. The upgraded Apaches will be easier
to navigate; have the Longbow's Global Positioning System; improved
communication, survivability, and reliability; and the
millimeter-wave radar. In addition, 227 of the 758 Apaches will also
be equipped with the Longbow fire-control radar and upgraded engines.
This upgrade will give the Army its first fire-and-forget missile
capability. The fire control radar will detect, classify, and
prioritize targets at night, through smoke and dust and in adverse
weather. The Apache Longbow could be effective against most
interdiction targets and will continue to be capable of firing the
Hellfire and Longbow Hellfire missiles.
The Comanche is expected to be a multimission helicopter capable of
armed reconnaissance and attack. It features technology that will
make it less detectable, enable it to engage multiple targets
simultaneously with high lethality, and provide day/night, adverse
weather fire-and-forget capability. Under current plans, the
Comanche will be fielded starting in fiscal year 2006. It can be
used against almost all of the Apache's targets plus radar sites and
will fire the Hellfire, Longbow Hellfire, and Stinger missiles.
--------------------
\6 BAT is an unpowered, gliding, terminally guided, top attack
anti-armor submunition designed to locate, attack, and kill moving
armored combat vehicles such as tanks and fighting vehicles.
ATACMS CONTRIBUTION TO
INTERDICTION IS UNCLEAR
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 3:4.5.2
The extent to which ATACMS are needed is not clear because the
services have not resolved how they will be used and who will control
them. The Army is developing ATACMS to interdict enemy targets
because of its unique attributes. It can hit enemy targets up to 200
kilometers away less than
12 minutes after target acquisition, day or night, in any weather,
with increased survivability over manned systems. Based on the
Army's ATACMS target data, these missiles would be appropriate to
employ against up to 27 percent of the target types in one MRC and 41
percent of the target types in the other. The services have not yet
resolved disputes over the control and coordination of deep battle
assets such as ATACMS; however, the Air Force and the Army disagree
about whether the Joint Force Air Component Commander (usually Air
Force) or the Land Component Commander (usually Army) can best
control the deep battle and consequently operational use of ATACMS.
Army officials believe the Joint Force Commander should address the
question of control during the initial planning for a conflict.
Until these issues are settled through doctrine or some other means,
the expected battlefield contribution or the possible force structure
implications of buying 2,800 more ATACMS is in question.
ARMY ATTACK HELICOPTERS'
POTENTIAL MAY NOT BE
REALIZED FOR JOINT
OPERATIONS
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 3:4.5.3
The Army is buying significant interdiction capability with the
acquisition and modernization of its helicopters. The Apache
helicopter can perform multiple roles and missions, including deep
attack operations and suppression of enemy air defenses. The
Comanche will also be able to perform multiple roles, including armed
reconnaissance and air combat. Both helicopters are capable of
attacking most interdiction targets, but no interdiction targets have
been designated for helicopters.
The Army considers attack helicopters to be responsive, precise,
highly lethal deep strike systems. However, because the Army
considers helicopters maneuver assets, it has restricted their use
from joint interdiction operations. The extent to which the
helicopters could be used for joint interdiction missions is
therefore unclear because the same dispute about who should control
the use of ATACMS appears to also apply to the Army's attack
helicopters.
PRECISION-GUIDED
MUNITIONS TO IMPROVE ALL
SERVICES' INTERDICTION
CAPABILITIES
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 3:4.5.4
The services have invested or plan to invest over $40 billion to
acquire 23 different types of precision-guided munitions (including
the TLAM) and over 260,000 total munitions (see app. II). They
expect these munitions to offset reductions in force size by
increasing their accuracy and lethality through the use of target
location information from inertial navigation systems, laser guidance
systems, Global Positioning System satellites, or a combination of
these and other sources.\7 The services identified a specific need
for increased munitions accuracy during Operation Desert Storm, when
37 percent of the Air Force's and the Navy's strike sorties were
ineffective due to bad weather.
The services expect precision-guided munitions such as JDAM to add
accuracy and lethality against ground targets and increase aircraft
survivability. Some of these munitions can be dropped from higher
altitudes with greater accuracy than conventional gravity bombs, and
some can be launched from outside the effective range of enemy
defenses. An Air Force-sponsored analysis of JDAM operational
effectiveness, for example, shows that the use of the munition could
result in a decrease of 16 to 20 percent of aircraft lost to enemy
fire. It is also expected to allow each aircraft to accurately
attack a greater number of targets during each sortie. The increased
standoff capability provided by the WCMD and the JSOW are also
expected to enable fighters and bombers to hit targets more
effectively and thereby increase aircraft survivability. WCMD
provides increased high-altitude accuracy and the capability for
all-weather operations and independent targeting. The JSOW is
likewise expected to be effectively launched outside enemy point
defenses during day or night and in adverse weather conditions.
--------------------
\7 Weapons Acquisition: Precision Guided Munitions in Inventory,
Production, and Development (GAO/NSIAD-95-95, June 1995).
PRECISION-GUIDED
MUNITIONS OFFER A UNIQUE
CAPABILITY WITH FORCE
STRUCTURE IMPLICATIONS
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 3:4.5.5
The services consider precision-guided munitions the asset they need
to offset the reduced force structure and to sustain their lethal
capability. DOD's bottom-up review emphasized that precision-guided
munitions are one of the improvements needed to ensure that U.S.
forces can operate successfully in future MRCs. However, the
services' future force structure plans do not indicate that they
expect the increased use of these munitions to reduce force structure
any more than that cited in the review.
Our analysis of the Air Force and the Navy munitions requirements
shows that, by 2002, the two services expect to reduce the number of
sorties flown during two MRCs by about 28 percent. Most of this
reduction is attributable to precision-guided munitions, which can
correct errors in flight, resulting in the same or higher levels of
success as could be achieved with larger numbers of unguided weapons.
In addition, the services expect precision-guided munitions' accuracy
and lethality to increase aircraft survivability. For example, as
cited above, the number of aircraft lost to enemy fire could decrease
by up to 20 percent with use of the JDAM. According to the analysis,
aircraft are less vulnerable to enemy air defense when using JDAM
than when using other weapons like the GBU-24, AGM-130, or AGM-65G
(Maverick). Moreover, JSOW is expected to hit several targets with
its multiple submunitions; consequently, the services would need to
fly fewer sorties to hit the desired number of targets. Therefore,
in addition to ensuring the adequacy of the current force to meet
warfighting needs, further reductions in sorties appear to raise the
possibility that the number of aircraft to be modernized, purchased,
or retained in the force could be reduced.
CONCLUSION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:5
While modernization may be vital to preserving U.S forces' edge and
ensuring future readiness, modernizing or buying capability that adds
little or unknown value to the interdiction mission and costs more
than $213 billion may not be a sound investment. The upgrade to the
B-1B and the purchase of additional F/A-18E/Fs, Apache and Comanche
helicopters, and precision-guided munitions constitute a significant
investment. Some of these modernization programs may be worth the
cost if they materially strengthen interdiction capabilities, but
until DOD's decision processes give sufficient attention to
interdiction capabilities in the aggregate, there can be little
assurance that the appropriate, most cost-effective mix of weapon
systems is being identified, developed, and fielded for interdiction
missions. If they do materially improve capabilities, then, as
suggested in the Defense Planning Guidance, their acquisition may
also allow DOD to consider reductions elsewhere in the force. The
need for such an assessment has been borne out by the Commission and
our analysis of the services' interdiction capabilities and proposed
modernization.
RECOMMENDATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:6
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense routinely review service
modernization proposals based on how they will increase the current
aggregate ability of the U.S. military to perform the interdiction
mission. Such a process should prioritize funding for those
capabilities that contribute most to meeting the joint operation
requirements and assist in determining the appropriate mix and
quantities of interdiction capabilities. Moreover, proposals that
add redundancy·such as the B-1B and Apache modifications and the
purchase of F/A-18E/Fs, ATACMS, attack helicopters, and
precision-guided missiles·should be examined in the context of the
additional interdiction capability they offer as well as the
contributions they make to other mission areas. This analysis could
serve as the basis for deciding funding priorities, the sufficiency
of investment, and the future force structure. We recognize that
some weapon systems are multimission and this recommended assessment
should consider the potential contribution to those other missions.
AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
EVALUATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:7
DOD agreed with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense
routinely review service modernization proposals based on how they
would enhance the current aggregate capability of the U.S. military
to perform the interdiction mission. It further agreed that
assessing total capabilities offers opportunities to seek
alternatives when modernizing. DOD acknowledged that there are
problems regarding joint-service planning and agreed that it needs to
modify its requirements determination process to assess modernization
proposals in terms of threat, adequacy of current aggregate
capabilities, and the contributions of the proposed modernization to
this aggregate capability. However, DOD said that (1) it could best
accomplish this goal by making changes to its existing process,
rather than creating an entirely new process and (2) it was already
acting on some of the criticisms of its joint-service planning. On
this latter point, DOD cited its deep attack weapons mix study, whose
first phase results are due in the summer of 1996.
Our intention was not to suggest an entirely new and separate process
to conduct the envisioned assessments. Rather, our intent is that
DOD's process incorporate the necessary analysis to assess the
aggregate capabilities of the services to perform interdiction before
deciding on the need for force modernization.
DOD disagreed with our finding that it plans more interdiction
capability at high cost despite the fact that it has ample forces to
meet current and future interdiction needs. DOD asserted that its
planned acquisitions are necessary to keep its modernization program
proactive rather than reactive. In making this point, it said that
the portion of the acquisition budget devoted to interdiction-capable
assets is not excessive given their multirole capabilities.
We acknowledge the multiple roles that some interdiction assets are
expected to perform and agree that their contributions to other
missions must be considered in performing the broad assessments that
we recommend. However, DOD officials and external experts have
achieved a consensus that current interdiction capabilities are
already adequate. For example, the most recent Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs program assessment points out that tactical aircraft
procurement plans call for more resources than may be forthcoming.
Accordingly, he recommended that the services identify programs that
could be slowed or terminated. The deep attack weapons mix study
that DOD cites is in fact being done to identify how plans can be
modified to achieve such savings.
Given the high cost of planned upgrades and questions about whether
funding will be forthcoming to cover all of them, DOD is likely to be
faced with difficult trade-off decisions on which enhancements it can
pursue. The broad assessments of aggregate capabilities that we
recommend compared to the contribution of planned upgrades to this
capability should assist the Secretary in making these difficult
choices.
DOD partially concurred with other issues discussed in the report.
We considered its comments, which appear in appendix III.
U.S. MILITARY INTERDICTION
PLATFORMS' AND WEAPONS' CURRENT
AND FUTURE CAPABILITIES
=========================================================== Appendix I
F/A- F/A- F/A- Ships/
Weapons A-10 F-16 F-111 F-15E B-52 F-117 B-1B B-2 18 A-6 AV-8B F-14 18AC 18EF Subs MLRS
------------------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ --------- ------
Mark 82 X X X X X X X X X X X X
Mark 84 X X X X X X X X X X
Mark 83 X X X X X X
M-117 X
Mk 20 X X X X
Rockeye X X X X X X
CBU-58 X X X
CBU-87 (CEM) X X X X
CBU-97 (SFW) X X X
GBU-10 X X X X
GBU-12 X X X
GBU-15 X X
GBU-24 X X X X X X X
GBU-27 X
GBU-28 X
AGM-65 X X X
AGM-130 X X
AGM-142 X
JDAM X X X X X X X X X X
JSOW X X X X
CALCM X
MAVERICK X X X X X X X
WCMD X X X X X
LGB X X X X
SLAM-ER X X X
Walleye X X X X
TLAM X
ATACMS-B1 X
ATACMS- X
B1A
ATACMS-B2 X
ATACMS-B2/BAT P31 X
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PRECISION-GUIDED MUNITIONS
========================================================== Appendix II
(Dollars in millions)
Total
acquisition
Munition cost\a Quantity\a
---------------------------------------- ---------------- ----------
AGM-130 $ 647.47\b 502
AGM-142 200.70 130
CALCM \c \c
GBU-10 271.34\d 11,329
GBU-12 620.23\d 32,636
GBU-15 774.50 2,823
GBU-24 729.14\d 13,114
GBU-27 176.72\d 3,213
GBU-28 18.20 125
JDAM 4,650.60 74,000
JDAM PIP 76.50\e 5,000\e
JSOW/Baseline 3,327.60 11,800
JSOW/BLU-108 2,033.50 4,200
JSOW/Unitary 5,608.30 7,800
Longbow Hellfire 2,158.00\f 13,311\f
Maverick, Air Force 3,063.50 23,689
Maverick, Navy 653.00 4,115
GBU-97(SFW) 1,827.10 5,000
SLAM 1,138.80 767
SLAM-ER 550.30 700\g
TLAM 8,426.80 3,405
TLAM Baseline Improvement Program 2,578.60 1,181\g
Walleye 372.00 3,200
WCMD \c 40,000\h
======================================================================
Total $ 39,902.90 260,859
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Weapons Acquisition: Precision Guided Munitions in Inventory,
Production, and Development (GAO/NSIAD-95-95, June 1995).
\b Acquisition cost for the AGM-130C includes development cost only.
\c Cost information and quantity are classified.
\d Cost includes only production; development cost was not available.
\e The Air Force did not provide complete costs for the JDAM product
improvement because the seeker technology has not been decided.
However, the Air Force has programmed $76.5 million through fiscal
year 2001 for the program. Also, quantities for the product
improvement are not included in the total because 5,000 of the
baseline JDAMs will be equipped with the terminal seeker.
\f Data supplied by the U.S. Army.
\g Quantities for the SLAM-ER and TBIP are not included in the total
because these munitions are improvements and remanufactures of
existing SLAMs and TLAMs.
\h Data supplied by the U.S. Air Force.
(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix III
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
========================================================== Appendix II
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
========================================================== Appendix IV
NATIONAL SECURITY AND
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
William C. Meredith, Assistant Director
NORFOLK FIELD OFFICE
Richard G. Payne, Evaluator-in-Charge
George O. Morse, Evaluator
Bonita P. Anderson, Evaluator
Mary Jo LaCasse, Evaluator
Susan J. Schildkret, Evaluator
Paul A. Gvoth, Operations Research Analyst
*** End of document. ***

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