Defense Budget: Need to Better Inform Congress on Funding for Army Division Training (05-JUL-01, GAO-01-902)
Congress has expressed concern about the extent to which the
Department of Defense has moved funds that directly affect
military readiness, such as those that finance training, to pay
for other subactivities within its operation and maintenance
(O&M) account, such as real property maintenance and base
operations. This report reviews the (1) Army's obligation of O&M
division training funds and (2) readiness of the Army's
divisions. GAO found that the Army continued to use division
training funds for purposes other than training during fiscal
year 2000. However, the reduced funding did not interfere with
the Army's planned training events or exercises. The Army's tank
units further reported that, despite the reduced funding and
their failure to meet their tank mileage performance goal, their
readiness remained high. Specifically, many tank units reported
that they could be fully trained for their wartime mission within
a short time period. And for those units that reported that they
would need additional time to become fully trained, they
generally cited personnel issues as the reason, rather than the
lack of training funds. Even so, starting in fiscal year 2001,
the Army has taken action to restrict moving training funds by
exempting unit training funds from any Army headquarters'
adjustments and requiring prior approval before Army commands
move any training funds.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-01-902
ACCNO: A01342
TITLE: Defense Budget: Need to Better Inform Congress on Funding
for Army Division Training
DATE: 07/05/2001
SUBJECT: Combat readiness
Military budgets
Military land vehicles
Military training
Reporting requirements
Reprogramming of appropriated funds
Army Battalion Level Training Model
Army Combined Arms Training Strategy
Army Training Resource Model
DOD Global Status of Resources and
Training System
******************************************************************
** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a **
** GAO Testimony. **
** **
** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
** figure captions are reproduced. Tables are included, but **
** may not resemble those in the printed version. **
** **
** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when **
** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed **
** document's contents. **
** **
******************************************************************
GAO-01-902
Report to Congressional Committees
United States General Accounting Office
GAO
July 2001 DEFENSE BUDGET Need to Better Inform Congress on Funding for Army
Division Training
GAO- 01- 902
Page i GAO- 01- 902 Defense Budget Letter 1
Appendix I Scope and Methodology 21
Appendix II Locations of the Army?s Divisions in Its Active Forces 22
Appendix III Comments From the Department of Defense 23
Tables
Table 1: Net Difference Between Conferees Initial Designation and Reported
Obligation for Army Operating Tempo Subactivities, Fiscal Years 1997- 2000 8
Table 2: Net Difference Between Conferees Initial Designation and
Reported Obligation for Divisions, Fiscal Year 2000 10
Figures
Figure 1: The Army?s Building Block Approach to Armor Training 5 Figure 2:
The Army?s Process for Converting Its Training Strategy
Into a Budget Request 6 Figure 3: Funds Moved From the Army?s Division
Training
Subactivity, Fiscal Years 1997- 2000 9 Figure 4: Average Number of Home
Station Tank Miles Budgeted and
Achieved, Fiscal Year 1997- 2000 11 Figure 5: Average Number of Tank Miles
Achieved by Training
Location, Fiscal Years 1997- 2000 16 Abbreviations CATS Combined Arms
Training Strategy DOD Department of Defense O& M Operation and Maintenance
Contents
Page 1 GAO- 01- 902 Defense Budget
July 5, 2001 Congressional Committees Congress has expressed concern about
the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has moved funds that
directly affect military readiness, such as those that finance training, to
pay for other subactivities within its operation and maintenance (O& M)
account such as real property maintenance and base operations. 1 Section 365
of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 directed us
to examine several issues associated with the movement of training funds. We
are responding to the act with a series of reports. We reported last year on
the extent that funds were being moved by all the services, pointing out
that the Army had moved nearly $1.1 billion from its training budget during
fiscal years 1997 through 1999. 2 As agreed with your offices, in this
report we assessed in more detail the extent to which Army tank training
funds had been moved. Specifically, our objectives were to (1) identify
whether the Army was continuing to move training funds planned for its
divisions; (2) assess whether reported readiness remained at high levels for
these divisions, specifically their armor (i. e., tank) battalions; 3 and
(3) assess whether DOD and the Army are providing Congress with complete and
consistent information regarding tank training. Appendix I describes our
scope and methodology.
To have trained and ready forces, Army armor units conduct training at their
home bases, called home station training; at the National Training Center at
Fort Irwin, California, and the Combat Maneuver Training
1 Generally, funding for training, base operations, real property
maintenance, and other ongoing purposes is provided by statute to the Army
in its O& M appropriation. Usually, the actual amounts that are to be used
for various purposes, such as training, are not set out in the statute, but
they are displayed in the appropriation act?s conference report by budget
subactivity. DOD requests funding from Congress by dividing the O& M budget
request for the military services into budget activities, then again into
various activity groups, and then again into subactivity groups.
Congressional conferees indicate by budget subactivity how they expect O& M
funds to be spent. However, the Army has the flexibility to move funds among
these subactivities.
2 Defense Budget: Analysis of Real Property Maintenance and Base Operations
Fund Movements (GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 87, Feb. 29, 2000). 3 Collectively, we refer
to armor battalions to include cavalry squadrons and the 3rd Armored Cavalry
Regiment throughout this report.
United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548
Page 2 GAO- 01- 902 Defense Budget
Center in Germany, which are the Army?s premier locations to conduct
training; and in Kuwait as part of military exercises with the armed forces
of Kuwait. The Army has determined that its armor units need to conduct 800
miles of training annually on their tanks at their home station in order to
be adequately trained to carry out their wartime mission. In addition to
conducting home station training, the Army periodically sends its armor
units to the National Training Center and other training exercises. There
are no tank mile goals associated with this training away from the home
station. The Army tracks and reports the miles its tanks are driven on a
monthly basis and aggregates them annually.
The Army continued to use division training funds for purposes other than
training during fiscal year 2000. Over the 4- year period fiscal years 1997
through 2000, the Army obligated 4 almost $1 billion (about 21 percent) less
than the nearly $4.8 billion that Congress provided for training. Generally,
the Army moved training funds planned for its divisions to finance other
expenses such as base operations and real property maintenance. At the same
time, Army tanks drove an annual average of 591 miles at home stations for
these years- which is much less than the established 800- mile goal.
However, we found no evidence showing that reduced funding caused the Army
to cancel or delay any planned tank training events or exercises. Starting
with fiscal year 2001, the Army has taken action to restrict moving training
funds by exempting unit training funds from any Army headquarters?
adjustments and requiring prior approval before Army commands move any
training funds.
Even though tank training funds have been reduced and the Army has not
driven its tanks enough at home station to meet its 800- mile goal, the
Army?s tank units have reported that they are a trained and ready force.
Army tank units reported high overall mission readiness during fiscal years
1997 through 2000. Similarly, tank units reported high training readiness.
Specifically, most Army tank units reported that they could be fully trained
for their wartime mission within a short period of time. In the few
instances when armor units have reported needing more time to be fully
trained, it was generally for personnel reasons rather than for lack of
funds to support training requirements.
4 Obligations are a commitment of funds when a federal agency awards a
contract, places an order, receives a service, or otherwise commits funds.
Results in Brief
Page 3 GAO- 01- 902 Defense Budget
Both the Army and DOD provide Congress with information on the number of
miles Army tanks are driven annually. However, the information is both
incomplete and inconsistent. The Army conducts training that it does not
always include in its reports on tank mile training. For example, the Army
conducts not only home station training but also training at the National
Training Center and other training locations, which is funded from budget
subactivities other than the division training subactivity. The tank miles
associated with this additional training, which is not part of the Army?s
goal of 800 tank miles from home station training, added an average of about
127 tank miles in addition to its reported average of 591 tank miles from
home station training for the period fiscal years 1997 through 2000. All
this training contributes to the Army?s goal of having a trained and ready
combat force. However, the categories of tank training (such as home station
and National Training Center) that the Army includes in its budget
submission documents vary from year to year because in some years it
includes only home station training and in other years it includes both
training at and away from home station. In addition to the Army?s reporting
on the number of tank miles achieved, DOD has chosen the number of tank
miles as one of its performance measures under the Government Performance
and Results Act. However, in its Results Act reporting, the Department is
representing the 800- tank mile training goal differently than the Army, and
depending on the year, is including different categories of training.
Specifically, the Department?s use of the 800- mile training goal refers to
both home station and National Training Center tank training while the
Army?s 800- mile goal refers only to home station training. As a result, the
Department and the Army are providing Congress with confusing information
about what the 800- tank mile goal represents.
We are making several recommendations to improve the information the
Department provides Congress in its budget submissions and its reporting
under the Results Act. In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD
fully agreed with our two recommendations concerning improving the
information provided to Congress and in part with our recommendation
concerning reexamining its operation and maintenance funding request. DOD
agreed that the Army should reexamine its funding request in all areas of
its operation and maintenance budget submission. However, DOD objected to
the implication that the Army was requesting too much funding for division
training. While we did not conclude that the Army was requesting too much
funding for division training, we believe that the Army?s movement of funds
within its operation and maintenance account suggests a need for
reexamination. A detailed discussion of the
Page 4 GAO- 01- 902 Defense Budget
Department?s comments and our evaluation is contained in the body of this
report.
The Army has 10 active duty divisions, as listed in appendix II. Six of
these divisions are called heavy divisions because they are equipped with
large numbers of tanks, called armor. Two other divisions are called light
divisions because they have no armor. The remaining two divisions are an
airborne division and an air assault division. Heavy divisions accounted for
the majority of the Army?s division training funds, about 70 percent ($ 808
million) in fiscal year 2000, and these divisions are the focus of this
report.
The Army uses a building block approach to train its armor forces- beginning
with individual training and building up to brigade- sized unit training, as
shown in figure 1. This training approach is documented in the Army?s
Combined Arms Training Strategy (CATS). 5 The strategy identifies the
critical tasks, called mission essential tasks, that units need to be
capable of performing in time of war and the type of events or exercises and
the frequency with which the units train to the task to produce a combat
ready force. The strategy, in turn, guides the development of unit training
plans.
5 The Army has developed over a hundred strategies that together comprise
CATS, each oriented toward different types of units. This report addresses
the strategy for armor units. Background
Page 5 GAO- 01- 902 Defense Budget
Figure 1: The Army?s Building Block Approach to Armor Training
Source: Army training manuals.
The Army uses CATS as the basis for determining its training budget. To do
this, it uses models to convert training events into budgetary resources, as
shown in figure 2. For armor units, the Battalion Level Training Model
translates the type of training events identified in CATS and the frequency
with which they should be conducted into the number of tank miles to be
driven in conducting those training events. The Army then uses another
model, the Training Resource Model, to compute the estimated training cost
for units based on the previous 3 years? cost experience. The output from
these models is the basis for the Army?s training budget.
Page 6 GAO- 01- 902 Defense Budget
Figure 2: The Army?s Process for Converting Its Training Strategy Into a
Budget Request
Source: The Army?s Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and
Plans, Training Directorate.
CATS, in combination with the Battalion Level Training Model, has
established that the tanks in armor units will be driven, on average, about
800 miles each year for home station training. 6 This is the level of
training the Army has identified as needed to have a combat ready force, and
its budget request states that it includes funds necessary to support that
training. While the Army uses the 800- tank mile goal as a tool to develop
its divisions? home station budgets, it does not identify the number of tank
miles to be driven in its training guidance and training field manuals as a
training requirement nor does it mention the miles in unit training plans.
To measure the readiness of its units, the Army uses the Global Status of
Resources and Training System. Unit commanders use this readiness system to
report their units? overall readiness level. Under this readiness system,
each reporting unit provides information monthly on the current level of
personnel, equipment on hand, equipment serviceability, and training, and
the commander?s overall assessment of the unit?s readiness to undertake its
wartime mission. Units can be rated on a scale of C- 1 to C- 5. A C- 1 unit
can undertake the full wartime mission for which it is organized and
designed; a C- 2 unit can undertake most of its wartime
6 Generally, the Army considers home station training to be training
conducted where the unit is based and does not include training conducted at
its National Training Center.
Page 7 GAO- 01- 902 Defense Budget
mission; a C- 3 unit can undertake many but not all elements of its wartime
mission; a C- 4 unit requires additional resources or training to undertake
its wartime mission; and a C- 5 unit is not prepared to undertake its
wartime mission. Currently, the training readiness portion of the readiness
report reflects the commander?s assessment of the number of training days
that are needed for the unit to be fully combat ready.
In addition to the Army setting a training goal of 800 miles for tanks
located at unit home stations, in its performance report for fiscal year
1999, DOD began to use 800 tank training miles, including miles driven at
units? home station and the National Training Center, as a performance
benchmark for measuring near- term readiness in responding to the Government
Performance and Results Act. This act is a key component of a statutory
framework that Congress put in place during the 1990s to promote a new focus
on results.
The Army is continuing to move training funds planned for its tank divisions
to other purposes. Budget requests should reflect the funds needed to
conduct an organization?s activities and its spending priorities. The Army?s
budget request for tank division training includes funding needed to conduct
800 miles of unit home station tank training. However, each year since at
least the mid- 1990s, the Army has obligated millions of dollars less than
it budgets to conduct training, and tanks have not trained to the 800- mile
level. For the 4- year period fiscal years 1997 through 2000, the Army
obligated a total of almost $1 billion less than Congress provided for
training all its divisions. At the same time, the Army trained on its tanks
an annual average of 591 miles at home station. Beginning with fiscal year
2001, the Army is taking action to restrict moving tank training funds.
Each fiscal year the Army develops a budget request to fund, among other
activities and programs, the operation of its land forces. The largest
component of the land forces budget is for training the Army?s 10 activeduty
divisions. The Army, through the President?s budget submission, requests
more than $1 billion annually in O& M funds to conduct home station division
training. The majority of this budget request is for the Army?s six heavy
divisions to use for unit training purposes. Over the last 4 years, Congress
has provided the Army with the training funds it has requested. For much of
the past decade, the Army has moved some of The Army Continues
to Use Tank Division Training Funds for Other Purposes
Army Continues to Underexecute Its Proposed Spending Plan
Page 8 GAO- 01- 902 Defense Budget
these funds from its division training to other purposes, such as base
operations and real property maintenance. We previously reported that this
occurred in fiscal years 1993 and 1994 7 and our current work shows that the
Army continues to move training funds to other purposes. Although the Army
has moved funds from all of its land forces subactivities, as shown in table
1, for the 4- year period fiscal years 1997 through 2000, it moved the most
funds from its subactivity planned for division training.
Table 1: Net Difference Between Conferees Initial Designation and Reported
Obligation for Army Operating Tempo Subactivities, Fiscal Years 1997- 2000
Current dollars in millions Army?s O& M subactivities
Conferees initial designation a
Army reported obligation Net
difference Percent obligated
Divisions $4,791.4 $3,804.0 ($ 987.4) 79 Corps combat forces 1,343.8 955.6
(388.2) 71 Corps support forces 1,257.0 1, 140.9 (116.1) 91 Echelon above
corps forces 1,794.7 1, 686.9 (107.8) 94 Land forces operations support 3,
087.8 3, 084.8 (3.0) 100
Total $12,274.7 $10,672.2 ($ 1,602.5) 87
a We use the term ?conferees initial designation? to refer to amounts set
forth in an appropriation act?s conference report. Source: Our analysis
based on appropriations acts? conference reports and DOD?s O& M budget data.
Although the Army has moved the most funds out of its division training
subactivity, the amount moved has decreased over the past 2 years, as shown
in figure 3.
7 Army Training: One- Third of 1993 and 1994 Budgeted Funds Were Used for
Other Purposes (GAO/ NSIAD- 95- 71, Apr. 7, 1995).
Page 9 GAO- 01- 902 Defense Budget
Figure 3: Funds Moved From the Army?s Division Training Subactivity, Fiscal
Years 1997- 2000
Source: Our analysis based on (1) appropriations acts? conference reports
and (2) DOD?s O& M budget data.
Despite the recent decrease in training funds moved from the divisions, the
Army moved almost $190 million in fiscal year 2000. Most of the training
funds moved occurred within the Army?s six heavy divisions. As shown in
table 2, $117.7 million of the $189.7 million in division funds that were
moved in fiscal year 2000 occurred in the heavy divisions. 8
8 Detailed data by type of division first became available for fiscal year
1999. Therefore, we were unable to provide a 4- year summary for fiscal
years 1997 through 2000, as we did in table 1.
Page 10 GAO- 01- 902 Defense Budget
Table 2: Net Difference Between Conferees Initial Designation and Reported
Obligation for Divisions, Fiscal Year 2000
Current dollars in millions Army divisions
Conferees initial designation
Army reported obligation Net
difference Percent moved
Heavy (six divisions) $807.7 $690.0 ($ 117.7) 62 Airborne (one division)
65.6 60.3 (5.3) 3 Air Assault (one division) 156.2 131.2 (25.0) 13 Light
(two divisions) 113.7 97.2 (16.5) 9
Subtotal $1,143.2 $978.7 ($ 164.5) Unallocated adjustments a 25.2 (25.2) 13
Total $1,168.4 $978.7 ($ 189.7) 100
a Fund movement of $25.2 million resulted from what we termed unallocated
adjustments. Some of this fund movement-$ 12.2 million- resulted from either
the appropriation act or the conference report direction. Also, the Army
moved $13 million to align funds for a congressionally approved program into
the proper budget subactivity in order to carry out DOD?s understanding of
what Congress intended. Army budget data show that these adjustments were
made in the division subactivity but before funds were distributed to the
divisions, thus cannot be assigned to any specific division.
Source: Our analysis based on DOD?s O& M budget data.
Although O& M funds cannot generally be traced dollar for dollar to their
ultimate disposition, an analysis of funds obligated compared to the funds
conferees? initially designated 9 shows which subactivities within the
Army?s O& M account had their funding increased or decreased during the
budget year. Generally, the Army obligated funds planned for training its
divisions for other purposes such as base operations, real property
maintenance, and operational readiness (such as maintaining its training
ranges).
Although the Army budgets to achieve 800 tank miles for home station
training, it has consistently achieved less than the 800 training miles for
the last 4 years (see fig. 4). During this period, armor units missed the
800- tank mile goal annually by about an average of 26 percent. Recently,
however, the number of home station tank miles achieved increased, from 568
miles in fiscal year 1999 to 655 miles in fiscal year 2000.
9 We use the term ?conferees initially designated,? ?conferees designation,?
or variations of these terms throughout this report to refer to amounts set
forth at the budget subactivity group level in an appropriation act?s
conference report. The Army Is Not Canceling
Tank Training Due to Lack of Funds
Page 11 GAO- 01- 902 Defense Budget
Figure 4: Average Number of Home Station Tank Miles Budgeted and Achieved,
Fiscal Year 1997- 2000
Source: Our analysis based on data from the Army?s budget submission and
data from its Cost and Economic Analysis Center.
There are some valid reasons for not achieving the 800- tank mile goal at
home station, which are described below. The Army, however, does not adjust
its tank mile goal to reflect these reasons. The Army develops its data on
tank mile achievement from each unit?s tank odometer readings. Some home
station training, however, does not involve driving tanks. Specifically, the
800- tank mile goal for home station training includes a 60 tank mile
increment that some units can conduct through the use of training
simulators. 10 These 60 miles are included in the funding for the 800- tank
miles, but they are not reflected in tank mile reporting because they are
not driven on real tanks.
In addition, deployment to contingency operations, such as the ones in the
Balkans (Bosnia and Kosovo), affects both the available funding and the
amount of training that can be conducted at home station. For example, when
armor units are deployed to the Balkans they are not able to conduct their
normal home station training. During fiscal year 1999, for example,
10 We are referring to the Army?s close combat tactical trainer. These
simulators have been fielded in several locations. The Army?s plans to
complete its fielding of these simulators by the end of fiscal year 2003.
Page 12 GAO- 01- 902 Defense Budget
the 1st Cavalry Division deployed to the Balkans for 11 months.
Consequently, the division did very little home station training, which
affected the Army- wide average home station tank training miles achieved
for that year- specifically, an average of 568 tank training miles. However,
if the Army had excluded the 1st Cavalry Division because it was deployed to
the Balkans for most of that fiscal year, the Army- wide average home
station tank mile training would have increased to 655 miles, nearly 90
miles more. In addition, the Army moved and used the funds associated with
this missed training to offset the cost of Balkan operations. Although the
magnitude of funding shifted to support contingency operations varies
annually, the Army does not adjust its methodology and reporting to reflect
the tank training miles associated with these cost offsets.
Even though the Army is not conducting 800 tank miles of home station
training, its armor units are still able to execute their unit training
events. During our work at five of the Army?s six heavy divisions, we found
no evidence to demonstrate that scheduled training events had been delayed
or canceled in recent years because training funds were moved out of the
division subactivity to other purposes. Training events included those at a
unit?s home station and at the Army?s National Training Center and its
Combat Maneuver Training Center. Unit trainers told us that if scheduled
training had to be canceled or delayed, it likely would be for reasons such
as deployments or bad weather. In addition, when unit trainers establish
their training plans for certain training events, they focus on achieving
the unit?s mission essential tasks and not on how many miles will be driven
on the tanks.
According to the Army, units can execute their training plans despite funds
being moved for several reasons. The major reasons were
because most of the movement in funds occurs before the divisions receive
the funds, division trainers, using past experience, anticipate the amount
of training funds they will likely receive from higher commands and adjust
their training plans accordingly and
the intensity of the training event can be modified to fit within
available funding by taking steps such as driving fewer miles and
transporting- rather than driving- tanks to training ranges.
In fiscal year 2001, the Army implemented an initiative to protect training
funds from being moved that should result in the Army?s using these training
dollars for the purposes originally planned. Senior Army leadership directed
that for fiscal year 2001, Army land forces would be exempt from any budget
adjustments within the discretion of Army The Army Is Taking Action
to Restrict Moving Funds Out of Training Subactivities
Page 13 GAO- 01- 902 Defense Budget
headquarters. The senior leadership also required that Army commands obtain
prior approval from Army headquarters before reducing training funds.
However, subactivities within the Army?s O& M account that have received
these funds in the past- such as real property maintenance, base operations,
and operational readiness- may be affected by less funding unless the Army
requests more funds for these subactivities in the future. At the time of
our work, this initiative had been in effect for only a few months; thus, we
believe it is too early to assess its success in restricting the movement of
training funds.
Army readiness assessments reported in the Global Status of Resources and
Training System show that for the last 4 fiscal years, armor units have
consistently reported high levels of readiness, despite reduced training
funding and not achieving its tank mile goals. This readiness assessment
system does not require considering tank miles driven as an explicit factor
when a unit commander determines the unit?s training or overall readiness
posture. In fact, the number of tank miles driven is not mentioned in
readiness reporting regulations.
We analyzed monthly Global Status of Resources and Training System data to
see how often active- duty Army armor units were reporting readiness at high
levels and lower levels. Our analysis showed that most armor units reported
high overall readiness for fiscal years 1997 through 2000.
In our analysis of monthly readiness reports for fiscal years 1997 through
2000, we found that when armor units reported lower overall readiness the
reason was usually personnel readiness. In reviewing comments of commanders
who reported degraded readiness for the same period, we found that
insufficient funding was rarely cited as a cause of degraded readiness. Only
a handful of unit reports filed in the 4- year period covering fiscal years
1997 through 2000, identified instances in which a shortage of funds was
cited as a factor in reporting lower readiness levels. During the same
period, when commanders cited training as the reason for reporting lower
overall readiness, they never cited insufficient funding as a cause.
Not only do unit commanders report on their overall readiness levels, but
they also are required to report on the four subareas that comprise overall
readiness. These subareas are current readiness levels of personnel,
equipment on hand, equipment serviceability, and training. For the training
Armor Units Report
High Levels of Readiness Despite Reduced Training Funds
Page 14 GAO- 01- 902 Defense Budget
readiness component, a unit?s training status rating is based upon a
commander?s estimate of the number of training days required for the unit to
become proficient in its wartime mission. 11 Our analysis of these readiness
reports showed that most armor units reported that their training status was
high throughout fiscal years 1997 through 2000.
There seems to be no direct relationship between average tank miles achieved
and reported training readiness. There were times when tank miles achieved
(1) increased while the proportion of time units reporting high readiness
levels declined and (2) declined while the proportion of units reporting
high readiness levels increased. For example, tank miles achieved rose more
than 25 percent between the second and third quarter of fiscal year 2000
while the proportion of time units were reporting high readiness levels
declined. Conversely, tank miles achieved fell by more than 20 percent
between the third and fourth quarter of fiscal year 1999 while the
proportion of time units were reporting high readiness levels increased.
Both the Army and DOD provide Congress with information on tank miles
achieved, but reporting is incomplete and inconsistent. The Army reports
tank miles achieved to Congress as part of DOD?s annual budget
documentation. DOD reports tank miles achieved as part of its reporting
under the Government Performance and Results Act. Army units train on their
tanks at their home stations, at major training centers, and in Kuwait in
concert with Kuwait?s military forces. All armor training contributes to the
Army?s goal of having a trained and ready combat force. However, we found
that the categories of tank training the Army includes in its annual budget
documentation vary from year to year and the categories of training the Army
includes in its budget documents and DOD includes in its Results Act
reporting vary.
11 Commanders can assign a training status rating ranging from T- 1, meaning
most ready, to T- 4, meaning least ready. Specifically, a T- 1 rating
assessment means the unit requires 0 to 14 days to train to proficiency in
its wartime mission; a T- 2 unit requires 15 to 28 days; a T- 3 unit
requires 29 to 42 days; and a T- 4 unit requires 43 or more days to train to
proficiency in its wartime mission. A T- 5 rating assessment means that a
unit?s training proficiency cannot be determined due to special
circumstances, such as an inactivation. DOD and the Army
Are Not Presenting Congress a Clear Picture of All Tank Training Conducted
Page 15 GAO- 01- 902 Defense Budget
In addition to home station training, Army units conduct training away from
home station. This additional training is paid from different budget
subactivities within the Army?s O& M account and thus is not included in the
Army?s budget request for funds to conduct 800 miles of home station
training. One such subactivity funds training at the National Training
Center. Armor units based in the United States train at the National
Training Center on average once every 18 months. Based on congressional
guidance, the Army includes funds for this training in a separate budget
subactivity. This subactivity, in essence, pays for tank training miles in
addition to the 800 miles for home station training that is funded in the
divisions? training subactivity. During the period fiscal years 1997 through
2000, the National Training Center training added an annual average of 87
miles to overall Army tank training in addition to the average of 591 miles
of home station training. Because, through fiscal year 2000, these miles
have been conducted on prepositioned equipment rather than on a unit?s own
tanks, they appropriately have not been included in home station training
activity. Beginning in fiscal year 2001, the Army plans to have an as yet
undetermined number of units transport their own tanks for use at the
National Training Center. As this occurs, these units will report National
Training Center tank miles achieved as part of their home station training.
The Army is examining how to adjust division and the National Training
Center budget subactivities to reflect this shift.
Similarly, some armor units conduct training in Kuwait in conjunction with
Kuwait?s military forces in a training exercise called Desert Spring
(formerly called Intrinsic Action). Kuwait pays part of the cost of this
training and the balance is paid from funds appropriated for contingency
operations. The tanks used for this training are prepositioned in Kuwait.
Over the last 4 fiscal years, this training added an annual average of about
40 miles to overall Army tank training and was also appropriately not
included in the home station training activity. However, this training also
contributed to the Army?s goal of having a trained and ready combat force.
As shown in figure 5, when the miles associated with additional training are
included, for the period fiscal years 1997 through 2000, an average of about
127 miles were added to the annual overall tank- miles achieved. Army
Conducts Additional
Training That It Does Not Always Include in Reports on Tank Miles Achieved
Page 16 GAO- 01- 902 Defense Budget
Figure 5: Average Number of Tank Miles Achieved by Training Location, Fiscal
Years 1997- 2000
Source: Our analysis based on data from the Army?s Cost and Economic
Analysis Center.
The Army has not been consistent about reporting these miles. We found that
in some years the Army included these miles in its reporting on tank miles
achieved and in some years it did not. For example, for fiscal year 1999,
the latest year for which such data were available, the Army reported only
home station tank miles in its budget submission, while for fiscal year 1998
it reported both home station and National Training Center miles. Further,
the Army did not include tank miles driven in Kuwait in either year.
In fiscal year 1999, DOD began to report on the Army?s achievement of 800
tank miles of training as one of its performance goals under the Government
Performance and Results Act. The Results Act seeks to strengthen federal
decision- making and accountability by focusing on the results of federal
activities and spending. A key expectation is that Congress will gain a
clearer understanding of what is being achieved in relation to what is being
spent. To accomplish this, the act requires that agencies prepare annual
performance plans containing annual performance goals covering the program
activities in agencies? budget requests. The act aims for a closer and
clearer link between the process of allocating resources and the expected
results to be achieved with those resources. Agency plans that meet these
expectations can provide DOD Presents an Unclear
Picture to Congress in Its Results Act Reporting
Page 17 GAO- 01- 902 Defense Budget
Congress with useful information on the performance consequences of budget
decisions.
In its Results Act reporting, DOD is using a different training goal than
the Army and, depending on the year, is including different categories of
training. In response to the Results Act, DOD stated in its fiscal year 1999
performance plan that it planned to use 800 tank miles of training as one of
its performance goals for measuring short- term readiness. In DOD?s
performance report for 1999, DOD reported, among other performance measures,
how well it achieved its training mile goal for tanks. In its reporting on
progress toward the goal, DOD included mileage associated with training at
the National Training Center in its tank mile reporting. As discussed
previously, for the Army, the 800- tank mile goal relates exclusively to
home station training, and tank miles achieved at the National Training
Center are funded through a separate subactivity within the Army?s O& M
account and tank miles achieved in Kuwait are paid for in part by Kuwait and
in part by funds appropriated for contingency operations. In addition,
because the Army has varied the categories of training (home station and
National Training Center) it includes in its budget submission reporting,
depending on the year, the Army and DOD are sometimes using different bases
for their tank mile achievement reporting. As a result, Congress is being
provided confusing information about what the 800- tank mile goal
represents.
Because the Army has consistently (1) not obligated all its O& M unit
training funds for the purposes it told Congress that it needed them; (2)
continues to conduct its required training events; and (3) reports that its
heavy divisions remain trained and in a high state of readiness, questions
are raised as to the Army?s proposed use of funds within its O& M account.
In addition, the different ways in which the Army and DOD report tank mile
training, results in Congress receiving conflicting information. By not
providing Congress with clear and consistent information on Army tank
training, the usefulness of the information is diminished.
To better reflect Army funding needs and more fully portray all its tank
training, we recommend that the Secretary of the Army
reexamine the Army?s proposed use of funds in its annual O& M budget
submission, particularly with regard to the funds identified for division
Conclusions
Recommendations to an Executive Agency
Page 18 GAO- 01- 902 Defense Budget
training and for other activities such as base operations and real property
maintenance and
improve the information contained in the Army?s budget documentation by
identifying more clearly the elements discussed in this report, such as (1)
all funds associated with tank mile training; (2) the type of training
conducted (home station, simulator, and National Training Center); (3) the
training that could not be undertaken due to Balkan and any future
deployments; (4) the budget subactivities within its O& M account that fund
the training; and (5) the training conducted in and paid for in part by
Kuwait.
To provide Congress with a clearer understanding of tank training, we also
recommend that the Secretary of Defense, in concert with the Secretary of
the Army, develop consistent tank training performance goals and tank mile
reporting for use in Army budget submissions and under the Results Act.
DOD provided written comments on a draft of this report, which are reprinted
in appendix III. DOD fully agreed with our two recommendations concerning
improving the information provided to Congress and in part with our
recommendation concerning reexamining its O& M funding request. DOD agreed
that the Army should reexamine its funding request in all areas of its O& M
budget submission. However, DOD objected to the implication that the Army
was requesting too much funding for division training and noted that since
we had not assessed the level of division training necessary to meet
approved Army standards, any conclusion as to the adequacy of training funds
is inappropriate. We did not directly examine whether the Army was training
to its approved standards. We did examine whether the Army had delayed or
canceled training due to the movement of funds. We found no evidence to
demonstrate that scheduled training events had been delayed or canceled in
recent years because training funds were moved. We also found that Army unit
trainers plan their training events to focus on their mission essential
tasks. These tasks form the basis of the Army?s training strategy. While we
believe that our findings, including the Army?s movement of almost $1
billion- about 21 percent- of its division training funds to other O& M
budget subactivities over the 4- year period fiscal years 1997 through 2000
suggest a need to reexamine the Army?s proposed use of funds within that
subactivity, we did not conclude that the Army was requesting too much
funding in some areas and not enough in others. As noted above, DOD concurs
that the Army should make such a reexamination. We have, Agency Comments
and Our Evaluation
Page 19 GAO- 01- 902 Defense Budget
however, clarified our recommendation to focus on the need to reexamine the
Army?s planned use of funds.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the Under
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller and Chief Financial Officer); the
Secretary of the Army; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We
will make copies available to others on request.
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report please call
me on (757) 552- 8100. This report was prepared under the direction of Steve
Sternlieb, Assistant Director. Major contributors to this report were Howard
Deshong, Brenda Farrell, Madelon Savaides, Frank Smith, Leo Sullivan, and
Laura Talbott.
Neal P. Curtin, Director Defense Capabilities and Management
Page 20 GAO- 01- 902 Defense Budget
List of Congressional Committees
The Honorable Carl Levin Chairman The Honorable John W. Warner Ranking
Minority Member Committee on Armed Services United States Senate
The Honorable Bob Stump Chairman The Honorable Ike Skelton Ranking Minority
Member Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Page 21 GAO- 01- 902 Defense Budget
To identify whether the Army is continuing to move training funds planned
for its divisions, we examined Army budget submissions, the Secretary of
Defense?s high priority readiness reports to Congress, appropriations acts
for the Department of Defense (DOD), and the conference reports on those
acts. We focused our analysis on fiscal years 1997 through 2000. We began
with fiscal year 1997 because the Army had revised its operation and
maintenance (O& M) budget structure for operating forces beginning in that
year. We extracted data from these documents to compare the amounts
congressional conferees initially designated for the Army?s operation of its
land forces, including its divisions, to those the Army reported as
obligated. We also obtained Army data on tank miles achieved for the Army
overall and by armor battalion. To understand how the Army trains its armor
forces to be combat ready as well as to ascertain how Army units adjust to
reduced funding and if the Army had canceled or delayed any scheduled
training due to the movement of training funds, we obtained briefings,
reviewed training documents, and interviewed Army personnel at a variety of
locations, including Army headquarters, the Army?s Forces Command and U. S.
Army Europe, five of the six heavy divisions both within the United States
and Europe, and the Army?s school for armor doctrine and training. We also
analyzed tank mile data from the Army?s Cost and Economic Analysis Center.
To assess the reported readiness of Army tank units, we examined monthly
readiness reporting data from DOD?s Global Status of Resources and Training
System for fiscal years 1997 through 2000. We examined both the reported
overall readiness and the training component of the readiness reports. We
reviewed this system?s readiness status ratings to determine (1) what level
of readiness units were reporting, (2) whether unit readiness had declined,
(3) whether training readiness was determined to be the primary cause for
any decline in readiness, and (4) whether unit commanders had attributed
training funding shortfalls as the cause for any decline in readiness
levels.
To assess whether DOD and the Army are providing Congress with complete and
consistent information regarding armor training, we compared Army budget
submissions with Army tank training data and DOD?s report on its performance
required by the Government Performance and Results Act. We also discussed
overall training versus home station training and the differences between
Army and Results Act reports with Army officials.
Our review was conducted from March 2000 through January 2001 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. Appendix I: Scope and
Methodology
Appendix II: Locations of the Army?s Divisions in Its Active Forces
Page 22 GAO- 01- 902 Defense Budget
Appendix II: Locations of the Army?s Divisions in Its Active Forces
Appendix III: Comments From the Department of Defense
Page 23 GAO- 01- 902 Defense Budget
Appendix III: Comments From the Department of Defense
Appendix III: Comments From the Department of Defense
Page 24 GAO- 01- 902 Defense Budget
Now on p. 18. Now on p. 17.
Appendix III: Comments From the Department of Defense
Page 25 GAO- 01- 902 Defense Budget
Now on p. 18.
(350093)
The first copy of each GAO report is free. Additional copies of reports are
$2 each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent of
Documents. VISA and MasterCard credit cards are also accepted.
Orders for 100 or more copies to be mailed to a single address are
discounted 25 percent.
Orders by mail:
U. S. General Accounting Office P. O. Box 37050 Washington, DC 20013
Orders by visiting:
Room 1100 700 4 th St., NW (corner of 4 th and G Sts. NW) Washington, DC
20013
Orders by phone:
(202) 512- 6000 fax: (202) 512- 6061 TDD (202) 512- 2537
Each day, GAO issues a list of newly available reports and testimony. To
receive facsimile copies of the daily list or any list from the past 30
days, please call (202) 512- 6000 using a touchtone phone. A recorded menu
will provide information on how to obtain these lists.
Orders by Internet
For information on how to access GAO reports on the Internet, send an e-
mail message with ?info? in the body to:
Info@ www. gao. gov or visit GAO?s World Wide Web home page at: http:// www.
gao. gov
Contact one:
Web site: http:// www. gao. gov/ fraudnet/ fraudnet. htm
E- mail: fraudnet@ gao. gov
1- 800- 424- 5454 (automated answering system) Ordering Information
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
*** End of document. ***
|
NEWSLETTER
|
|
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list
|
|
|
