U.S.-Japan Cooperative Development: Progress on FS-X Program Enhances Japanese Aerospace Capabilities (Chapter Report, 08/11/95, GAO/NSIAD-95-145)
GAO examined the U.S.-Japan FS-X program, focusing on: (1) the program's
status; (2) U.S. government and contractor controls over technical data
and hardware given to Japan; (3) the transfer of program technology from
Japan to the United States; and (4) the benefits the program has
provided to the Japanese and U.S. aerospace industries.
GAO found that: (1) Japanese and U.S. contractors are working on FS-X
prototype aircraft, and the first flight test is scheduled for late
summer 1995; (2) U.S. officials have expressed concerns about Japan's
ability to develop digital flight control software for the aircraft; (3)
the overall cost for the development of FS-X aircraft has not been
determined because the FS-X agreements do not allow U.S. access to
Japanese contractors' FS-X related cost data; (4) although the Air Force
adequately screens F-16 data for release to Japan, Japan continues to
request F-16 technical data that has been previously denied for release;
and (5) the United States has not determined whether Japanese technology
has been beneficial for its aerospace industry, but the FS-X program has
helped strengthen Japan's aerospace industry by introducing valuable
design and systems integration experiences that are applicable to other
military and commercial aircraft projects.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: NSIAD-95-145
TITLE: U.S.-Japan Cooperative Development: Progress on FS-X
Program Enhances Japanese Aerospace Capabilities
DATE: 08/11/95
SUBJECT: Foreign technical aid
Aerospace engineering
Exporting
International relations
Fighter aircraft
Aerospace industry
Technology transfer
Military coproduction agreements
Technical assistance
Information disclosure
IDENTIFIER: FS-X Aircraft
Japan
F-16 Aircraft
DOD Foreign Disclosure and Technical Information System
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Cover
================================================================ COVER
Report to the Congress
August 1995
U.S.-JAPAN COOPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT
- PROGRESS ON THE FS-X PROGRAM
ENHANCES JAPANESE AEROSPACE
CAPABILITIES
GAO/NSIAD-95-145
U.S.-Japan Cooperative Development
Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV
DOD - Department of Defense
DDV - Direct Drive Valve
EPU - Emergency Power Unit
GAO - General Accounting Office
MELCO - Mitsubishi Electric Corporation
MITI - Ministry of International Trade and Industry
Letter
=============================================================== LETTER
B-261890
August 11, 1995
The Honorable Newt Gingrich
Speaker of the House of
Representatives
The Honorable Strom Thurmond
President Pro Tempore
United States Senate
This is an unclassified version of a classified report issued to you
earlier this year, on the progress made in implementing the
U.S.-Japanese agreement on the FS-X program. We have updated
information concerning the release of F-16 technical data and FS-X
technology visits to reflect more current conditions. This report
was prepared in response to the conference report on the fiscal year
1990 appropriations act for the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and
State; the Judiciary; and related agencies.
This report contains recommendations to improve the U.S.
government's review of FS-X related export licenses to Japan and to
establish an FS-X Technology Transfer Evaluation Task Force under the
Defense Science Board to improve U.S. government and industry
evaluation of transferred Japanese FS-X technologies.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees and to the Secretaries of Defense, State, and Commerce.
This report was prepared under the direction of David E. Cooper,
Director, Acquisition Policy, Technology, and Competitiveness Issues,
who may be reached on (202) 512-4587 if you or your staff have any
questions. Major contributors are listed in appendix VII.
Henry L. Hinton, Jr.
Assistant Comptroller General
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
============================================================ Chapter 0
PURPOSE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1
In November 1988, the United States and Japan agreed to cooperatively
develop the FS-X fighter aircraft. The FS-X is a significantly
modified derivative of the U.S. Air Force's F-16 Block 40 fighter
aircraft. Congress has been concerned about the transfer of U.S.
technology to Japan through the FS-X program and whether the program
will provide the United States with useful technology. Consequently,
the conference report on the fiscal year 1990 appropriations act for
the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State; the Judiciary; and
related agencies called for GAO to monitor and periodically report on
the implementation of the FS-X program. GAO has issued several
reports on the FS-X program since 1989.
For this report, GAO examined (1) the program's status, (2) U.S.
government and contractor controls over technical data and hardware
provided to Japan for the program, (3) the transfer of program
technology from Japan to the United States, and (4) benefits the
program has provided to the Japanese and U.S. aerospace industries.
BACKGROUND
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2
The U.S.-Japan FS-X program, funded by Japan, involves the
cooperative development of a fighter aircraft and the manufacture of
six prototypes. The FS-X is planned as the replacement for Japan's
aging, domestically developed F-1 fighter. Japan is obtaining U.S.
design and development assistance based primarily on F-16 technical
data. Japan is also purchasing certain items and services from U.S.
firms for the development program, including engines for the
prototype aircraft.
Under the FS-X agreements, the value of the U.S. work share is to
reach 40 percent of Japan's FS-X development budget. According to
Department of Defense (DOD) officials, the United States should
receive, at no cost, all FS-X technologies essentially developed
(derived) from U.S. technical data. Under these agreements, the
United States must pay for FS-X technologies that are not essentially
developed from U.S. technical data (non-derived), although the
United States may obtain some information about the non-derived
technologies at no cost. The FS-X agreements allow Japan to submit
technologies to the United States for possible reclassification to
non-derived status.
The government of Japan has overall FS-X program responsibility, and
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries is the prime contractor. Lockheed Fort
Worth Company (formerly General Dynamics Fort Worth Division), the
manufacturer of the F-16, is the principal U.S. subcontractor.
Lockheed will manufacture eight left wings for the FS-X test articles
and prototypes using composite design and manufacturing processes
transferred from Mitsubishi. The U.S. Air Force monitors day-to-day
program activities for the U.S. government and has delegated much of
this responsibility to the F-16 System Program Office.
RESULTS IN BRIEF
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3
The FS-X development program entered the prototype production phase
in April 1993. The first prototype flight is currently scheduled for
late summer 1995, a delay of about 2 years from earlier estimates.
U.S. officials believe the only serious technical obstacle to a
successful first flight test is Japanese development of the digital
flight control software. The current estimated value of the U.S.
work share is over $1 billion and is linked to the Japanese
government's FS-X budget. Total FS-X development costs may exceed
the FS-X budget. The United States cannot determine the overall cost
of FS-X development because the FS-X agreements do not provide U.S.
access to Japanese contractors' FS-X related cost data. DOD and
Lockheed officials believe that the FS-X program will proceed into
the production phase and are beginning to plan for production
negotiations.
The adequacy of U.S. controls of the transfer of technology and
hardware to Japan has varied. U.S. Air Force review of F-16
technical data for release to Japan seems adequate, while Japan
continues to request certain F-16 data previously denied for release.
In addition to the F-16 data, Japan is obtaining technologies and
FS-X subsystem items from U.S. companies under export licenses.
However, there is inadequate sharing of licensing information among
U.S. government entities on these and related exports to ensure (1)
compliance with DOD releasability guidelines or (2) that FS-X items
are properly categorized as derived or non-derived.
The United States has gained more access to Japanese FS-X
technologies since GAO's June 1992 FS-X review, although some issues
remain unresolved. Japan has been reluctant to transfer data for
certain systems to the United States and is seeking to limit
technology transfer to the United States for those systems by
reclassifying them as non-derived.
No one currently knows what benefits, if any, Japanese technologies
will provide to the United States. In addition, U.S. evaluation has
been incomplete and ineffective. Lockheed and U.S. officials
believe that better coordination between U.S. defense contractors is
necessary to effectively evaluate and apply Japanese FS-X
technologies. Some limited U.S. efforts are underway to improve
evaluation.
The FS-X program is helping strengthen Japan's aerospace industry.
Japanese FS-X engineers are acquiring valuable design and systems
integration experience applicable to other military and commercial
aircraft projects. By making extensive changes to the F-16 baseline,
Japan has maximized its use of indigenous design concepts and
technologies, and has ensured an important role for Japanese
companies. As a result, the FS-X program will reduce Japan's
dependence on U.S suppliers for future Japanese military, and
possibly commercial, aircraft programs. The program is also
providing some benefits to U.S. companies that are now acting as
subcontractor or suppliers. The technological contribution to the
U.S. aerospace industry overall is currently unknown.
PRINCIPAL FINDINGS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4
FS-X PROGRAM IS IN PROTOTYPE
PHASE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.1
Japanese and U.S. contractors are working on the FS-X prototype
aircraft and the first flight test is currently scheduled for late
summer 1995. Air Force and U.S. industry officials have expressed
concerns about Japan's ability to develop its digital flight control
software. The FS-X aircraft cannot fly safely until the digital
flight control software is operational.
Under the FS-X agreements, the U.S. work share is linked to the
Japanese government's FS-X development budget rather than total
Japanese expenditures or costs. DOD officials stated that the United
States has access to Japan's FS-X budget figures. Current Japanese
figures show that the value of the U.S. work share exceeds 40
percent of the development budget. The United States is attempting
to validate these figures.
According to U.S. program officials, under the FS-X agreements, the
United States does not have complete access to Japanese contractors'
FS-X related cost data. At least one Japanese company has spent more
on FS-X development than it has received from the Japanese
government. Therefore, the United States may never know the total
cost of the development program or whether total FS-X development
costs exceed the FS-X budget.
DOD believes Japan will probably produce between 50 and 130 FS-X
aircraft to (1) replace its outdated F-1 aircraft and (2) maintain
its good security relationship with the United States.
ADEQUACY OF CONTROLS FOR
U.S. PROVIDED ITEMS VARIES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.2
The F-16 System Program Office completed its review of the F-16
technical data package, which served as the baseline for the FS-X
design, and continues to review supplemental F-16 data for release.
GAO's examination of selected cases indicated that the Program Office
was adequately screening F-16 data to ensure adherence to DOD
releasability guidelines. However, Japan persists in seeking F-16
data the U.S. government has previously denied for release.
In addition to the F-16 related data, U. S. companies provide other
technologies and hardware to Japan for FS-X subsystems under export
licenses. The number of State Department FS-X related munitions
export licenses to Japan has increased nearly 600 percent from 75 to
518 since June 1992. The State Department is approving munitions
export licenses for FS-X prototype items. In addition, the
Department of Commerce has approved export license applications for
dual-use (military and civilian) items that could contribute to
Japan's FS-X development program.
Inadequate sharing of information between licensing agencies and with
DOD hampers U.S. oversight of FS-X related exports to Japan. Since
agencies do not routinely share all FS-X related licensing
information, DOD is unable to ensure compliance with releasability
guidelines established for national security reasons. In one case
the Department of State improperly approved an export license for a
very sensitive F-16 item without coordinating with DOD. Further,
GAO's analysis indicates that the Department of Commerce approved
export licenses for military aircraft items that may be under the
jurisdiction of the Department of State.
Additionally, poor coordination in the licensing process can impair
the U.S. ability to properly categorize FS-X items as derived or
non-derived. For example, before August 1992, the Air Force did not
provide complete FS-X license information to the F-16 System Program
Office, limiting its oversight of and insight into FS-X related
exports to Japan.
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER FROM
JAPAN IS OF UNCERTAIN VALUE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.3
Japanese transfers of FS-X technologies to the United States have
increased during the past 2 years. DOD and Lockheed have received
thousands of FS-X technical documents, including drawings,
photographs, and video tapes. Japanese subcontractors have also
begun providing FS-X technologies to the United States.
To date, Japan and the United States have agreed to classify five
technologies as non-derived: the active phased array fire control
radar, mission computer hardware, inertial reference/navigation
system, integrated electronic warfare system, and radar absorbing
material. DOD has conducted technical visits in Japan for all of
these technologies except radar absorbing material.
During GAO's review, the United States and Japan were negotiating the
appropriate degree of U.S. access to certain other FS-X
technologies. In December 1993, Japan submitted 12 items as
candidates for reclassification to non-derived status. The U.S.
government evaluated the 12 to determine if Japan developed them with
minimal or insignificant U.S. input, as Japan claimed. In September
1994, the U.S. government told Japan that the United States would
agree to reclassify 4 of the 12 items. U.S. officials said the
Japan Defense Agency has limited technology transfers to the United
States for some of the 12 candidate technologies pending resolution
of the reclassification issue.
Through technology transfers and visits, the United States is
learning about certain Japanese FS-X technologies. Preliminary
analyses of the performance of these systems indicate that Japanese
technologies, while strong in some areas, do not match U.S.
capabilities. U.S. government and industry officials believe,
however, that Japanese design and production methods may be more
promising than the technologies themselves. For example, Japan
designs and builds some avionics components that are lighter and
smaller than similar U.S. equipment.
U.S. government and industry officials told GAO that they do not
know what, if any, benefits will accrue to the United States from
transfers of Japanese FS-X technology, because:
Until the FS-X flies a test mission, no one can know if the
Japanese modifications to F-16 systems are successful.
U.S. sources believe that FS-X systems are based on technologies
that the U.S. Air Force should surpass with its latest
generation systems.
It is not clear that Japan will transfer key manufacturing data
that would most benefit U.S. industry.
U.S. companies do not know what markets might exist for Japanese
FS-X technologies.
There have been only limited efforts to systematically evaluate
transferred Japanese FS-X technologies, and DOD has provided very
little FS-X information to U.S. industry. However, DOD plans to
establish an FS-X database at the Defense Technical Information
Center that could improve dissemination of Japanese technologies.
During the course of GAO's review, the U.S. Air Force developed a
plan for analyzing Japanese modifications to U.S. F-16 data.
PROGRAM PROVIDES DIFFERENT
BENEFITS TO JAPANESE AND
U.S. AEROSPACE INDUSTRIES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.4
Japan's aircraft engineers are improving their skills by designing
and developing the FS-X fighter aircraft, according to U.S. and
Japanese officials. Japan's FS-X experience also increases the
likelihood of future autonomous Japanese aircraft development
projects. U.S. officials stated that Japanese engineers are
learning systems integration skills during the FS-X program that are
also applicable to commercial aircraft projects.
According to U.S. officials, the Japanese government has provided
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries extensive financial support for improving
its aerospace composite capabilities. Japanese FS-X contractors can
also use some of the equipment acquired for the FS-X program for
other aircraft programs, including commercial projects.
Japan's substantial changes to the F-16 design ensure that Japan's
aircraft industry will benefit from the program. Japan modified the
F-16 to meet its stated operational requirements and to maximize
opportunities for Japanese suppliers. Consequently, Japanese firms
are supplying over half of the configuration items for the FS-X
prototype aircraft. GAO's analysis of about 25 percent of these
items indicated that Japanese firms obtained more FS-X contracts than
U.S. firms for items with commercial applications.
While the program has enhanced the technical capabilities of the
Japanese aerospace industry, to date program benefits to the United
States have been mainly economic. The estimated value of U.S. work
share has grown from initial projections of $480 million to over $1
billion as cost estimates for the overall FS-X development budget
increased. The FS-X agreements specifically reserved certain tasks
for Lockheed and General Electric while other U.S. firms had to
compete with Japanese companies for FS-X work. Most of the U.S.
work share is reserved for Lockheed, which is guaranteed between 30
and 31 percent of the value of the FS-X development budget. As of
May 1994, Japan had awarded over $1 billion of contracts to over 200
U.S. firms for the development program.
RECOMMENDATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:5
To ensure compliance with FS-X releasability guidelines, oversight of
FS-X related exports to Japan, and proper categorization of derived
and non-derived technologies, GAO makes recommendations in chapter 3
to the Secretaries of Commerce, Defense, and State regarding the
development and implementation of written, formal procedures for
sharing information about FS-X related export licenses and
applications to Japan.
To assist DOD in developing and implementing a program to evaluate
transferred Japanese FS-X technologies and determine how the United
States may benefit from them, GAO makes recommendations in chapter 4
to the Secretary of Defense regarding the establishment of an FS-X
Technology Transfer Evaluation Task Force under the Defense Science
Board.
AGENCY COMMENTS AND GAO'S
EVALUATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:6
GAO obtained comments on a draft of this report from the Departments
of Defense, State, and Commerce (see apps. IV, V, and VI,
respectively). DOD and State concurred with GAO's recommendations
for establishing and implementing procedures to improve the sharing
of export licensing information. DOD indicated that it planned to
monitor current activities to identify, evaluate, and disseminate
Japanese FS-X technologies and if they proved to be unsatisfactory,
it would consider other actions such as establishing an FS-X Task
Force under the Defense Science Board. GAO believes that once
adequate development and testing of FS-X technologies has occurred,
DOD should establish the Task Force because current U.S. efforts are
probably too limited to provide sufficient evaluation and
dissemination of FS-X technologies.
DOD commented that the U.S. contribution to substantially enhancing
Japanese aerospace capabilities is not as significant as the GAO
draft implied. DOD added that it has effectively limited Japanese
access to sensitive U.S. aerospace technologies. GAO did not
attempt to measure the significance of the U.S. contribution to
enhanced Japanese aerospace capabilities through the FS-X program.
Although DOD has limited Japanese access to certain U.S.
technologies such as some software design and systems integration
know-how, a number of experts have concluded that the Japanese
aerospace industry has acquired significant technology from the
United States during the program that it could not have acquired
otherwise without considerable investments of time and money.
State and Commerce interpreted the draft report as advocating an
inappropriate use of the U.S. export licensing system to restrict
FS-X related exports. State pointed out that economic concerns are
not mentioned in the Arms Export Control Act as a criterion on which
a license may be granted or withheld. While that statement is
correct, GAO's draft did not propose withholding licenses for
economic reasons. Commerce also commented correctly that if
statutory and regulatory requirements are met, the fact that an
export item may be used for FS-X purposes does not provide a basis
for it to deny an export license. GAO notes, however, that the draft
report recommended only that State and Commerce share licensing
information about FS-X related exports with DOD. In GAO's view, this
exchange of information is needed to ensure that licensing decisions
take into account government-to-government agreements and DOD
releasability guidelines established for national security reasons.
This information is also needed to properly categorize FS-X
technologies as derived or non-derived.
Commerce commented that DOD would have to make a formal request for
historical information on export license applications to ship to
Japan equipment or data that could be used on military aircraft and
Commerce would have to determine that the release of such information
was in the national interest. Commerce also stated that under a
proposed executive order, DOD would be able to review all dual-use
license applications processed by Commerce, before approval, if DOD
chose to do so. GAO has not examined the draft executive order, but
if properly constructed and implemented, it could improve the sharing
of licensing information among involved executive branch agencies.
This could help to ensure that licensing decisions are made in
accordance with the FS-X government-to-government agreements and
DOD's releasability guidelines, and that FS-X technologies are
properly categorized as derived or non-derived from U.S. sources.
INTRODUCTION
============================================================ Chapter 1
In November 1988, the U.S. and Japanese governments signed a
memorandum of understanding establishing the FS-X cooperative
development program. Japan had seriously explored the option of
developing its own aircraft to replace its aging fleet of
domestically produced F-1 fighter support aircraft. Japanese
industry and elements of the Japan Defense Agency advocated Japanese
domestic development of the FS-X. In 1985, the Japan Defense
Agency's research and development arm, the Technical Research and
Development Institute, announced that, except for the engine, Japan
possessed the domestic capability to develop an advanced fighter for
about $1 billion. However, after extensive discussions with the U.S.
government, Japan agreed to develop the aircraft with U.S.
assistance by basing its design on Lockheed's\1 F-16 Block 40 fighter
aircraft. The block number refers to a specific stage of the F-16's
development. In contrast to previous F-16 coproduction programs, the
United States agreed to release certain F-16 design and software data
during the FS-X program.
Japan has significantly modified the F-16 design for the FS-X
program. While similar in appearance, the FS-X will be larger and
heavier than the F-16. For example, the FS-X design calls for a
25-percent larger wing, longer fuselage, and longer horizontal and
vertical tails. The FS-X will also have the same engine used in the
latest U.S. version of the F-16 aircraft. The FS-X will incorporate
five technologies defined by FS-X agreements as Japanese
(non-derived):\2 active phased array fire control radar, integrated
electronic warfare system, inertial reference/navigation system,
mission computer hardware,\3 and radar absorbing material. Japan is
also developing a co-cured composite wing for the FS-X. Figure 1.1
shows the major differences between the FS-X and the F-16.
Figure 1.1: Differences
Between the FS-X Configuration
and Block 40 F-16
(See figure in printed
edition.)
--------------------
\1 In 1993, General Dynamics sold its Fort Worth Division, which
developed and produced the F-16, to Lockheed Corporation.
\2 Given the large amount of technology the United States has
provided to Japan since the 1950s, it is likely that some of these
systems are based to a certain extent on U.S. technology.
\3 The FS-X mission computer performs the functions of the F-16 Block
40 fire control computer. The mission computer integrates various
on-board systems that enable the pilot to effectively aim and fire
weapons at a target.
JAPAN PROVIDES PROGRAM
LEADERSHIP AND FUNDING
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:0.1
Under a series of government-to-government and commercial agreements
on the FS-X program, Japan funds the development program and is
responsible for program leadership. It also has final authority over
the aircraft's configuration, scheduling, and cost. Six prototype
aircraft are planned--two for ground testing and four for flight
testing. The United States is guaranteed 40 percent of the value of
the total development work share budget and approximately 40 percent
of the value of the total production budget, if the program proceeds
into that phase. If Japan decides to undertake a production program,
between 50 and 130 aircraft will likely be built.
The FS-X program agreements provide the United States access to
technologies introduced into the program. According to the
Department of Defense (DOD) officials, under the FS-X agreements, the
Japan Defense Agency will transfer to the United States, at no cost,
all FS-X technologies essentially derived from U.S. technical data.
Under these agreements, the U.S. government and U.S. companies may
negotiate purchases of FS-X technologies that are not essentially
developed from U.S. technical data (non-derived) at a cost to be
determined at the time of transfer. The United States may also
obtain some information about the non-derived technologies at no
cost.
JAPANESE AND U.S. INDUSTRY
PLAY ROLES IN PROGRAM
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:0.2
U.S. and Japanese companies share FS-X design and manufacturing
responsibilities. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, a Japanese company,
is the prime contractor and is responsible for portions of the
airframe, some avionics, digital flight controls, and support
equipment. Mitsubishi is also responsible for overall FS-X systems
integration. Systems integration is critical to a successful
advanced aircraft program and refers to all of the aircraft
components working together to perform mission-related functions.
U.S. government officials have noted that Japan has limited
experience in advanced aircraft systems integration.
Key Japanese industry subcontractors include Fuji Heavy Industries
and Kawasaki Heavy Industries. Fuji is responsible for developing
the aircraft nose, composite wing upper skin, and tail assembly;
Kawasaki is responsible for the center fuselage. Ishikawajima Harima
Industries, another Japanese participant, will perform engine testing
and maintenance during the development phase and is expected to
manufacture portions of the U.S. engine under license if the program
proceeds into production. Certain engine manufacturing tasks will
likely be reserved for U.S. industry because of U.S. government
technology release restrictions. Many other Japanese firms
participate in the program as subcontractors and suppliers.
Lockheed Fort Worth Company is the major U.S. industry participant
and is guaranteed between 30 and 31 percent of the value of the total
FS-X development budget. Although Lockheed is a subcontractor, it is
providing technical assistance to Japan and will design and produce
certain parts of the FS-X, including the aft fuselage and leading
edge wing flaps. Lockheed is manufacturing eight co-cured composite
left wings for the FS-X test articles and prototypes. Lockheed is
also designing and manufacturing certain avionics equipment and
avionics test equipment. General Electric, another key U.S.
participant, is manufacturing the engines for the prototype aircraft.
Japan is also buying various items for the FS-X from over 200 U.S.
companies. The more significant items include external fuel tanks,
armament equipment, and certain avionics equipment.
FS-X PROGRAM ENCOUNTERED
DELAYS IN APPROVAL AND
IMPLEMENTATION
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:0.3
The FS-X program was initially delayed because of congressional and
executive branch scrutiny of the proposed arrangement in early 1989.
Congress and executive branch agencies raised concerns about (1)
protecting sensitive U.S. technology, (2) minimizing Japan's
opportunities to use the technology to advance its commercial
aerospace industry, (3) guaranteeing U.S. industrial participation
beyond the development program, and (4) ensuring U.S. access to and
transfer of Japanese technology. In response to these concerns,
President Bush ordered an interagency review of the program in
February 1989, and Japan agreed to clarifications to the basic
agreement that
ensured a production work share of approximately 40 percent for the
United States if the program proceeds into production,
increased safeguards for U.S. technology, and
confirmed U.S. access rights to Japanese FS-X technologies.
Lockheed and Mitsubishi planned to begin the first phase of the
program in October 1989. However, contract negotiations deadlocked
in August 1989 due to fundamental differences over the transfer, use,
and payment for Japanese technology. During that time, the Air Force
suspended transfers of F-16 technical data to Japan. These highly
complex issues were finally resolved in February 1990 when the two
governments signed a clarifying agreement that cleared FS-X
technology for transfer to the United States.
U.S. AND JAPANESE GOVERNMENTS
JOINTLY OVERSEE THE FS-X
PROGRAM
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1
An FS-X Technical Steering Committee, composed of government
officials from the United States and Japan, is responsible for
general program management and oversight. The Committee is cochaired
by representatives from the U.S. Air Force and the Japan Defense
Agency's Technical Research and Development Institute. Four
subcommittees are responsible for managing specific aspects of the
program, including work share, budget, technology transfer,
interoperability, logistics, and technical support. The Department
of Commerce is an adviser to the Committee, and Commerce officials
attend meetings of the subcommittee that oversees work share, budget
and technology transfer policy. The Technical Steering Committee
refers issues it cannot resolve to higher levels in the defense
agencies of both countries for resolution.
The Air Force's F-16 System Program Office, located at
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio, monitors the
day-to-day activities of the FS-X program for the U.S. government.
The Program Office also (1) approves the release of most Lockheed
F-16 and FS-X technical data, (2) monitors work share issues, and (3)
coordinates DOD's collection and evaluation of Japanese technologies.
Two program office liaison officers stationed in Japan facilitate
program management and exercise oversight. DOD officials from the
Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, the Defense Security
Assistance Agency, and the Defense Technology Security Administration
monitor the program and participate in Steering Committee activities.
PREVIOUS GAO REPORTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:2
Since November 1989, we have issued a number of reports dealing with
the FS-X program. In general, these reports concluded that
the development program cost estimate had increased by 70 percent
from initial estimates and the date for the first flight test
had changed from 1993 to 1995,
the United States was adequately controlling the release of F-16
related technical data to Japan, and
little technology had been transferred from Japan to the United
States.
A list of GAO products on this subject is on pages 111 and 112. In
addition, we have four classified reports on the FS-X development
program.
OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND
METHODOLOGY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:3
In response to a requirement in the conference report on the fiscal
year 1990 appropriations act for the Departments of Commerce,
Justice, and State; the Judiciary; and related agencies, we have
continued to monitor implementation of the FS-X program.
Specifically, during this review we examined
the program's status, including schedule, cost, work share, and
production issues;
U.S. government and contractor controls over technical data and
hardware the United States provided to Japan for the program;
the transfer of program technology from Japan to the United States;
and
benefits the program has provided to the Japanese and U.S.
aerospace industries.
We reviewed pertinent schedule, cost, and work share data from U.S.
government and industry sources. We did not evaluate the accuracy of
the estimates. We obtained information on production issues from
U.S. and Japanese government and industry sources.
We converted FS-X development cost estimates from yen to U.S.
dollars at intervals that corresponded with the Japanese government's
fiscal years. We did this because the Japanese government funds the
FS-X program with annual budgets based on the Japanese fiscal year.
To assess the adequacy of U.S. controls over the release of the F-16
technical data to Japan, we reviewed data release policies and
procedures established by the U.S. Air Force, the Defense Technology
Security Administration, and Lockheed Fort Worth Company. We also
reviewed technical data released or authorized for release,
determined if the release was consistent with established U.S.
guidelines, and discussed the release criteria with appropriate U.S.
government and industry officials. Given the amount of data that has
been transferred to Japan, we made spot checks of certain types of
data, such as supplemental F-16 technical data, to evaluate
compliance with releasability guidelines and procedures. We also
observed document security systems at Lockheed and Mitsubishi Heavy
Industries.
To evaluate U.S. government export licenses for technical data and
hardware related to the FS-X program, we obtained data lists from
DOD, State, and Commerce. We also met with officials from DOD, Air
Force, State, and Commerce responsible for reviewing and approving
these licenses. We were unable to determine the exact number of FS-X
licenses State approved because State's database did not identify
specific FS-X related munitions license cases.\4 The list of FS-X
license cases we obtained from DOD may not be complete because State
may not have provided all FS-X cases to DOD.
To address technology transfers from Japan to the United States, we
reviewed pertinent government-to-government agreements and held
discussions with officials from DOD, the U.S. Air Force, Commerce,
State, and U.S. Embassy, Japan, as well as U.S. industry
representatives in Japan and the United States. We met with
representatives from Lockheed Fort Worth International Corporation
(Nagoya, Japan) and Lockheed Fort Worth Company. We had discussions
with representatives from Texas Instruments, General Electric, Hughes
Airborne Radar Systems, Westinghouse Electric Corporation, and Norden
Systems as well as from the Rand Corporation, a research
organization. We also met with officials from the Naval Air Warfare
Center and the Air Force's Wright Laboratory, Dayton, Ohio, to
discuss specific technical aspects of Japan's FS-X radar development
and other technology issues.
We met with representatives from the Japan Defense Agency, and the
Japanese Ministries of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and
Industry to address technology transfer and other program issues. We
also held discussions with officials from Mitsubishi Heavy
Industries, Ltd./Nagoya Aerospace Systems; Mitsubishi Electric
Corporation (MELCO) Headquarters; MELCO Communications Equipment
Works; and MELCO Kamakura Works; and Fuji Heavy Industries,
Ltd./Aerospace Division.
To ascertain the benefits provided to the U.S. and Japanese
aerospace industries, we examined U.S. government and industry
documents, spoke with and reviewed literature from U.S. experts in
Japanese industrial and aerospace policy, and analyzed allocations of
FS-X work among U.S. and Japanese companies. We also addressed
industrial base issues in our discussions with U.S. and Japanese
government and industry officials.
We obtained written comments from DOD and the Departments of State
and Commerce on a draft of this report. We incorporated their
comments where appropriate.
We conducted our primary review from April 1993 through June 1994.
For this report, we updated information pertaining to the release of
F-16 technical data and FS-X technology visits to reflect more
current activities as of March 1995. We performed our review in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
--------------------
\4 We asked State officials to help us identify FS-X license cases in
State's database for this review and our prior FS-X review (see
U.S.-Japan Codevelopment: Update of the FS-X Program
(GAO/NSIAD-92-165, June 5, 1992)), but that database was not
programmed to identify FS-X license cases. However, State officials
agreed to add a code to mark FS-X licenses processed after March
1994.
STATUS OF THE FS-X PROGRAM
============================================================ Chapter 2
FS-X contractors are working on the prototype aircraft, which is
currently scheduled for its first flight test in late summer 1995.
U.S. officials believe the only serious technical obstacle to a
successful first flight test is Japanese development of the digital
flight control software. In March 1992, the Japan Defense Agency
imposed a limit on the FS-X development budget. This forced Lockheed
to modify some of its tasks. According to a Japan Defense Agency
estimate, the current value of the U.S. FS-X development work share,
which is linked to the Japanese government's FS-X budget, is over $1
billion. At the time of our review, the U.S. Air Force was trying
to validate U.S. work share data. The United States may never learn
the true cost of the development program because the FS-X agreements
do not provide U.S. access to Japanese FS-X contractors' cost data.
DOD and Lockheed officials believe that the FS-X program will
probably enter a production phase and are planning for production
agreement negotiations.
FS-X PROGRAM IS PROGRESSING,
BUT FACES SOME CHALLENGES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1
Japan and the United States have made considerable progress in
developing the FS-X aircraft, according to both U.S. and Japanese
officials. Despite difficulties in the initial stages of the
program, Lockheed and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries officials said
their companies are now cooperating satisfactorily to meet FS-X cost
and schedule goals. The FS-X program entered the prototype
production phase in April 1993. Prototype production drawings are
complete, and Japan has selected equipment suppliers for all major
items. On January 12, 1995, the Japan Defense Agency introduced the
first FS-X prototype to the public (see fig. 2.1).
Figure 2.1: First Japanese
FS-X Prototype Aircraft at
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries
Aerospace Systems Works
Facility in Nagoya, Japan
(See figure in printed
edition.)
The first FS-X prototype flight test is scheduled for late summer
1995, a delay of about 2 years from earlier estimates.
FS-X SCHEDULE IS VERY
AGGRESSIVE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1.1
DOD, Air Force, and Lockheed officials described the FS-X development
schedule as aggressive, with tight deadlines for contractor tasks.
Despite the compressed schedule, the Air Force had no evidence the
program would encounter significant delays. Lockheed officials
stated that Lockheed would meet deadlines for its tasks as long as
Japan continued to provide Lockheed with required resources, such as
composite wing data, on a timely basis. Japanese officials told us
that the FS-X program was on schedule and had no major technical
problems.
JAPAN MUST OVERCOME SOME
SIGNIFICANT TECHNICAL RISKS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1.2
Japanese officials and U.S. government reports have identified
several areas of significant technical risk. In February 1993,
Japanese officials identified three FS-X systems that pose great
technical challenges: the co-cured composite wing, the leading edge
flap drive system, and the digital flight control software.\1
According to a U.S. official, in October 1993, the Japan Defense
Agency also said that the integration of the avionics systems would
be technically challenging. Additionally, U.S. government reports
state that Japan has had technical problems with the radar and
electronic warfare system. Japan has been simplifying some aspects
of its original FS-X design and equipment to reduce potential
technical problems and meet the revised first flight schedule,
according to Air Force and Lockheed officials.
--------------------
\1 Digital flight control computer software enables inherently
unstable aircraft such as FS-X to fly and maneuver quickly and
safely.
CONCERNS ABOUT DIGITAL
FLIGHT CONTROL SOFTWARE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1.3
U.S. Air Force and U.S. industry officials and some Japanese
military officials are concerned that Japanese problems with their
digital flight control software could lead to significant schedule
delays and possibly jeopardize continued Japanese government support
for the program. Japan chose to develop its own software after the
U.S. government said Japan could not have the F-16 flight control
software for the FS-X unless Lockheed developed it in the United
States with minimal Japanese participation. The F-16 flight control
software is considered state-of-the-art, is unique in its
sophistication, and can have direct application to commercial
aircraft.
Japanese government officials believe it will be technically
challenging to develop a safe digital flight control system. While
the other FS-X avionics systems do not have to be fully operational
for the aircraft to achieve its scheduled first flight date, the FS-X
cannot fly safely until the digital flight control software functions
properly. U.S. Air Force and industry officials have expressed
concerns about Japan's ability to develop the software. Air Force
officials based their concerns largely on indirect evidence such as
difficulties experienced developing digital flight control software
for other aircraft. They also noted Japan's limited experience with
digital flight control software development. Because Japan is
developing the software without U.S. assistance, the United States
has had limited insight into its progress.
According to Lockheed officials, in August 1993, the Air Force asked
Lockheed to begin assessing how to respond to a possible Japanese
request for assistance in testing the digital flight control
software. Additionally, a U.S. Air Force official said that in
October 1993 the Air Force briefed Japanese officials on how to
reduce flight control development risks and offered to test the
Japanese flight control software on Air Force test aircraft.
However, Japanese officials reportedly said that U.S. assistance
would be unnecessary.
JAPAN CAPS FS-X DEVELOPMENT
PHASE COSTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2
In early 1992, the Japan Defense Agency established a limit on the
FS-X development budget in response to significant growth in its
program cost estimates. In 1992, we reported that the estimate of
FS-X development costs had increased by about 70 percent to 280
billion yen from a 1987 cost estimate of 165 billion yen. According
to an Air Force official, the Technical Steering Committee's Japanese
co-chairman told U.S. government and Lockheed officials that the
program could be canceled if the contractors did not limit their
costs to meet the budget limit. Subsequently, Lockheed agreed to
modify some of its tasks to reduce program costs. Mitsubishi Heavy
Industries and Lockheed then signed a March 1992 agreement limiting
Lockheed's development budget costs to $735 million.\2
Lockheed achieved its greatest cost savings by agreeing, with the
concurrence of the U.S. government, to (1) produce left-hand
co-cured composite wings, instead of both left and right hand wings
and (2) provide Mitsubishi with less capable avionics test equipment.
By producing only left-hand wings, Lockheed will not need separate
tooling for right-hand wings. Despite its modified wing tasks,
Lockheed should not suffer any loss of work quality or composite wing
technology, according to Lockheed and Air Force officials.
--------------------
\2 According to Lockheed officials, the $735 million Lockheed budget
did not include a $60-million licensing fee paid by Mitsubishi Heavy
Industries, costs incurred to support FS-X development phase ground
and flight test activities, and certain other costs.
UNITED STATES SEEKS TO VALIDATE
FS-X WORK SHARE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3
In October 1993, Japan estimated the value of U.S. work share at
over $1 billion and told the United States that this figure exceeded
the 40-percent U.S. share specified in an FS-X agreement. The
Japanese estimate of U.S. work share ranged from 41 to 46 percent of
the value of the FS-X development budget.\3 Under the FS-X
agreements, the U.S. work share is linked to the Japanese
government's FS-X development budget, not to Japan's total FS-X
development expenditures or costs. DOD officials stated that the
U.S. government has access to the Japanese government's FS-X
development program budgets. At the time of our review, the Air
Force was trying to validate the Japanese data for the value of U.S.
work share by contacting all U.S. companies Japan identified as
holding FS-X contracts to verify the dollar value of the contracts.\4
U.S. government officials do not know if the program's total costs
equal the Japanese government's FS-X development budget figures. At
least one Japanese company is spending more on FS-X development than
it has received from the Japanese government. These added costs are
not included in FS-X budget data the Japanese government reports to
the United States nor are they included in work share calculations.
DOD officials stated that under the FS-X agreements, the United
States does not have access to the Japanese contractors' cost data
that would be needed to determine the total cost of the FS-X
development program. However, it is clear that Japan will spend far
more developing and producing the FS-X than it would have purchasing
F-16s from the United States.
--------------------
\3 The Japan Defense Agency estimate of U.S. work share varied
according to the exchange rate used. For the October 1993 estimate,
the agency used yen to dollar exchange rates ranging from 130 to 100
yen per dollar.
\4 The United States and Japan agreed that any deviations from the
40-percent development phase target, in either direction, would be
considered in the production phase work share.
PRODUCTION APPEARS LIKELY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:4
U.S. government and industry officials believe the Japanese
government will fund production of the FS-X aircraft. DOD believes
Japan will probably produce the FS-X because Japan (1) needs to
replace its outdated F-1 aircraft and (2) does not want to risk
harming its security relationship with the United States by
abandoning production. An Air Force official noted that Japan has
never terminated a major defense program before production. However,
U.S. officials said that FS-X production might not occur if
the estimated production costs of the aircraft increase
significantly;
a major technical problem, such as failure of the digital flight
control software, prevents the aircraft from flying safely;
a prototype aircraft crashes during flight tests; or
a drastic change in Japanese defense policy eliminates military
requirements for the FS-X.
U.S. officials expected formal production discussions to begin in
1994. However, a DOD official stated that the U.S. government will
not begin formal negotiations for an FS-X production agreement with
Japan until DOD agrees that the United States has received sufficient
technology transfer from Japan during development. Current Japanese
plans call for FS-X production activities to begin in 1996.
U.S. and Japanese government officials believe Japan will probably
produce between 50 and 130 aircraft. However, Lockheed officials,
citing Japan's history of producing more aircraft than originally
estimated, felt that Japan might ultimately produce as many as 200
FS-X aircraft.
U.S. PRODUCTION WORK SHARE
TARGET WILL BE DIFFICULT TO
ATTAIN
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:4.1
In 1989, the U.S. and Japanese governments agreed that the United
States would receive a work share of about 40 percent of the value of
any FS-X production program. However, U.S. government program
officials believe that goal will be very difficult to achieve because
the decline of the dollar against the yen, since the work share
percentage was agreed to, makes U.S. work cheaper;
changes in DOD policy have eliminated nonrecurring cost recoupment
charges\5 Japan would pay to the U.S. government during the
production phase;
Japan's selection of many Japanese suppliers for the development
phase did not account for U.S. production work share; and
many U.S. companies providing end items for development might not
want to bear the costs of maintaining production capability for
the projected small quantities of FS-X aircraft (a maximum of 24
aircraft annually), and instead choose to accept lower licensed
production payments from Japan.
A U.S. government memorandum stated that, to attain a 40-percent
U.S. production work share, U.S. companies would need to build some
parts during the production phase that Japanese firms manufactured
for the development phase. Such a shift could disrupt the program's
schedule and increase its costs.
Allocation of FS-X engine work share is another potentially difficult
production issue. General Electric is selling its F110-129 "improved
performance" engine, which the U.S. Air Force uses on its latest
F-16s, to Japan for the development program. Japanese agency
officials responsible for FS-X production have indicated that Japan
will want to maximize its share of engine licensed production.
Japan seeks to maximize its engine work because its jet engine design
and development capabilities lag behind the United States. Japan
would like to use an FS-X production program to improve its aircraft
engine technology and move toward its national goal of independently
developing and producing advanced aircraft engines. U.S. government
officials acknowledged that Japan's desire to maximize its share of
engine work and the difficulty of reaching a 40-percent U.S.
production work share will make the engine an important production
agreement issue.
--------------------
\5 According to a DOD official, nonrecurring cost recoupment charges
are payments made by foreign purchasers for DOD's investment in the
development and production of major defense equipment.
PROGRAM OFFICIALS' VIEWS ON
LESSONS LEARNED TO DATE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:4.2
U.S. program officials said their development program experiences
can help the United States develop strategies for negotiating a
production agreement. They said that the United States should try to
minimize the number of government-to-government production
agreements. Nine separate agreements--in addition to the memorandum
of understanding--governed the development phase. Elements of the
agreements are contradictory and extremely difficult, if not
impossible, to interpret. The two governments spent considerable
time trying to resolve differing Japanese and U.S. interpretations
of the agreements. The governments could limit this problem by
resolving conflicts and ensuring adequate specificity and consistency
before signing production agreements, and by minimizing the number of
agreements.
U.S. program officials also suggested that the United States should
require Japan to clearly define the elements that comprise the
production phase work share to avoid delays, confusion, and
subsequent disagreement during the production phase. During
development, the United States learned, contrary to initial
expectations, that Japan's FS-X budget did not include certain costs.
The United States would benefit from a formal statement of U.S.
goals and improved U.S. government interagency coordination during
production negotiations, according to U.S. program officials. At
various times during the development program, there were significant
disagreements within the U.S. government on program issues that led
to delays and awkward shifts in U.S. positions. U.S. program
officials stated that the lack of unified U.S. positions created ill
will with Japan and led Japan to be very cautious about undertaking
other cooperative defense programs with the United States. The
officials said that the U.S. government should resolve internal
differences before negotiating production agreements so that it
presents a consistent, united position to Japan.
AGENCY COMMENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:5
In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD generally concurred with
this chapter. DOD agreed that:
Under the FS-X agreements, the U.S. work share is linked to the
Japanese government's FS-X development budget.
The United States should require Japan to define clearly the
elements comprising the U.S. work share for a production phase.
DOD plans to identify each element of a U.S. production phase
work share explicitly in the production memorandum of
understanding projected for early 1996.
The United States would benefit from a formal statement of U.S.
goals and improved interagency coordination before negotiating
production phase agreements. A formal statement of U.S. goals
relating to the production phase has been prepared for
interagency coordination. DOD stated that steering and working
groups have been established to consider all relevant viewpoints
during the drafting and negotiation of production phase
agreements.
UNITED STATES IS PROVIDING
TECHNOLOGY TO JAPAN FOR THE FS-X
PROGRAM
============================================================ Chapter 3
The adequacy of U.S. controls over the transfer of technology and
hardware to Japan has varied. U.S. controls over F-16 and Lockheed
generated FS-X technical data seem adequate, while Japan has
continued to seek the release of previously denied F-16 technical
data. The U.S. government has delegated release authority to
Lockheed for certain FS-X data. Lockheed's release decisions appear
consistent with U.S. government releasability guidelines. After
extensive review, the U.S. government released some F-16 related
production information to Japan.
In addition to the F-16 and FS-X technical data, Japan has obtained
FS-X subsystem items and technologies through the U.S. export
licensing process. Although U.S. government agencies review export
license applications for Japan, they do not adequately share
licensing information for certain items. Furthermore, there is no
comprehensive interagency information on U.S. technologies and
hardware exported to Japan for FS-X subsystems. As a result, the
United States is not adequately monitoring and controlling the
release of FS-X subsystem items and technologies to Japan.
U.S. AIR FORCE REVIEW OF THE
F-16 DATA APPEARS ADEQUATE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1
The Air Force's F-16 System Program Office completed its review of
the F-16 technical data package, which served as the baseline for the
FS-X design, and approved release of over 90 percent of the package
and supplemental data documents to Japan in complete or modified
form. However, the United States continues to withhold sensitive
software and design data. The Program Office continues to review
supplemental F-16 data for release. Our examination of selected
cases indicated that the Program Office was adequately reviewing F-16
data to ensure adherence to DOD releasability guidelines.\1
Lockheed continues to generate data to supplement the F-16 technical
data package, which the Air Force reviews for release to Mitsubishi.
The supplemental data includes:
Technical assistance requests, which clarify, complete, or
complement the F-16 technical data Lockheed has provided to
Mitsubishi.
Engineering or technical interface memorandums, containing
supplemental technical data, that Lockheed personnel use to
support ongoing program activities.
Technical data requests for missing or illegible pages of
previously released F-16 data. Mitsubishi can also obtain data
referenced in previously released F-16 documents through
technical data requests.
Engineering change proposals, which transmit information about
certain design or engineering changes proposed for items found
on the F-16 Block 40 aircraft.
When these types of requests and proposals generate technical data
not previously approved for release, the Air Force is required to
review the information in accordance with Lockheed's State Department
approved commercial agreements with Mitsubishi. Our test checks of
these F-16 supplemental data release records provided no indication
that the Air Force or Lockheed was not adhering to established
releasability procedures and policies. Appendix I shows the status
of the review of the F-16 technical data package and supplemental
F-16 data requests as of February 1, 1994.
--------------------
\1 The Air Force, in coordination with the Defense Technology
Security Administration, drafted a Delegation of Disclosure Authority
Letter, which provides criteria on what technical data and hardware
the United States can and cannot release to Japan in support of the
FS-X program.
JAPAN REPEATEDLY REQUESTS
PREVIOUSLY DENIED DATA
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1.1
Japan has persisted in seeking certain F-16 data that the U.S.
government has repeatedly declined to release. In June 1992, we
reported that the System Program Office, in response to a Mitsubishi
request, had reevaluated about 250 F-16 documents it had previously
denied and that it again declined to release about 200 of them.\2
After completing the reevaluation exercise, the Program Office told
Mitsubishi to request the specific data it required, rather than
entire documents. Mitsubishi again submitted requests for 24 of the
denied documents. The Program Office, working with Lockheed,
completed its reevaluation of these requests in the summer of 1992.
Table 3.1 shows the results of the review.
Table 3.1
Reevaluation of Previously Denied F-16
Technical Data Package Documents
Percen
Document status Number t
-------------------------------------------- ------ ------
Releasable or modified 3 13
Alternate data provided for FS-X 13 54
Not releasable 8 33
============================================================
Total 24 100
------------------------------------------------------------
The types of data the Program Office authorized for release in
complete, modified, or alternate form included pre-Block 40 data and
an engine support document. The Program Office modified pre-Block 40
information and approved its release when Block 40 documents did not
sufficiently explain changes to the F-16 Block 40. The United States
released the engine document after Japan selected General Electric as
the FS-X engine contractor. At the end of our review, a Program
Office official told us that Mitsubishi had again submitted requests
for some of the denied technical data.
--------------------
\2 U.S.-Japan Codevelopment: Update of the FS-X Program
(GAO/NSIAD-92-165, June 5, 1992).
U.S. GOVERNMENT DELEGATES
RELEASE AUTHORITY FOR SOME
FS-X DATA TO LOCKHEED
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1.2
With the transfer of virtually all of the releasable portions of the
Lockheed F-16 technical data package to Mitsubishi, the principal
flow of technology between Lockheed and Mitsubishi now involves data
produced during the FS-X program, known as foreground data.\3
Starting in September 1992, the Air Force, with the concurrence of
DOD's Defense Technology Security Administration and the State
Department, delegated release authority to Lockheed for certain types
of foreground data Lockheed generates for the program. Air Force and
Lockheed officials stated that the delegations were necessary because
(1) most of the foreground data is not sensitive because Lockheed
creates it from previously released data or Japanese-provided data
and (2) the program's tight schedule required expediting the flow of
foreground information to Mitsubishi.
The delegation of foreground data review and release responsibilities
to Lockheed has occurred in stages, with program office personnel
training and testing Lockheed engineers in releasability review
procedures and policies for specific items or technologies. Program
Office officials said that they trained Lockheed personnel to adopt a
conservative approach to data release decisions and to consult with
the Program Office on questionable cases. In the final stage,
Lockheed officials make release decisions and ship data judged
releasable immediately to Japan. Subsequently, Lockheed provides the
Program Office with periodic reports on the released data.
As of February 1, 1994, the Air Force and Lockheed had released 1,456
foreground data documents, withheld 26, and modified 12. According
to Program Office officials, Lockheed's decisions have been
consistent with U.S. government release guidelines. Our limited
review of Lockheed and Air Force records of delegated release
decisions revealed no evidence that either party was not conforming
to applicable releasability procedures and policies.
--------------------
\3 As defined in the FS-X memorandum of understanding, foreground
data is "technical data and computer software, including any
invention, process, or discovery, whether or not patentable,
conceived or first actually reduced to practice in the performance of
work under the program."
U.S. GOVERNMENT APPROVES
RELEASE OF SOME PRODUCTION DATA
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2
In late 1991, in response to Japanese requests and after a DOD
review, the U.S. government authorized the release of some F-16
related production data for items that Japan said were essential for
completing the FS-X design. DOD's review was prompted by Japanese
industry requests in the summer of 1991 for proposals from U.S. and
Japanese companies to provide licensed production data for 122 FS-X
subsystems. The Japan Defense Agency justified the requests by
stating that it needed production information to ensure the safety of
the FS-X design and to avoid schedule delays.
According to U.S. program officials, the Japanese requests caused
concern within the U.S. government because many U.S. officials
believed that licensed production of U.S. items would not be
discussed at least until negotiations for a government-to-government
FS-X production agreement began. One DOD official also saw the
Japanese request for production information as a means of
circumventing the FS-X development agreement and obtaining U.S.
technology. An Air Force official stated that Japan wanted licensed
production information to avoid having to purchase end items from
U.S. firms. This would increase the number of jobs for Japanese
workers and ensure an adequate level of contractor support during the
program. The Japan Defense Agency had complained about the support
it received from U.S. companies on other programs and believed it
could obtain more timely assistance from Japanese firms.
In July 1991, at a meeting of the FS-X Technical Steering Committee,
the U.S. position was that, in general, the United States could not
approve licensed production before production negotiations. The
United States asked Japan to reduce its license production requests
to the minimum required to ensure the safety of the FS-X design. In
August, DOD told the Japan Defense Agency that the United States
would consider Japanese requests for licensed production information
on a case-by-case basis. DOD also said that U.S. companies should
not, as called for in one of the Japanese requests, be expected to
transfer intellectual property rights to participate in the FS-X
program and that Japan should give U.S. companies more time to
respond to the requests. The Japan Defense Agency accepted DOD's
offer and suggestions and subsequently reduced its requests from 122
to 96 items.
DOD, in consultation with Commerce and U.S. industry, analyzed the
Japanese requests and approved 22 items for full or partial licensed
production.\4 Items approved for licensed production included the
windshield, a fuel tank, and main and nose landing gear assemblies.
The United States offered 74 other items to Japan as end items,
including the head-up display unit, 600-gallon fuel tank, bomb
ejector unit, radar altimeter, and high frequency radio.
In May 1992, Japan announced most of the source selections for FS-X
subsystems. Japan selected U.S. companies for 19 of the 22\5 items
offered by the United States for complete or partial licensed
production. Of the 74 items offered as end items, Japan selected 48
from U.S. companies. The Japanese co-chairman of the FS-X Technical
Steering Committee told DOD that one factor in Japan's selection of
some Japanese firms was U.S. restrictions on the release of licensed
production information during the development phase. DOD officials
stated that the United States would probably allow more licensed
production by U.S. firms upon completion of an FS-X production
agreement.
--------------------
\4 The United States offered licensed production for the 22 items to
Japan on a "build-to-print" basis. This means that U.S. companies
could provide Japanese firms with the technical drawings and
associated specifications to replicate a specific item. However, the
U.S. companies could not provide any detailed design, development,
or production data. The United States included this "build-to-print"
restriction as a proviso in the export licenses for these items.
\5 The Japan Defense Agency eliminated one of these items, the
vertical canard actuator, from the FS-X.
JAPAN IS OBTAINING DATA AND
ITEMS THROUGH U.S. EXPORT
LICENSING PROCESS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3
In addition to F-16 and Lockheed FS-X technical data, Japan has
obtained technology and items from U.S. firms through the export
licensing process. As of March 18, 1994, State had issued at least
518 export licenses for items on the U.S. Munitions List to U.S.
companies to provide technologies and items to Japan for the FS-X
program.\6 In addition, between 1988 and 1993, Commerce approved at
least one export license for the program. We were unable to obtain a
definite count of FS-X related export licenses due to difficulties in
analyzing State and Commerce licensing data. Further, while
licensing procedures have improved since our last review, inadequate
sharing of licensing information between State, DOD, and Commerce
remains a concern and has resulted in inadequate monitoring and
controls of program technology and hardware releases to Japan.
--------------------
\6 We did not confirm that companies actually exported items under
these approved licenses.
SEVERAL U.S. GOVERNMENT
ENTITIES REVIEW FS-X EXPORT
APPLICATIONS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3.1
Both the State and Commerce Departments review and approve export
license applications for the FS-X program. State has jurisdiction
over items and services on the U.S. Munitions List while Commerce
maintains jurisdiction over dual-use items (items with both civil and
military uses). Neither State nor Commerce are required to refer
FS-X related license applications to DOD or share information with
DOD about these cases. However, State frequently provided FS-X
related license applications to DOD while Commerce generally did not
share licensing information with State or DOD. As a result, no U.S.
government agency or office has complete information on approved FS-X
related licenses to Japan. Program officials said that the separate
systems of license application review lead to gaps in knowledge that
prevent them from fully monitoring FS-X transfers to Japan.
NUMBER OF APPROVED MUNITIONS
LICENSES HAS INCREASED
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3.2
The number of approved FS-X munitions export licenses to Japan has
increased from 75 to at least 518 since our June 1992 report. Most
of these licenses cover hardware for the development and production
of prototype aircraft. As table 3.2 shows, 54 percent of the
approved munitions licenses to Japan for the FS-X program are for
program hardware. In contrast, our 1992 review showed that most of
the approved licenses were for marketing purposes. U.S. companies
continued seeking approval for marketing presentations to Japan, and
State has approved 109 licenses for marketing purposes since 1987.
Table 3.2
Types of Exports Approved Under FS-X
Munitions Licenses to Japan
Percen
Type of export Number t
-------------------------------------------- ------ ------
Development or prototype aircraft 278 54
hardware
Marketing information (brochures, 109 21
presentations, and plant visits)
Technical data, drawings, or consultations 61 12
Maintenance and testing data or 23 4
equipment
Castings and toolings 18 3
Technical Assistance Agreements 29 6
============================================================
Total 518 100
------------------------------------------------------------
JAPAN HAS OBTAINED DUAL-USE
ITEM LICENSES WITH POSSIBLE
FS-X APPLICATIONS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3.3
Under the Export Administration regulations, the vast majority of
dual-use goods and technologies are exported to Japan under general
licenses and require neither applications nor Commerce-issued
documents. Many dual-use items that may have utility in the FS-X
program can be exported to Japan under general licenses.
Consequently, it was difficult to identify many exports that may
contribute to the FS-X program. We identified, and Commerce
confirmed, only one Individual Validated License\7 for exporting U.S.
goods to Japan specifically for use in the FS-X program.
However, Commerce approved additional licenses to Japan for dual-use
items that, according to knowledgeable Commerce officials, may
contribute to the FS-X program. For example, during our search of
Commerce licensing data, we found approved Individual Validated
Licenses to Japan for materials and technical data for radomes, parts
for military inertial reference/navigation systems, material useful
for radar absorbing purposes, and military aircraft testing
equipment. Commerce and State Department officials have conflicting
views on which department has jurisdiction over some of these items.
Moreover, Commerce officials told us Commerce is not obligated to
coordinate its review of these licenses or share information on these
cases with State or DOD. We found that Commerce did not coordinate
or share information on the licenses we examined. DOD officials are
concerned that certain Commerce-approved licenses may be inconsistent
with U.S. releasability guidelines for the FS-X program. However,
Commerce officials said they have no legal basis for denying most
licenses to Japan and that Commerce is not legally obligated to
follow DOD FS-X program releasability guidelines. Commerce also
stated that the dual-use items it has jurisdiction over would not
make significant contributions to the development of an advanced
weapon system such as the FS-X, but did not provide evidence to
support this statement.
--------------------
\7 Commerce requires U.S. companies to obtain Individual Validated
Licenses for the export of certain categories of goods to Japan.
These items include stealth technology, inertial reference/navigation
equipment, and other aircraft subsystems.
STATE AND DOD COORDINATE
REVIEW OF FS-X MUNITIONS
LICENSE APPLICATIONS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3.4
State's Office of Defense Trade Controls reviews applications to
export items and services on the U.S. Munitions List. To help
ensure full consideration of technical, national security, and
foreign policy concerns, Defense Trade Controls sends license
applications that require additional scrutiny to bureaus within the
State Department and other U.S. government agencies, principally
DOD. State and DOD officials said that Defense Trade Controls sends
nearly all FS-X applications to DOD for review. However, we were
unable to verify this and found one case where Defense Trade Controls
did not send an application for an especially sensitive item to DOD
for review.
Within DOD, three units routinely review FS-X related license
applications--the Defense Technology Security Administration, the Air
Force, and the Defense Security Assistance Agency. The Defense
Technology Security Administration coordinates DOD's reviews of
military export license applications and establishes the DOD position
in consultation with other DOD reviewing entities. It conducts a
technical and policy review and ensures that other units review each
FS-X license.
In June 1992, we reported that the Air Force did not routinely
forward the FS-X munitions applications to the F-16 System Program
Office. This situation has improved during the past 2 years. The
System Program Office is the DOD entity most familiar with the FS-X
program. It uses the FS-X releasability guidelines to determine what
items the United States can release to Japan. We found that the Air
Force forwarded about 61 percent of the FS-X munitions license
applications to the Program Office for review and comment between
September 25, 1992, and February 16, 1994. In another 14 percent of
FS-X cases, the Air Force found license applications that clearly
should be approved and did not require Program Office review.
Nonetheless, the Air Force provided information on these cases to the
Program Office after license approval. In total, Program Office
officials have seen about 75 percent of FS-X munitions licenses since
September 1992. Since August 1993, however, the Program Office has
reviewed or received nearly all incoming FS-X munitions license
applications.
COMMERCE DOES NOT SHARE
INFORMATION ABOUT DUAL-USE
APPLICATIONS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3.5
Our analysis of Commerce licensing data showed that Commerce had not,
except for one occasion, shared information on licenses for items
with possible FS-X applications with DOD or State. Commerce did
provide some of its licensing information to the Program Office for
analyzing whether certain technologies are non-derived; however, we
found that information to be incomplete. DOD FS-X program officials
said they know very little about items Commerce approves for export
to Japan. As a result, they are unable to monitor all transfers to
Japan that may contribute to the FS-X development. It is possible,
therefore, that Japanese companies are obtaining U.S. technology for
the FS-X program through licenses for other programs. In addition,
since licenses are not required for most commercial exports to Japan,
Commerce officials stated they are unable to monitor most of these
exports.
LICENSING IRREGULARITIES
POSE RISK OF IMPROPER
RELEASES TO JAPAN
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3.6
During our review, we encountered irregularities in U.S. export
license processing that may undermine efforts to control the release
of technology to Japan during the FS-X program. For example:
State approved a munitions export license for a very sensitive item
related to the FS-X program without referring the application to
DOD for review. U.S. Air Force officials believe State should
have denied this license because export of the item is strictly
limited. U.S. officials intercepted this item at a port and
were able to prevent shipment.
State approved an FS-X engine license without the limitations
required by DOD's FS-X releasability guidelines. This license
permitted a U.S. company to (1) export some data without
government review and (2) discuss prohibited production issues
with the Japanese importer. Program office officials had
recommended, including limitations based on a previously
approved engine license.
Program Office personnel did not always review referred license
applications within the allotted time. As a result, DOD
processed the applications without the Program Office input.
Program Office officials said they often receive unrealistic
deadlines for reviewing proposed licenses.
MANAGEMENT INFORMATION
SYSTEM COULD IMPROVE FLOW OF
LICENSING DATA
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3.7
In June 1992, we reported that the Program Office's insight into the
licensing process could improve with installation of a computer
terminal with access to DOD's Foreign Disclosure and Technical
Information System. The system contains a database that lists the
status of DOD's review of all military export license cases State
refers to DOD, including the DOD position on applications. As of May
1994, Air Force officials were not aware of any specific plans to
install the terminal.
CONCLUSIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:4
The FS-X program involves the transfer of certain sensitive U.S.
technology to Japan. Monitoring this transfer is critical for
ensuring compliance with U.S. releasability guidelines. Inadequate
sharing of information between licensing agencies and with DOD
hampers U.S. oversight and control of FS-X related exports to Japan.
There is no centralized source of interagency information on FS-X
related licenses to Japan. As a result, program officials are unable
to fully monitor the release of FS-X items and technologies to Japan.
RECOMMENDATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:5
To ensure compliance with FS-X releasability guidelines and oversight
of FS-X related exports to Japan, we recommend that the Secretaries
of State, Commerce, and Defense direct the appropriate offices within
their departments to develop and implement written, formal procedures
for sharing information about export license applications to Japan
that are potentially related to the FS-X program. These procedures
should, among other things,
require State to refer all FS-X munitions license applications to
DOD for review,
provide sufficient information for F-16 System Program Office
personnel to adequately monitor FS-X related export license
applications to Japan,
provide program office personnel on-line access to DOD's Foreign
Disclosure and Technical Information System, and
require Commerce to provide DOD information on Individual Validated
Licenses for exports to Japan of equipment or data with existing
or potential uses on military aircraft.
AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
EVALUATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:6
In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD and State agreed with
our recommendations. Commerce stated that it could, as we
recommended, provide historical information to DOD on Individual
Validated License applications for exports to Japan of equipment or
data with existing or potential uses on military aircraft. However,
Commerce said DOD would have to make a formal request and Commerce
would have to determine that the release of such information is in
the national interest. Commerce also stated that under a proposed
executive order, DOD would be able to review all dual-use license
applications processed by Commerce if DOD chose to do so. We have
not examined the draft executive order, but if properly constructed
and implemented, it should enhance sharing of licensing information
among executive branch agencies, which would help to ensure that
licensing decisions take into account both the FS-X
government-to-government agreements and DOD's FS-X releasability
guidelines, which were established for national security reasons.
This exchange of information is also needed to properly categorize
FS-X technologies as derived or non-derived.
State and Commerce interpreted the draft report as advocating an
inappropriate use of the U.S. export licensing system to restrict
the export of items and technologies to Japan for the FS-X program.
State commented that economic concerns are not mentioned in the Arms
Export Control Act as a criterion on which a license may be granted
or withheld. While that statement is correct, our draft did not
propose withholding licenses for economic reasons. Commerce also
commented correctly that if statutory and regulatory requirements are
met, the fact that an export item may be used for FS-X purposes does
not provide a basis for it to deny an export license. However, we
note that the draft report only recommended that State and Commerce
share licensing information about FS-X related exports with DOD. In
our view, this exchange of information is needed to ensure that
licensing decisions take into account the FS-X agreements and DOD
guidelines, and that FS-X technologies are properly categorized.
Commerce commented that current law and regulations do not authorize
it to deny export license applications for dual-use items to Japan on
the basis of their potential use in the FS-X program. This point is
valid if the applications in question fall under Commerce's
jurisdiction. As noted in the report, Commerce may have processed
some license applications for Japan that fall under State's
jurisdiction. Commerce stated that all but one of 12 licensing cases
we identified as potentially falling under State's jurisdiction were
clearly under Commerce's jurisdiction. We note that Commerce can not
unilaterally make a commodity jurisdiction determination; such
determinations are reached by State after coordination with DOD and
Commerce. Furthermore, these 12 cases represent only a sample of a
larger number of items licensed by Commerce that could have potential
applications for the FS-X or fall under State's jurisdiction.
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER FROM JAPAN IS
IMPROVING, BUT OF UNCERTAIN VALUE
============================================================ Chapter 4
Although transfers of both derived and non-derived Japanese FS-X
technologies to the United States have increased since our June 1992
report, it is unclear how much the United States will benefit from
these transfers. U.S. evaluation of Japanese FS-X technologies has
been limited and the U.S. government has done little to help U.S.
industry obtain information about FS-X technologies. Questions
remain about Japanese technical capabilities and the value of
Japanese technologies to the United States. Japanese design and
manufacturing techniques could be useful, but the United States may
not obtain these technologies under the FS-X program. In addition,
U.S. and Japanese industry officials do not know what markets exist
at this time for transferred Japanese FS-X technology.
PROGRESS MADE ON TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFERS FROM JAPAN, BUT SOME
PROBLEMS REMAIN
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:1
Overall, Japanese efforts to transfer FS-X technical information to
the United States have improved since 1992 and U.S. program
officials are generally satisfied with the transfers. The United
States has collected information on the FS-X wing and the four
Japanese non-derived avionics systems: the active phased array fire
control radar, the mission computer hardware, the inertial
reference/navigation system, and the integrated electronic warfare
system. Japan has provided increasing levels of access to these
technologies as they reach key development points. However, program
officials are uncertain if Japan is transferring all the data it
should. The United States and Japan also disagree on how the United
States may use some Japanese FS-X technology.
UNITED STATES IS RECEIVING
FS-X TECHNOLOGY FROM JAPAN
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:1.1
The United States had received thousands of FS-X technical documents,
including drawings, photographs, and video tapes as of early 1994.
Japanese subcontractors have also begun providing FS-X technologies
to the United States. Japan has provided English translations of
technical documents that Lockheed officials believe are complete and
accurate. Japan has also hosted U.S. government technology visits
for Japanese non-derived FS-X avionics technologies.
A U.S. Air Force official stated that technology transfers will
continue throughout the development program and that the number of
U.S. companies receiving Japanese technology should increase
further, now that Japan has selected about 200 U.S. firms to
participate in the program. Under the FS-X agreements, a U.S. firm
is entitled to Japanese FS-X technologies that incorporate changes,
modifications, or improvements to technical data the U.S. firm
supplied to Japan for the program.
THE UNITED STATES IS
OBTAINING SOME JAPANESE FS-X
DATA THROUGH TECHNOLOGY
VISITS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:1.2
The FS-X agreements specify that DOD may request technology visits to
obtain information about Japanese non-derived FS-X systems. At the
time of our review, Japan had hosted 11 U.S. government technology
visits. The U.S. strategy is to have at least one technology visit
during both the design and prototype production stages of the
development program to ensure that DOD collects information about
Japanese design and production approaches. During each visit, U.S.
and Japanese engineers
discuss design philosophy and technical specifications of the
system;
review test methodology, test data, and evaluate the system's test
performance;
review the development schedule for the item as well as key dates
for integrating the item into the FS-X aircraft;
examine system hardware; and
tour applicable Japanese Defense Agency research and development
sites, as well as the design and manufacturing facilities of the
associated Japanese manufacturer(s).
Upon its return, the DOD team produces a technology visit report that
will be available to DOD agencies and certain U.S. DOD contractors.
Table 4.1 shows the dates of prior and planned FS-X technology
visits.
Table 4.1
Dates of FS-X Technology Visits
Japanese non-
derived system Date Purpose of visit
------------------ ------------------ --------------------
Active phased March 1990 Assess Japanese
array fire control design
radar
May 1991 Assess Japanese
development/
manufacturing
facilities
June 1992 Commerce/DOD/
Mitsubishi Electric
Corporation radar
symposium in
Washington, D.C.
July 1993 Test Module
Controller
May 1994 Share/compare
testing results
November 1994 Commerce/DOD/
industry assessment;
company discussions
Mission computer November 1991 Assess Japanese
design
May 1993 Assess Japanese
development/
manufacturing
facilities
Integrated July 1993 Assess Japanese
electronic warfare design
system
September 1994 Assess Japanese
development/
manufacturing
facilities
Inertial November 1993 Assess Japanese
reference/ design
navigation system
September 1994 Assess Japanese
development/
manufacturing
facilities
Radar absorbing May 1995 Assess Japanese
material (planned) design
------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. and Japanese officials told us they have been satisfied with
the most recent technology visits. U.S. team members reported that
the Japanese have provided good access to FS-X facilities and
responded completely to U.S. inquiries about the non-derived
technologies. The Air Force intends to continue monitoring
development of the Japanese non-derived FS-X systems.
Air Force officials have indicated that they are seeking U.S.
industry participation in upcoming avionics technology visits.
Commerce officials have also discussed additional industry visits to
Japan to facilitate discussions between U.S. and Japanese industry
on the non-derived systems. Parts of the technology visit reports
will be available to qualified users of the Defense Technical
Information Center\1 and from Commerce through electronic databases
and industry associations. However, as of June 1994, all of these
efforts to share FS-X information outside DOD were still in the
planning stages.
--------------------
\1 A DOD computerized defense information service available to
qualified government and industry personnel.
LOCKHEED AND DOD NEED
ADDITIONAL DATA TO ASSESS
NOVEL JAPANESE WING DESIGN
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:1.3
According to Lockheed officials, they are receiving sufficient data
and technical assistance from Mitsubishi Heavy Industries to build
FS-X wings that meet Japanese technical specifications. Lockheed has
produced co-cured composite wing sections according to the Mitsubishi
design. However, at the time of our review, Mitsubishi had not yet
provided all the information Lockheed needed to apply the composites
technology to other programs. Nevertheless, Lockheed continues to
receive wing data from Mitsubishi, and officials were optimistic that
Lockheed would receive sufficient data to consider using the co-cured
composite technology for other applications.
Some U.S. officials are concerned about the capabilities of the
Japanese FS-X co-cured composite wing design. Sections of Lockheed
and Mitsubishi wings meet testing specifications. However, the
overall wing design has several unique features such as (1) extensive
application of composite materials,\2 (2) a novel configuration of
internal wing support structures, and (3) a complex Japanese
manufacturing process. Japan must prove this design on a flying
prototype. Since the Japanese design represents a departure from
typical U.S. approaches, some U.S. officials are uncertain whether
the composite wing will meet all FS-X mission requirements.
U.S. program officials have requested full access to Japanese FS-X
flight testing, which will ultimately verify the capabilities of the
wings. These officials stressed the importance of participating in
the flight test program and obtaining as much testing data as
possible from Japan. Flight testing will (1) verify the wing's
performance characteristics, (2) allow Lockheed to better evaluate
Japanese composites design and processes, and (3) provide insight
into other potential (non-FS-X) uses of this technology.
During our review, members of the FS-X Technical Steering Committee
had been negotiating U.S. involvement in flight testing.
--------------------
\2 Composite materials include carbon based fabrics and resins that,
when heated under high pressure, bond to create a single structure.
QUESTIONS ABOUT FS-X RADAR
REMAIN FOLLOWING 1992
SYMPOSIUM
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:1.4
Following two DOD technology visits to Japan, Commerce and DOD
sponsored a symposium on the FS-X active phased array fire control
radar in June 1992. Mitsubishi Electric Corporation (MELCO), which
is developing the radar, provided a technical overview to over 150
U.S. industry and government attendees in Washington, D.C. Reviews
of the symposium varied. U.S. government and some industry
officials said that Japanese willingness to participate in the
symposium was unprecedented and provided a possible model for future
technology exchanges. Other radar industry officials, on the other
hand, said MELCO provided very limited information about the FS-X
radar. Consequently, they were unable to adequately evaluate
Japanese radar technology.
There has been little follow-up to the symposium by either Commerce
or MELCO, although some U.S. firms have been expecting such efforts.
MELCO officials told us they had contacted several U.S. companies
about commercial applications for FS-X radar technology. When we
contacted some of these companies, however, officials said that MELCO
has been reluctant to discuss its radar technology. This is partly
because Japanese companies are generally prohibited from exporting
goods for military use. MELCO officials said this prohibition
interferes with efforts to export its modules that MELCO believes
have both commercial and military applications. Japan's Ministry of
International Trade and Industry has told MELCO it must demonstrate a
commercial application of the modules before receiving approval to
export them.
Interest in the FS-X radar among the U.S. radar companies we
contacted is mixed. Some U.S. radar industry officials told us they
would like to visit MELCO's FS-X facilities in Japan to learn more
about their radar modules.\3 U.S. companies produce similar modules
and believe they could benefit from knowledge of Japanese production
methods. However, some of these companies believe U.S. radar
technology itself is more advanced and therefore they cannot learn
much from Japan. Radar experts are also uncertain about the
potential market for this technology especially since current module
costs preclude widespread commercial applications. Commerce
officials told us that a government-sponsored radar industry visit to
Japan would help resolve these questions. Such a visit occurred in
November 1994 and involved more than a dozen U.S. companies,
according to a Commerce official.
In the spring of 1994, DOD completed testing of five radar modules
the United States purchased from Japan. Appendix II describes the
U.S. testing program and module costs.
--------------------
\3 These approximately 3.5x1.1x.0.3 inch modules incorporate
state-of-the-art gallium arsenide monolithic microwave integrated
circuit technology. Each FS-X active phased array radar antenna will
use about 800 individual modules.
UNITED STATES AND JAPAN
CONTINUE TO CONSIDER
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER ISSUES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:1.5
Under the FS-X agreements, Japan may submit evidence and requests to
change the technology transfer status for specific FS-X technologies.
If Japan demonstrates it developed a technology with insignificant or
no U.S. input, the United States may agree to reclassify the
technology as non-derived. Under non-derived classification, Japan
may limit certain technology transfers to the United States. Japan
may also sell non-derived technologies to the United States. In
contrast, Japan is required to provide complete technology transfers
for changes, modifications, or improvements to derived technologies
free of charge to the United States.
In February 1993, the United States agreed to reclassify radar
absorbing material to non-derived status. According to DOD
officials, the U.S. decision was primarily based on DOD's export
license records, which showed that no U.S. licenses referred to DOD
had been approved for transfer of radar absorbing material to Japan.
However, we identified two approved Commerce licenses to Japan for an
item classified as radar absorbing material. An official from the
U.S. company that obtained these licenses told us that his firm had
exported the item to Japan on at least two occasions under Commerce
Department export licenses. He also said that the Japanese importers
could use the imported material for FS-X radar absorbing
applications.
This company official told us that his firm attempted to obtain a
State Department munitions export license for this material, but that
State, in coordination with DOD, determined that the item was not
controlled under the U.S. Munitions List. As a result, the company
obtained export licenses from Commerce. The company official was
surprised about State's response because State had previously
controlled a similar item under the Munitions List and the company
had obtained munitions export licenses for the item. Commerce
provided us with documents showing that State had passed jurisdiction
for these cases to Commerce.
We asked DOD to inquire about Commerce's licensing jurisdiction over
this item. At the time of our review, DOD was seeking information on
these cases from Commerce and had not completed its review. From the
information we obtained for these cases, it appears that DOD lacked
complete information when it decided to reclassify radar absorbing
material.
In December 1993, Japan requested non-derived classification for 12
FS-X items.\4 The United States conducted an analysis to determine
the level and significance of U.S. input into the 12 candidate items
and to assess the technology transfer consequences of agreeing to
non-derived status. For example, DOD searched for military
licenses--and some dual-use and commercial export licenses--State and
Commerce issued for Japan that contributed to any of the 12
candidates. We encouraged DOD to work with Commerce and State to
obtain and analyze all pertinent U.S. export licenses approved for
Japan. DOD officials agreed that a thorough analysis was needed
because changing the classification of these items could limit U.S.
program benefits. Additionally, if improperly classified as
non-derived, the United States could later buy technology derived
from U.S. data. In September 1994, the U.S. FS-X Technical
Steering Committee co-chairman informed his Japanese counterpart that
the United States had agreed to change 4 of the 12 candidate items to
non-derived status. At the time of our review, the Japan Defense
Agency was studying the U.S. decision.
--------------------
\4 Among the 12 candidates for reclassification are the map
generator, cockpit displays, the aircraft video tape recorder, the
radar liquid cooling system, and the digital flight control software.
JAPAN MAY NOT BE
TRANSFERRING ALL FS-X DATA
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:1.6
The Japan Defense Agency has been holding up transfers for
reclassification candidate technologies pending the resolution of the
December 1993 reclassification request. The agency is reluctant to
transfer candidate technologies before the U.S. evaluation is
complete, because it believes they are not essentially developed from
U.S. technology. On the other hand, U.S. officials contend that
all FS-X technology is derived until classified otherwise and that
Japan is obligated to transfer data until classification negotiations
end. At the time of our review, the United States and Japan had not
resolved this issue.
JAPAN IS DISPUTING U.S.
RIGHTS TO USE SOME FS-X
TECHNOLOGY
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:1.7
The two countries also disagree on how the United States may use some
transferred Japanese FS-X technology. The FS-X agreements state that
DOD may use certain Japanese data for defense purposes.\5 U.S.
officials believe this allows the U.S. government to share Japanese
data with companies not involved in the FS-X program for use in other
defense programs. Japanese companies are concerned that this
arrangement may reveal company secrets. By the end of our review,
DOD had received several requests for Japanese FS-X wing data from
U.S. companies that are not participating in the program. As a
result, the two governments were working to resolve differences over
how the U.S. government could distribute Japanese data.
--------------------
\5 Specifically, the FS-X memorandum of understanding essentially
states that the Japan Defense Agency grants to the U.S. government a
non-exclusive and irrevocable license to use the technical data
essentially developed from U.S. technical data (derived technology)
for its defense purposes (including Grant Aid) and defense sales
(including Foreign Military Sales).
EFFORTS ARE UNDERWAY TO
EVALUATE JAPANESE TECHNOLOGIES
BUT OBSTACLES REMAIN
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:2
Overall, U.S. efforts to evaluate Japanese-provided FS-X
technologies have been limited and uncoordinated. This is partly
because the U.S. government did not originally consider technology
transfer from Japan as a primary program goal and did not have an
established infrastructure to evaluate transferred technology. As
late as 1993, Air Force, Commerce, and Lockheed officials told us
they lacked the resources to evaluate Japanese FS-X technology
transfers.
DOD and several U.S. firms were evaluating three Japanese FS-X
technologies at the time of our review: the co-cured composite wing,
the digital flight control computer, and Japanese radar modules (see
app. II for further information on the radar evaluation). In
addition, following our inquiries, the Air Force began an analysis to
determine which FS-X technologies might be of interest to U.S.
industry. According to an Air Force official, DOD plans to
distribute the results of this analysis within DOD and to most U.S.
FS-X contractors. Preliminary results of this analysis show that the
United States may be interested in several Japanese FS-X technologies
listed in table 4.2.
Table 4.2
Japanese FS-X Technologies of Potential
Interest to the United States
Technology/system Important characteristics
----------------------------- -----------------------------
Four Japanese non-derived Represent a culmination of
avionics systems: years of Japanese avionics
Active phased array fire development work. Gallium
control radar Arsenide Monolithic Microwave
Mission computer hardware Integrated Circuit technology
Integrated electronic warfare in the radar is of special
system interest because the United
Inertial reference/ States currently produces and
navigation system uses this technology.
Active matrix standby and Display manufacturing
multi-function displays technologies and dual-
redundancy of the multi-
function display system.
Emergency Power Unit (EPU) The FS-X EPU will use JP-4
fuel, a less hazardous
substance than the hydrazine
that powers the F-16 EPU.
Airframe sections Material properties, material
and process specifications,
and tooling concepts.
Nose radome Knowledge of material
properties, coatings, and
processing techniques.
Direct drive valve (DDV) DDV cartridges are a
cartridges relatively new technology and
the United States could learn
from Japanese test results.
Possible replacements for F- Substitution of Japanese
16 equipment including: equipment could increase the
Fuel/oil heat exchanger performance capability of
Variable delivery hydraulic certain U.S. F-16 systems.
pump
Rate of fuel flow transmitter
------------------------------------------------------------
UNITED STATES LACKS AN FS-X
TECHNOLOGY EVALUATION
STRATEGY
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:2.1
U.S. program officials and observers told us the United States has
not done much to evaluate Japanese FS-X technologies with potential
value to the United States due to a lack of resources. These include
flat panel displays, the co-cured wing, and beta titanium technology,
according to a former program official. Ideally, one observer said,
the United States should have begun evaluating these technologies and
considering uses for them as soon as Japan provided technical data on
them.
Lockheed Fort Worth officials further explained that they cannot
fully evaluate Japanese FS-X technologies without input from other
experienced U.S. defense companies. Because Lockheed and other
manufacturers guard their industrial secrets very closely, Lockheed
does not know all of the capabilities of other companies in areas
such as composites. Lockheed officials believe that Commerce and DOD
must lead overall evaluation efforts because competing U.S. defense
companies are very unlikely to do so on their own.
U.S. officials contend that there are limited opportunities to use
Japanese FS-X technologies without military requirements for them.
For example, with the pending closure of F-16 production lines, a
program official stated the company will not have a program that
could readily incorporate Japanese technology.\6 This official also
noted that the next generation U.S. F-22 fighter aircraft currently
in development is unlikely to benefit from transferred FS-X
technology. However, the United States will not know if Japanese
FS-X technologies will benefit U.S. programs without further
evaluation of those technologies.
The lack of a comprehensive U.S. evaluation program several years
into FS-X development could hamper subsequent use of Japanese FS-X
technologies. During FS-X development, the United States can obtain
virtually any technical document for Japanese systems essentially
derived from U.S. technical data. However, this opportunity could
end with completion of the development phase. Until DOD and U.S.
industry examine Japanese technology transfers, they cannot know what
additional information the United States should request from Japan.
--------------------
\6 Although Lockheed is involved in the F-22 program, program
officials believe that transferred FS-X technology would be of little
use in this program.
PLANS FOR DISSEMINATING
JAPANESE FS-X TECHNOLOGY ARE
LIMITED
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:2.2
As discussed in one of our prior reports, the United States is
generally less effective in disseminating foreign technology among
its government institutions and industry than Japan.\7 This seems to
be the case with the FS-X program. Although certain Lockheed and DOD
officials have had access to Japanese technical data for over a year,
we found little evidence of measures to share the data outside of
Lockheed and the F-16 System Program Office. The limited
distribution of Japanese data within the United States partially
explains, in our opinion, the limited evaluation of Japanese FS-X
technology by U.S. government and industry.
U.S. FS-X officials made little progress in distributing Japanese
technical information during our review. In May 1993, F-16 System
Program Office officials disclosed plans to distribute Japanese data
through the Defense Technical Information Center. However, a year
later no FS-X data was available on the system. A Center official
told us that in April 1994, the Center and the Air Force had agreed
to add bibliographies of Japanese FS-X technical reports to the
system. Qualified users could also order specific documents in those
bibliographies from the Center or the Program Office.
The only FS-X data publicly available from the U.S. government is a
video providing an overview of the fire control radar. The
Department of Commerce's National Technical Information Service began
selling this video in February 1994. Certain DOD FS-X technical
reports developed in cooperation with Japan are available within the
U.S. government and to some industry officials. For example, a U.S.
Air Force official said the U.S. government is distributing a report
of its radar module testing results to all attendees of the 1992
radar symposium.
Commerce would like to develop opportunities for U.S. companies
interested in Japanese FS-X technology. Commerce could organize
industry visits to Japan to examine non-derived technologies, for
example. Commerce is also considering a composites conference
similar to the radar symposium of 1992. During 1993, however,
Commerce officials told us that, due to the transition between
administrations and staff cuts, they encountered delays in developing
and proceeding with these efforts. As of mid-1994, Commerce was
still developing plans for industry outreach for the FS-X program.
--------------------
\7 Foreign Technology: Collection and Dissemination of Japanese
Information Can Be Improved (GAO/NSIAD-93-251, Sept. 30, 1993).
ULTIMATE VALUE OF JAPANESE
TECHNOLOGIES IS UNKNOWN
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:3
U.S. program officials do not know how the United States will
benefit from transfers of Japanese FS-X technologies because (1) many
Japanese FS-X technologies are unproven, (2) the United States may
not seek or obtain information on Japanese production methods, and
(3) program officials do not yet know how the United States can apply
or market Japanese technologies. Further, until the FS-X
successfully completes flight testing, neither the United States nor
Japan can know how new systems will perform.
Preliminary U.S. evaluations of some Japanese FS-X technologies
yielded mixed reviews. For example:
While U.S. engineers believe that U.S. radar modules are more
advanced than Japanese modules overall, the Japanese module
matches U.S. capabilities in certain areas and may prove
innovative in another. However, one U.S. radar expert noted
that the United States does not yet know how well complete
Japanese FS-X radar arrays (as opposed to individual modules)
will perform.
The other Japanese non-derived avionics systems represent
conservative yet proven and competitive designs.
In a few areas, Japanese technologies use novel design or
manufacturing approaches. In particular, U.S. engineers have
noted certain Japanese innovations for designing the FS-X
mission computer hardware and the inertial reference/navigation
system. Moreover, some avionics components are lighter and
smaller than similar U.S. equipment.
There is general agreement among U.S. program officials and
observers that insight into Japanese manufacturing techniques would
be useful to the United States. However, it is not clear how or when
Japan might transfer production information to the United States for
three reasons: (1) Japanese companies may be unwilling to give
proprietary derived technology to the United States, (2) a U.S.
company must build something to obtain and test Japanese
manufacturing technology, and (3) under the FS-X agreements, U.S.
firms must pay for certain Japanese technologies. Therefore, the
company would have to buy rights to the technology and then make a
large capital investment for the necessary production equipment.
According to an Air Force program official, this scenario seems
unlikely.
Regardless of the ultimate value of Japanese technology itself, the
United States could benefit from transfers of Japanese technology for
two reasons. First, the FS-X program set precedents and provided
lessons for technology transfers from Japan that may prove useful in
the future. Second, U.S. program engineers are gaining experience
with Japanese design and development methods that may be valuable in
other aircraft programs. However, the United States may not
recognize the value of this information. Program officials explained
that some U.S. engineers are skeptical of high technology not
invented or developed in the United States. This "not invented here"
syndrome may contribute to unwarranted skepticism about Japanese
technology that could interfere with U.S. attempts to fully exploit
transferred Japanese FS-X technologies.
CONCLUSIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:4
Although the United States continues to receive a large volume of
Japanese FS-X technical data, to date the efforts to evaluate and use
this data have been limited and ineffective. U.S. government and
industry have been unwilling or unable to fully analyze or use
Japanese FS-X technologies outside the program. As a result, the
United States may not be receiving the full benefits accorded its
participation in the FS-X development program.
The development program thus offers an important lesson to U.S.
policy makers as they approach a production program. As our previous
work shows,\8 Japan's coordinated approach to technology management
can foster new uses for existing technologies, as well as the
development of new technologies. We believe the United States has an
opportunity to improve management of transferred Japanese technology
during an FS-X production program.
--------------------
\8 In our 1993 report on foreign technology, we reported that
Japanese experts collect information in specific areas of interest,
which is targeted to the needs of users, and then use extensive and
multiple channels to disseminate the data.
RECOMMENDATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:5
To ensure effective evaluation of transferred Japanese FS-X
technologies, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the
Defense Science Board to establish and convene an FS-X Technology
Transfer Evaluation Task Force. To the extent the FS-X agreements
and Defense Science Board Charter permit, this Task Force should
include U.S. government and industry FS-X officials. To the maximum
extent possible, consistent with the agreements, representatives of
the four services and of leading U.S. aerospace companies who have
expertise in fighter aircraft (including the F-22), composites
applications, or potential commercial uses for FS-X technologies
should be included on the Task Force.
Such a task force could (1) assist DOD in developing and implementing
a program to more thoroughly evaluate transferred Japanese FS-X
technology and (2) determine how the United States can most benefit,
if at all, from transfers of Japanese FS-X technologies. In
particular, the Task Force could:
Determine if and how Japanese technology improves upon or surpasses
U.S. technology.
Identify Japanese FS-X design, technology, or manufacturing
approaches that differ from U.S. experience and that could
provide instructive lessons for the United States.
Develop a strategy for identifying, obtaining, managing, and
applying useful or promising Japanese FS-X technologies.
AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
EVALUATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:6
DOD did not believe that the establishment of a Defense Science Board
FS-X Task Force was currently warranted. DOD stated that it would
consider establishing such a task force or taking other actions, if
its ongoing FS-X technology identification, evaluation, and
dissemination activities proved unsuccessful. DOD officials also
told us DOD did not want to commit additional resources at this time
to evaluate FS-X technologies because most of them, such as the
co-cured composite wing, were not yet fully developed or had not been
adequately tested.
We believe that once adequate development and testing has occurred,
DOD should establish the Task Force because current U.S. efforts are
probably too limited to ensure sufficient evaluation and
dissemination of FS-X technologies. The Task Force would ensure that
more aerospace experts from outside of the FS-X program are allowed
to evaluate FS-X technologies and Japanese design and manufacturing
approaches. It would also provide DOD with an overall assessment of
the value of Japanese FS-X technologies. Such an assessment would
provide DOD and Commerce with guidance as to the level of resources
that should be committed to disseminating FS-X technologies.
JAPANESE AND U.S. AEROSPACE
INDUSTRIES RECEIVE DIFFERENT
PROGRAM BENEFITS
============================================================ Chapter 5
Overall, Japan has received technological benefits from the FS-X
program, while to date, U.S. aerospace firms have obtained primarily
contract orders. The program is consistent with the Japanese
government's strategy of making defense development and production as
indigenous as possible. Our analysis of a limited number of FS-X
supplier selections indicated that Japanese firms obtained more work
than U.S. firms for items with commercial applications. Japan has
obtained proven F-16 design data and the program has strengthened
Japan's aerospace industry by providing Japanese engineers with
valuable experience and skills they can use for future military and
commercial aerospace projects.
Japanese aerospace firms have acquired new equipment and, according
to U.S. government and industry officials, received Japanese
government financial assistance through the program that will be
useful for other aerospace projects. Substantial Japanese
modifications to the F-16 design and the terms of the FS-X agreements
ensure that Japanese firms will produce over half of the FS-X
configuration items.\1 Changing the F-16 design made it easier to
incorporate Japanese design ideas into the FS-X and for Japan to
justify awarding contracts to Japanese firms. The cumulative effect
of the program has been to help improve Japanese firms' ability to
compete for future aircraft projects.
To date, program benefits to U.S. aerospace firms have primarily
consisted of additional work and payments. Cost increases in the
FS-X budget have resulted in an increase of the estimated value of
the U.S. work share from $480 million to over $1 billion. Most of
the U.S. FS-X work share is reserved for Lockheed, which is
guaranteed between 30 and 31 percent of the value of the FS-X
development budget. Although over 200 U.S. firms have received FS-X
contracts from Japan, about 90 percent of the value of the U.S. work
share will go to three U.S. firms--Lockheed, General Electric, and
Allied Signal. U.S. officials believe that, in overall terms, U.S.
firms received an acceptable share of FS-X development work.
--------------------
\1 An item the Japan Defense Agency or Mitsubishi Heavy Industries
designates for monitoring by inclusion on the FS-X baseline
configuration lists.
FS-X PROGRAM CONFORMS TO
JAPANESE DEFENSE ACQUISITION
STRATEGY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 5:1
Japan views its defense programs not only as weapon acquisitions,
but, more importantly, as technology acquisitions. The FS-X program
contributes to this strategy by providing work and learning
opportunities to many Japanese subcontractors and suppliers,
increasing the skills and experience of Japanese aerospace engineers,
and prompting Japanese firms to purchase new equipment and construct
facilities that can be used for future projects.
During the FS-X program, Japanese firms have sought to sever their
dependence on U.S. licensed production and position themselves to be
suppliers for future aircraft programs. A comparison of F-16 and
FS-X manufacturers provides evidence of Japan's intention to use the
FS-X program to increase Japanese aerospace capabilities. A list of
F-16 and FS-X configuration item manufacturers in appendix III shows
that, of the 249 items common to both aircraft, Japanese firms are
responsible for providing over half of them for the FS-X. This
increase in capabilities will make it easier in the future for Japan
to develop a completely indigenous military aircraft and for Japanese
firms to compete more effectively with U.S. suppliers for military,
and possibly commercial, aircraft-related sales. Japanese firms have
replaced U.S. companies to become key suppliers or even sole sources
for certain commercial and military products, which in some cases,
Japan originally licensed from U.S. firms.
JAPANESE COMPANIES APPEAR TO
OBTAIN HIGH QUALITY WORK
SHARE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 5:1.1
To determine the quality of the FS-X work share obtained by Japanese
and U.S. companies, we examined data the U.S. Air Force used to
evaluate Japan's 1991 licensed production requests. This data,
covering about 25 percent of FS-X configuration items, does not
represent a random sample of FS-X items. Our analysis of this group
of items indicates that Japan will manufacture about 77 percent of
the items with commercial applications. The results of this limited
analysis are consistent with U.S. government and other assessments
of Japanese industrial policy that contend that Japan consistently
seeks to develop and manufacture items with the greatest commercial
applications.
FS-X PROGRAM HELPS ENHANCE
JAPANESE AEROSPACE INDUSTRY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 5:2
The FS-X program has increased the capabilities of Japan's aerospace
industry. Unlike previous F-16 international coproduction programs,
which released only operations, maintenance, and production data, the
United States has released F-16 design data for the FS-X program. As
part of a $60-million licensing fee, Lockheed provided Mitsubishi
Heavy Industries with the rights to use large volumes of F-16 design
and manufacturing data proven by years of F-16 production. This F-16
design data provides Japanese aerospace engineers with valuable
information that will increase the knowledge level of the Japanese
aerospace industry.
Japanese and U.S. officials agreed that a major program benefit for
Japan is the experience Japanese aircraft engineers have gained in
design and in system development and integration. Mitsubishi Heavy
Industries seeks to use the FS-X program to develop an engineering
work force capable of future independent Japanese aircraft
development projects. The program is particularly important to the
Japanese aerospace industry and engineers because of decreasing
Japanese licensed production of F-15 aircraft and the lack of any
other full-scale aircraft development projects.\2 The program
addresses a weakness in Japan's military aerospace capabilities by
providing Japanese engineers the experience of working through all
the phases of the aircraft concept-to-design cycle. A lack of
knowledge and experience in the concept-to-design process can lead to
major mistakes in aircraft development program and design acceptance
decisions. A U.S. Air Force official noted that the overall
experience of developing a modern fighter aircraft and integrating
its sophisticated systems will be even more valuable to Japan's
aerospace industry than the knowledge derived from developing
specific FS-X technologies. Japan is unlikely to obtain such
experience through its current participation in civil aircraft
programs.
According to U.S. government officials, the most valuable experience
for Japanese engineers will be in systems integration. Systems
integration consists of combining various aircraft components to work
with each other successfully to perform mission-related functions.
U.S. government officials stated that Japan has had limited
experience in advanced aircraft systems integration, which these
officials believe it is an art only learned through costly trial and
error. According to U.S. officials, any systems integration skills
Japanese engineers acquire during the FS-X program will be applicable
to future commercial, as well as military, aerospace projects. A
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries official stated that the FS-X experience
has confirmed that Japanese aerospace engineers have systems
integration skills comparable to those of Lockheed's F-16 engineers.
The program is also enhancing Japan's avionics capabilities and may
enable Japanese avionics firms to sever or reduce their ties with
U.S. industry, according to a U.S. Air Force official. For
example, because Japan is independently developing the FS-X inertial
reference/navigation system, U.S. government experts believe
Japanese firms will enhance their competitiveness with U.S. firms in
this market. The increase in Japanese inertial navigation systems
capabilities has commercial significance because this technology is
applicable to both military and commercial aircraft. Because of the
redundancy built into the FS-X inertial navigation system, it is
highly useful for commercial applications that generally require
higher safety standards than military applications. A U.S. industry
official stated that Mitsubishi Electric Corporation, the Japanese
firm responsible for the FS-X advanced phased array fire control
radar, may use its FS-X experience to provide upgrades for the radar
on Japanese F-15 aircraft.
Japan Defense Agency officials acknowledged that the FS-X program
will give Japan the opportunity to lead the development of a complex
aircraft, but added that their agency views the program's primary
goal as fulfilling certain Japanese defense requirements. In our
June 1992 report, Japan Defense Agency officials rejected the idea
that the FS-X program promotes Japan's commercial aviation industry.
However, according to a U.S. observer of the Japanese aerospace
industry, the president of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Japanese
engineers have acknowledged the link of FS-X design and manufacturing
experience to future commercial aircraft such as hypersonic and
supersonic transports. Further, a U.S. Air Force official stated
that Japanese officials have also indicated that if Japan opts to
develop its YSX passenger aircraft, Japan will use as much FS-X
co-cured composite technology as possible on that aircraft.
U.S. government officials believe that while the FS-X program is
advancing Japanese aerospace capabilities, Japan is obtaining more
commercially useful benefits from programs with Boeing such as the
777 program. U.S. aerospace experts in Japan noted that during the
Boeing 777 program, about 200 Japanese engineers were trained and
allowed to work for about 2 years in Boeing design facilities in the
United States.\3
--------------------
\2 Although they are not coequal partners with Boeing, Japanese
aerospace firms are significantly involved with the design and
development of Boeing's 777 commercial aircraft.
\3 Technology Transfer: Japanese Firms Involved in F-15 Coproduction
and Civil Aircraft Programs (GAO/NSIAD-92-178, June 10, 1992).
JAPANESE FIRMS MAKE CAPITAL
INVESTMENTS AND OBTAIN
GOVERNMENT FINANCIAL
ASSISTANCE TO IMPROVE THEIR
INDUSTRIAL CAPABILITIES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 5:2.1
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries has improved its capabilities by making
certain capital investments for the FS-X program that will be useful
for other aerospace projects. For example, Mitsubishi purchased
sophisticated, expensive composites tape-laying equipment, contour
measuring machinery, and established composite test facilities for
producing the FS-X co-cured composite wings. Mitsubishi also
established a testing and integration facility for the FS-X
aircraft's avionics systems. U.S. and Japanese officials stated
that the composite and avionics-related equipment and facilities will
be used for other aircraft projects.
Mitsubishi officials said that they purchased the composite-related
machinery and avionics and composite testing facilities with the
firm's own funds and officials from Japan's Ministry of International
Trade and Industry (MITI) said that their ministry had not made
expenditures for the FS-X program. However, U.S. government and
industry officials noted that before the FS-X program formally began,
the Japanese government had provided extensive funding to Mitsubishi
and other Japanese firms for developing technologies intended for use
on the FS-X aircraft, including those related to the co-cured
composite wing and the active phased array radar. A U.S. Air Force
official stated that MITI saw the FS-X program as a means of
increasing the composite capabilities of Mitsubishi.
Japanese industry officials did not provide us figures on the costs
of investments made for the FS-X program. They said that because
their firms use the equipment and facilities for other programs, they
could not determine the costs incurred exclusively for the FS-X
program.
JAPANESE SUPPLIERS HAVE
MAJOR ROLE IN PROGRAM
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 5:2.2
Japanese firms are responsible for providing over half of the
configuration items for the FS-X prototype aircraft. Figure 5.1
shows the extent to which Japanese, U.S. and third country firms are
providing FS-X items.
Figure 5.1: Responsibilities
for FS-X Configuration Items
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Note: Lockheed and Mitsubishi are both producing one FS-X
configuration item, the left wing. Therefore, the total number of
items here is one greater than the 256 items listed in the F-16/FS-X
Baseline Configuration List.
\a This category covers instances in which the designated supplier is
a Japanese company, but the Japanese supplier received either end
item hardware or significant technical assistance from a U.S. firm.
The substantial Japanese role in supplying FS-X configuration items
resulted from several factors. Because FS-X agreements left Japan
with about 60 percent of the total value of the FS-X development
budget, it was inevitable that many Japanese firms would be selected
to provide FS-X items. Furthermore, Japan claimed that because of
previous negative experiences with U.S. suppliers on coproduction
programs, it wanted to select Japanese firms for certain items to
ensure timely contractor support if any modifications or repairs were
needed during the development phase. More importantly, major
modifications to the F-16 baseline also led to a prominent Japanese
industry role in providing FS-X items.
FS-X DESIGN CHANGES
CONTRIBUTE TO SIGNIFICANT
JAPANESE INDUSTRY ROLE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 5:2.3
Contrary to U.S. views in the early years of the program that the
FS-X aircraft would be a lightly modified version of the F-16, the
FS-X aircraft has evolved to be a significantly modified aircraft,
with basic changes in the F-16 design leading to many changes in the
configuration items. Under the terms of the FS-X memorandum of
understanding, Japan did not have to purchase items for the FS-X from
U.S. F-16 suppliers if the U.S. items did not satisfy Japanese FS-X
performance requirements or if it was not cost-effective to do so.
After finalizing the general configuration of the FS-X aircraft and
the program budget, the Japan Defense Agency concluded that many of
the F-16 items available from U.S. manufacturers did not meet
Japanese FS-X requirements for factors such as cost, schedule,
performance, design, and engineering risk.
Although Japanese defense operational requirements caused many of the
modifications to the F-16 baseline, the desire of the Japanese
military and industry to incorporate as many of their own design
concepts as possible into the FS-X aircraft and to maximize the
participation of Japanese subcontractors and suppliers also led to
many changes. For the most part, Japan selected Japanese firms to
provide FS-X items that were significantly modified from the
equivalent F-16 items. Conversely, Japan tended to select U.S.
firms to provide those FS-X items that were identical to those found
on the F-16.
Throughout the development process, Japan, particularly Japanese
industry, sought to achieve many of the objectives of an indigenous
development program that it was denied as a result of the political
compromise that led to U.S. involvement in the program.
Furthermore, according to Japanese government and industry officials,
Japanese firms were playing a smaller role in the FS-X program than
originally planned because of the need to shift certain FS-X tasks to
U.S. companies. Changing the F-16 design made it easier to
incorporate Japanese design ideas into the FS-X and for Japan to
justify awarding certain tasks to Japanese firms. Consequently,
Japanese industry partially obtained its goal of an indigenous
aircraft development effort. Air Force officials acknowledged that
FS-X agreements did not provide the United States with adequate
authority to control changes to the F-16 baseline.
U.S. FIRMS HAVE RECEIVED OVER
$1 BILLION IN FS-X CONTRACTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 5:3
To date, the benefits provided to the U.S. aerospace industry
through the FS-X program have consisted primarily of contracts to
U.S. companies to act as subcontractors or suppliers. As discussed
in chapter 4, it is not yet clear if U.S. firms will acquire
significant technological benefits from the program. As of May 1994,
Japan had awarded over $1 billion of contracts to over 200 U.S.
firms for the program.
LOCKHEED IS PRIMARY U.S.
PROGRAM BENEFICIARY
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 5:3.1
FS-X agreements reserved specific development phase work for only two
U.S. firms--Lockheed and General Electric, the company selected to
supply the engines for the FS-X prototype aircraft. Furthermore,
FS-X commercial agreements guaranteed that Lockheed would receive
work valued between 30 and 31 percent of the FS-X development budget,
the largest share for any U.S. company. At the time of our review,
Lockheed had received over $849 million and General Electric over $60
million of FS-X contracts.
According to U.S. government and industry officials, the economic
importance of the FS-X program for U.S. contractors has increased in
recent years as sales of military items to DOD have declined. With
F-16 production rapidly declining, the FS-X program has become
increasingly valuable to Lockheed in terms of sales and jobs,
according to Lockheed officials. According to U.S. government and
industry officials, Lockheed could earn hundreds of millions of
dollars in sales if the program enters production.
Figure 5.2 shows the number of Lockheed Fort Worth Company personnel
that have and are projected to work on the FS-X program and other
assignments, including the F-16 program.
Figure 5.2: Lockheed Fort
Worth Company Personnel
Assigned to FS-X and Other
Programs
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Note: These employment figures do not include Lockheed staff time
for functions such as accounting and contracting that are not
directly related to the actual design, manufacture, and testing of
aircraft. According to Lockheed officials, if such indirect labor is
included, the employment figures would increase by over 30 percent.
According to Lockheed, FS-X employment figures for 1996 to 2000 and
beyond assume that (1) the FS-X program will enter production in 1996
and (2) the Japanese government will commit to procuring 130 FS-X
aircraft at a rate of 2 per month. At the time of our review,
Lockheed did not provide us with employment figures beyond 2000;
however, a Lockheed official subsequently told us that Lockheed
anticipates that its FS-X production activities would go well beyond
2000. According to Lockheed, figures for other programs assume (1)
Lockheed will deliver about 750 F-16 aircraft between 1994 and 2000
and (2) Lockheed will have a certain level of F-22 work.
U.S. suppliers have also benefited from subcontracts awarded by
Lockheed for FS-X work. According to Lockheed data, as of June 1994,
approximately 800 U.S. firms were supplying items or services to
Lockheed for the FS-X program. The value of these subcontracts was
over $49 million, according to Lockheed officials. Most of these
companies were also subcontractors or suppliers for the F-16 program.
Lockheed data indicated that approximately 80 U.S. firms had
provided unique FS-X items (not used for the F-16) and services to
Lockheed. Using Lockheed data, we identified about $2.7 million of
Lockheed purchase orders issued to U.S. firms for unique FS-X
structural parts.
According to Lockheed officials, their firm has made no capital
investments for the FS-X program and used existing equipment as much
as possible. Lockheed has procured two major pieces of equipment
valued at nearly $3 million with FS-X funds--a coordinate measuring
machine and a wing roll-over fixture--used, respectively, for
checking and manufacturing composites. Lockheed will likely use this
equipment during for FS-X production if the program proceeds into
that phase. Mitsubishi can reclaim these items following Lockheed's
contractual use of the equipment.
U.S. GENERALLY SATISFIED
WITH JAPANESE FS-X
SELECTIONS, BUT QUESTIONED
SOME CHOICES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 5:3.2
U.S. government officials involved with the FS-X program were
generally satisfied with Japan's selection of over 200 U.S.
companies for FS-X contracts. They believed there were cases where
U.S. companies were not chosen even though they offered superior
products; however, the officials stated that, in overall terms, U.S.
firms obtained an acceptable share of FS-X work considering that the
program was completely funded by Japan and subject to a U.S.
40-percent work share.
During our review, we found 11 cases where the U.S. government
formally questioned the Japan Defense Agency's selections of
suppliers for FS-X items. For example, in July 1992, the U.S. Air
Force told the Japan Defense Agency that the United States was
disappointed with Japan's apparent emphasis on not selecting U.S.
companies when licensed production was not permitted. In several
cases where Japan had requested licensed production, Japan did not
select U.S. companies because of U.S. government restrictions on
the release of detailed design data. The Japan Defense Agency
believed it required this data to integrate items into the aircraft
with acceptable risk. Japan justified the questioned selections to
the United States on the basis of criteria found in the FS-X
memorandum of understanding. The memorandum stipulated that work
share selections should be based on such factors as cost
effectiveness, schedule, engineering risks, and Japanese performance
requirements. A DOD official said that Japan generally chose U.S.
firms when the U.S. government was willing to transfer some
technology, and Japanese firms otherwise.
DOD questioned Japan's choice to license produce two FS-X items with
British and French companies. DOD stated that the FS-X memorandum of
understanding was intended to prohibit third country involvement
unless Japan proved U.S. or Japanese solutions were unacceptable and
that U.S. policy was to review such selections on a case-by-case
basis. In the British case, Japan responded to DOD's concerns by
providing further justification for purchasing the British item.
In the French case, Japan justified its selection by indicating that
the U.S. firm competing for the contract did not meet Japanese
engineering risk and performance requirements. However, the U.S.
contractor stated that the selection process was unfair because it
had not been provided a reasonable time in which to submit a proposal
to meet a late change in Japan Defense Agency technical
specifications. An Air Force review of the case could find no
definitive evidence of Japanese unfairness in making the selection
and concluded that the selection had been in accordance with criteria
agreed upon by the United States and Japan.
CONCLUSIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 5:4
Generally, the FS-X program provides different benefits to the
Japanese and U.S. aerospace industries. The information we
collected during our review indicates that the primary benefit to the
Japanese aerospace industry is an increase in the level of its
technological capabilities. Conversely, the benefits to the U.S.
aerospace industry, because they have come primarily in the form of
payments and work orders rather than new technologies, tend to
preserve existing U.S. aerospace capabilities, rather than enhance
them. It is not yet clear if U.S. firms will acquire significant
technological benefits from the program.
AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
EVALUATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 5:5
DOD agreed that the FS-X program will enhance Japanese aerospace
capabilities in certain areas. However, DOD commented that the U.S.
contribution to substantially enhancing Japanese aerospace
capabilities is not as significant as we implied. DOD added that it
has effectively limited Japanese access to sensitive U.S. aerospace
capabilities. We did not attempt to measure the significance of the
U.S. contribution to enhanced Japanese aerospace capabilities
through the FS-X program. Although DOD has limited Japanese access
to certain U.S. technologies such as some software design and
systems integration know-how, we note that some experts on these
matters believe that the Japanese aerospace industry has acquired
significant technology from the United States during the program that
it could not have acquired otherwise without considerable investments
of time and money.
DATA REVIEW STATISTICS
=========================================================== Appendix I
The following tables show the status of the F-16 System Program
Office's review of the F-16 Technical Data Package and F-16
supplemental data as of February 1, 1994.\1
Table I.1
Results of the F-16 Technical Data
Package Review
Percen
Document status Number t
-------------------------------------------- ------ ------
Releasable\a 9,757 93
Not releasable 568 5
Releasable with modifications 201 2
============================================================
Total 10,526 100
------------------------------------------------------------
\a Includes approximately 7,900 technical drawings the Air Force and
Lockheed do not consider sensitive.
Table I.2
F-16 Supplemental Data Review Status
Percen
Document status Number t
-------------------------------------------- ------ ------
Releasable 2,127 71
Not releasable 653 22
Releasable with modifications 224 7
============================================================
Total 3,004 100
------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------
\1 According to a Lockheed official, one F-16 Technical Data Package
item was shipped to Japan in June 1994.
UNITED STATES IS EVALUATING
JAPANESE RADAR MODULES ALTHOUGH
POTENTIAL USES ARE UNCERTAIN
========================================================== Appendix II
The United States has obtained more information on the Japanese
active phased array fire control radar than any other non-derived
FS-X technology. In August 1992, DOD purchased five Japanese FS-X
radar transmit/receive modules, supporting connectors, and technical
data for testing purposes. DOD paid the then current Japan Defense
Agency/Mitsubishi Electric Corporation prototype module contract
price of $4,800 per unit and about $70,000 for technical data and
additional items required to test the modules.
Mitsubishi Electric officials reported in November 1993 that they had
reduced module unit costs to about $3,300. Mitsubishi Electric
officials would like to reduce module costs even further by
increasing the module production run to at least 20,000 units
annually. Mitsubishi Electric's cost goal is about $1,400 per unit
for the FS-X program, assuming production of 120,000 units (or enough
for about 130 aircraft). Mitsubishi Electric officials noted that
they do not expect to reach the $1,400 per module goal until 2 years
into full-rate FS-X production.
Mitsubishi Electric officials said they will pursue commercial
applications for FS-X transmit/receive modules that could reduce
module costs during FS-X production. Mitsubishi Electric officials
noted, however, that commercial applications are not practical at
this time because of the modules' high cost. Commercial applications
could include air traffic control antennas, satellite and mobile
communications, and anticollision automobile radars.
In August 1993, U.S. engineers at the Wright Laboratory Solid State
Electronics Directorate began testing the five radar modules DOD
purchased from Japan. By February 1994, the United States had
finished a complete set of verification tests for module performance.
The tests indicated that the modules perform according to
specifications and will meet Japanese FS-X radar requirements. A
U.S. engineer involved in the testing said that the performance of
Japanese modules was very good and in one area are on a par with the
best U.S. modules.
In May 1994, a U.S. radar module testing team visited Japan to
compare and verify U.S. and Japanese test results. U.S. engineers
may conduct additional tests to assess the performance of FS-X radar
modules relative to U.S. modules planned for use on the F-22
aircraft.\1 DOD was preparing a report summarizing the results of the
radar testing at the time of our review.
--------------------
\1 Japan has also tested a complete FS-X radar array on the ground
and in flight aboard a specially modified Japanese C-1 electronics
testbed aircraft. Japan had not shared its radar array testing data
with the United States as of March 1994, according to a radar expert,
nor would Japanese officials permit us to observe ground-based radar
array testing during our November 1993 trip to Japan.
F-16 AND FS-X CONFIGURATION ITEM
MANUFACTURERS
========================================================= Appendix III
This appendix lists the manufacturers of certain F-16 and FS-X
configuration items. For the FS-X program, configuration items are
items the Japan Defense Agency or Mitsubishi Heavy Industries
designates for monitoring by inclusion on the FS-X baseline
configuration lists. The first column of this appendix lists items
that are common, unless otherwise noted in the second column, to both
aircraft. The second column lists the qualified manufacturer\1 of
the item for the F-16 aircraft, and the third column the FS-X
manufacturer. Non-U.S. manufacturers are also noted in the second
and third columns.
Of the 256 items listed in this appendix, 249 are common to the FS-X
and F-16. Japanese companies will provide 132, or over half of the
FS-X configuration items common to the F-16. The list provides
evidence of Japan's ability to produce indigenously many of the items
needed for modern fighter aircraft. For example, instead of
purchasing the F-16 fire control radar (item 180) from the U.S. firm
Westinghouse Electric Corporation, the Japan Defense Agency chose
Mitsubishi Electric Corporation to develop and produce the FS-X fire
control radar.
Configuration item F-16 manufacturer FS-X manufacturer
-- ------------------------ ------------------------ ------------------------
System: Air vehicle
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. F-16C Air vehicle (1 Lockheed Fort Worth Co. Mitsubishi Heavy
seat) Industries, Ltd.\a
2. F-16D Air vehicle (2 Lockheed Fort Worth Co. Mitsubishi Heavy
seat) Industries, Ltd.\a
System: Airframe
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. Forward fuselage Lockheed Fort Worth Co. Mitsubishi Heavy
assembly (1 seat) Industries, Ltd.\a
4. Forward fuselage Lockheed Fort Worth Co. Mitsubishi Heavy
assembly (2 seat) Industries, Ltd.\a
5. Center section fuselage Lockheed Fort Worth Co. Kawasaki Heavy
assembly (1 seat) Industries, Ltd.\a
6. Center section fuselage Lockheed Fort Worth Co. Kawasaki Heavy
assembly (2 seat) Industries, Ltd.\a
7. Aft fuselage assembly Lockheed Fort Worth Co. Lockheed Fort Worth Co.
8. Ventral fin support Lockheed Fort Worth Co. Lockheed Fort Worth Co.
fitting
9. Right ventral fin Lockheed Fort Worth Co. Fuji Heavy Industries,
Ltd.\a
10 Left ventral fin Lockheed Fort Worth Co. Fuji Heavy Industries,
. Ltd.\a
11 Right wing box assembly Lockheed Fort Worth Co. Mitsubishi Heavy
. Industries, Ltd.\a
12 Left wing box assembly Lockheed Fort Worth Co. Mitsubishi Heavy
. Industries, Ltd.,\a and
Lockheed Fort Worth Co.
13 Right wing leading edge Lockheed Fort Worth Co. Lockheed Fort Worth Co.
. flap maneuver assembly
14 Left wing leading edge Lockheed Fort Worth Co. Lockheed Fort Worth Co.
. flap maneuver assembly
15 Right wing assembly Lockheed Fort Worth Co. Mitsubishi Heavy
. Industries, Ltd.\a
16 Left wing assembly Lockheed Fort Worth Co. Mitsubishi Heavy
. Industries, Ltd.\a
17 Wing flaperon assembly Lockheed Fort Worth Co. Fuji Heavy Industries,
. (right) Ltd.\a
18 Wing flaperon assembly Lockheed Fort Worth Co. Fuji Heavy Industries,
. (left) Ltd.\a
19 Vertical stabilizer Lockheed Fort Worth Co. Fuji Heavy Industries,
. assembly (1 seat and Ltd.\a
2 seat)
20 Vertical stabilizer Lockheed Fort Worth Co. Fuji Heavy Industries,
. fairing assembly (1 seat Ltd.\a
and 2 seat)
21 Rudder assembly Lockheed Fort Worth Co. Fuji Heavy Industries,
. Ltd.\a
22 Horizontal stabilizer Lockheed Fort Worth Co. Fuji Heavy Industries,
. assembly Ltd.\a
23 Windshield panel Item not found in F-16 Mitsubishi Rayon Co.,
. Ltd.\a
24 Nose radome assembly Brunswick Corporation Sumitomo Electric
. Industries\a
25 Canopy transparency (1 Sierracin-Sylmar, and Mitsubishi Rayon Co.,
. seat) Texstar Inc. Ltd.\a
26 Canopy transparency (2 Sierracin-Sylmar, and Mitsubishi Rayon Co.,
. seat, forward) Texstar Inc. Ltd.\a
27 Canopy transparency (2 Sierracin-Sylmar, and Mitsubishi Rayon Co.,
. seat, aft) Texstar Inc. Ltd.\a
28 Fixed canopy Texstar Inc. Mitsubishi Rayon Co.,
. transparency assembly Ltd.\a
(F-16C, aft)
System: Landing gear
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
29 Drag chute actuator Kaiser Fluid Kaiser Fluid
. assembly Technologies Technologies
30 Hydraulic actuator for Arkwin Industries Inc. Arkwin Industries Inc.
. main landing gear door &
uplock (right)
31 Hydraulic actuator for Arkwin Industries Inc. Arkwin Industries Inc.
. main landing gear door &
uplock (left)
32 Hydraulic actuator Arkwin Industries Inc. Arkwin Industries Inc.
. assembly for nose
landing gear door
33 Single acting pneumatic GST Industries Inc. GST Industries Inc.
. actuator for arresting
hook
34 Valve assembly for Sterer Engineering & Sterer Engineering &
. emergency landing gear Manufacturing Co. Manufacturing Co.
control
35 Arresting hook assembly Lockheed Fort Worth Co. Sumitomo Precision
. Products Co., Ltd. \a
36 Forward landing gear Lockheed Fort Worth Co. Koito Manufacturing Co.,
. control assembly Ltd.\a
37 Aft landing gear control Lockheed Fort Worth Co. Koito Manufacturing Co.,
. assembly (2 seat) Ltd.\a
38 Nose landing gear Sterer Engineering & Sterer Engineering &
. sequence valve assembly Manufacturing Co. Manufacturing Co.
39 Landing gear door Sterer Engineering & Sterer Engineering &
. sequence valve assembly Manufacturing Co. Manufacturing Co.
40 Hydraulic valve assembly Sterer Engineering & Sumitomo Precision
. for nose wheel steering Manufacturing Co. Products Co., Ltd.\a
41 Valve assembly for Sterer Engineering & Sterer Engineering &
. arresting hook control Manufacturing Co. Manufacturing Co.
42 Control box for nose Sterer Engineering & Sumitomo Precision
. gear steering Manufacturing Co. Products., Ltd.\a
43 Valve assembly for main Lockheed Fort Worth Co. Kayaba Industry Co.,
. landing gear brake Ltd.\a
control
44 Hydraulic solenoid- Sterer Engineering & Sterer Engineering &
. operated valve for Manufacturing Co. Manufacturing Co.
landing gear selector
45 Brake control box Loral Corp. Sumitomo Precision
a. assembly Products Co., Ltd.\a
45 Skid control box Aircraft Braking Systems Sumitomo Precision
b. assembly, brake control Corp. Products Co., Ltd.\a
box
46 Valve assembly for drag E.G.&G. Wright E.G.&G. Wright
. chute control Components Inc. Components Inc.
47 Steerable shock strut Menasco Aerosystems Sumitomo Precision
. assembly for nose Products Co., Ltd.\a
landing gear
48 Drag brace assembly for Menasco Aerosystems Sumitomo Precision
. nose landing gear (upper Products Co., Ltd.\a
and lower)
49 Nose landing gear wheel Marc Avenue Corp., and Marc Avenue Corp.
. assembly B.F. Goodrich Co.
50 Main landing gear tire B.F. Goodrich Co., and Michelin\b
. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
51 Nose landing gear tire Goodyear Tire and Rubber Michelin\b
. Co., Michelin, and
Dunlop Ltd. Precision
Rubber Div.
52 Drag chute assembly Irvin Industries Inc. Irvin Industries Inc.
.
53 Hydraulic actuator Arkwin Industries Inc. Arkwin Industries Inc.
. assembly for nose
landing gear retract
54 Main landing gear shock Menasco Aerosystems Sumitomo Precision
. strut assembly Products Co., Ltd.\a
55 Drag brace assembly for Menasco Aerosystems Sumitomo Precision
. main landing gear (upper Products Co., Ltd.\a
and lower)
56 Main landing gear Menasco Aerosystems Sumitomo Precision
. tension strut assembly Products Co., Ltd.\a
(right)
57 Main landing gear Menasco Aerosystems Sumitomo Precision
. tension strut assembly Products Co., Ltd.\a
(left)
58 Anti-skid wheel speed Goodyear Aerospace Corp. Sumitomo Precision
. sensor for main landing Products Co., Ltd.\a
gear brake (left)
59 Main landing gear Aircraft Braking Systems Kayaba Industry Co.,
. increased capacity wheel Corp. Ltd.\a
assembly
60 Main landing gear Aircraft Braking Systems Kayaba Industry Co.,
. increased capacity brake Corp. Ltd.\a
assembly
61 Hydraulic retract Menasco Aerosystems Sumitomo Precision
. actuator assembly for Products Co., Ltd.\a
main landing gear
System: Propulsion
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
62 Engine monitor computer General Electric Co. General Electric Co.
.
63 Turbine power unit for Allied Signal Aerospace Mitsubishi Heavy
. emergency power unit Co. Industries, Ltd.\a
(EPU)
64 EPU controller Allied Signal Aerospace Mitsubishi Heavy
. Co. Industries, Ltd.\a
65 Lube oil-fuel heat Allied Signal Aerospace Mitsubishi Heavy
. exchanger, EPU Co. Industries, Ltd.\a
66 Jet fuel starter Sundstrand Aerospace Sundstrand Aerospace
. assembly
67 Hydraulic jet fuel Crissair Inc. Crissair Inc.
. starter actuator for air
inlet/exhaust doors
68 Airframe-mounted drive Lucas Western Inc. Power Lucas Western Inc. Power
. shaft accessory Transmission Transmission
69 Engine starting system Sundstrand Aerospace Mitsubishi Heavy
. gearbox assembly Industries, Ltd.\a
70 Engine starter assembly Sundstrand Aerospace Mitsubishi Heavy
. Industries, Ltd.\a
71 Hydraulic start motor Sundstrand Aerospace Mitsubishi Heavy
. Industries, Ltd.\a
72 Engine starting Sundstrand Aerospace Mitsubishi Heavy
. controller Industries, Ltd.\a
73 Fuel control assembly Sundstrand Aerospace Mitsubishi Heavy
. Industries, Ltd.\a
74 Regulator & shutoff Whittaker Controls Inc. Whittaker Controls, Inc.
. valve, EPU
75 Regulator & shutoff- Whittaker Controls Inc. Whittaker Controls, Inc.
. nacelle ejector valve
76 Fire detection sensing Fenwal Safety Systems Fenwal Safety Systems
. element
77 Overheat sensing element Fenwal Safety Systems Fenwal Safety Systems
.
78 Overheat sensing element Fenwal Safety Systems Fenwal Safety Systems
.
79 Turbofan engine General Electric Co. General Electric Co.
.
80 Ice detection system DNE Technologies Inc. DNE Technologies Inc.
.
System: Fuel
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
81 Motor operated valve Teleflex Control Systems Teleflex Control Systems
.
82 Single ply forward fuel American Fuel Cell, and The Yokohama Rubber Co.,
. cell assembly (F-16C) Goodyear Aerospace Corp. Ltd.\a
83 Single ply forward fuel American Fuel Cell, and The Yokohama Rubber Co.,
. cell assembly (F-16D) Goodyear Aerospace Corp. Ltd.\a
84 Aerial refueling XAR Industries Inc. XAR Industries Inc.
. receptacle assembly
85 Hydraulic actuator GST Industries Inc. GST Industries Inc.
. (aerial refuel)
86 Ground refuel adaptor CLA-VAL Co., and Parker Shaw Aero Devices, Inc.
. Hannifin Corp.
87 Vent & pressurization HR Textron Inc. HR Textron Inc.
. valve for external fuel
tank
88 Shutoff valve (refuel) J.C. Carter Co. Inc. J.C. Carter Co., Inc.
.
89 Refuel/transfer float J.C. Carter Co. Inc. J.C. Carter Co., Inc.
. valve
90 Refuel shuttle valve J.C. Carter Co. Inc. J.C. Carter, Co., Inc
.
91 Control valve for Parker Hannifin Corp. Parker Hannifin Corp.
. inerting fuel tank
92 Halon reservoir Walter Kidde Aerospace Walter Kidde Aerospace
.
93 Fuel tank pressure & Parker Hannifin Corp. Parker Hannifin Corp.
. vent control valve
94 Fuel ejector pump Parker Hannifin Corp. Parker Hannifin Corp.
.
95 Fuel ejector pump (2 Parker Hannifin Corp. Parker Hannifin Corp.
. seat)
96 Remote sensing fuel J.C. Carter Co. Inc., J.C. Carter Co., Inc.
. pressure relief valve and Parker Hannifin
Corp.
97 Cross feed fuel valve XAR Industries Inc. XAR Industries Inc.
.
98 Cross feed fuel valve XAR Industries Inc. XAR Industries Inc.
. (jet fuel starter
bypass)
99 Single inlet fuel Argo-Tech Corp. Argo-Tech Corp.
. transfer pump
10 Fuel flow proportioner J.C. Carter Co., Inc. J.C. Carter Co., Inc.
0. assembly
10 Dual inlet power driven Argo-Tech Corp. Argo-Tech Corp.
1. centrifugal fuel pump
assembly
10 Fuel-oil heat exchanger Parker Hannifin Corp., Parker Hannifin Corp.
2. and Hughes-Treitler
Manufacturing Corp.
10 Flexible engine feed Aeroquip Corp., and Aeroquip Corp., and
3. line/disconnect IMPCO Technologies Inc. IMPCO Technologies Inc.
System: Environment control
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
10 Cooling turbine Allied Signal Aerospace Shimadzu Corp.\a
4. Co.
10 Primary and secondary Hamilton Standard Corp. Shimadzu Corp.\a
5. air to air heat
exchanger
10 Regenerative heat Hamilton Standard Corp. Shimadzu Corp.\a
6. exchanger
10 Digital environmental Dynamic Controls Corp. Shimadzu Corp.\a
7. and electrical equipment
cooling set sensor
controllers
10 Liquid pump package Item not found in F-16 Shimadzu Corp.\a
8.
10 High pressure air Allied Signal Aerospace Shimadzu Corp.\a
9. pressure regulator and Co.
shutoff valve
11 Intermediate pressure Whittaker Corp. Shimadzu Corp.\a
0. air pressure regulator
and shutoff valve
11 Aircraft cabin air Allied Signal Controls Allied Signal Controls
1. pressure regulator and Accessories and Accessories
11 Cabin air pressure Allied Signal Controls Allied Signal Controls
2. relief and dump valve and Accessories and Accessories
System: Crew
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
11 Liquid oxygen converter The Aro Corp. Tokyo Aircraft
3. Instrument Co., Ltd.\a
11 Oxygen diluter demand The Aro Corp., and Tokyo Aircraft
4. regulator Litton Systems Inc. Instrument Co., Ltd.\a
11 Forward seat assembly McDonnell Douglas Daicel Chemical
5. Aerospace Industries, Ltd.\a
11 Aft seat assembly McDonnell Douglas Daicel Chemical
6. Aerospace Industries, Ltd.\a
11 Electromechanical Teleflex Control Teleflex Control Systems
7. actuator for rotary Systems, and Datron
canopy (1-place) Systems Inc.
11 Electromechanical Teleflex Control Teleflex Control Systems
8. actuator for linear Systems, and Datron
canopy (2-place) Systems Inc.
11 Anti-gravity valve Alar Products Inc. Alar Products Inc.
9.
12 Detonation transfer Lockheed Fort Worth Co., Daicel Chemical
0. assembly for canopy and ET Inc. Industries, Ltd.\a
jettison (right)
12 Detonation transfer Lockheed Fort Worth Co., Daicel Chemical
1. assembly for canopy and ET Inc. Industries, Ltd.\a
jettison (left)
12 Rocket assembly for OEA Inc. Daicel Chemical
2. canopy remover (right Industries, Ltd.\a
and left)
12 Emergency canopy release ET Inc. Daicel Chemical
3. (right and left) Industries, Ltd.\a
12 Release-canopy actuator OEA Inc. Daicel Chemical
4. bolt Industries, Ltd.\a
System: Flight Control
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
12 Digital flight control Allied Signal Aerospace Japan Aviation
5. computer assembly Co. Electronics Industries,
Ltd.\a
12 Flight control rate gyro Lockheed Fort Worth Co. Tamagawa Seiki Co.,
6. assembly Ltd.\a
12 Force transducer Lear Astronics Corp. Lear Astronics Corp.
7. assembly
12 Flight control panel Lockheed Fort Worth Co. Koito Manufacturing Co.,
8. assembly Ltd.\a
12 Manual trim panel Lockheed Fort Worth Co. Tokyo Aircraft
9. assembly Instrument Co., Ltd.\a
13 Servoactuator assembly Abex/National Waterlift Teijin Seiki Co., Ltd.\a
0. for horizontal tail &
flaperon
13 Servoactuator assembly Abex/National Waterlift Mitsubishi Heavy
1. for horizontal tail & Industries, Ltd.\a
flaperon
13 Servoactuator assembly Abex/National Waterlift Kayaba Industry Co.,
2. for rudder Ltd.\a
13 Leading edge flap drive Mitsubishi Heavy
3. system Industries, Ltd.\a
Curtiss-Wright Flight
Rotary actuator gearbox Systems, and Allied
for leading edge drive Signal Aerospace Co.
system (stations 1 -4)
Lockheed Fort Worth Co.
Power drive unit
assembly for leading
edge drive system
13 Hydraulic control valve Tactair Fluid Controls Tactair Fluid Controls
4. for speed brake Inc. Inc.
13 Lateral & normal Lockheed Fort Worth Co. Tokimec Inc.\a
5. accelerometer assembly
13 Rudder pedal position Kavlico Corp. Kavlico Corp.
6. sensor
13 Hydraulic actuator Arkwin Industries Inc. Arkwin Industries Inc.
7. assembly for speed brake
(right)
13 Hydraulic actuator Arkwin Industries Inc. Arkwin Industries Inc.
8. assembly for speed brake
(left)
System: Hydraulic
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
13 Variable delivery Vickers Inc. Vickers Inc.
9. hydraulic pump
(emergency)
14 Variable delivery Abex/National Waterlift Abex Japan, Ltd.\a
0. hydraulic pump (main
system)
14 Hydraulic reservoir Parker Hannifin Corp. Parker Hannifin Corp.
1. assembly (system A)
14 Hydraulic reservoir Parker Hannifin Corp. Parker Hannifin Corp.
2. assembly (system B)
14 High pressure pneumatic Tavco Inc., and HR Tavco Inc.
3. reservoir (brake/jet Textron Inc.
fuel starter)
14 Drag chute accumulator York Industries Inc. York Industries Inc.
4.
14 100-cubic inch hydraulic Parker Hannifin Corp. Parker Hannifin Corp.
5. accumulator
14 Self-sealing hydraulic Aeroquip Corp. Aeroquip Corp.
6. ground service coupling
half (ground test
manifold, system A)
14 Self-sealing hydraulic Aeroquip Corp. Aeroquip Corp.
7. ground service coupling
half (ground test
manifold, system B)
14 Self-sealing hydraulic Aeroquip Corp. Aeroquip Corp.
8. ground service coupling
half (hydraulic fill
connector)
14 Pressure filter manifold Lockheed Fort Worth Co. Koito Manufacturing Co.,
9. assembly (system A) Ltd.\a
15 Pressure filter manifold Lockheed Fort Worth Co. Koito Manufacturing Co.,
0. assembly (system B) Ltd.\a
15 Return filters and Lockheed Fort Worth Co. Koito Manufacturing Co.,
1a bypass valve for filter Ltd.\a
. manifold assembly
(system A)
15 Return filters and Lockheed Fort Worth Co. Koito Manufacturing Co.,
1b bypass valve for filter Ltd.\a
. manifold assembly
(system B)
15 Hydraulic valve assembly Standard-Thomson Corp. Standard-Thomson Corp.
2. for cooler thermal
bypass
15 Hydraulic reservoir York Industries York Industries
3. accumulator
15 Hand pump FCD Corp., Teledyne FCD Corp.
4. Republic Manufacturing,
and Crane Co.
15 Hydraulic accumulator Parker Hannifin Corp. Parker Hannifin Corp.
5. (brake and jet fuel
starter)
15 Hydraulic pressure Eaton Corp. Eaton Corp.
6. switch assembly (EPU
pump)
15 High pressure 200- Tavco Inc. Tavco Inc.
7. cubic-inch pneumatic
reservoir
System: Armament
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
15 M-61A1 20mm automatic Martin Marietta Armament Martin Marietta Armament
8. gun Systems Systems
15 Ammunition handling unit Martin Marietta Armament Martin Marietta Armament
9. Systems Systems
16 Gun control unit Dynamic Controls Corp. Dynamic Controls Corp.
0.
System: Weapon delivery
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
16 Guided missile launcher Lockheed Fort Worth Co. Fuji Heavy Industries,
1. assembly Ltd.\a
16 AIM-7 under wing Item not found in F-16 Japan Aircraft Mfg. Co.,
2. launcher Ltd.\a
16 Modified triple ejection Lockheed Fort Worth Co. Marvin Engineering Co.,
3. rack-9A Inc.
16 Wing missile launcher Lockheed Fort Worth Co. Fuji Heavy Industries,
4. adapter Ltd.\a
16 Rack ejector Warner Robins Air EDO Corp.
5. Logistics Command
16 Alternate fuel pylon Lockheed Fort Worth Co. Japan Aircraft Mfg. Co.,
6. assembly Ltd.\a
16 Weapon pylon assembly Lockheed Fort Worth Co. Fuji Heavy Industries,
7. (left) Ltd.\a
16 Weapon pylon assembly Lockheed Fort Worth Co. Fuji Heavy Industries,
8. (right) Ltd.\a
16 Centerline fuselage Lockheed Fort Worth Co. Japan Aircraft Mfg. Co.,
9. pylon assembly Ltd.\a
17 370-gallon external fuel Sargent-Fletcher Co. Sargent-Fletcher Co.
0. tank
17 300-gallon center line Sargent-Fletcher Co. Sargent-Fletcher Co.
1. external fuel tank
System: Avionics
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
17 Enhanced central Lockheed Fort Worth Co. Lockheed Fort Worth Co.
2. interface unit assembly
17 Advanced missile remote Lockheed Fort Worth Co. Lockheed Fort Worth Co.
3. interface unit for
Stores Management System
(SMS)
17 Advanced conventional Lockheed Fort Worth Co. Lockheed Fort Worth Co.
4. remote interface unit
(SMS)
17 Jettison & release Lockheed Fort Worth Co. Lockheed Fort Worth Co.
5. remote interface unit
(SMS)
17 RT-1300/ARC-186(V) Rockwell International NEC\a
6. receiver/transmitter Corp.
(VHF/UHF)
17 RT1159A TACAN receiver/ Rockwell International Rockwell International
7. transmitter Corp. Corp.
17 HF radio Item not found in F-16 Kokusai Electric Co.,
8. Ltd.\a
17 R-1781/ARN-108 Rockwell International Toshiba Corp.\a
9. instrument landing Corp.
system receiver
18 Fire control radar (APG- Westinghouse Electric Mitsubishi Electric
0. 68) Corp. Corp.\a
18 Identification friend or Teledyne Electronics Hazeltine Corp.
1. foe receiver/
transmitter
18 General avionics Teledyne Systems Co. Mitsubishi Electric
2. computer Corp.\a
18 Electronic warfare Tracor Corp. Mitsubishi Electric
3. computer for integrated Corp.\a
electronic warfare
system (IEWS)
18 Electronic support Loral Corp. Mitsubishi Electric
4. measures for IEWS Corp.\a
18 Electronic Westinghouse Electric Mitsubishi Electric
5. countermeasures for IEWS Corp., and Raytheon Corp.\a
Corp.
18 Countermeasures Tracor Corp. Mitsubishi Electric
6. dispensers for IEWS Corp.\a
18 Advanced interference SCI Systems Inc. SCI Systems Inc.
7. blanker unit
18 Map generator Item not found in F-16 Toshiba Corp.\a
8.
18 Angle-of-attack Teledyne Avionics Japan Aviation
9. transmitter (right and Electronics Industries,
left) Ltd.\a
19 Inertial navigation set Litton Systems Inc. Japan Aviation
0. Electronics Industries,
Ltd.\a
19 Crash-survivable flight Smith Industries Inc. Kanto Aircraft
1. data recorder signal Instrument Co., Ltd.\a
acquisition and memory
units
19 Airborne video tape Teac Corp. of America Teac Corp.\a
2. recorder
19 Central air data Honeywell Inc. Tokimec Inc.\a
3. computer
19 Head-up display set: GEC Avionics Ltd.\c Shimadzu Corp.\a
4. electronics and display
units
\Astronautics Corp. of
Aft seat head-up display America
monitor
19 Rate sensor unit Honeywell Inc., and GEC Honeywell Inc.
5. Avionics Ltd.\c
19 Fuselage-mounted air Rosemount Aerospace Inc. Rosemount Aerospace Inc.
6. data probe
19 Combined altitude radar Gould Defense Systems Japan Radio Co., Ltd.\a
7. altimeter receiver/ Inc.
transmitter unit
19 Engine warning control SCI Systems Inc. Shinko Electric Co.,
8a unit Ltd.\a
.
19 Voice message unit SCI Systems Inc. Shinko Electric Co.,
8b Ltd.\a
.
19 Extended capability data Lockheed Fort Worth Co. Lockheed Fort Worth Co.
9. entry electronic unit
20 Pilot fault list display Litton Systems Canada, Litton Systems Canada,
0. Ltd.\d Ltd.\d
20 Data entry display power Litton Systems Canada, Litton Systems Canada,
1. supply Ltd.\d Ltd.\d
20 Data entry display Litton Systems Canada, Koito Manufacturing Co.,
2. Ltd.\d Ltd.\a
20 Aft station integrated Lockheed Fort Worth Co. Koito Manufacturing Co.,
3. control panel assembly Ltd.\a
(2 seat)
20 Nose mounted pitot Rosemount Aerospace Inc. Rosemount Aerospace Inc.
4. static tube
20 Standby display set Item not found in F-16 Yokogawa Electric
5. Corp.\a
20 Data link set Item not found in F-16 Hitachi, Ltd.\a
6.
20 Auxiliary communication Lambda Novatronics Inc. Lambda Novatronics Inc.
7. panel
System: Electricity
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
20 10KVA AC generator Westinghouse Electric Shinko Electric Co.,
8. Corp. Ltd.\a
20 10KVA generator control Westinghouse Electric Shinko Electric Co.,
9. unit Corp. Ltd.\a
21 10KVA frequency Westinghouse Electric Shinko Electric Co.,
0. converter Corp. Ltd.\a
21 Constant speed drive Sundstrand Aerospace Teijin Seiki Co., Ltd.\a
1.
21 5KVA AC Emergency power Lucas Aerospace, and Shinko Electric Co.,
2. generator Pacific Scientific Co. Ltd.\a
21 Electrical converter and Aerospace Avionics Inc. Shinko Electric Co.,
3. 5KVA generator control Ltd.\a
unit
21 60KVA AC generator Westinghouse Electric Shinko Electric Co.,
4. Corp. Ltd.\a
21 60KVA AC generator Westinghouse Electric Shinko Electric Co.,
5. control unit Corp. Ltd.\a
21 Converter regulator Aerospace Avionics Inc., Mitsubishi Electric
6. and Lockheed Fort Worth Corp.\a
Co.
21 Nickel-cadmium aircraft Marathon Power The Furukawa Battery
7. storage battery Technologies, and Saft Co., Ltd.\a
America Inc.
21 Battery charger/control Aerospace Avionics Inc. The Furukawa Battery
8. unit Co., Ltd.\a
21 External power Burton Electrical Burton Electrical
9. receptacle Engineering Corp. Engineering Corp.
22 Ground electrical Avibank Mfg. Inc. Avibank Mfg. Inc.
0. receptacle
22 DC converter Lockheed Fort Worth Co. Mitsubishi Electric
1. Corp.\a
System: Instrumentation
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
22 ABU-11/A aircraft Aerosonic Corp., Macleod Tokyo Aircraft
2. mechanical clock Instrument Corp., and Instrument Co., Ltd.\a
Waltham Clock Co., Inc.
22 ARU-42/A1 attitude Jet Electronics & Jet Electronics and
3. indicator Technology, Inc. Technology, Inc.
22 Multi-function display Astronautics Corp. of Yokogawa Electric
4. set: America, and Litton Corp.\a
Systems Inc.
AQU-13A/A horizontal
situation indicator and
ARU-50/A flight attitude Litton Systems Inc., and
indicator Sequa Corp.
AAU-34/A servo control Honeywell Inc.
altimeter
Multi-function
programmable display
generator
22 AN/AXQ-16(V)-1 TV Loral Fairchild Corp. NAC Inc.\a
5. cockpit sensor
22 Pilot's controller grip Lockheed Fort Worth Co. Koito Manufacturing Co.,
6. assembly Ltd.\a
22 TRU-63/A-3 fuel flow Ametek Aerospace Ametek Aerospace
7. transmitter Products Inc., and Gull Products Inc.
Electronic Systems Div.
22 Engine control and aft Lockheed Fort Worth Co. Koito Manufacturing Co.,
8. station throttle Ltd.\a
quadrant assembly
22 Light assemblies Aerospace Avionics Inc. Koito Manufacturing Co.,
9. Ltd.\a
Master caution light Grimes Aerospace
assembly
23 AAU-3A/A pressurized Aerosonic Corp., and Aerosonic Corp.
0. compartment altimeter Kearflex Engineering
Co., Inc.
23 Total temperature Rosemount Aerospace Inc. Rosemount Aerospace Inc.
1. deiceable probe
23 Fuel quantity measuring BF Goodrich Military Yokogawa Electric
2. system Fuels & Integrated Corp.\a
Systems
System: Operational software
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
23 Stores management Lockheed Fort Worth Co. Lockheed Fort Worth Co.
3. computer software
23 Up front control Lockheed Fort Worth Co. Mitsubishi Heavy
4. software Industries, Ltd.\a
23 Programmable display Lockheed Fort Worth Co. Mitsubishi Heavy
5. generator software Industries, Ltd.\a
23 Mission computer Lockheed Fort Worth Co. Mitsubishi Heavy
6. software Industries, Ltd.\a
23 Flight control computer Lockheed Fort Worth Co. Mitsubishi Heavy
7. software Industries, Ltd.\a
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Configuration Control
Items
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
23 RT-1168b UHF receiver/ Magnavox Co. Magnavox Co.
8. transmitter
23 AM1963/AIC-1 Andrea Radio Corp. Andrea Radio Corp.
9. intercommunication
amplifier
24 C6624/AIC-25 Andrea Radio Corp., Andrea Radio Corp.
0. intercommunication Melcor Electronics
station Corp., and Monmouth
Industries Inc.
24 Data transfer unit Fairchild Defense Co. Fairchild Defense Co.
1.
24 Data transfer cartridge Fairchild Defense Co. Fairchild Defense Co.
2. assembly
24 TRU-2A/A rate gyro Aircraft Instr. & Dev. Aircraft Instrument and
3. transmitter Inc.; Honeywell Inc.; Development Inc.
Smith Industries Inc.;
Abex/National Waterlift;
Condor Pacific
Industries Inc.; and Jet
Electronics and
Technology Inc.
24 AGU-1B/U hydraulic Allied Signal Inc. Allied Signal Inc.
4. pressure indicator Courter Operations Courter Operations
24 EHU-49/A fan turbine Gull Electronic Systems Tokyo Aircraft
5. inlet temperature Div., and Ametek Instrument Co. Ltd.\a
indicator Aerospace Products Inc.
24 Rate of fuel flow Ragen Data Systems Inc. Tokyo Aircraft
6. indicator Instrument Co., Ltd.\a
24 ALU-16/A nozzle position Litton Special Devices, Litton Special Devices
7. indicator and Gull Electronic
Systems Div.
24 EGU-12/A oil pressure Allied Signal Inc. Allied Signal Inc.
8. indicator Courter Operations Courter Operations
24 Electrical tachometer Aero Mechanism Inc., and Tokyo Aircraft
9. indicator Ametek Aerospace Instrument Co., Ltd.\a
Products Inc.
25 Emergency fuel quantity Ametek Aerospace Ametek Aerospace
0. indicator model 1822 Products Inc., and Products Inc.
Aerosonic Corp.
25 ABU-4A/A accelerometer QED Inc. QED Inc.
1.
25 Landing/taxi light Grimes Aerospace Co., Koito Manufacturing Co.,
2. and Godfrey Engineering Ltd.\a
Inc.
25 Landing/taxi light Grimes Aerospace Co., Grimes Aerospace Co.
3. transformer and Godfrey Engineering
Inc.
25 Anti-collision light Grimes Aerospace Co. Koito Manufacturing Co.,
4. system: anti-collision Ltd.\a
light, power supply,
strobe light
25 Navigational aircraft Grimes Aerospace Inc., Koito Manufacturing Co.,
5. formation light (left and Specialty Lighting Ltd.\a
and right) Inc.
25 Aircraft formation light Grimes Aerospace Co., Koito Manufacturing Co.
6. and Specialty Lighting Ltd.\a
Inc.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Indicates a Japanese company.
\b Michelin is a French company.
\c GEC Avionics is a British company.
\d Indicates a Canadian Company.
(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix IV
--------------------
\1 A qualified F-16 manufacturer is a company that has demonstrated
that it can produce an item that meets all designated specifications
for use on the F-16 aircraft. However, not all qualified F-16
suppliers have actually provided items for the F-16. For example,
CLA-VAL company is a qualified F-16 supplier for the ground refuel
adaptor (item 86), but it has not yet supplied this item for the
F-16, according to an Air Force official.
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
========================================================= Appendix III
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
The following are GAO's comments on the Department of Defense's
letter dated May 22, 1995.
GAO COMMENTS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:1
1. We revised the report to clarify the distinction between the FS-X
budget, which is paid for by the Japanese government, and the total
costs of the FS-X development program, which include Japanese
government funds and any costs paid by Japanese firms with their own
corporate funds. We also added language indicating that U.S.
officials do not know the total FS-X development costs or whether
FS-X costs exceed the FS-X budget.
2. We modified the report's text in response to this comment.
3. We revised our report to indicate that it is the status of 12
FS-X technologies that is in question. We also added updated
DOD-provided information on the status of the reclassification
process. We note that while the rules governing the reclassification
process are established, the technology transfer required for derived
technologies is greater than that for non-derived items.
(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix V
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
STATE
========================================================= Appendix III
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
The following are GAO's comments on the Department of State's letter
dated May 26, 1995.
GAO COMMENTS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:2
1. While both derived and non-derived technologies may be made
available to the United States, Japan can limit U.S. access to
technologies classified as non-derived. In contrast, under the FS-X
agreements, derived technologies must be transferred to the United
States automatically and free of charge, including any background
data necessary to make such transfers effective.
2. State's failure to refer a sensitive case to DOD and possible
Commerce licensing of munitions items, demonstrate that the U.S.
government's FS-X related licensing activities could be improved. As
stated in the report, we believe that increased sharing of licensing
information between DOD, State, and Commerce would improve the U.S.
government's ability to monitor the flow of U.S. items and
technologies to the FS-X program. This, in turn, would enhance the
quality of FS-X related licensing decisions and the U.S.
government's examination of Japanese requests to reclassify FS-X
technologies to non-derived status. We note that State in its
comments on our draft report agreed that a central registry would
assist the U.S. FS-X program office to monitor program developments.
3. We believe Japan's repeated requests for previously denied F-16
data demonstrate the continued need for adequate U.S. controls over
the transfer of U.S. technology for the FS-X program.
(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix VI
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE
========================================================= Appendix III
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
The following are GAO's comments on the Department of Commerce's
letter dated June 20, 1995.
GAO COMMENTS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:3
1. We do not have the responsibility for determining what items are
covered by DOD's FS-X releasability guidelines. If Commerce were to
consistently share licensing information with DOD, DOD could assist
Commerce in determining a license application's significance and
potential utility for the FS-X program. Such sharing would permit
DOD to determine if its FS-X releasability guidelines and the FS-X
government-to-government agreements were consistent with Commerce's
interpretations of the requirements of the Export Administration Act,
improve DOD's ability to properly categorize FS-X technologies as
derived or non-derived from U.S. sources, and facilitate DOD's
compilation of FS-X work share data.
2. We responded to Commerce's October 12, 1994, comments on the
classified version of this report.
3. We agree that there is no way to know whether general license
exports are FS-X related.
MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
========================================================= Appendix VII
NATIONAL SECURITY AND
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix VII:1
James F. Wiggins
Davi M. D'Agostino
David G. Jones
Daniel B. Mezger
Jai Eun Lee
Wanda R. Beasley
GAO RELATED PRODUCTS
============================================================ Chapter 1
U.S. Military Coproduction Programs Assist Japan in Developing Its
Civil Aircraft Industry (GAO/ID-82-23, Mar. 18, 1982).
Industrial Policy: Japan's Flexible Approach (GAO/ID-82-32, June 23,
1982).
Industrial Policy: Case Studies in the Japanese Experience
(GAO/ID-83-11, Oct. 20, 1982).
Support for Development of Electronics and Materials Technologies by
the Governments of the United States, Japan, West Germany, France,
and the United Kingdom (GAO/RCED-85-63, Sept. 9, 1985).
U.S. Military Aircraft Coproduction With Japan (GAO/T-NSIAD-89-6,
Feb. 23, 1989).
U.S.-Japan FS-X Codevelopment Program (GAO/T-NSIAD-89-31, May 11,
1989).
U.S.-Japan FS-X Codevelopment Program (GAO/T-NSIAD-89-32, May 16,
1989).
Investment in Foreign Aerospace Vehicle Research and Technological
Development Efforts (GAO/T-NSIAD-89-43, Aug. 2, 1989).
U.S.-Japan Codevelopment: Review of the FS-X Program
(GAO/NSIAD-90-77BR, Feb. 6, 1990).
Commercialization of Technology by Japanese Companies
(GAO/T-NSIAD-91-32, Apr. 30, 1991).
Aerospace Plane Technology: Research and Development Efforts in
Japan and Australia (GAO/NSIAD-92-5, Oct. 4, 1991).
Foreign Technology: Federal Processes for Collection and
Dissemination (GAO/NSIAD-92-101, Mar. 23, 1992).
Defense Technology Base: Risks of Foreign Dependencies for Military
Unique Critical Technologies (GAO/NSIAD-92-231, June 5, 1992).
U.S.-Japan Codevelopment: Update of the FS-X Program
(GAO/NSIAD-92-165, June 5, 1992).
Technology Transfer: Japanese Firms Involved in F-15 Coproduction
and Civil Aircraft Programs (GAO/NSIAD-92-178, June 10, 1992).
High-Technology Competitiveness: Trends in U.S. and Foreign
Performance (GAO/NSIAD-92-236, Sept. 16, 1992).
Competitiveness Issues: The Business Environment in the United
States, Japan, and Germany (GAO/GGD-93-124, Aug. 9, 1993).
Foreign Technology: Collection and Dissemination of Japanese
Information Can Be Improved (GAO/NSIAD-93-251, Sept. 30, 1993).
Asian Aeronautics: Technology Acquisition Drives Industry
Development (GAO/NSIAD-94-140, May 4, 1994).
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