U.N. Peacekeeping: Executive Branch Consultations With Congress Did Not Fully Meet Expectations in 1999-2000 (10-SEP-01, GAO-01-917)
Presidential Decision Directive 25, which established executive
branch policy about supporting U.N. and multilateral operations,
stated that U.S. involvement in peacekeeping must be selective
and effective. Toward this end, the directive established
specific factors that U.S. officials were required to consider
before deciding whether to support proposed operations, including
whether the operations advanced U.S. interests, had realistic
criteria for ending the operations, and had appropriate forces
and financing to accomplish their missions. The directive
established these factors as an aid for executive decision-making
and not as criteria for supporting particular operations.
Executive branch officials thoroughly considered all Presidential
Decision Directive 25 factors before deciding to support the
authorization or expansion of peacekeeping operations in East
Timor, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. At
the time the decisions were made, executive branch assessments
identified at least one Directive 25 shortfall in all of the
proposed operations and several shortfalls in six of them.
Executive branch officials nonetheless decided to support the
operations because they believed that these shortfalls were
outweighed by the presence of other Directive 25 factors and
various other factors, including U.S. interests in the region.
Executive branch officials provided Congress with considerable
information about the conflicts that the proposed operations were
intended to address. However, GAO found no evidence that Congress
was informed about most Directive 25 shortfalls identified in
executive branch assessments of the proposed operations in East
Timor and Sierra Leone or about U.S. plans to address the risks
posed by these shortfalls. Congress was informed, however, about
most shortfalls identified in executive branch assessments of the
proposed U.N. operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-01-917
ACCNO: A01706
TITLE: U.N. Peacekeeping: Executive Branch Consultations With
Congress Did Not Fully Meet Expectations in 1999-2000
DATE: 09/10/2001
SUBJECT: Congressional/executive relations
Decision making
International cooperation
Peacekeeping
Democratic Republic of the Congo
East Timor
Sierra Leone
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GAO-01-917
Report to Congressional Requesters
United States General Accounting Office
GAO
September 2001 U. N. PEACEKEEPING Executive Branch Consultations With
Congress Did Not Fully Meet Expectations in 1999- 2000
GAO- 01- 917
Page i GAO- 01- 917 Executive Branch Consultations With Congress Letter 1
Results in Brief 4 Background 5 Executive Branch Judged That U. S. Interests
Outweighed Directive
25 Shortfalls 10 Executive Branch Provided Considerable Information but Did
Not
Consult Fully With the Congress About Shortfalls 20 Conclusions 29
Recommendation for Executive Action 30 Agency Comments 30
Appendix I U. S. Policy and Law Established Guidance and Requirements for
Peacekeeping Decisions and Consultations 32
Appendix II Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 39
Appendix III Key Events Related to Operations in East Timor, Sierra Leone,
and the Democratic Republic of the Congo 42
Appendix IV Executive Branch Actions to Address Presidential Decision
Directive 25 Shortfalls 54
Appendix V Comments From the National Security Council 57
Appendix VI Comments From the Department of State 58
Appendix VII GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 60 Contents
Page ii GAO- 01- 917 Executive Branch Consultations With Congress Tables
Table 1: Eight Decisions on U. N. and Multilateral Operations in East Timor,
Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mid- 1999 Through
Early 2000 6 Table 2: U. S. National Interests 33 Table 3: Presidential
Decision Directive 25 Political and
Operational Feasibility Factors 35 Table 4: Congressional Consultation and
Reporting Requirements
for U. N. Peacekeeping 38 Table 5: Timeline of Key Events Related to U. S.
Decisions About
U. N. and Multilateral Operations in East Timor, 1960 to March 2000 42 Table
6: Timeline of Key Events Related to U. S. Decisions About
U. N. Operations in Sierra Leone, March 1991 to May 2000 47 Table 7: Key
Events Related to U. S. Decisions About U. N.
Operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, August 1998 to February
2000 50 Table 8: Executive Branch Actions to Address Directive 25
Shortfalls 54
Figures
Figure 1: Executive Branch Decision- making Process for Peacekeeping
Operations, 1999 to Early 2000 11 Figure 2: Executive Branch Assessments of
Directive 25 Factors
for the Proposed U. N. and Multilateral Operations at the Time of the U. S.
Decisions to Support Them 14 Figure 3: Timing and Content of Consultations
for U. N. Operations
in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1999
to Early 2000 22 Figure 4: Summary of Executive Branch Consultations With
the
Congress About Directive 25 Shortfalls That Existed at the Time of the U. S.
Decisions to Support Them 26
Page iii GAO- 01- 917 Executive Branch Consultations With Congress
Abbreviations
ECOMOG Economic Community of West African States Military Observers Group
INTERFET International Force in East Timor MONUC U. N. Organization Mission
in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo UNAMET U. N. Mission in East Timor UNAMSIL U. N. Mission in
Sierra Leone UNOMSIL U. N. Observer Mission in Sierra Leone UNTAET U. N.
Transitional Administration in East Timor
Page 1 GAO- 01- 917 Executive Branch Consultations With Congress
September 10, 2001 The Honorable Henry J. Hyde Chairman, Committee on
International Relations
The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman Chairman, Subcommittee on the Middle East
and South Asia Committee on International Relations House of Representatives
From mid- 1999 to early 2000, the United States voted eight times in the U.
N. Security Council to authorize or expand multilateral operations in East
Timor, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The ongoing
U. N. operations in these three locations are estimated to cost $1.4 billion
in 2001. 1 You asked us to examine whether U. S. decisions to vote for these
operations were consistent with executive branch policies for supporting
such operations and consulting with the Congress about the decisions.
Presidential Decision Directive 25, 2 which established executive branch
policy about supporting U. N. and multilateral operations, stated that U. S.
involvement in peacekeeping must be selective and effective. Toward this
end, the directive established specific factors that U. S. officials were
required to consider before deciding whether to support proposed operations,
including whether the operations advanced U. S. interests, had realistic
criteria for ending the operations, and had appropriate forces and financing
to accomplish their missions. The directive established these factors as an
aid for executive branch decision- making and not as criteria for supporting
particular operations. However, Directive 25 was based on experience from
past peacekeeping operations, such as the U. N. operation
1 This cost estimate is for the U. N. peacekeeping fiscal year ending June
30, 2001. See
United Nations: Cost of Peacekeeping Is Likely to Exceed Current Estimate
(GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 228BR, Aug. 31, 2000). 2 Presidential Decision Directive
25, the Clinton Administration Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace
Operations, was issued in May 1994 as a classified document. An unclassified
summary was issued at the same time, and all references to Directive 25 in
this report are based on that summary. According to National Security
Council and other executive branch officials in the Bush administration,
Directive 25 is still being used but some aspects of the decision- making
process have been changed. Directive 25 may be revised later.
United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548
Page 2 GAO- 01- 917 Executive Branch Consultations With Congress
in Somalia, and reflected a judgment that operations lacking these factors
might be at risk. 3
Presidential Decision Directive 25 also established general expectations for
executive branch consultations with the Congress. The directive, for
example, stated that the ?Congress must? be actively involved in the
continuing implementation of U. S. policy on peacekeeping.? It also stated
that the executive branch would solicit the involvement of the Congress on
matters related to peacekeeping and the Clinton administration was
?committed to working with the Congress to improve and regularize
communication and consultation on [peacekeeping] issues.?
The United Nations Participation Act of 1945, as amended, imposes certain
consultation requirements on the president regarding ongoing and new U. N.
peacekeeping operations. 4 Thus, the president currently is required to (1)
consult each month with the Congress on the status of these operations and
(2) in conjunction with this consultation requirement, provide certain
information to the Congress at least 15 days before the U. N. Security
Council is expected to vote on resolutions authorizing new and expanded
operations. 5 Within the executive branch, the Department of State generally
has the lead responsibility for consulting with the Congress on peacekeeping
issues. Appendix I provides additional information about U. S. policies and
laws regarding peacekeeping decisions and consultation.
You requested that we assess how executive branch officials used
Presidential Decision Directive 25 in deciding to support the authorization
or expansion of peacekeeping operations in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and how the officials consulted
3 See U. N. Peacekeeping: Lessons Learned in Managing Recent Missions
(GAO/ NSIAD- 94- 9, Dec. 29, 1993) and U. N. Peacekeeping: Observations on
Mandates and Operational Capability (GAO/ T- NSIAD- 93- 15, June 9, 1993).
4 See 22 U. S. C. section 287b. For consultation purposes, 22 U. S. C.
section 287b( e)( 4) defines new operations to include ongoing operations
(1) where force strength is to be expanded, (2) that are authorized to
operate in a different country, or (3) where the mandate is significantly
changed. For clarity, this report refers to new or expanded operations.
5 For six of the eight decisions in our study, the president was required to
report to the Congress 5 days before voting in the U. N. Security Council.
See Public Law 103- 236, section 407( a)( 4), 108 Stat. 449. For the last
two decisions, the requirement was 15 days. This new requirement took effect
on November 29, 1999. See Public Law- 106- 113, section 724( a), 113 Stat.
1501A- 465.
Page 3 GAO- 01- 917 Executive Branch Consultations With Congress
with the Congress about the decisions. Specifically, we assessed (1) whether
executive branch officials considered all applicable Directive 25 factors
before making their decisions and identified shortfalls 6 in any of these
factors at the time the decisions were made and (2) how executive branch
officials consulted with the Congress during the decision- making process,
including the content and timing of the information provided.
Our review covered eight executive branch decisions made between May 1999
and February 2000 to vote in the U. N. Security Council to authorize new or
expanded operations in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic
of the Congo. We analyzed more than 200 executive branch records directly
related to these decisions, such as decision memorandums and summaries of
decision meetings. We supplemented this analysis by reviewing hundreds of
other records, such as related intelligence assessments, and discussing the
eight decisions with agency officials. To examine consultation with the
Congress, we reviewed statements by executive branch officials at
congressional hearings, a log of executive branch congressional contact
memorandums, notification letters required by U. S. law, and transcripts of
monthly briefings on peacekeeping for the Congress. We also attended most of
these monthly briefings. However, we were denied full access to some records
related to the eight decisions in our study, on the basis of the executive
branch?s concern about protecting its deliberative process. 7 This denial of
full access prevented us from assessing how Directive 25 factors and the
risks associated with shortfalls were weighed by executive branch officials
and how an interagency position was reached. As a result, we limited the
scope of our study to whether Directive 25 factors were considered, whether
the factors were judged to be present or absent in an operation, and how the
Congress was consulted about the decisions- questions for which we had
sufficient information to reach independent findings and
6 We define ?shortfall? as a Directive 25 factor that executive branch
officials judged to be absent in a proposed operation, such as an operation
not having realistic criteria for ending the operation. A State Department
paper about the application of Directive 25 stated that consideration of the
directive?s factors helped executive branch officials ?identify [proposed
peacekeeping operations?] basic political, military, and resource
shortfalls.?
7 See U. N. Peacekeeping: GAO?s Access to Records on Executive Branch
Decision- making
(GAO- 01- 440R, Mar. 6, 2001); Preliminary Observations About the U. S.
Process for Deciding to Support U. N. Peace Operations (GAO- 01- 100T, Oct.
4, 2000); and U. N. Peacekeeping: Access to Records Concerning the U. S.
Decision- making Process
(GAO- 01- 180T, Nov. 1, 2000).
Page 4 GAO- 01- 917 Executive Branch Consultations With Congress
conclusions. Appendix II further describes our study?s scope and
methodology.
Executive branch officials thoroughly considered all Presidential Decision
Directive 25 factors before deciding to support the authorization or
expansion of peacekeeping operations in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. At the time the decisions were made,
executive branch assessments identified at least one Directive 25 shortfall
in all of the proposed operations and several shortfalls in six of them.
Executive branch officials nevertheless decided to support the operations
because they believed that these shortfalls were outweighed by the presence
of other Directive 25 factors and various other factors, including U. S.
interests in the operations. For example, executive branch assessments
concluded that a proposed peacekeeping operation in Sierra Leone lacked a
clear mandate, appropriate forces, and realistic exit criteria. Despite the
risks posed by these shortfalls, the administration decided in October 1999
that the United States would support the authorization of this operation, in
part, because of U. S. interests in ending the violence against innocent
civilians and in supporting U. S. allies in this regional peacemaking
effort. Moreover, as part of the decision- making process, executive branch
officials attempted to remedy some shortfalls before the U. N. Security
Council voted to authorize the operations or developed plans to reduce the
risks posed by the shortfalls after the authorization.
Executive officials also provided the Congress with considerable information
about the conflicts that the proposed operations were intended to address.
However, we found no evidence that the Congress was informed about most
Directive 25 shortfalls identified in executive branch assessments of the
proposed operations in East Timor and Sierra Leone or about U. S. plans to
address the risks posed by these shortfalls. For example, we found no
evidence that the Congress was informed about the previously discussed
shortfalls in the Sierra Leone operation approved in October 1999. Although
neither Directive 25 nor the U. N. Participation Act 8 requires consultation
about shortfalls, they create an expectation that the executive branch
consultations should provide the Congress with ?U. S. policy- makers? views
on the shortfalls, challenges, and risks associated
8 The legislative history accompanying the act does not address the issue of
the executive branch?s consulting with the Congress about shortfalls in U.
N. peacekeeping operations. Results in Brief
Page 5 GAO- 01- 917 Executive Branch Consultations With Congress
with successfully undertaking [peacekeeping operations].? 9 In the spirit of
consultation called for by Directive 25 and the U. N. Participation Act, the
Congress was informed about most shortfalls identified in executive branch
assessments of the proposed U. N. operations in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo. Congressional staff told us that these candid discussions helped
the Congress to develop a more informed opinion about these operations and
support for these operations.
This report recommends that the State Department provide the Congress with
more information about the shortfalls of proposed operations as part of the
executive branch?s commitment to improve consultation with the Congress. We
provided a draft of this report to the National Security Council, the State
Department, and the Department of Defense for comment. The National Security
Council and the State Department provided written comments, which are
reproduced in appendixes V and VI. The Defense Department did not provide
written comments but told us that it concurred with State?s comments. We
discuss these comments at the end of this letter. The State and Defense
Departments also provided technical comments, which we incorporated into
this report as appropriate.
Between January 1999 and May 2000, the U. N. Security Council adopted 10
resolutions authorizing new peacekeeping operations or significantly
expanding existing ones, including 8 resolutions for operations in East
Timor, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 10 Table 1
lists the eight decisions and the dates respectively of the executive branch
decisions to support the operations, the letters informing the Congress of
these decisions, and the U. N. Security Council votes.
9 Information Paper: Application of U. S. Peacekeeping Policy Under PDD- 25
[Presidential Decision Directive 25] (Department of State, May 15, 2000).
The State Department prepared this paper- which was approved by the National
Security Council- in response to our questions about the application of
Directive 25.
10 During this period, the U. N. Security Council also authorized the U. N.
Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo and restructured the U. N. Mission
in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Other U. N. Security Council votes on U. N.
peacekeeping during this period were to extend the mandates of ongoing
operations without significant restructuring or expansion. Background
Page 6 GAO- 01- 917 Executive Branch Consultations With Congress
Table 1: Eight Decisions on U. N. and Multilateral Operations in East Timor,
Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mid- 1999 Through
Early 2000
Description of decision Date of executive branch decision
Date of letter informing Congress of decision
Date of U. N. Security Council vote (resolution number) East Timor
Authorized the U. N. Mission in East Timor to organize and conduct a secret
ballot to determine the future status of the territory
5/ 27/ 99 5/ 27/ 99 6/ 11/ 99 (S/ RES/ 1246) Authorized the International
Force in East Timor to restore peace and security in East Timor, protect and
support the U. N. Mission in East Timor, and facilitate humanitarian
assistance operations
9/ 11/ 99 No letter sent a 9/ 15/ 99 (S/ RES/ 1264)
Authorized the U. N. Transitional Administration in East Timor to administer
East Timor during its transition to independence 9/ 29/ 99 10/ 8/ 99 10/ 25/
99
(S/ RES/ 1272)
Sierra Leone
Expanded the U. N. Observer Mission in Sierra Leone to monitor
implementation of the Lomé Peace Agreement b 8/ 4/ 99 8/ 5/ 99 8/ 20/ 99
(S/ RES/ 1260) Authorized the U. N. Mission in Sierra Leone to help
implement the Lomé Peace Agreement
10/ 4/ 99 10/ 8/ 99 10/ 22/ 99 (S/ RES/ 1270) Expanded the U. N. Mission in
Sierra Leone to help implement the Lomé Peace Agreement
1/ 24/ 00 1/ 24/ 00 2/ 7/ 00 (S/ RES/ 1289)
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Authorized the U. N. Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo c to help implement the Lusaka Cease- fire Agreement d
7/ 23/ 99 7/ 23/ 99 8/ 6/ 99 (S/ RES/ 1258)
Expanded the U. N. Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (Phase II) to monitor compliance with, and help implement, the Lusaka
Cease- fire Agreement
1/ 28/ 00 2/ 7/ 00 2/ 24/ 00 (S/ RES/ 1291)
a This operation was a U. N.- authorized multilateral force led by
Australia. The State Department did not inform the Congress in writing of
the executive branch?s decision to support its authorization, asserting that
the law requires written notification only for U. N.- led peacekeeping
operations. b The Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United
Front of Sierra Leone signed the
Lomé Peace Agreement (S/ 1999/ 777) on July 7, 1999. c U. N. Security
Council resolution 1279 (1999), adopted on November 11, 1999, formally
constituted
the U. N. preliminary deployment in the Democratic Republic of the Congo as
the U. N. Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. d
The Democratic Republic of the Congo and five regional states signed the
Lusaka Cease- fire Agreement (S/ 1999/ 815) on July 10, 1999. Source: GAO
analysis of State Department and U. N. records.
Page 7 GAO- 01- 917 Executive Branch Consultations With Congress
The U. N. and multilateral operations in these three locations were
undertaken to help resolve long- standing internal conflicts. The estimated
cost of the ongoing U. N. operations in these locations represented over
half of the $2.7 billion estimated cost of U. N peacekeeping operations in
2001. 11 Although peace agreements or cease- fires had been reached or were
imminent in these three locations, violence continued and the political
accords appeared tenuous. The following paragraphs briefly describe the
situations in these three locations to provide some context for the eight
executive branch decisions. Appendix III provides additional information
about key events related to these decisions.
Since 1975, when Indonesia forcibly incorporated East Timor, the United
States had supported some form of self- determination for the former
Portuguese colony with a population of about 800,000 people. In 1983,
Portugal and Indonesia began regular talks aimed at resolving East Timor?s
status; in June 1998, Indonesia agreed to enter U. N.- mediated talks about
autonomy for East Timor. In January 1999, Indonesia?s President announced
his support for offering the people of East Timor a choice between autonomy
within Indonesia or independence. On May 5, 1999, Indonesia and Portugal
concluded a general agreement that, among other things, called for the
establishment of a U. N. operation to conduct a free and fair vote 12 for
the people of East Timor to choose the territory?s future status- either
autonomy within Indonesia or independence. 13 Despite this agreement, pro-
autonomy factions, supported by local militia and the Indonesian military,
attempted to use violence to intimidate proindependence factions and
influence the outcome of the vote. There also was uncertainty about the
Indonesian security forces? willingness to allow a free and fair vote.
11 This cost estimate is for the U. N. peacekeeping fiscal year ending June
30, 2001. See GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 228BR. 12 Under the agreement, the vote was
formally termed a ?popular consultation.?
13 Under the agreement, the people of East Timor could choose to accept or
reject autonomy. However, a vote to reject autonomy, coupled with the
Indonesian President?s promise to seek to have Indonesia?s Supreme People?s
Consultative Assembly reverse the territory?s annexation in the event of
such an outcome, was essentially a vote for independence. The agreement
stipulated that, if the people of East Timor rejected autonomy, the United
Nations would administer East Timor until it assumed full independence. East
Timor
Page 8 GAO- 01- 917 Executive Branch Consultations With Congress
The conflict in Sierra Leone began in 1991, when rebel forces (the
Revolutionary United Front) began attacking government forces near the
Liberian border. Sierra Leone?s army at first tried to defend the government
with the support of military forces provided by the Economic Community of
West African States, but the army itself overthrew the government in 1992.
Despite the change of power, the rebel forces continued their attacks. The
army relinquished power in 1996 after parliamentary and presidential
elections. Rebel forces, however, did not participate in the elections and
did not recognize the results. A November 1996 peace agreement between the
government and the rebels (the Abidjan Accord) was derailed by another
military coup d?état in May 1997. This time the army joined forces with the
rebels to form a ruling junta and the elected government was forced into
exile in Guinea. In February 1998, the West African military forces launched
an attack that led to the collapse of the junta and the restoration of the
elected government. In July 1998, the U. N. Security Council established the
U. N. Observer Mission in Sierra Leone to monitor the situation and help the
combatants reach an overall peace agreement. In July 1999, the combatants
signed the Lomé Peace Agreement, under which U. N. and West African
peacekeeping forces would share in helping to provide security and disarm,
demobilize, and reintegrate the combatants. During the 8 years of fighting,
an estimated 500,000 Sierra Leone citizens were forced to flee to
neighboring Guinea, Liberia, Gambia, and other locations. Of the estimated 6
million people remaining in Sierra Leone, 2.6 million could not be reached
by humanitarian agencies and 370,000 were internally displaced. 14 These
populations suffered severe human rights abuses, including mutilations,
amputations, summary executions, torture, and sexual abuse.
The Congo conflict grew out of the instability that followed the Rwandan
crisis of 1994 and eventually involved the armed forces of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and five regional states, several Congolese rebel
groups, and groups responsible for the Rwandan genocide. According to a U.
N. report, this conflict was ?characterized by appalling, widespread and
systematic human rights violations, including mass killings, ethnic
cleansing, rape and destruction of property? and its effects had ?spread
14 Internally displaced persons are persons or groups who have been forced
to flee their homes or places of residence- in particular by armed conflict,
general violence, human rights violations, or natural or human disasters-
and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border. Sierra
Leone
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Page 9 GAO- 01- 917 Executive Branch Consultations With Congress
beyond the subregion to afflict the continent of Africa as a whole.? 15 In
August 1998, the Southern Africa Development Community and the Organization
for African Unity announced the start of a regional initiative to negotiate
an end to the Congo conflict. On July 10, 1999, six states signed the Lusaka
Cease- fire Agreement and 5 days later, on July 15, the U. N. Secretary
General proposed establishing a U. N. operation to help monitor
implementation of the cease- fire agreement.
Directive 25 stated that U. S. and U. N. involvement in peacekeeping must be
both selective and effective. This principle was underscored by the 1996 U.
S. National Security Strategy Report, which stated that ?the United States
must make highly disciplined choices about when and under what circumstances
to support? peacekeeping operations and directed officials to ?undertake a
rigorous assessment of requirements before voting to support [such]
operations.? 16 To this end, Directive 25 required executive branch
decision- makers to consider specific factors in deciding whether to support
a proposed operation. These factors included questions about a proposed
operation?s (1) political context, such as whether it advanced U. S.
interests and the consequences of inaction were judged unacceptable, and (2)
feasibility, such as whether it had appropriate forces, financing, and
mandate to accomplish its mission and its anticipated duration was tied to
clear objectives and realistic exit criteria. Directive 25 established these
factors to help executive branch officials identify proposed operations?
basic political, military, and resource shortfalls but did not require that
all or any particular factors be present in a proposed operation before it
was approved. The directive stated that decisions would be based on the
cumulative weight of the factors, with no single factor being an absolute
determinant. However, the directive also stated that the United States
generally would support only well- defined peace operations linked to
concrete political solutions.
15 Report of the Secretary- General on the United Nations Preliminary
Deployment in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/ 1999/ 790, July 15,
1999). 16 A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (The
White House, Feb. 1996). Presidential Decision
Directive 25 and Other Guidance for Peacekeeping Decisionmaking
Page 10 GAO- 01- 917 Executive Branch Consultations With Congress
Executive branch officials extensively considered all Directive 25 factors
before deciding to support the authorization or expansion of the U. N.
operations. Executive branch assessments of proposed operations identified
concerns about some directive factors and shortfalls in others. Executive
branch officials decided to support the operations because most factors were
present and, in their judgment, U. S. interests were advanced by supporting
regional allies, creating or maintaining regional stability, or addressing
humanitarian disasters. Following interagency deliberations, senior
executive branch officials directed State and Defense officials to
strengthen the proposed operations before the U. N. Security Council voted
or to develop plans to address the risks that the shortfalls posed.
For the eight decisions, we found that the executive branch used a
systematic process that resulted in a full consideration of all Directive 25
factors. The process for making these decisions involved the consideration
of Directive 25 at the following three levels:
Individual agencies. The State and Defense Departments and the National
Security Council were the primary agencies that assessed the proposed
operations. Individual agency deliberations included relevant regional,
functional, legal, and legislative affairs experts. Peacekeeping Core
Group. This interagency working group, chaired by the
National Security Council?s Senior Director for Multilateral and
Humanitarian Affairs, was comprised of assistant and deputy assistant
secretaries of State, Defense, and other U. S. departments and agencies. The
core group brought together the individual agency assessments and developed
consensus recommendations for senior decision- makers for each of the eight
decisions. Deputies Committee. This interagency decision- making group,
chaired by
the Deputy Adviser to the President for National Security Affairs or his
designee, was typically comprised of the undersecretaries of State and
Defense and similar officials from other agencies. For these eight
decisions, the Deputies Committee made the final decision to vote for the
proposed operation.
Interactions between these three levels were iterative and supported by
extensive intelligence reporting. Figure 1 illustrates the process used to
make these eight decisions. Executive Branch
Judged That U. S. Interests Outweighed Directive 25 Shortfalls
Process Ensured Extensive Consideration of All Directive 25 Factors
Page 11 GAO- 01- 917 Executive Branch Consultations With Congress
Figure 1: Executive Branch Decision- making Process for Peacekeeping
Operations, 1999 to Early 2000
Source: GAO analysis of executive branch records.
For the eight decisions we reviewed, we found that executive officials
prepared and reviewed hundreds of records considering all applicable
Directive 25 factors before deciding to support the proposed operations.
These records included decision memorandums, situation assessments, concept
papers, and summaries of interagency discussions. For five of the eight
decisions, the State Department prepared comprehensive Directive 25 analyses
that candidly assessed the proposed operations, including identifying basic
political, military, and resource shortfalls. Analysis of these records
showed that executive branch officials considered all applicable Directive
25 factors before making their decisions. Before the late May 1999 decision
to support the U. N. Mission in East Timor, for example, executive branch
officials prepared 19 assessments of the proposed operation, including a
comprehensive Directive 25 analysis. These assessments considered all
applicable Directive 25 factors, for example, whether (1) there was support
among U. N. member states for U. N. action in Indonesia and (2) the parties
consented to the deployment of a U. N. force. Before the August 1999
decision to support the expansion of the U. N. Observer Mission in Sierra
Leone, executive branch officials prepared 16 assessments of the proposed
operation, including a
Page 12 GAO- 01- 917 Executive Branch Consultations With Congress
comprehensive Directive 25 analysis. These assessments considered all
applicable Directive 25 factors, for example, whether the expanded operation
had adequate financing and forces to carry out its mission. In making all
eight decisions, executive branch officials also considered assessments
provided by other governments, the U. N. Secretariat, diplomatic envoys and
negotiators, regional organizations, and others operating in the areas of
concern.
For the eight decisions, the Peacekeeping Core Group met several times
specifically to consider applicable Directive 25 factors for the proposed
operations and develop options and recommendations for senior
decisionmakers. The Deputies Committee met less frequently to consider and
act on the options and recommendations developed by the core group. For
example, our analysis of executive branch records showed that the core group
met nine times between March and late May 1999 specifically to discuss the
proposed U. N. Mission in East Timor. During this same period, the Deputies
Committee met three times to consider and act on the core group?s
recommendations. Similarly, between February and early August 1999, our
analysis showed that the core group met eight times to discuss the proposed
expansion of the U. N. Observer Mission in Sierra Leone. During this same
period, the Deputies Committee met twice to consider and act on the core
group?s recommendations. According to executive branch officials, these
meetings were supplemented by frequent informal contacts between members of
the core group and Deputies Committee. For example, core group members
participated in weekly conference calls.
At the time the eight decisions were made, executive branch assessments
indicated that the proposed operations advanced U. S. interests. In defining
U. S. interests, executive branch officials used the definitions in the
annual U. S. national security strategy reports. 17 These reports defined U.
S. interests as (1) vital- those interests that affect the safety and
survival of the United States; (2) important- those interests that affect U.
S. national well- being, including commitments to allies; and (3)
humanitarian and other- those interests related to U. S. values. Executive
branch officials judged that the proposed operations in East Timor, Sierra
Leone, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo advanced important and
humanitarian
17 The Goldwater- Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986
requires the president to submit a national security strategy report to the
Congress each year. See 50 U. S. C. section 404a( a)( 1). Operations Judged
to
Serve U. S. Interests but They Had Some Directive 25 Shortfalls
Page 13 GAO- 01- 917 Executive Branch Consultations With Congress
and other U. S. interests. For all operations, the consequences of inaction
also were judged unacceptable. Other than the definitions in the annual
national security strategy reports, we could find no criteria to guide
executive branch officials in making judgments about these two Directive 25
factors.
At the time the eight decisions were made, executive branch assessments
identified at least one Directive 25 shortfall in all of the proposed
operations and several shortfalls in six of them. Most of these shortfalls
were related to the proposed operations? operational feasibility, such as
whether they had adequate means for carrying out their missions and their
duration was tied to clear objectives and realistic exit criteria. Executive
branch assessments also identified concerns about some factors. On the basis
of our analysis of executive branch records, figure 2 summarizes executive
branch assessments of the Directive 25 factors for the proposed operations
at the time of the eight Deputies Committee decisions.
Page 14 GAO- 01- 917 Executive Branch Consultations With Congress
Figure 2: Executive Branch Assessments of Directive 25 Factors for the
Proposed U. N. and Multilateral Operations at the Time of the U. S.
Decisions to Support Them
Source: GAO analysis of executive branch records.
Page 15 GAO- 01- 917 Executive Branch Consultations With Congress
The following sections briefly describe the Directive 25 shortfalls
identified in executive branch assessments of the proposed operations.
As shown in figure 2, executive branch assessments of the proposed U. N.
Mission in East Timor identified four Directive 25 shortfalls. First,
assessments questioned whether the preconditions for a peacekeeping
operation (a cease- fire in place and the parties consent to the deployment
of a U. N. force) existed in East Timor. Violence against pro- independence
factions continued and, despite the Indonesian government?s announced
consent to the operation, Indonesian security forces appeared to be
supporting this violence. Second, assessments questioned whether, in the
face of this continuing violence, there was a clear understanding of where
the proposed operation would fit between peacekeeping and peace enforcement.
Third, assessments questioned whether the proposed operation?s mandate was
appropriate. Despite concern about violence, the proposed operation did not
include peacekeeping troops primarily because Indonesia objected to the
deployment of such forces. Additionally, the role and objectives of the
civilian police component were unclear given the scope of the violence.
Fourth, assessments questioned whether the proposed operation?s exit
criteria were realistic because there was a gap of several months between
the end of the operation and a proposed follow- on U. N. operation. On May
27, 1999, the Deputies Committee decided the United States would vote in the
U. N. Security Council to authorize the proposed peacekeeping operation.
Factors considered in this decision included U. S. interests in aiding
Australia and ending the violence in East Timor, regional support for U. N.
action, and the judgment that U. N. action was East Timor?s best opportunity
for democratic development.
Executive branch assessments of the proposed International Force in East
Timor identified one Directive 25 shortfall. As shown in figure 2,
assessments questioned whether the operation?s duration was linked to
realistic criteria for ending the operation. The operation?s general exit
strategy was to restore peace and security to East Timor and then transfer
responsibility for maintaining peace and security to the proposed U. N.
Transitional Administration in East Timor. However, at the time executive
branch officials made their decision, the specific timing and criteria for
this transfer were uncertain. The Deputies Committee decided that the United
States would vote in the U. N. Security Council to authorize the proposed
multilateral peace enforcement operation. As before, factors considered in
this decision included U. S. interests in aiding Australia and ending the
violence in East Timor. Led by Australia, the multinational force began
deploying in East Timor on September 20, 1999. East Timor
Page 16 GAO- 01- 917 Executive Branch Consultations With Congress
Executive branch assessments of the proposed U. N. Transitional
Administration in East Timor identified one Directive 25 shortfall. As shown
in figure 2, assessments questioned whether the proposed operation had
adequate means- specifically, forces and financing- to carry out its
extensive nation- building tasks. In particular, assessments questioned
whether the United Nations could recruit sufficient troops and international
civilians to staff the operation. Although not identifying a clear shortfall
in international support for U. N. action in East Timor, several assessments
noted some members states? concerns about whether the proposed operation
would violate Indonesia?s sovereignty. On October 8, 1999, the Deputies
Committee decided that the United States would vote for the proposed peace
enforcement and nation- building operation. Factors considered in this
decision included U. S. interests in aiding important regional allies and
the judgment that a U. N. operation was the best choice for administering
East Timor during its transition to independence.
As shown in figure 2, executive branch assessments of the proposed expansion
of the U. N. Observer Mission in Sierra Leone identified three shortfalls.
First, assessments questioned whether the preconditions for a peacekeeping
operation existed in Sierra Leone. Fighting continued in some areas of the
country, and there was concern about whether the rebels and Liberia truly
consented to the deployment of an expanded U. N. force. 18 Second,
assessments questioned whether the proposed operation had adequate means to
carry out its mission in the face of potential rebel resistance. Third,
assessments questioned whether the proposed operation?s duration was linked
to realistic criteria for ending it. Concerns included whether the proposed
milestones for completing some tasks were realistic and whether rebel forces
would disarm and relinquish control of diamond- producing areas, as called
for in the Lomé Peace Agreement. On August 5, 1999, the Deputies Committee
decided to support the proposed expansion of the peacekeeping operation.
Factors considered in this decision included U. S. interests in resolving
the conflict in Sierra Leone, maintaining regional stability, and ending the
violence against innocent civilians.
Executive branch assessments of the proposed U. N. Mission in Sierra Leone
identified four shortfalls, as shown in figure 2. First, assessments
18 Liberia signed the Lomé Peace Agreement as a ?moral guarantor? but was
not a party to it. Liberia reportedly had trained and supplied rebel forces.
Sierra Leone
Page 17 GAO- 01- 917 Executive Branch Consultations With Congress
again questioned whether the preconditions for a peacekeeping operation
existed in Sierra Leone. Fighting continued in some areas of the country,
and there was continuing concern about whether the rebels and Liberia truly
consented to the deployment of an expanded U. N. force. Second, assessments
questioned whether, in the face of continuing violence, there was a clear
understanding of where the proposed operation would fit between peacekeeping
and peace enforcement. Third, assessments questioned whether the proposed
operation had adequate means to carry out its mission- identifying
shortfalls in its forces, financing, and mandate. One concern was whether
some proposed troop contingents had adequate training and equipment to deal
effectively with rebel resistance. Fourth, assessments questioned whether
the proposed operation?s duration was linked to clear objectives and
realistic criteria for ending it. One concern was whether rebel forces would
disarm and relinquish control of diamondproducing areas. On October 8, 1999,
the Deputies Committee decided that the United States would vote to
authorize this new peacekeeping operation. Factors considered in this
decision included the unacceptable humanitarian consequences of inaction,
particularly continued human rights abuses by rebel forces, and support for
U. N. action by U. N. Security Council members and important regional
states, including Nigeria, Guinea, and Ghana.
As shown in figure 2, executive branch assessments of the proposed expansion
of the U. N. Mission in Sierra Leone identified three shortfalls. First,
assessments questioned whether there was a clear understanding of where the
proposed operation would fit between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. One
concern was whether a peace enforcement operation could maintain the
neutrality and consent needed to carry out some peacekeeping tasks. Second,
assessments questioned whether the proposed operation had adequate means to
carry out its mission, expressing concern about whether its forces,
financing, and mandate were appropriate. One concern was whether some
proposed troop contingents- which were poorly trained and equipped- could
effectively carry out peace enforcement tasks. Third, assessments questioned
whether the proposed operation?s duration was linked to clear objectives and
realistic criteria for ending it. A continuing concern was whether the
rebels would disarm and relinquish control of diamond- producing areas. On
January 24, 2000, the Deputies Committee decided that the United States
would vote to expand the U. N. Mission in Sierra Leone and authorize it to
use force to accomplish some tasks. Factors considered in this decision
included U. S. interests in preventing this conflict from spreading to
neighboring states, the unacceptable humanitarian consequences of inaction,
and international support for U. N. action.
Page 18 GAO- 01- 917 Executive Branch Consultations With Congress
Executive branch assessments of the proposed U. N. Organization Mission in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo identified four shortfalls, as shown in
figure 2. First, assessments questioned whether the preconditions for a
peacekeeping operation existed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Fighting continued in some areas of the country, and it was uncertain
whether the warring parties consented to the deployment of a U. N. force.
Second, assessments questioned whether, in the face of continuing violence,
there was a clear understanding of where the proposed operation fit between
peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Third, assessments questioned whether
the proposed operation had adequate means- appropriate forces, financing,
and mandate- to carry out its mission. Concerns included whether U. N.
forces would have adequate protection and could move about the vast country
effectively. Fourth, assessments questioned whether the proposed operation?s
duration was linked to clear objectives and realistic criteria for ending
it. One concern was the potential for the United Nations to become more
deeply involved in the conflict. In recognition of such shortfalls, the
United States rejected proposals to deploy a large (up to 30,000 troops) U.
N. peacekeeping force in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Instead, the
Deputies Committee decided on July 23, 1999, that the United States would
vote to support a small monitoring operation. Factors considered in this
decision included U. S. interests in resolving the conflict in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, which involved several regional states;
maintaining regional stability; and preventing the resurgence of genocide
and mass killings in Central Africa.
As shown in figure 2, executive branch assessments of the proposed expansion
(phase II) of the U. N. Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo identified three Directive 25 shortfalls. These assessments
reflected the same basic concerns identified in executive branch assessments
of the initial operation (previously described). Again, in recognition of
such shortfalls, the United States rejected proposals to deploy a large U.
N. peacekeeping force. Instead, the Deputies Committee decided on January
24, 2000, that the United States would vote to support a proposed
peacekeeping operation that would deploy up to 5, 537 troops (including up
to 500 observers) in phases. Under the proposal, these phased deployments
were tied to the attainment of specific objectives related to the
shortfalls, such as the parties establishing a durable ceasefire. As before,
factors considered in the decision included U. S. interests in resolving the
conflict, restoring regional stability, and humanitarian concerns.
Democratic Republic of the
Congo
Page 19 GAO- 01- 917 Executive Branch Consultations With Congress
As part of the process of making the eight decisions, executive branch
officials attempted to improve the operations? chances of success by shaping
their mandates and forces to eliminate identified shortfalls. For example,
concerned that objectives for the U. N. Mission in Sierra Leone were
unclear, the Peacekeeping Core Group directed officials at the U. S. Mission
to the United Nations to work with other U. N. member states and U. N.
officials to link the objectives more directly to helping the government and
the rebels implement the Lomé Peace Agreement. This was accomplished before
the Deputies Committee decided to support the operation and allowed
executive branch officials to change their assessment of this Directive 25
factor to reflect that the operation had clear objectives (see fig. 2).
Additionally, concerned that the presence of regional peacekeeping forces
was vital to the success to this operation, the Deputies Committee and
Peacekeeping Core Group directed State and Defense officials to develop
options for providing financial and logistical support to encourage the
continued engagement of regional forces. In other cases, for example, the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, executive branch officials ?helped shape
the scope and scale of the U. N. mission? to ensure [it had] achievable
objectives? and avoid overextending the [United Nations] and sending in [U.
N.] peacekeepers before the conflict was ripe for resolution or a political
settlement was still in the making.? 19
In all eight decisions where Directive 25 shortfalls could not be addressed
adequately before the U. N. Security Council voted, executive branch
officials worked to mitigate the risks associated with these weaknesses by
reducing the shortfalls? impact on the operations. For example, concerned
about the capability of forces serving in the U. N. Mission in Sierra Leone,
the Deputies Committee and the Peacekeeping Core Group directed U. S.
officials to (1) contact U. N. members and officials to seek more capable
forces and (2) develop options for providing logistical support for some
troop contingents. Furthermore, concerned about whether the cease- fire
would hold in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Deputies Committee
directed U. S. officials to monitor compliance closely and apply diplomatic
pressure to the warring parties to observe the cease- fire agreement. Our
analysis of executive branch records identified similar attempts to address
other Directive 25 shortfalls for the eight decisions we reviewed. Appendix
IV provides information about some of the actions taken by the executive
branch to address Directive 25 shortfalls.
19 Information Paper: Application of U. S. Peacekeeping Policy Under PDD- 25
[Presidential Decision Directive 25]. Executive Branch Officials
Took Actions to Eliminate or Mitigate Directive 25 Shortfalls
Page 20 GAO- 01- 917 Executive Branch Consultations With Congress
The executive branch provided a substantial amount of information to the
Congress about the proposed operations in consultations before or just after
the decisions to support them. This information described how the proposed
operations advanced U. S. interests, the conflicts that the proposed
operations were intended to address, and other related considerations.
Executive branch consultations about the two decisions regarding proposed
operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo also described Directive
25 shortfalls, which helped build support in the Congress for the decisions
to vote for deploying these operations. However, for the other six decisions
we found little or no evidence that executive branch officials informed the
Congress about the proposed operations? Directive 25 shortfalls either in
consultations with the Congress before the executive branch decided on the
operations or in the information provided to the Congress in writing just
after the decisions were made. Additionally, aside from the shortfall issue,
executive branch officials had considerable detailed information about the
proposed operations well in advance of the time they provided this
information to the Congress.
Our analysis of executive branch records and transcripts of monthly
peacekeeping briefings for the Senate, supplemented by our observation of
similar briefings for the House, showed that the executive branch began
providing information to the Congress about the proposed operations in East
Timor, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo as long as 4
to 6 months before the eight decisions. At monthly peacekeeping briefings,
executive officials provided information about the status of ongoing U. N.
operations and proposals for new or expanded operations. At these briefings,
executive branch officials provided copies of key U. N. Secretary General
reports, the U. N. Security Council?s upcoming calendar and work program,
and monthly reports of peacekeeping finances and troop contributions.
Additionally, senior executive branch officials briefed Members of Congress
and their staffs about the U. N. Secretary General?s proposals for proposed
peacekeeping operations and related topics. For example, in February 2000,
senior officials provided a special briefing to the Chairman of the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations about the conflict in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo. The briefing included detailed information about the factions
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the role of neighboring states
in the conflict, such as Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. Administration
officials also testified several times before the Congress about the
operations and had separate Executive Branch
Provided Considerable Information but Did Not Consult Fully With the
Congress About Shortfalls
Process Provided Substantial Opportunities for Consultation
Page 21 GAO- 01- 917 Executive Branch Consultations With Congress
telephone discussions and other meetings as noted in their log of
congressional contacts.
For seven of the eight decisions we reviewed, the executive branch informed
the Congress in writing of its decision to support the proposed operation
within a few days of the Deputies Committee?s decision. 20 These letters
were dated at least 15 days before the U. N. Security Council voted on the
matter and were transmitted to the Congress for the purpose of meeting one
of the peacekeeping reporting requirements in the U. N. Participation Act.
21 The information required to be provided for each proposed operation
includes the ?anticipated duration, mandate, and command and control
arrangements? the planned exit strategy, and the vital national interests to
be served.? These letters provided the Congress with the most comprehensive
and detailed information it received about the proposed operations.
As discussed in the following section, executive branch consultations- such
as briefings and reports- provided the Congress with substantial information
about the U. S. interests in the proposed operations and details about their
mandate, cost, and exit strategy. However, these consultations provided
limited information about Directive 25 shortfalls. Figure 3 shows the
typical timing and content of consultations with the Congress about the
seven decisions.
20 The executive branch did not inform the Congress in writing of its
decision to support the International Force in East Timor because it was a
multilateral operation led by Australia and not a U. N. operation.
21 As previously discussed, the U. N. Participation Act requires the
president to (1) consult each month with the Congress on the status of U. N.
peacekeeping operations and (2) in conjunction with this consultation
requirement, provide information to the Congress at least 15 days before the
U. N. Security Council is expected to vote on a resolution authorizing new
or expanded operations. See footnotes 4 and 5.
Page 22 GAO- 01- 917 Executive Branch Consultations With Congress
Figure 3: Timing and Content of Consultations for U. N. Operations in East
Timor, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1999 to Early
2000
Source: GAO analysis of executive branch records.
Although neither Directive 25 nor the U. N. Participation Act required that
the executive branch consult with the Congress about operational shortfalls
in the proposed operations, executive branch officials recognize that ?U. S.
policy- makers? views on the shortfalls, challenges and risks associated
with successfully undertaking an operation? should be addressed
comprehensively during consultation discussions with the Congress. 22 Our
analysis of executive branch records and transcripts of monthly peacekeeping
briefings for the Senate, supplemented by our observation of similar
briefings for the House, showed that the executive branch provided the
Congress with substantial information about the U. S. interests in all of
the proposed operations and general information about their mandates, cost,
and exit strategies. However, we found no evidence that the Congress was
informed about most shortfalls identified in executive branch assessments of
the proposed operations for East Timor and Sierra Leone. As previously
discussed, these shortfalls included
22 See, for example, Information Paper: Application of U. S. Peacekeeping
Policy Under PDD- 25 [Presidential Decision Directive 25]. Consultations for
Six
Decisions Provided Limited Information About Proposed Operations? Shortfalls
Page 23 GAO- 01- 917 Executive Branch Consultations With Congress
judgments that the proposed operations lacked adequate means to carry out
their missions or their duration was not linked to realistic exit criteria.
In contrast, our analysis showed that the Congress was informed about most
shortfalls identified in executive branch assessments of the proposed
operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. According to
congressional staff, this information provided the Congress with an
opportunity to develop a more informed opinion about the proposed operations
and better convey to policy- makers its views about them. The following
examples illustrate our findings about the content of executive branch
consultations.
Prior to the May 1999 decision to support the U. N. Mission in East Timor,
executive branch assessments identified four Directive 25 shortfalls in the
proposed operation. For example, 13 assessments questioned whether the
operation?s mandate was appropriate, in part because the role and objectives
of the civilian police component were unclear. Similarly, five assessments
questioned whether the operation?s duration was tied to realistic exit
criteria. In the months before the May decision, executive branch officials
briefed the Congress at least 10 times about peacekeeping issues. Our
analysis of executive branch and congressional records showed that those
briefings provided substantial information about (1) how the proposed
operation would advance the United States? substantial security, political,
and commercial interests in Indonesia; (2) the threat to international peace
and security posed by the violent attacks in civilians; and (3) the
necessity of U. N. action to ensure a free and fair vote. Additionally,
these briefings provided information about one shortfall- concerns about
whether the preconditions for a peacekeeping operation existed in East
Timor. However, these briefings did not provide information about the other
three shortfalls identified in executive branch assessments. Moreover, our
analysis showed that these three shortfalls were not cited in the reports
and other written material provided to the Congress.
Prior to the August 1999 decision to support the expansion of the U. N.
Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, executive branch assessments identified
three shortfalls in the proposed operation. For example, six assessments
questioned whether the rebels truly consented to the deployment of an
expanded U. N. force and the proposed operation had adequate means to carry
out its mission in the face of potential rebel resistance. In the months
before the August decision, executive branch officials briefed the Congress
at least 16 times about peacekeeping issues. Our analysis of executive
branch and congressional records showed that six of those briefings provided
substantial information about the threat to international
Page 24 GAO- 01- 917 Executive Branch Consultations With Congress
peace and security posed by the humanitarian crisis and the danger of the
conflict spreading to neighboring countries. These briefings also provided
information about how the proposed operation would advance U. S. interests
in supporting the West African peacekeeping force in providing regional
security. Additionally, these briefings provided information about one
shortfall- concerns about whether the preconditions for a peacekeeping
operation existed in Sierra Leone because of uncertain rebel consent.
However, these briefings did not provide information about the other two
shortfalls; moreover, these two shortfalls were not cited in the reports and
other written material provided to the Congress.
Prior to the February 2000 decision to support the expansion of the U. N.
Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, executive
branch assessments identified three shortfalls in the proposed operation.
For example, six assessments questioned whether the operation had adequate
means- appropriate forces, financing, and mandate- to accomplish its mission
and its duration was tied to realistic exit criteria. In the months before
the February decision, executive branch officials briefed the Congress at
least 12 times about peacekeeping issues. Our analysis of executive branch
and congressional records showed that, in contrast to the previous two
examples, those briefings provided substantial information about all three
shortfalls. Moreover, our analysis showed that these three shortfalls were
cited in the reports and other written material provided to the Congress.
The February 7 letter informing the Congress of the decision to support the
proposed operation, for example, clearly cited executive branch concerns
that the warring parties were not observing the cease- fire and that the U.
N. force would have to provide for its own security and protection in many
areas because the parties lacked the capability. According to congressional
staff, this information helped the Congress develop an informed opinion
about the risks associated with this operation and reflected similar
information provided in briefings and other consultations that occurred
before the notification.
Figure 4 summarizes our analysis of the information the executive branch
provided to the Congress about the Directive 25 shortfalls that existed at
the time the Deputies Committee decided the United States would vote for the
operations. In each case in which the figure identifies a lack of
consultation about a shortfall, our analysis of executive branch records
showed that assessments consistently had identified a shortfall in this
factor before the decision to support the operation in the U. N. Security
Council. Our analysis also showed that executive branch assessments had
identified shortfalls in other factors, but figure 4 does not include these
Page 25 GAO- 01- 917 Executive Branch Consultations With Congress
shortfalls because assessments of these factors changed during the decision-
making process.
Page 26 GAO- 01- 917 Executive Branch Consultations With Congress
Figure 4: Summary of Executive Branch Consultations With the Congress About
Directive 25 Shortfalls That Existed at the Time of the U. S. Decisions to
Support Them
Source: GAO analysis of executive branch records.
Page 27 GAO- 01- 917 Executive Branch Consultations With Congress
Senior executive branch officials told us that they did not consult with the
Congress about some Directive 25 shortfalls because (1) the administration
had not reached a consensus on whether they were actual shortfalls and (2)
it had not decided whether to support the operations. Additionally,
executive branch officials stated that congressional committees, members,
and staff had ample opportunity to ask questions about the shortfalls but
did not pose specific questions to the executive branch about Directive 25
weaknesses. Moreover, according to one executive branch official, the
administration provided considerable negative information about the
operations, but it was up to the Congress to reach its own conclusion.
Finally, executive branch officials said that it could be more forthcoming
in briefing the Congress if the briefings were held in secure settings.
According to these officials, the information about shortfalls was
sensitive, and many of the briefings were held in relatively open forums. If
the information were to become publicly known, it could be used to undermine
U. S. strategy and U. N. operations.
Despite these issues, executive branch officials said that the concerns
expressed by the Congress during the consultations were integrated into the
executive branch?s decision- making deliberations. Our review of executive
branch records showed that officials did consider anticipated congressional
reactions during the decision- making process. For example, the executive
branch often internally discussed the reaction of congressional Members and
staff to the costs and availability of troops to support the operations,
particularly with the proposed expansion of the operations in Sierra Leone
and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
The information provided to the Congress in writing by the executive branch
for the purpose of meeting the consultation requirements established by the
U. N. Participation Act provided the Congress with the most comprehensive
and detailed information it received about the proposed peacekeeping
operations. The executive branch provided this information at about the same
time that the U. N. Secretary General first made recommendations to the U.
N. Security Council about the composition and mandate of the proposed
operations. However, U. S. officials knew many details about the likely
shape of the operations well before this time, because they had been working
with other U. N. members and U. N. officials to develop and refine them.
Although neither Directive 25 nor the U. N. Participation Act required the
executive branch to provide such information sooner than it did, earlier
disclosure of this information would have provided the Congress with more
time to assess and develop Some Information Could
Have Been Provided Sooner
Page 28 GAO- 01- 917 Executive Branch Consultations With Congress
an informed opinion about the proposed operations. The following two
examples involving East Timor illustrate this issue.
The executive branch informed the Congress of its intent to vote for the
U. N. Mission in East Timor in a letter dated May 27, 1999- just over 2
weeks before the U. N. Security Council authorized the operation. 23 This
letter provided the Congress with the most complete information it had
received to date about the proposed operation?s purpose, composition,
mandate, financing, exit strategy, and relationship to U. S. national
interests. The letter also informed the Congress for the first time that the
executive branch anticipated a U. N. operation to administer the transition
to independence if the people of East Timor rejected autonomy and Indonesia
ended the territory?s annexation. However, executive branch officials had
been working since early April 1999 to develop a conceptual framework for a
series of operations in East Timor. On April 8, for example, executive
branch officials had completed a paper outlining a conceptual framework for
three potential operations in East Timor. This paper proposed three
sequential operations- one to organize and conduct a free and fair vote to
determine East Timor?s future status, one to stabilize East Timor following
the vote, and one to organize and direct its transition to autonomy or
independence. This paper noted that the stabilization mission might require
a multinational force and that the transition mission would involve
development assistance and the creation of governmental and economic
institutions. Additionally, on May 7, executive branch officials completed a
detailed Directive 25 analysis of the proposed U. N. Mission in East Timor.
During April and May 1999, executive branch officials briefed congressional
staff four times about U. N. peacekeeping issues, but our analysis showed
that they did not provide details about the proposed East Timor operations
at these briefings.
The executive branch informed the Congress of its intent to vote for the
U. N. Transitional Administration in East Timor in a letter dated October 8,
1999- about 2-½ weeks before the U. N. Security Council authorized the
operation. 24 As before, this letter provided the Congress with the most
23 The U. N. Secretary General proposed establishing the U. N. Mission in
East Timor on May 22, 1999. See Question of East Timor: Report of the
Secretary General (S/ 1999/ 595, May 22, 1999).
24 The U. N. Secretary General proposed establishing the U. N. Transitional
Administration in East Timor on October 4, 1999. See Report of the Secretary
General on the Situation in East Timor (S/ 1999/ 1024, Oct. 4, 1999).
Page 29 GAO- 01- 917 Executive Branch Consultations With Congress
complete information it had received to date about the proposed operation?s
purpose, composition, mandate, financing, exit strategy, and relationship to
U. S. national interests. However, in August 1999, the executive branch had
completed a paper that (1) described in detail many components of the
proposed operation (as one of several possible contingencies) and (2)
directed U. S. officials to work with U. N. and other officials in
developing more detailed plans for these components. By early September
1999, the executive branch had completed a full concept of operations for
this operation. During August and September, executive branch officials
briefed congressional staff several times about U. N. peacekeeping issues,
but our analysis showed that they did not provide details about the proposed
East Timor operation at these briefings.
Executive branch officials told us that, although they provided considerable
information to the Congress about potential or proposed peacekeeping
operations in East Timor and other locations, they did not provide some
detailed information sooner because it was related to (1) their routine,
ongoing work with U. N. and other officials and did not represent a unified
executive branch position and (2) the internal deliberative process of the
executive branch.
For the cases we examined, the driving factors in the decisions to support
operations in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of the
Congo were the executive branch judgments that the operations advanced U. S.
interests and that the consequences of inaction were unacceptable. Directive
25 served as a framework for identifying shortfalls and tasks to be
undertaken to strengthen the proposed operations. Consequently, the
decisions we examined clearly demonstrated a tradeoff- proceed with
operations judged to advance U. S. interests but accept the risk of failure
inherent in operations having Directive 25 shortfalls.
Consultation with the Congress did occur, but information about the full
range of executive branch officials? views on the benefits, challenges, and
risks associated with supporting the operations in East Timor and Sierra
Leone was not provided to the Congress so that it could develop a fully
informed opinion and make decisions about appropriating funds for the
operations. In contrast, more complete information about the benefits,
risks, and challenges associated with supporting the operations in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo was provided to the Congress. This positive
model of consultation helped in developing congressional support for the
executive branch?s decisions on these operations and was Conclusions
Page 30 GAO- 01- 917 Executive Branch Consultations With Congress
consistent with the expectations of Directive 25 and the spirit of the U. N.
Participation Act.
To improve executive branch consultations with the Congress, we recommend
that the Secretary of State and other appropriate officials provide the
Congress with timely, detailed, and complete information about Directive 25
shortfalls for all proposed new or substantially revised peacekeeping
operations and the plans to mitigate the shortfalls. The timing of providing
such information to the Congress is a matter of judgment; however, at a
minimum, this information should be provided no later than at the time the
Congress is informed in writing about the decisions to support such
operations.
Although Presidential Decision Directive 25 was issued by the Clinton
administration, the Bush administration continues to use this guidance and
is required by law to consult with the Congress about peacekeeping
decisions. Accordingly, we obtained comments from the current administration
(the National Security Council and the Departments of State and Defense)
regarding its evaluation of this report and our recommendation on
consultation. The National Security Council and the State Department
provided written comments on this report. Their comments are reprinted in
appendixes V and VI. The Defense Department elected not to provide written
comments, but a Defense official told us that the Department concurred with
State?s written comments. The Departments of State and Defense also provided
technical comments, which we incorporated into this report as appropriate.
The State Department did not characterize its views on this report. However,
in reference to our recommendation, State said that it intended to continue
to provide the Congress with timely, detailed and complete information about
all new or substantially revised U. N. peacekeeping operations, including
known potential and actual problem areas. Noting that the timing of the
provision of this information is a matter of judgment, State said that it
planned to continue to provide this information in a timely way, no later
than the time that the Congress is informed in writing about decisions to
support such operations. The National Security Council said that it
appreciated the opportunity to review our report, had taken note of its
findings, but did not have any comments on the report. The Acting Senior
Director for Democracy, Human Rights, and International Operations wrote
that the Council understood the importance of consulting with the Congress
on peacekeeping missions and Recommendation for
Executive Action Agency Comments
Page 31 GAO- 01- 917 Executive Branch Consultations With Congress
looked forward to working closely with the Congress on these and other
important national security issues.
As arranged with your office, we plan no further distribution of this report
until 30 days from the date of the report unless you publicly announce its
contents earlier. At that time, we will send copies to interested
congressional committees and to the Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs; the Secretary of State; and the Secretary of Defense.
Copies will also be made available to other interested parties upon request.
If you have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-
4128. Other GAO contacts and staff acknowledgments are listed in appendix
VII.
Susan S. Westin Managing Director, International Affairs
and Trade
Appendix I: U. S. Policy and Law Established Guidance and Requirements for
Peacekeeping Decisions and Consultations
Page 32 GAO- 01- 917 Executive Branch Consultations With Congress
Since the end of the Cold War, U. N. and other multilateral peacekeeping
operations have been an important component of U. S. foreign policy. For the
eight decisions we reviewed, annual U. S. national security strategy reports
and several Presidential Decision Directives provided guidance to executive
branch officials making decisions about U. S. support for these operations,
managing these operations once authorized, and consulting with the Congress
about these matters. Additionally, the Congress in recent years has enacted
peacekeeping notification and reporting requirements to enhance its ability
to play a more effective role on these matters.
Several U. S. policies established the basic framework for executive branch
decision- making about U. S. support for U. N. or other multilateral
peacekeeping operations. Annual U. S. national security strategy reports
defined U. S. national interests. Several Presidential Decision Directives
established the basic framework for U. S. national security decisionmaking
and provide specific guidance to executive branch officials for making
decisions about U. S. support for peacekeeping operations and managing these
operations once authorized.
Annual U. S. national security strategy reports 25 recognize that, since
there are always many demands for U. S. action, U. S. national interests
must be clear. 26 Toward this end, these reports established a three- level
basic hierarchy of U. S. interests to guide executive branch decisions about
national security matters, including peacekeeping. Table 2 describes these
interests.
25 As previously discussed, the Goldwater- Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 requires the President to submit a national
security strategy report to the Congress each year. See 50 U. S. C. section
404a( a)( 1).
26 See, for example, A National Security Strategy for a New Century (The
White House, Dec. 1999). Appendix I: U. S. Policy and Law Established
Guidance and Requirements for Peacekeeping Decisions and Consultations
U. S. Policy Established Framework for Peacekeeping Decision- making
U. S. National Security Strategy Reports Defined U. S. National Interests
Appendix I: U. S. Policy and Law Established Guidance and Requirements for
Peacekeeping Decisions and Consultations
Page 33 GAO- 01- 917 Executive Branch Consultations With Congress
Table 2: U. S. National Interests Category of interest Description
Vital interests Those interests of broad, overriding importance to the
survival, safety, and vitality of the United States. These include the
physical security of U. S. territory and that of our allies, the safety of
U. S. citizens, the economic well- being of U. S. society, and the
protection of U. S. critical infrastructure from paralyzing attack. The
United States will do whatever is necessary to defend its vital interests,
including the unilateral and decisive use of U. S. military force when
necessary and appropriate. Important interests Those interests that do not
affect U. S. national survival but do affect U. S. national wellbeing and
the character of the world. These include regions in which the United States
has large economic interests or commitments to allies and crises with a
potential to generate substantial and highly destabilizing refugee flows.
The 1999 Strategy specifically cites U. S. ?assistance to Asian allies and
friends supporting the transition in East Timor? as an example of an
important U. S. interest. Humanitarian and other interests Those interests
related to U. S. values. These include responding to natural and
manmade disasters; promoting human rights and seeking to halt gross
violations of those rights; and supporting the spread of democracy,
adherence to the rule of law, and civilian control of the military. The 1999
Strategy states that, whenever possible, the United States seeks to avert
humanitarian disasters and conflict through diplomacy and cooperation with a
wide range of partners, including other governments, international
institutions, and nongovernmental organizations.
Source: GAO analysis of annual U. S. national security strategy reports.
In addition to defining U. S. national interests, the 1996 U. S. National
Security Strategy Report recognized that, to maximize the benefits (to U. S.
interests) of U. N. peace operations, the United States must make highly
disciplined choices about when and under what circumstances to support or
participate in these operations.
Presidential Decision Directive 2 (Organization of the National Security
Council), issued in March 1993, established the basic framework for
executive branch decision- making on national security issues, 27 consistent
with the National Security Act of 1947, as amended. 28 This directive
established two senior- level interagency committees, known as the
Principals and the Deputies Committees.
27 Presidential Decision Directive 2 was superceded by National Security
Presidential Directive 1, which President Bush signed on February 13, 2001.
28 See 50 U. S. C. sections 401 and following. Presidential Decision
Directive 2 Established National Security Decision- making Framework
Appendix I: U. S. Policy and Law Established Guidance and Requirements for
Peacekeeping Decisions and Consultations
Page 34 GAO- 01- 917 Executive Branch Consultations With Congress
The Principals Committee was the senior interagency forum for the
consideration of policy issues affecting U. S. national security. The
committee?s function was to review, coordinate, and monitor the development
and implementation of national security policy. It was intended to be a
flexible forum for Cabinet- level officials to meet to discuss and resolve
issues not requiring the President?s participation. Members of the committee
were as follows in 1999- 2000:
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (chair)
Secretary of State (or Deputy Secretary) Secretary of Defense (or Deputy
Secretary) U. S. Representative to the United Nations Director of
Central Intelligence Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Assistant to
the President for Economic Policy Assistant to the Vice President for
National Security Affairs The Secretary of Treasury, the Attorney General,
and other heads of
departments and agencies were invited as needed. The Deputies Committee was
the senior sub- Cabinet interagency forum for consideration of policy issues
affecting U. S. national security. The committee?s function was to review
and monitor the work of the interagency process and to focus attention on
policy implementation. It assisted the Principals Committee by addressing
policy decisions below the Principals? level and was the main forum for
making decisions on U. S. support for U. N. peacekeeping. Members of the
committee were as follows in 1999- 2000:
Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (chair)
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Vice Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff Deputy Assistant to the President for Economic
Policy Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs
Other senior department and agency officials were invited as needed.
Presidential Decision Directive 25 (Clinton Administration Policy on
Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations), issued in May 1994, charged
executive branch officials with making ?disciplined and coherent choices?
about when and under what circumstances to support or participate in these
operations. It directed executive branch officials to consider a range of
factors to determine operations? political and practical feasibility when
Presidential Decision
Directive 25 Established Analytical Framework and Expectations for
Peacekeeping Decisions
Appendix I: U. S. Policy and Law Established Guidance and Requirements for
Peacekeeping Decisions and Consultations
Page 35 GAO- 01- 917 Executive Branch Consultations With Congress
deciding whether to vote in the U. N. Security Council for proposed U. N. or
U. N.- authorized peacekeeping operations. Directive 25 stated that (1)
these factors were an aid in executive branch decision- making and did not
constitute a prescriptive device and (2) decisions would be made on the
cumulative weight of the factors, with no single factor necessarily being an
absolute determinant. Table 3 lists the Directive 25 factors.
Table 3: Presidential Decision Directive 25 Political and Operational
Feasibility Factors Political feasibility factors A threat to, or breach
of, international peace and security exists?
U. S. interests are advanced by multilateral action?
International community of interest exists for multilateral action?
The political, economic, and humanitarian consequences of inaction by the
international community have been weighed and are considered unacceptable?
For peacekeeping operations- a cease- fire is in place and the warring
parties consent to the deployment of a U. N. force?
For peace enforcement operations- the threat to international peace and
security is considered significant?
Operational feasibility factors Proposed operation has clear objectives?
Clear understanding of where the proposed operation fits on a spectrum
between peacekeeping and peace enforcement exists?
Proposed operation has adequate means- including appropriate forces,
financing, and mandate?
Proposed operation?s duration is tied to clear objectives and realistic
exit criteria? Source: GAO analysis of Directive 25.
Directive 25 instructed U. S. officials to apply additional factors when
deciding whether to recommend to the President that U. S. personnel
participate in proposed multilateral operations. For operations that were
likely to involve combat, it directed U. S. officials to apply even more
rigorous factors in their decision- making.
Directive 25 assigned the State Department primary responsibility for
managing and funding peacekeeping operations in which U. S. combat troops
did not participate. It assigned the Defense Department primary
responsibility for managing and funding those peacekeeping operations in
which U. S. combat troops participated and for all peace enforcement
operations. However, the Defense Department never actually received this
responsibility.
An interagency working group- known as the Peacekeeping Core Group- managed
day- to- day Directive 25 decision- making and implementation for U. N.
peacekeeping operations. This group was chaired by the National Security
Council?s Senior Director for Multilateral and Humanitarian Affairs and
consisted of assistant and deputy assistant secretaries of U. S. government
Departments and agencies.
Appendix I: U. S. Policy and Law Established Guidance and Requirements for
Peacekeeping Decisions and Consultations
Page 36 GAO- 01- 917 Executive Branch Consultations With Congress
Directive 56 (Managing Complex Contingency Operations), issued in 1997,
guided executive branch officials in managing implementation of ongoing,
smaller- scale contingency operations, including some multilateral
peacekeeping operations.
Directive 68 (International Public Information), issued in 1999, guided
executive branch officials in coordinating public information activities in
support of complex contingency operations, including multilateral
peacekeeping operations.
Directive 71 (Strengthening Criminal Justice Systems in support of Peace
Operations and Other Complex Contingencies), issued in 2000, guided
executive branch officials in improving U. S. response to the criminal
justice aspects of peacekeeping operations to aid in the successful
transition to durable peace and a timely exit of peacekeepers.
Presidential Decision Directive 25 recognized that sustaining U. S. support
for U. N. and multilateral operations requires that the Congress and the
American people understand and accept the value of such operations as tools
for advancing U. S. interests. Toward this end, Directive 25 stated that the
?Congress must? be actively involved in the continuing implementation of U.
S. policy on peacekeeping? and that the ?Congress and the American people
must? be genuine participants in the processes that support U. S. decision-
making on new and on- going peace operations.? Directive 25 recognized that
the executive branch traditionally ?has not solicited the involvement of
Congress or the American people on matters related to U. N. peacekeeping.?
It concluded that this ?lack of communication is not desirable in an era
when peace operations have become numerous, complex, and expensive.?
Directive 25 instructed executive branch officials to undertake six specific
initiatives ?to improve and regularize communication and consultation? with
the Congress about U. N. peacekeeping to ensure that sufficient public and
congressional support existed for proposed operations.
Additionally, the Congress has enacted peacekeeping consultation and
reporting requirements to enhance its ability to play a more effective role
on these matters. The U. N. Participation Act of 1945, as amended, for
example, requires the President to (1) consult with and provide information
to the Congress in writing at least 15 days before the U. N. Presidential
Decision
Directives 56, 68, and 71 Provided Guidance for Managing Peacekeeping
Operations
U. S. Policy and Law Established Guidance and Requirements for Consultations
About Peacekeeping
Appendix I: U. S. Policy and Law Established Guidance and Requirements for
Peacekeeping Decisions and Consultations
Page 37 GAO- 01- 917 Executive Branch Consultations With Congress
Security Council votes to authorize or expand U. N. peacekeeping operations
29 and (2) consult monthly with the Congress on the status of U. N.
peacekeeping operations, including anticipated operations. Table 4
summarizes the consultation, notification, and reporting requirements for U.
N. peacekeeping operations.
29 For the decisions in our study that occurred before November 29, 1999,
the president generally was required to submit a report to the Congress not
less than 5 days before the U. N. Security Council was expected to vote on a
resolution authorizing a peacekeeping operation. Public Law 103- 236,
section 407( a)( 4), 108 Stat. 449.
Appendix I: U. S. Policy and Law Established Guidance and Requirements for
Peacekeeping Decisions and Consultations
Page 38 GAO- 01- 917 Executive Branch Consultations With Congress
Table 4: Congressional Consultation and Reporting Requirements for U. N.
Peacekeeping Requirements established by Directive 25
Consult periodically with bipartisan congressional leaders on foreign
policy engagements that might involve U. S. forces, including possible
deployments of U. S. military units in U. N. operations.
Brief congressional staff monthly on the United Nations? upcoming
calendar, including current, new, and expanded peacekeeping operations.
Inform the Congress as soon as possible of unanticipated U. N. Security
Council votes on new or expanded operations.
Inform the Congress of U. N. command and control arrangements when U. S.
military units participate in U. N. operations.
Provide U. N. documents to appropriate congressional committees on a
timely basis.
Submit a comprehensive annual report on U. N. peacekeeping operations to
the Congress.
Requirements established by U. S. law a
Consult monthly with the Congress on the status of U. N. peacekeeping
operations, including anticipated operations.
Provide information to the Congress in writing at least 15 days before
voting in the U. N. Security Council to authorize or expand operations.
Submit to the Congress all U. N. Security Council resolutions and any
supporting documentation no later than 3 working days after adoption.
Promptly transmit to the Congress any published U. N. report distributed
to U. N. Security Council members that contains assessments of proposed,
ongoing, or concluded U. N. operations.
Submit to the Congress quarterly reports on U. S. assistance provided to
support U. N. peacekeeping operations and a comprehensive annual report on
U. N. operations.
Notify the Congress at least 15 days before the United States provides any
assistance to the United Nations to support peacekeeping operations. a 22 U.
S. C. section 287b.
Source: GAO analysis of Directive 25, U. S. law, and other information.
Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Page 39 GAO- 01- 917 Executive Branch Consultations With Congress
Our study is based on a review of eight executive branch decisions made
between May 1999 and February 2000 to vote in the U. N. Security Council to
authorize or expand the operations in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (see table 1). The Chairman of the House
Committee on International Relations and the Chairman of the Subcommittee on
the Middle East and South Asia, House Committee on International Relations,
asked us to assess how executive branch officials used Presidential Decision
Directive 25 in deciding to support the authorization or expansion of
peacekeeping operations in these locations and how the officials consulted
with the Congress about the decisions. Specifically, we assessed
whether executive branch officials considered all applicable Directive 25
factors before making their decisions and identified shortfalls in any of
these factors at the time the decisions were made and how the executive
branch officials consulted with the Congress during the
decision- making process, including the timing and content of the
information provided.
To assess whether executive branch officials considered all applicable
Directive 25 factors, we collected and analyzed information from more than
200 National Security Council and State and Defense Department records
related to these decisions. These records included summaries of conclusions
of Deputies Committee and Peacekeeping Core Group meetings, decision
memorandums, concept and briefing papers, and Directive 25 analyses
(prepared for five of the eight decisions). 30 We used a checklist of
Directive 25 factors to collect information from these records about
executive branch consideration and assessment of Directive 25 factors. We
entered information into a database and analyzed it to determine whether
executive branch officials (1) considered all Directive 25 factors before
deciding to vote to authorize or expand U. N. operations, (2) identified
Directive 25 shortfalls at the time they made their decisions, and (3) took
actions to address identified shortfalls. To gain an understanding of the
wider context in which these decisions were made, we supplemented this
analysis by (1) reviewing several hundred other executive branch records,
such as State and Defense Department intelligence analyses, and (2)
discussing our analysis of the eight decisions
30 We had to rely on executive branch officials to identify these and other
executive branch records. We asked these officials to identify all executive
branch records relevant to the eight decisions created from January 1999
through June 2000. Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and
Methodology
Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Page 40 GAO- 01- 917 Executive Branch Consultations With Congress
with State and Defense Department and National Security Council officials.
As we informed you several times, executive branch officials, citing
deliberative process concerns, denied us full and complete access to records
related to the eight decisions in our study, particularly records created
during the earlier stages of the decision- making process. 31 Although
executive branch officials briefed us about some of the information in these
records, as discussed in our auditing standards, this lack of full and
complete access limited our ability to form independent and objective
opinions and conclusions about the process used by U. S. decision- makers to
weigh various assessments and arrive at an interagency position. As a
result, we limited the scope of our study primarily to the outcome of the
decision- making process- that is, whether executive officials considered
Directive 25 factors in making decisions, not how they considered them and
arrived at decisions. For example, although our analysis showed that State
and Defense officials? assessments of some Directive 25 factors differed at
some points, we were unable to determine how executive branch officials
reached consensus on these factors during the interagency process.
Consequently, this report does not discuss such issues. Because most of the
records we examined were classified, some of the information in this report
is necessarily general.
To assess executive branch consultations with the Congress about the eight
decisions, we collected and analyzed information from both executive branch
and congressional records. Executive branch records included State and
Defense Department summaries of monthly and special briefings, notification
letters and reports required by U. S. law, the State Department?s
congressional contact log, and written statements of senior executive branch
officials testifying before Senate and House committees. Congressional
records included transcripts of monthly executive branch briefings for the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and written statements by committee
and subcommittee chairmen and other Members of Congress. We examined these
records to determine whether executive branch officials had complied with
the consultation and reporting requirements in Directive 25 and relevant
laws. For example, we determined whether executive branch officials had
notified the Congress in writing of their decisions before the U. S.
Representative to the United Nations voted in the U. N. Security Council. We
used a checklist of
31 See GAO- 01- 440R, GAO- 01- 100T, and GAO- 01- 180T.
Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Page 41 GAO- 01- 917 Executive Branch Consultations With Congress
Directive 25 factors to collect information from executive branch and
congressional records about executive branch consultations for the eight
decisions. We entered this information into a database and analyzed it to
determine the timing and content of information provided to the Congress.
We conducted our work from March 2000 to July 2001 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
Appendix III: Key Events Related to Operations in East Timor, Sierra Leone,
and the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Page 42 GAO- 01- 917 Executive Branch Consultations With Congress
The following tables present timelines of the key international and U. S.
events leading up to the approval of the proposed U. N. and multilateral
operations in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of the
Congo for the eight decisions we reviewed.
Table 5 presents a timeline of key events leading up to the approval of the
U. N. Mission in East Timor (UNAMET), the International Force in East Timor
(INTERFET), and the U. N. Transitional Administration in East Timor
(UNTAET). The shaded text highlights summaries of the mandates for these
three operations.
Table 5: Timeline of Key Events Related to U. S. Decisions About U. N. and
Multilateral Operations in East Timor, 1960 to March 2000
Date Key international and U. S. events 1960 The U. N. General Assembly
added East Timor- a Portuguese colony- to the list of non- self- governing
territories
falling under Chapter XI of the U. N. Charter.
1975- 76 Portugal withdrew from East Timor and civil war broke out between
East Timorese factions. In late 1975, Indonesian forces invaded East Timor
and forcibly incorporated the former colony into Indonesia. United Nations
and most member states never formally recognized Indonesia?s takeover of
East Timor (e. g., see U. N. Security Council Resolutions 384 (1975) and 389
(1976)). United States supported U. N. Security Council Resolutions 384
(1975) and 389 (1976), which called for selfdetermination for East Timor.
1983 Portugal and Indonesia began regular talks aimed at resolving East
Timor?s status.
1998 June- Indonesia agreed to enter U. N.- mediated talks about autonomy
for East Timor.
1999 January- Indonesia?s President announced that if East Timor rejected
autonomy, his cabinet would recommend that Indonesia?s supreme legislative
assembly separate East Timor from Indonesia.
March- Indonesia and Portugal agreed to use a direct ballot to consult East
Timor?s people about whether they accept or reject autonomy.
Appendix III: Key Events Related to Operations in East Timor, Sierra Leone,
and the Democratic Republic of the Congo
East Timor
Appendix III: Key Events Related to Operations in East Timor, Sierra Leone,
and the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Page 43 GAO- 01- 917 Executive Branch Consultations With Congress
Date Key international and U. S. events May 4- U. N. Secretary General
dispatched a team to East Timor to evaluate the political and security
situation and gather information for use in developing a detailed
operational plan for holding a consultation.
May 5- Indonesia and Portugal concluded an agreement for East Timor (S/
1999/ 513, Annex I)
called for the establishment of a U. N. operation to conduct a popular
consultation to determine East Timor?s future status (autonomy or
independence)
made Indonesia responsible for maintaining peace and security to ensure
that the consultation occurred in an atmosphere free of intimidation,
violence, or interference
called on Indonesia, Portugal, and the United Nations to arrange for the
orderly transfer of authority in East Timor to the United Nations if the
consultation vote was for independence
called on the United Nations to maintain ?an adequate? presence in East
Timor between the consultation and the implementation of autonomy or
independence Separate agreements detailed the process for holding the
popular consultation and security arrangements (S/ 1999/ 513, Annexes II and
III).
May 7- State Department completed a Directive 25 analysis of the proposed U.
N. operation.
May 27
The Deputies Committee decided that the United States would vote to
establish a new peacekeeping operation in East Timor. State Department
notified the Congress that the United States intended to vote to authorize
UNAMET, citing the following factors:
U. S. interests in supporting UNAMET -- important U. S. security,
political, financial, economic, and commercial interests in Indonesia -- U.
S. regional interests in Indonesian stability -- importance of holding a
fair and credible consultation to resolve the longstanding problem in East
Timor -- Indonesia?s stability a vital national interest for Australia, a
close U. S. ally
UNAMET?s objective- ensure a free and fair consultation
UNAMET?s exit strategy was dependent on the outcome of the consultation --
autonomy accepted- U. N. operation would end shortly after the consultation
-- autonomy rejected- UN- run transition to independence that probably would
involve a peacekeeping component
U. S. cost-$ 13. 1 million
June 11- U. N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1246 (1999), which
established UNAMET to organize and conduct a secret ballot to determine the
future status of East Timor. The United States voted in favor of this
resolution.
U. N. Security Council Resolution 1246 (1999) established UNAMET to organize
and conduct a popular consultation (vote) to determine the future status of
East Timor (autonomy or independence):
Civilian police component- up to 280 civilian police officers to advise
the Indonesian police and, at the time of the vote, supervise the escort of
ballots to and from the polling sites.
Military liaison component- up to 50 military liaison officers to maintain
contact with the Indonesian military.
Political component- monitor the fairness of the political environment,
ensure the freedom of all organizations to carry out their responsibilities
freely, and monitor and advise the U. N. Secretary General?s Special
Representative for East Timor on all matters with political implications.
Electoral component- implement activities related to registration and
voting.
Information component- explain to the East Timorese people, in an
objective and impartial manner, the terms of the General Agreement and the
proposed autonomy framework; provide information about the process and
procedure of the vote; and explain the implications of a vote for autonomy
or independence.
Resolution 1246 reiterated the Indonesian government?s responsibility under
the May 5, 1999, agreement for maintaining peace and security to ensure the
consultation occurred in an atmosphere free of intimidation, violence, or
interference and ensuring the safety and security of U. N. personnel and
other international staff and observers.
Resolution 1246 authorized UNAMET through August 31, 1999; Resolution 1257
(1999), adopted August 3, 1999, extended UNAMET?s mandate until September
30, 1999; Resolution 1262 (1999), adopted August 27, 1999, extended UNAMET?s
mandate until November 30, 1999.
Appendix III: Key Events Related to Operations in East Timor, Sierra Leone,
and the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Page 44 GAO- 01- 917 Executive Branch Consultations With Congress
Date Key international and U. S. events June 27- United States called on U.
N. forces to use force preemptively to demonstrate that the United Nations
would not tolerate militia violence and intimidation.
July 16- Voter registration started as senior Indonesian and Portuguese
officials concluded security discussions.
July 20- U. N. Secretary General reported that UNAMET was fully deployed and
violence continued to interfere with preparations for the popular
consultation (A/ 1999/ 803).
July 28- U. N. Secretary General delayed the consultation vote until August
30, 1999.
August 3- U. N. Security Council extended UNAMET?s mandate until September
30, 1999.
August 9- U. S. agencies completed a political- military plan for East
Timor.
August 12- United States expressed concern about violence and intimidation
during the campaign and called on Indonesia to provide a secure environment
and promote disarmament of all paramilitary forces.
August 17- U. S. officials told House staff that
voter registration efforts appeared successful
voters were likely to choose independence
such an outcome could result in violence
August 30- Popular consultation held in East Timor.
August 31- Deputies Committee met to consider a multinational force and an
expanded U. N. operation in East Timor.
September 1- Violence erupted outside the U. N. compound in Dili, East
Timor.
September 2- Militia kill two local U. N. staff in Dili as the United
Nations started counting ballots.
September 3- United Nations announced the consultation results.
U. N. Secretary General reported that about 79 percent of the East
Timorese people voted against autonomy (and thus for independence).
Pro- independence outcome sparked widespread violence by pro- autonomy
militia.
September 4- Deputies Committee met again to consider a multinational force
and an expanded U. N. operation in East Timor.
September 8- U. N. Security Council dispatched a five- member mission to
Indonesia and East Timor to discuss peaceful implementation of the May 5
agreement.
September 9
U. S. agencies completed an updated political- military plan for East Timor.
Under Secretary of State told a joint congressional hearing that the United
States
had suspended military- to- military relations with Indonesia
would support a multinational force to restore order in East Timor
was working to obtain Indonesia?s consent to such a force
September 11
U. N. Security Council met in formal session to consider the situation in
East Timor. Members stressed the need for a multinational force to restore
peace and security in East Timor. Deputies Committee decided that the United
States would support a multinational force in East Timor.
September 12- Indonesia?s President announced Indonesia would accept
international assistance to restore peace and security in East Timor.
September 14- U. N. Security Council mission recommended that the Security
Council
authorize a framework for an international peacekeeping force
hold Indonesia to its obligations under the May 5, 1999, agreement
institute an investigation of apparent abuses of international law in East
Timor
September 15- U. N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1264 (1999), which
authorized a multilateral force to restore peace and security in East Timor,
protect and support UNAMET, and facilitate humanitarian assistance
operations. The United States voted in favor of this resolution.
Appendix III: Key Events Related to Operations in East Timor, Sierra Leone,
and the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Page 45 GAO- 01- 917 Executive Branch Consultations With Congress
Date Key international and U. S. events U. N. Security Council Resolution
1264 (1999) authorized a multinational force in East Timor (INTERFET) under
Chapter VII of the U. N. Charter to ?take all necessary measures? to
restore peace and security in East Timor
protect and support UNAMET in carrying out its tasks
facilitate humanitarian assistance operations Resolution 1264 agreed this
force would remain deployed in East Timor until replaced by a follow- on U.
N. peacekeeping operation and invited the U. N. Secretary General to plan
and prepare for a U. N. transitional administration in East Timor,
incorporating a U. N. peacekeeping operation.
September 20- 21
INTERFET started deploying.
Australian and New Zealand troops inserted by air secure airport and began
deploying around Dili (East Timor?s capital).
Additional troops inserted through the port continued deploying around
Dili.
INTERFET eventually deployed about 8,000 troops.
The United States contributed over 400 communications, logistics, and
intelligence personnel to INTERFET as well as airlift capability.
September 23- Foreign ministers of the five permanent members of the U. N.
Security Council condemned the violence in East Timor, voiced their support
for the deployment of a multinational force, and called on all parties to
cooperate.
September 29- Deputies Committee met to consider an expanded U. N. operation
in East Timor.
October 8- State Department notified the Congress that the United States
intended to vote to establish UNTAET, citing the following factors:
Collapse of civil administration in East Timor had forced the United
Nations to accelerate preparations for a transitional administration for
East Timor.
Severe humanitarian crisis in the aftermath of Indonesian military and
militia violence, with an estimated 350,000 internally displaced and 200,000
refugees in West Timor.
U. S. interests in supporting UNTAET -- critical U. S. security,
political, financial, economic, and commercial interests in Indonesia -- U.
S. regional interests in Indonesia?s stability -- Indonesia?s stability a
vital national interest for Australia, a close U. S. ally
UNTAET?s objective- replace INTERFET and administer the territory of East
Timor during its transition to independence -- maintain security and order
-- facilitate and coordinate relief assistance -- facilitate emergency
rehabilitation of physical infrastructure -- administer East Timor and
create structures for sustainable governance and rule of law -- assist in
drafting a constitution and conduct elections for a national government
UNTAET?s exit strategy- operation would end after an expected 2- to 3-
year process of transferring responsibilities for government to the people
of East Timor.
U. S. cost-$ 170 million for 12 months (25 percent of an estimated $680
million).
October 12 and 16- Deputies Committee met to consider issues related to the
proposed UNTAET and East Timor.
October 19- Indonesia?s supreme legislative assembly recognized the outcome
of the consultation, marking the formal start of East Timor?s transition to
independence.
October 21- Deputies Committee met to consider issues related to the
proposed UNTAET and East Timor.
October 25- U. N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1272 (1999), which
established UNTAET to administer East Timor during its transition to
independence. The United States voted in favor of this resolution.
Appendix III: Key Events Related to Operations in East Timor, Sierra Leone,
and the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Page 46 GAO- 01- 917 Executive Branch Consultations With Congress
Date Key international and U. S. events U. N. Security Council Resolution
1272 (1999) established UNTAET under Chapter VII of the U. N. Charter
through January 31, 2001. The resolution endowed UNTAET with overall
responsibility for the administration of East Timor; empowered it to
exercise all legislative and executive authority, including the
administration of justice, and take all necessary measures to fulfill its
mandate; and specified the following elements for its mandate:
provide security and maintain law and order throughout East Timor
establish an effective civil administration
assist in the development of civil and social services
ensure the coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance,
rehabilitation, and development assistance
support capacity- building for self government
assist in the establishment of conditions for sustainable development
Resolution 1272 authorized three components for UNTAET:
governance and public administration component, including a civilian
police division with up to 1,640 officers
humanitarian assistance and emergency rehabilitation component
military component, with a strength of up to 8,950 troops and up to 200
military observers
November 1- Last Indonesian Army units left East Timor.
November 4- Militia forces intimidated returning refugees along the border
between East and West Timor.
December 1- Nobel Laureate Jose Ramos Horta returns to East Timor after 24
years in exile.
December 2- 15- member National Consultative Council established to allow
East Timorese to participate in the transitional authority?s decision-
making process.
2000 February 1- INTERFET began handing over military authority to UNTAET.
February 23- UNTAET assumed responsibility for security in East Timor.
March 3
UNTAET declared western parts of East Timor ?high threat? areas after a
series of armed attacks against civilians and U. N. troops. U. N. report
concluded that the Indonesian military was complicit in 16 incidents of
militia violence between February 21 and March 7, 2000.
Source: GAO analysis of U. S., U. N., and other records.
Appendix III: Key Events Related to Operations in East Timor, Sierra Leone,
and the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Page 47 GAO- 01- 917 Executive Branch Consultations With Congress
Table 6 presents a timeline of key events leading up to the approval of the
U. N. Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL), the U. N. Mission in
Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), and the expansion of UNAMSIL. The shaded text
highlights summaries of the mandates for these three operations.
Table 6: Timeline of Key Events Related to U. S. Decisions About U. N.
Operations in Sierra Leone, March 1991 to May 2000 Date Key international
and U. S. events 1991 March- Revolutionary United Front forces began
attacking government forces near the Liberian border.
1992 Sierra Leone government overthrown by Sierra Leone Army.
1995 February- U. N. Special Envoy appointed to assist Organization of
African Unity and Economic Community of West African States efforts to
negotiate a settlement and return Sierra Leone to civilian rule.
1996 February- Parliamentary and presidential elections held and Sierra
Leone Army relinquished power to President Kabbah. Conflict continued
because rebels did not participate in the elections and did not recognize
the results.
June- U. S. Congress adopted concurrent resolution congratulating the people
of Sierra Leone on their first democratic presidential and parliamentary
elections in nearly 30 years and encouraging its citizens to work together
for peace.
November- Sierra Leone government and rebels negotiated a peace agreement
(Abidjan Accord).
1997 May- Sierra Leone Army and rebels overthrew government, sending
President Kabbah and his government into exile in neighboring Guinea.
May- June- U. S. Marine Expeditionary Unit evacuated about 2, 500 foreign
nationals, including 450 Americans, from Freetown, Sierra Leone to Conakry,
Guinea.
October 3- United States condemned the seizure of power by the Sierra Leone
Army and rebels.
October 8- U. N. Security Council imposed an oil and arms embargo and
authorized the Economic Community of West African States Military Observers
Group (ECOMOG) to enforce the embargo.
October 23- Economic Community of West African States, Sierra Leone Army,
and rebel representatives signed a peace agreement that called for a cease-
fire to be monitored by ECOMOG assisted by U. N. military observers.
November 5- President Kabbah stated his acceptance of the agreement and his
government?s willingness to cooperate with the Economic Community of West
African States, ECOMOG, and the United Nations in implementing the
agreement.
1998 January- State Department?s Sierra Leone Country Report on Human Rights
Practices for 1997 reported widespread violation of human rights in Sierra
Leone.
February- ECOMOG launched a military attack in response to an attack by
rebel/ army forces that led to the junta?s collapse and its expulsion from
Freetown.
March
President Kabbah returned to office. U. N. Security Council terminated the
oil and arms embargo and strengthened the office of the U. N. Special Envoy
to include U. N. military liaison officers and security advisory personnel.
June
U. N. Security Council established UNOMSIL to monitor efforts to disarm
combatants and restructure the Sierra Leone?s security forces under the
protection of ECOMOG. UNOMSIL documented reports of ongoing atrocities and
human rights abuses committed against civilians. Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for African Affairs testified before the Congress that a
humanitarian crisis was looming in Sierra Leone.
July- U. S. Special Envoy meets with the presidents of Liberia and Sierra
Leone and influences signing of nonaggression agreement.
November- U. S. Special Envoy met with African heads of state, including
Nigeria and Sierra Leone.
December- Rebel forces began an offensive to retake Freetown.
Sierra Leone
Appendix III: Key Events Related to Operations in East Timor, Sierra Leone,
and the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Page 48 GAO- 01- 917 Executive Branch Consultations With Congress
Date Key international and U. S. events 1999 January
Rebel forces took control of most of Freetown. UNOMSIL personnel evacuated.
Later in the month, ECOMOG troops retook Freetown.
May- Sierra Leone government and rebels began negotiations.
July
Sierra Leone government and rebels signed the Lomé Peace Agreement (S/ 1999/
777) on July 7, agreeing to end hostilities, form a government of national
unity, and request an expanded role for UNOMSIL. Assistant Secretary of
State for African Affairs briefed the Congress about the situation in Sierra
Leone; stated that the Lomé Peace Agreement held promise. State Department
completed a Directive 25 analysis of the proposed operation.
August 20- U. N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1260 (1999), which
authorized UNOMSIL?s expansion. The United States voted in favor of this
resolution.
U. N. Security Council Resolution 1260 (1999) authorized the provisional
expansion of UNOMSIL to up to 210 military observers, along with the
necessary equipment and administrative and medical support, under security
provided by the Economic Community of West Africa Military Observer Group
(ECOMOG) to:
strengthen and expand the contacts already established by UNOMSIL with the
Revolutionary United Front and government troops in the countryside
extend UNOMSIL?s cease- fire monitoring activities to a wider geographical
area (security conditions permitting)
strengthen and assist the cease- fire monitoring mechanisms established
under the Lomé Peace Agreement
monitor the military and security situation in the country and report to
the Special Representative of the U. N. Secretary General
assist and monitor the disarmament and demobilization of combatants in
areas where adequate security is provided
work closely with humanitarian organizations to exchange information on
security conditions with a view to ensuring the widest possible access for
humanitarian assistance
work closely with human rights officers, as required, in their visits
throughout the country
maintain liaison and coordinate closely with ECOMOG
assist in the preparation of plans for the deployment of neutral
peacekeeping troops, as envisioned in the agreement Resolution 1260
authorized strengthening UNOMSIL?s political, civil affairs, information,
human rights, and child protection elements:
appointed a deputy Special Representative of the Secretary- General and
the expansion of the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General
augmented the human rights component by authorizing 10 international human
rights officers, including 2 child protection officers
required up to 35 military (or civilian) medical personnel
included an aviation capability to provide 24- hour medical evacuation as
well as daytime monitoring and observation
September 30- State Department completed a Directive 25 analysis of the
proposed operation (UNAMSIL).
October- U. S. Secretary of State meets with President of Sierra Leone and
pledges support of peace efforts.
October 22- U. N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1270 (1999), which
established UNAMSIL. The United States voted in favor of this resolution.
Appendix III: Key Events Related to Operations in East Timor, Sierra Leone,
and the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Page 49 GAO- 01- 917 Executive Branch Consultations With Congress
Date Key international and U. S. events U. N. Security Council Resolution
1270 (1999) established UNAMSIL under Chapter VI of the U. N. Charter to
cooperate with the Government of Sierra Leone and the other parties in
implementing the Lomé Peace Agreement and assist the Government of Sierra
Leone in implementing the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
plan. Key elements of UNAMSIL?s mandate were as follows:
establish a presence at key locations throughout Sierra Leone, including
disarmament, reception, and demobilization centers
ensure the security and freedom of movement of U. N. personnel
monitor adherence to the cease- fire agreement
encourage the parties to create and implement confidence- building
mechanisms
facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance
support the activities of U. N. officials, including the Special
Representative of the Secretary- General and human rights and civil affairs
officers
provide support, as requested, to the elections to be held in accordance
with Sierra Leone?s constitution 2000 January 13- State Department completed
a Directive 25 analysis of the proposed expansion of UNAMSIL.
February 7- U. N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1289 (2000), which
authorized the expansion of UNAMSIL. The United States voted in favor of the
resolution.
U. N. Security Council Resolution 1289 (2000) authorized the expansion of
UNAMSIL under Chapter VII of the U. N. Charter to take all necessary action
to accomplish the following objectives:
provide security at key locations and government buildings, in particular
in Freetown; important intersections; and major airports, including Lungi
airport
facilitate the free flow of people, goods and humanitarian assistance
provide security in and at all disarmament, demobilization, and
reintegration program sites
coordinate with and assist the Sierra Leone law enforcement authorities in
the discharge of their responsibilities
guard weapons, ammunition, and other military equipment collected from ex-
combatants and assist in their subsequent disposal or destruction
Resolution 1289 affirmed that, in the discharge of its mandate, UNAMSIL
could take all necessary action to
ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel
afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence
May- U. S. Special Envoy, undertaking a diplomatic mission to Sierra Leone,
stated ?our mission is on target.? Source: GAO analysis of U. S., U. N., and
other records.
Appendix III: Key Events Related to Operations in East Timor, Sierra Leone,
and the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Page 50 GAO- 01- 917 Executive Branch Consultations With Congress
Table 7 presents a timeline of key events leading up to the approval of the
U. N. Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC)
and the expansion of this operation (Phase II). The shaded text highlights
summaries of the mandates for these two operations.
Table 7: Key Events Related to U. S. Decisions About U. N. Operations in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, August 1998 to February 2000
Date Key international and U. S. events 1998 August- Southern Africa
Development Community and the Organization for African Unity announced a
regional
initiative to end the Congo conflict, which U. S. officials supported.
1999 February 9- State Department press statement
welcomed efforts to mediate conflict and urged parties to reach a peaceful
settlement
reiterated U. S. support for the Democratic Republic of the Congo
territorial integrity and sovereignty
March 19- U. S. statement in the U. N. Security Council
asserted that the Congo conflict had created a deepening humanitarian
crisis and presented a grave threat to regional peace, stability, and
development
declared U. S. support for the Democratic Republic of the Congo?s
territorial integrity and sovereignty and welcomed efforts to mediate
conflict and reach a peaceful settlement
called for establishing an immediate cease- fire and a mechanism to
address the Democratic Republic of the Congo?s and neighboring countries?
internal and external security concerns
condemned reported violence and some regional states? cooperation with
groups guilty of genocide
declared U. S. support for a peacekeeping operation in Congo under the
following conditions: -- parties reached a comprehensive settlement to end
the conflict and observed a cease- fire -- proposed operation was limited in
size and had a mandate to observe and monitor- not to enforce peace or
maintain the Democratic Republic of the Congo?s border security
April 9- U. N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1234 (1999). The United
States voted in favor of this resolution. Resolution 1234
welcomed the appointment of a U. N. Special Envoy for the peace process
and expressed support for regional efforts to end the conflict
reaffirmed states? obligation to respect the Democratic Republic of the
Congo?s and other states? territorial integrity, political independence, and
national sovereignty
deplored the continued fighting and presence of foreign forces in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and demanded an immediate halt to
hostilities
called for an immediate cease- fire agreement and the withdrawal of all
foreign forces, reestablishment of government authority, and disarmament of
nongovernment forces
stressed the need for, and welcomed the government?s intention to hold, an
inclusive political dialogue
called for the protection of human rights, respect for international
humanitarian law, and safe and unhindered access for humanitarian
assistance; condemned all massacres in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
and called for an international investigation
reaffirmed its readiness to consider a U. N. operation to assist in
implementing a cease- fire agreement and a political settlement; asked the
U. N. Secretary General to work with the Organization for African Unity in
promoting a peaceful settlement of the conflict
April 18- Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, and Chad signed an
agreement calling for the cessation of hostilities, deployment of an African
peacekeeping force, and the withdrawal of Rwandan and Ugandan troops.
May 28- Rwanda declared a unilateral cease- fire, which triggered a flurry
of diplomatic activity and reenergized regional peacemaking efforts.
May 29- U. S. delegation to the inauguration of Nigeria?s new civilian
government met with the presidents of the Congo, Uganda, Tanzania,
Mozambique, and Zimbabwe to urge progress in the wake of Rwanda?s May 28
cease- fire declaration.
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Appendix III: Key Events Related to Operations in East Timor, Sierra Leone,
and the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Page 51 GAO- 01- 917 Executive Branch Consultations With Congress
Date Key international and U. S. events July 10- Six countries signed the
Lusaka Cease- fire Agreement (S/ 1999/ 815).
July 15- U. N. Secretary General report recommended establishing a U. N.
observer mission and deploying a technical survey team to assess conditions
to prepare for subsequent U. N. operations in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (S/ 1999/ 790).
July 23- State Department notified the Congress that the United States
intended to vote to establish a U. N. liaison mission in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo:
mission would safeguard clear U. S. political and economic interests
threatened by the conflict?s potential to destabilize the region
estimated U. S. cost of the U. N. operation was $4 million for 3 months
August 1- Representatives of the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo,
one of two rebel groups involved in the conflict, signed the Lusaka
agreement.
August 6- U. N. Security Council adopted resolution 1258 (1999),
establishing MONUC. The United States voted in favor of this resolution.
U. N. Security Council Resolution 1258 (1999) welcomed the signing of a
cease- fire agreement in Lusaka on July 10, 1999, and the formation of a
joint military commission by the parties. It authorized the deployment of up
to 90 U. N. military liaisons, together with necessary civilian, political,
humanitarian, and administrative staff for 3 months with the following
mandate:
establish and maintain liaison with the joint military commission and the
parties
assist the joint military commission and the parties in planning the
implementation of the cease- fire agreement
provide information to help the Secretary General refine a concept of
operations for a further U. N. role in implementing the cease- fire
agreement
secure assurances of cooperation and security from the parties for the
possible deployment of U. N. military observers U. N. Security Council
Resolution 1273 (1999), adopted November 5, 1999, extended the operation?s
mandate until January 15, 2000; Resolution 1279 (1999), adopted November 30,
1999, formally named the operation the U. N. Organization Mission in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and extended its mandate until March 1,
2000.
August 31- Representatives of the Rally for Congolese Democracy, the second
of two rebel groups involved in the conflict, signed the Lusaka agreement.
September- MONUC military liaison officers began deploying to parties?
capitals.
September 23- Statement by Foreign Ministers of the Five Permanent Members
of the U. N. Security Council (S/ 1999/ 996, Annex I)
expressed deep concerns about continuing conflict in Africa; reaffirmed
the relationship between peace and development; underlined necessity for U.
N. system to give a high priority to Africa?s needs and concerns
welcomed efforts by the United Nations and regional organizations to
promote peace and stability and peacefully settle conflicts
reaffirmed the Democratic Republic of the Congo?s sovereignty, territorial
integrity, and political independence and expressed concern about the
situation there
welcomed the Lusaka accords; urged the parties to implement their
commitments fully; and expressed appreciation for regional and international
mediation efforts
appealed to the international community to assist the peace process,
including a possible U. N. peacekeeping operation; and welcomed the
deployment of military liaison officers
November 5- U. N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1273 (1999), which
extended MONUC?s mandate until January 15, 2000 (as recommended by U. N.
Secretary General report S/ 1999/ 1116). The United States voted in favor of
this resolution.
November 30- U. N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1279 (1999), which
asked the Secretary General to accelerate the development of a concept of
operations for an expanded MONUC and prepare to deploy up to 500 U. N.
military observers. The United States voted in favor of this resolution.
December 12- U. N. Security Council met to consider the conflict in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. The United States stated its opposition to
authorizing a U. N. operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo until
its mandate, size, composition, structure, command and control arrangements,
cost, and other factors were better understood.
Appendix III: Key Events Related to Operations in East Timor, Sierra Leone,
and the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Page 52 GAO- 01- 917 Executive Branch Consultations With Congress
Date Key international and U. S. events 2000 January 24
U. N. Security Council met to consider the conflict in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. At the meeting, the U. S. Secretary of State
asserted the Congo conflict could be called ?Africa?s first world war,?
because of the Democratic Republic of the Congo?s location and size and the
number of states involved
promised to consult with the Congress and work to achieve a swift U. N.
Security Council consensus on authorizing an expanded MONUC
noted the need to apply lessons learned about U. N. peacekeeping ?firmly
and realistically? in the Democratic Republic of the Congo State Department
completed a Directive 25 analysis of the proposed U. N. operation.
January 26- Deputies Committee met to consider U. S. support for MONUC
(phase II).
February 7- State Department notified the Congress that the United States
intended to vote to expand MONUC, citing the following factors:
U. S. political and economic interests threatened by the conflict?s
potential to destabilize Central Africa
U. S. interest in preventing the resurgence of genocide and mass killings
in the region
U. S. cost-$ 160 million for 6 months
Exit strategy- completion of phase II linked to progress in planning for a
comprehensive settlement of the conflict
U. N. Security Council would consider MONUC?s further expansion [phase
III] to help implement a comprehensive settlement
February 15- U. S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations and the
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs testified about the
conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo before the Subcommittee on
Africa, House Committee on International Relations:
International action was necessary to prevent further conflict and the
resurgence of genocide and mass killings in Central Africa.
Although fighting continued in a few areas, the parties had renewed their
commitments to the Lusaka accords and called for immediate deployment of an
expanded U. N. operation.
February 23- Summit meeting in Lusaka endorsed the proposed joint MONUC/
Joint Military Commission structure
February 24
U. N. Security Council adopted resolution 1291 (2000), which expanded MONUC.
The United States voted in favor of this resolution. A statement in the U.
N. Security Council by the U. S. Permanent Representative to the United
Nations explained the U. S. vote:
Although deeply concerned by reported cease- fire violations, the United
States supported expanding the U. N. presence to help implement the Lusaka
accords, partly because these accords were the ?only viable process? for
durable resolution of conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Keys to U. N. success: -- effective integration of MONUC and Joint
Military Commission efforts -- disarmament, demobilization, reintegration,
and resettlement of armed groups -- ending support for forces involved in
genocide
U. S. support for phase II expansion did not constitute prior approval of
a phase III (further expanded) operation. U. S. support for phase III
contingent on the parties achieving specific political and military
objectives: -- full observance of the Lusaka Cease- fire Agreement --
initiation of disengagement and redeployment -- substantial progress on a
national dialogue
Appendix III: Key Events Related to Operations in East Timor, Sierra Leone,
and the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Page 53 GAO- 01- 917 Executive Branch Consultations With Congress
Date Key international and U. S. events U. N. Security Council Resolution
1291 (2000) authorized expanding MONUC up to 5,537 military personnel
(including up to 500 observers) contingent on the following conditions:
the parties observe the cease- fire and relevant U. N. Security Council
resolutions
development of a plan for disengagement and redeployment of forces
the parties provide firm and credible assurances for the security and
movement of U. N. forces Resolution 1291 specified the following elements
for MONUC?s mandate:
monitor the cease- fire and investigate violations
establish and maintain liaison with the parties? military field
headquarters
develop a plan for implementing the cease- fire agreement that provides
for the following: -- collection and verification of information about the
parties? military forces -- maintenance of the cease- fire and disengagement
and redeployment of parties? military forces -- disarmament, demobilization,
resettlement, and reintegration of combatants -- orderly withdrawal of all
foreign forces
work with the parties to obtain the release of all prisoners of war
supervise and verify the disengagement and redeployment of the parties?
forces
monitor compliance with weapons and ammunition restrictions in the cease-
fire agreement
facilitate humanitarian and human rights monitoring
cooperate with, and provide assistance to, the facilitator of the national
(political) dialogue
deploy mine- clearing experts to assess the scope of the land mine
problem, coordinate mine- clearing activities, develop a mine- clearing
plan, and conduct emergency mine- clearing
Resolution 1291 authorized MONUC under Chapter VII of the U. N. Charter to
take all necessary action to protect U. N. and other personnel, facilities,
and equipment; ensure the security and freedom on movement of its personnel;
and protect civilians under imminent threat of violence.
Source: GAO analysis of U. S., U. N., and other records.
Appendix IV: Executive Branch Actions to Address Presidential Decision
Directive 25 Shortfalls
Page 54 GAO- 01- 917 Executive Branch Consultations With Congress
Our analysis of executive branch records showed that, for the eight
decisions we reviewed, executive branch officials worked to reduce risks and
maximize the chances of operational success by taking steps to eliminate, or
reduce the impact of, Presidential Decision Directive 25 shortfalls on the
proposed operations. Before the Deputies Committee or U. N. Security Council
approved the operations, executive branch officials worked to shape the
proposed operations? objectives, mandates, and forces to eliminate
shortfalls or reduce their impact. Where such shortfalls could not be
addressed before operations were approved, executive branch officials
undertook various activities to reduce their operational impact. Table 8
shows some of the actions taken by executive branch officials to address
Directive 25 shortfalls for the eight decisions we reviewed.
Table 8: Executive Branch Actions to Address Directive 25 Shortfalls
Directive 25 factor Shortfalls identified Executive branch actions East
Timor
International support for multilateral action exists? Uncertain or declining
international
support for U. N. action Worked to establish a ?friends group? for East
Timor to build international support and coordinate planning. For
peacekeeping operations- a cease- fire is in place and the warring parties
consent to the deployment of a U. N. force?
Potential or ongoing violence and human rights abuses
Uncertainty regarding parties? consent/ intentions
Worked informally with the parties to obtain consent for U. N. force.
Encouraged the parties to disarm. Encouraged the Indonesian government and
military and East Timorese to halt militia violence.
Assessed Indonesian government and military intentions after the
consultation vote, assuming voters (1) rejected autonomy or (2) accepted
autonomy. Proposed operation has clear objectives? Objectives unclear Worked
with U. N. members and officials to clarify
operation?s objectives, for example, by encouraging a coordinated planning
effort that includes the United Nations, Indonesia, and others. Proposed
operation has adequate means- including appropriate forces, financing, and
mandate?
Forces and/ or financing uncertain Presence of specific forces or
capabilities key to operational success
Proposed mandate unclear Encouraged ?friends group? to solicit capable
troops
and take lead in establishing a voluntary trust fund and soliciting
contributions.
Authorized funds to recruit, prepare, and deploy U. S. civilian police.
Ensured the operation included a human rights officer.
Appendix IV: Executive Branch Actions to Address Presidential Decision
Directive 25 Shortfalls
Appendix IV: Executive Branch Actions to Address Presidential Decision
Directive 25 Shortfalls
Page 55 GAO- 01- 917 Executive Branch Consultations With Congress
Directive 25 factor Shortfalls identified Executive branch actions
Sought changes to proposed mandate, for example, to ensure that civilian
police were tasked to provide a secure and stable atmosphere for voting.
Proposed operation?s duration is tied to clear objectives and realistic exit
criteria?
Objectives and exit strategy unclear. Defined/ Clarified objectives and exit
criteria. Developed a more complete plan with target dates.
Sierra Leone
International support for multilateral action exists? Uncertain or declining
international
support for U. N. action Contacted U. N. members and regional nations to
build/ maintain international support for a U. N. operation. For
peacekeeping operations- a cease- fire is in place and the warring parties
consent to the deployment of a U. N. force?
Uncertainty regarding parties? commitment to peace agreement
Uncertainty regarding parties? consent/ intentions
Potential or ongoing violence and human rights abuses
Monitored willingness of parties to comply with cease- fire and negotiate a
peaceful settlement.
Worked to ensure operation expanded only after parties demonstrate their
commitment to peace by negotiating a settlement.
Encouraged parties to devise and implement concrete confidence- building
measures as a precursor to disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration.
Pressured rebel leadership to remain committed to peace agreement.
Developed options for two scenarios: rebel parties (1) cooperated and comply
with peace process or (2) resorted to violence and civil war resumed.
Encouraged United Nations to document and denounce violence and human rights
violations. Proposed operation has clear objectives? Objectives unclear Work
with U. N. members and officials to shape
operation to clarify objectives. Proposed operation has adequate means-
including appropriate forces, financing, and mandate?
Presence of specific forces or capabilities key to operational success
Current or proposed forces lack needed logistics and operational
capabilities
Operation threatened by quick withdrawal of some forces and U. N. command
and control weaknesses
Proposed mandate unclear or inappropriate
Encouraged regional African peacekeeping force (ECOMOG) to remain engaged:
sought international donor support for ECOMOG
provided financial and logistical support for ECOMOG forces
Sought large role for ECOMOG to allow a more limited U. N. security role.
Sought more capable troop contingents and provide logistical support.
Strengthened U. N. command and control capabilities. Encouraged ECOMOG
members to slow withdrawal of ECOMOG troops until replacements can arrive.
Appendix IV: Executive Branch Actions to Address Presidential Decision
Directive 25 Shortfalls
Page 56 GAO- 01- 917 Executive Branch Consultations With Congress
Directive 25 factor Shortfalls identified Executive branch actions
Worked with U. N. members and officials to avoid a broad enforcement
mandate. Proposed operation?s duration is tied to clear objectives and
realistic exit criteria?
Objectives and exit strategy realistic only in the context of a
comprehensive peace settlement
Strongly encouraged parties to seek a peaceful settlement.
Encouraged U. N. Secretary General?s Special Representative to use good
offices to shape and facilitate settlement.
Worked with U. N. members and officials to avoid open- ended commitment by
developing and setting clear objectives and exit criteria:
form national government of reconciliation
transform rebel groups into political parties
hold free and fair national elections
create accountable, representative, and professional police force and army
establish mechanism to control diamond mining and revenues for legitimate
purposes
improve government administrative capabilities
establish truth and reconciliation committee to investigate human rights
abuses
establish timetable for the withdrawal of foreign forces
Democratic Republic of the Congo
International support for multilateral action exists? Uncertain or declining
international
support for U. N. action Contacted U. N. members to seek/ build support for
phased approach to U. N. operation. Contacted regional nations to seek/
build support for U. N. operation. For peacekeeping operations- a cease-
fire is in place and the warring parties consent to the deployment of a U.
N. force?
Potential or ongoing violence and human rights abuses
Uncertainty regarding parties? commitment to peace agreement
Monitored parties? compliance with cease- fire. Pressured parties to comply
with cease- fire.
Proposed operation has clear objectives? Objectives unclear Worked with U.
N. members and officials to shape
operation to clarify objectives. Proposed operation has adequate means-
including appropriate forces, financing, and mandate?
Uncertain forces and/ or financing Operation threatened by U. N. command and
control weaknesses
Proposed mandate unclear or inappropriate
Developed U. S. funding options. Explored/ Developed options for U. S.
technical support.
Worked with U. N. members and officials to ensure appropriate mandate.
Source: GAO analysis of executive branch records.
Appendix V: Comments From the National Security Council Page 57 GAO- 01- 917
Executive Branch Consultations With Congress
Appendix V: Comments From the National Security Council
Appendix VI: Comments From the Department of State
Page 58 GAO- 01- 917 Executive Branch Consultations With Congress
Appendix VI: Comments From the Department of State
Appendix VI: Comments From the Department of State
Page 59 GAO- 01- 917 Executive Branch Consultations With Congress
Appendix VII: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
Page 60 GAO- 01- 917 Executive Branch Consultations With Congress
Harold J. Johnson, (202) 512- 4128 Tet Miyabara, (202) 512- 8974
In addition to the persons named above, Michael Rohrback, Zina Merritt,
Richard Seldin, Rona Mendelsohn, and Lynn Cothern made key contributions to
this report. Appendix VII: GAO Contacts and Staff
Acknowledgments GAO Contacts Staff Acknowledgments
(711507)
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